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Executive Summary

An almost decade-long conflict has severely impacted Yemen's judiciary, weakening its already fragile infrastructure and further undermining its competence and credibility. Additionally, the judiciary has faced political polarization, diminishing trust in its neutrality and casting doubt on its ability to handle politically sensitive cases associated with transitional justice post-conflict. Notwithstanding the challenges, efforts must be exerted for the judiciary to assume a foundational role in post-conflict Yemen and serve as a channel for restoring the rule of law and reinstating public trust in state institutions. Following a comprehensive review of the transitional justice landscape in Yemen, including an examination of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, Yemen’s 2015 draft constitution, the draft transitional justice laws from 2012 and 2014, as well as an analysis of the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law resulting from the war, this policy brief identifies the obstacles and opportunities facing Yemen’s judiciary. It also explores alternative judicial mechanisms such as traditional customary laws, drawing lessons from the case of Rwanda’s gacaca courts. To conclude, it offers a set of recommendations on how to bolster and enhance the role of the judiciary in advancing transitional justice.

Introduction

The United Nations defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.^[1] It includes a range of processes, including formal and informal judicial procedures, reconciliation, reparations, institutional reform, and other measures. Transitional justice, however, varies from one context to another.

Nearly a decade has passed since transitional justice was first discussed in Yemen, gaining prominence during the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) held in 2013-14 following the uprising that led to the ouster of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yemen’s 2015 draft constitution^[2] was formulated based on the outcomes of the NDC, which stipulated the establishment of a transitional justice and national reconciliation commission. In parallel, the Ministry of Legal Affairs drafted the first version of the law on transitional justice and national reconciliation in 2012 and a second in 2014. Such commendable efforts, however, were superseded by the Houthis’ takeover in 2014 and the outbreak of war in 2015.

Since then, Yemen has witnessed an unprecedented rise in violations amid deep political fragmentation and polarization, including within the country’s judicial system. Unlike traditional forms of justice mechanisms, which are overseen by judicial institutions, transitional justice deals with distinct grievances that arise in exceptional circumstances, and which often implicates state actors, operating on a scale that the judiciary is not fully equipped to handle. In fragile states like Yemen, guaranteeing the fairness and effectiveness of the legal system is especially difficult, given the vast legacy of violations and grievances that need to be dealt with post-conflict, further complicated by the presence of a fragile peace process. Over the course of the war, judicial institutions have also suffered severe material damage, in addition to the burden of a huge backlog of cases arising from the conflict.^[3]

In light of these challenges, this paper contends that the judiciary must play a critical and fundamental role in post-conflict Yemen and serve as a conduit for the restoration of the rule of law and rebuilding people's trust in state institutions. To shine a light on its significance, this paper provides a comprehensive overview of the transitional justice landscape in Yemen, before moving on to an examination of how the judiciary can play a central role in achieving transitional justice in Yemen, drawing on examples from other countries with similar experience.

1.1. Methodology

This paper adopts an analytical approach, involving a review and analysis of primary sources, including the NDC outcomes,^[4] the draft constitution,^[5] and the draft transitional justice law. Additionally, secondary sources addressing the state of the conflict in Yemen and its impact on justice and human rights are considered, including relevant UN literature and human rights reports.

A comparative approach is employed to explore other countries’ relevant experiences in transitional justice. Rwanda in particular, despite the grave atrocities witnessed during its conflict, has a legacy of successful transitional justice practices that serve as valuable lessons. Research was also informed by the perspectives of some of Yemen’s most prominent figures working in the field of justice, including Nour El Bejjani Noureddine, Head of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) Yemen Programs; Eshraq al-Maqtari, Spokesperson and Investigative Judge at Yemen’s National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights (NCIAVHR); Judge Yahya Almawari, Supreme Court Judge; Mohamed Naji Alaw, Lawyer; Ahmed Arman, Minister of Legal and Human Rights Affairs; and Dr. Olfat Aldobui, Member of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission.

Using a multifaceted approach, the paper aims to shed light on the complex interplay between the judiciary and transitional justice, highlighting both the challenges and opportunities in navigating this delicate process.

Transitional Justice in the National Dialogue Conference

When the NDC was established under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), one of its goals was to take “steps aimed at achieving national reconciliation and transitional justice, and measures to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law do not occur in future.”^[6] Transitional justice emerged as a central theme in the NDC’s discussions, which were organized around nine thematic working groups. In addition to the working group dedicated to the National Dimension, National Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, two other groups worked on specific grievances: the Southern Issue and the Sa’ada Issue. The remaining working groups focused on state and institutional reforms, participation in governance, the rule of law, rights, and freedoms – all essential pillars of transitional justice.^[7]

Of all the outcomes of the NDC addressing transitional justice, the one focusing on recognition and redress was the most directly associated with it. It included restructuring of the state in a decentralized manner and granting broader authorities to the regions,^[8] as well as acknowledging the Southern Issue,^[9] the development needs of Sa’ada^[10] in the far north of Yemen, and recognizing the languages of Al-Mahra and Socotra.^[11] Critically, it also included the investigation of forced disappearances during Yemen’s previous conflicts,^[12] the acknowledgment of the victims of these conflicts, and memorializing them in the national memory.^[13] Compensation and remediation was another transitional justice-related outcome, which meant reinstating and compensating southern civil servant workers who lost their jobs after the 1994 civil war,^[14] compensating those who suffered mistreatment during the Sa’ada Wars,^[15] addressing injustices against the Tihama population,^[16] and acknowledging victims of terrorist and counter-terrorism operations.^[17]

Also directly related to transitional justice was the outcome on rehabilitation of affected individuals, which entailed reforming the public sector,^[18] service cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives,^[19] developing road infrastructure, as well as rebuilding institutions and factories in the south damaged following the 1994 civil war and in other conflict-affected regions, including Sa’ada, Abyan and Hajjah.^[20] Institutional reform of state agencies, especially those involved in human rights violations, was another outcome.^[21] The one on national reconciliation, highlighted as a fundamental principle of transitional justice, emphasized the proposed transitional justice commission’s role in establishing the foundations for national reconciliation and promoting a culture of tolerance and coexistence.^[22]

The outcome on accountability called for the prosecution of those involved in the killing of peaceful protesters in 2011, including members of security and military institutions; exposing those responsible for approving projects that harmed the environment and people in the coastal areas of Aden, Mukalla, and Hudaydah; and other acts of corruption related to state resources.^[23] Outcomes to do with community participation promised to look at the make-up of the armed forces, security, and intelligence services so that there is 50 percent representation from the north and 50 percent from the south in senior army, security, and intelligence leadership, and that women make up 30 percent of employees in all state institutions, and empowering other disenfranchised groups.^[24]

2.1. The Draft Constitution of 2015

The drafters of the 2015 constitution took into account the outcomes of the NDC, incorporating some of them in distinct legal articles that addressed the state’s structure, governance system, rights, and freedoms. For instance, Chapter Four, Article 273, Section Three, dealt with the specificity of both Sana’a and Aden cities, noting that “the city of Aden has a special economic and administrative status within the governorate of Aden. It shall enjoy autonomous legislative and executive authorities.”^[25] It also established the Sa’ada Reconstruction Fund to compensate those affected by the wars in the governorate. Article 424 stipulated that “the South (Aden and Hadramawt) shall be equally represented in the first electoral cycle in federal legislative power and in all leadership structures in legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, including the army and security,”^[26] while Article 76 stated that women’s representation should be no less than 30 percent in various authorities.^[27]

Chapter 10, the last of the draft constitution, entitled “Transitional Provisions,” dealt with Yemen’s transitional phase more generally, including transitional justice. It laid out how the state would commit to taking measures to achieve transitional justice and national reconciliation, including uncovering the truth about human rights violations, holding individuals and entities responsible for violations accountable, restoring dignity and providing reparations, reforming institutions that engaged in violations, and ensuring the non-recurrence of these violations.^[28]

Importantly, it stipulated the issuance of the transitional justice and national reconciliation law, the establishment of a transitional justice commission, addressing the grievances of the youth revolution and the Southern Movement, caring for their families and the families of martyrs, commemorating their memory, and establishing a compensation fund. While the draft constitution did not delve extensively into the provisions of transitional justice, it granted the necessary constitutional framework. It considered the 20 points of principles outlined by the NDC Technical Committee,^[29] including the 11th dealing with the Southern Issue,^[30] as integral references to consider when drafting the transitional justice law.^[31] The Technical Committee recommended accelerating the issuance of the transitional justice law in consensus between the components of the political process and relevant civil society organizations, in line with international human rights conventions and international standards for transitional justice.^[32]

2.2. Immunity and the Draft Transitional Justice Law

A transitional justice law^[33] was drafted by the Ministry of Legal Affairs prior to the conclusion of the NDC and the constitution drafting. The urgency stemmed from mounting local and international pressure following the enactment of the immunity law in January 2012, which granted former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his senior officials immunity from legal and judicial prosecution for violations committed during their rule,^[34] sparking criticism from several human rights organizations.^[35] At the NDC, the Minister of Legal Affairs, Mohammed al-Mikhlafi, claimed that one of the reasons for issuing the law before the conference concluded was to foster a positive atmosphere for the victims and those affected by political conflicts.^[36]

Still, Prime Minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa praised the transitional justice draft law for its comprehensiveness and its aim of alleviating the effects of the immunity law by affirming the right to truth and reparations.^[37] But the law stirred widespread controversy across all political, legal, and human rights bodies. It upset supporters of President Saleh in the General People's Congress (GPC), while also failing to meet the expectations of many civil society activists, human rights organizations, and victims' families.^[38] Many criticized its lack of adherence to international standards for transitional justice.^[39] A memorandum presented by the Peace and Justice Initiative^[40] to the Minister of Legal Affairs Al-Mikhlafi and the Minister of Human Rights Hooria Mashoor emphasized the need to consider accountability in an amended version of the law, stating that compensation alone cannot replace the criminal aspect of serious violations.^[41]

3. War Violations and Ongoing Transitional Justice Efforts

3.1. Decade-Long Violations

In the past decade, Yemen has witnessed unprecedented violations, both in terms of nature and scale. These include the use of illegitimate methods of war such as indiscriminate aerial bombardment, siege, shelling of civilian neighborhoods, bombings of homes, use of snipers, landmine planting, recruitment of children, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, torture, extrajudicial killing, and the targeting of ethnic and religious minorities and migrants, among other violations.^[42] Some of these actions are specified in Yemen’s penal code and are also considered crimes in international human rights law and UN humanitarian treaties. These violations have not been limited to military conflict zones but have also occurred in areas far from the battleground.^[43] All parties involved in the Yemeni conflict, whether domestic parties such as the Houthis and government forces, or those perpetrated by the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been implicated in serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law, some of which have been systematic.^[44]

Alarmed by the worsening human rights situation in Yemen, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights established the Group of Eminent Experts in 2017 to investigate and report on human rights and international humanitarian law violations. In their fourth and final report released in 2020, the team summarized the violations taking place in Yemen, accusing all direct parties to the conflict, including arms-exporting countries, of committing serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including what could be considered war crimes. The report noted that violations investigated during their mandate including airstrikes, shelling, enforced disappearances, torture leading to death, sexual violations, and child recruitment, were just a fraction of the violations perpetrated against civilians by warring parties, specifying the Houthis, the internationally recognized government, the Southern Transitional Council, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.^[45]

Yemen’s conflict has resulted in nearly 3 million displaced individuals living in challenging conditions.^[46] The majority of the population lives below the poverty line, facing significant obstacles in moving between cities and traveling abroad.^[47] The residents of Taiz continue to suffer from a siege imposed on their city, a blockade that has caused deaths from associated road accidents or lack of medical treatment.^[48] The psychological, health, and social damage directly resulting from the economic situation, non-payment of public sector salaries, and loss of business in Yemen since the war is incalculable. A postwar settlement will need to produce a comprehensive plan of reconstruction to remedy this.

A look into these violations further reveals varying degrees of severity, including broader violations that affect large segments of the population — such as the targeting of schools, hospitals, and government institutions, as well as road closures – and ones specifically targeting individuals — sniping, torture, arrest, and seizure of personal property, as well as administrative abuses and denial of financial entitlements, such as salaries for public service employees. Comprehensively categorizing these violations will prove key in determining the appropriate mechanisms for post-war transitional justice, such as those focusing specifically on questions of accountability, reparations, or institutional reform.

3.2. Current Transitional Justice Efforts

3.2.1 Government-led efforts

In conjunction with the NDC, in 2013, some official committees were formed to tackle specific grievances, including the ‘Committee for Considering and Addressing Land Issues in the Southern Governorate and the ‘Commission to Address Issues of Employees Forced Out of Their Jobs in the Civil, Security, and Military Fields.’^[49] Both were tasked with addressing southern grievances.^[50] In May 2023, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi issued a decree to settle the status of 52,766 dismissed civilian, security, and military employees in the southern provinces, still pending since the 1994 civil war.^[51] This decision was seen as a gesture of goodwill towards the STC, which had become a partner within the PLC. ^[52]

Other committees established in 2013 include: ‘The Fund for Families of the Martyrs and Wounded of the February 11 Revolution and its Peaceful Movement,’^[53] and the ‘Reparation Fund for Victims of Human Rights Violations, Conditions of the Wounded and Martyrs of the 1994 War and Sa’ada Wars, and Care for their Families.’^[54] Most of these committees were halted with the onset of the war in 2015, except the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations to Human Rights (NCIAVHR), which was established in 2012 by a presidential decree and is still operating from Aden.^[55] Immediately after the PLC was formed in 2022, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission (CRC) was also set up, though internal conflicts within the PLC have prevented it from working effectively.^[56] In April, 2024, the CRC formed five permanent committees, one of which focused on transitional justice. ^[57]

3.2.2 Civil Society and International Organizations’ Initiatives

Local civil initiatives have also been established to resolve specific conflicts and support the families of victims; some of these engage in reconciliation and mediation within the framework of transitional justice. The Abductees’ Mothers Association, for instance, is one of the most active initiatives that successfully mediated the release of kidnapped individuals. The association has strongly advocated the need of holding the perpetrators of kidnapping and torture accountable and compensating the affected individuals. Tribal mediators have also played a significant role in releasing detainees.^[58] Another example is the Community Mediation Committees in Aden, which form part of the Promoting Inclusive Access to Justice in Yemen (PIAJ) project supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These committees primarily handle more minor cases, such as individuals detained in police stations and resolving individual disputes. The initiative serves as a pilot bottom-up approach, with the potential for expansion to various other governorates.^[59] Individual initiatives, like those led by Hadi Jumaan, who collects bodies of the deceased and returns them to their families, are also noteworthy.^[60]

International organizations, including the UN’s Group of Eminent Experts (whose mandate was suspended in 2021), the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and International IDEA, have contributed to enhance the awareness of transitional justice and provided training on transitional justice to several Yemeni local organizations, judiciary members, and party leaders. Local human rights organizations like Mwatana, Sam and others, are also involved by monitoring and documenting violations to ensure victims’ right to reparations and truth disclosure.

Another noteworthy local initiative is the Reconciliation and Social Peace Committee in Taiz, comprising political leaders dedicated to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Formed to address the armed confrontations in the Al-Hujariah region between 2019 and 2020, which resulted in casualties among both military and civilian populations, the committee successfully facilitated reconciliation among the parties involved. It also provided compensation to 22 casualties as a form of redress to achieve political reconciliation. In March 2023, it released a report on the homes and public and private facilities in Taiz city that were attacked, destroyed, or seized by armed elements during the war. It also works on cases of individuals forcibly disappeared, victims of armed conflicts, and other issues that intersect with the principles of justice.^[61]

At the time of writing, the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies was leading a consultation initiative that involves human rights activists and legal experts with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the intricacies of transitional justice and determining the most effective approach within the Yemeni context. At its first and second Yemen International Forums, which brought together more than 200 Yemeni stakeholders to engage in dialogue, the Sana’a Center placed central emphasis on transitional justice. One of its flagship initiatives has been the support of the Yemen Declaration for Justice and Reconciliation,^[62] marking an initial step towards integrating transitional justice into the broader peace process.

4. The Impact of War on Yemen’s Judiciary

The judiciary is poised to play a critical role in Yemen’s transitional justice process, but it is weak and crippled with inefficiencies that predate the current crisis. As with most of Yemen’s state institutions, the outbreak of conflict has led to a near complete paralysis of its functioning, especially in the early years of the war,^[63] impacting both its physical infrastructure and its personnel. Over the course of the war, several court houses were either destroyed, neglected, or unable to pay building rents,^[64] while judicial personnel, including judges, were subject to threats and assassinations, and some even forced to flee or migrate. Worst of all, was the fragmentation of the judiciary and its exposure to political polarization, undermining its authority and the rule of law.^[65]

4.1. The Split of the Judiciary and Political Polarization

Yemen now has two separate judicial systems, each working independently. One is aligned with the internationally recognized government, and the other operates under the de facto authority of the Houthi group (Ansar Allah). Neither system recognizes the other.^[66]

In areas under the internationally recognized government, the judiciary has fallen victim to the numerous power struggles occurring between the different parties. In one particular incident, prior to the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022, the judiciary became polarized between the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the government, led at the time by President Abdo Rabbuh Mansour Hadi. Tensions peaked in February, 2021, when the Southern Judges Club, an association of judiciary members from southern governorates affiliated with the STC, declared a general strike in response to President Hadi’s unilateral appointment of Attorney General Ahmed al-Musa. The STC and other factions opposed to the appointment argued that the decision did not comply with judicial law.^[67] In response, the STC shut down courts in Aden and coastal Hadramawt. Subsequently, the head of the government-aligned Supreme Court issued an order to investigate both the head and executive members of the Southern Judges Club.^[68] The establishment of the PLC helped calm down these tensions with PLC President, Rashad al-Alimi, appointing a new Attorney General, Qaher Mustafa,^[69] and Judge Sabah al-Alwani, President of the Southern Judges Club, to the Supreme Judicial Council,^[70] along with several other judges to the Supreme Court. These appointments effectively halted the strikes initiated by the Southern Judges Club.^[71] By no means, however, has this ensured the judiciary’s harmonious, effective or independent functioning.

In areas under the control of the Houthi group, the judicial system is under similar threat of political manipulation. After they took over the capital Sana’a, the Houthis formed a committee, the Justice System, under the leadership of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of their Supreme Political Council, which presently holds powers exceeding those of the official Supreme Judicial Council. The Houthis have exploited judicial rotation for political polarization, replacing many independent judges with others affiliated with the Houthis or belonging to Hashemite families loyal to the group. Meanwhile, Houthi supervisors (mushrifeen) have been granted excessive supervisory powers and taken over roles previously ascribed to the judiciary.^[72]

The practices of the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC), meanwhile, provide another clear example of judicial politicization. The SCC was used primarily to suppress journalists, prosecute Houthi opponents, and seize their assets. The court has to date conducted show trials that lack the minimum fair trial procedures according to Yemeni law.^[73] On September 18, 2021, the Houthi authorities executed nine individuals accused by the Specialized Criminal Court of leaking information that led to the killing of the then-head of the Supreme Political Council, Saleh al-Sammad. The United Nations and human rights organizations strongly condemned the ruling.^[74]

4.2. Competence and Credibility

Yemen’s war has undermined the competence and credibility of its judiciary. Its infrastructure has suffered a near-total collapse, with many of its courts having ceased operation between 2015-17, particularly in the governorates witnessing armed confrontations, like Taiz and Aden. Several judges, prosecutors, and lawyers were subjected to assault, and some were even killed. Additionally, the war led to an increase in crime rates and personal disputes.^[75]

The judiciary’s infrastructure was weak from the outset, with many courts lacking suitable buildings to conduct their work and facing a shortage of basic necessities. The war only exacerbated the already weak infrastructure. Around 47 judicial facilities were partially or completely destroyed. According to a 2019 report from the Houthi-run Ministry of Justice in Sana’a, the estimated cost of the physical damage to judicial buildings was US$100 million.^[76] The majority of courts and judicial facilities in all governorates suffer from a shortage of electricity, communication devices, computers, and office supplies. Some courts have lost entire archives. Today, the courts face a significant backlog of cases and an inability to adjudicate them. This is attributed to various reasons, including:

• High crime rates and personal disputes: The absence of the state and the security breakdown has led to an increase in crime rates and individual disputes.^[77]
• Decline in security situation: The cessation of court operations during the years of conflict and deteriorating security resulted in the cancellation of sessions. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers have been threatened, attacked, and sometimes killed, while many litigants are unable to attend court proceedings.^[78]
• Shortage of judges and qualified staff: To secure their safety, some judges were forced to leave the country. The Higher Judicial Institute, meanwhile, stopped admitting new batches of judges during the early years of the war. The number of accepted candidates remains inadequate, and the acceptance process is marred by favoritism, affecting the competence of judges.^[79] In addition, courts continue to lack qualified administrative staff, which means many judges, already overburdened, also need to perform administrative tasks.
• Lack of material and financial resources: Yemen’s courts lack the most basic infrastructure for their operation, and suffer from a severe shortage of basic necessities, slowing down the workflow.^[80]
• Dire economic situation and impact on salaries: Like many Yemenis, judges, court staff, and public prosecutors face dire economic challenges due to the significant reduction in the value of the Yemeni currency and salaries amounting to less than a quarter of what they were before the war. Delays in salary payments, along with the deduction of incentives, have greatly hindered the commitment and performance of those working in the judiciary.^[81]

Even before the war, doubts have been raised about the independence and integrity of Yemen’s justice system, a perception that has only worsened since the conflict began. The judiciary does not operate in isolation but collaborates with state authorities. These, however, have not only failed to provide adequate budgets for the judiciary to function properly, but they have also failed to safeguard judges and prosecutors or enforce court rulings. Making matters worse, state authorities sometimes obstruct the implementation of justice following a verdict. The judiciary has thus become a casualty, incapable of fulfilling its tasks, leading to a loss of public confidence in the rule of law.

5. The Judiciary’s Role in Achieving Transitional Justice

5.1. Challenges

Transitional justice is intricately tied with politics.^[82] The judiciary’s role in transitional justice is thus contingent on several factors, political will being a primary determinant. Additionally, the role of state institutions, including the judiciary, in achieving transitional justice will vary based on the local factors and contexts that have shaped them.^[83]

In Yemen’s case, it is unlikely that the judiciary, in its current form, would be able to manage the files of justice and reconciliation in the transitional phase. It is nonetheless crucial that the judiciary be involved. One way could be through the involvement of selected judges in proposed mechanisms of reconciliation or, more specifically, in a transitional justice commission, such as the one recommended in the NDC outcomes and the draft constitution. A transitional justice and national reconciliation commission would need to be an independent body, separate from the formal judiciary. Such a proposition is compelling for several reasons.

Firstly, in its current weak form, the judiciary is unable to handle all pending cases within the regular judicial system, let alone the additional burden of war crimes cases. Secondly, the judiciary has faced political polarization, weakening trust in its neutrality, especially in sensitive political and criminal cases such as transitional justice. The judiciary itself needs reform as part of the transitional justice process to restore confidence in its credibility.

Thirdly, the comprehensive approach to transitional justice relies on the integration of judicial and non-judicial measures. The UN transitional justice guide emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach that includes truth-seeking, reparations, guarantees of non-recurrence, institutional reforms, and more.^[84] If the judiciary handles the transitional justice file independently, it may reinforce a vision centered solely on criminal trials and accountability, potentially facing resistance from implicated conflict parties with a vested interest in obstructing justice . Advocates for transitional justice in Yemen aim for a more comprehensive approach that balances both justice and a political settlement.

Lastly, to gain popular support, the involvement of local civil society in managing transitional justice will prove key.^[85] Transitional justice, when implemented properly, seeks to have a significant impact on people’s lives on a broad scale.^[86] Its process should thus involve all segments of society, in addition to victims, given that virtually no one in society is immune to both the direct and indirect repercussions and effects of war.

5.2. Opportunities

Under the right conditions, there are four crucial roles that the judiciary can play in achieving transitional justice:

Enhancing the Legitimacy of Transitional Justice: Yemen is currently on the top list of failed states globally.^[87] While the government in Aden relies more on international recognition, Houthi authorities in Sana’a depend on its control over the majority of Yemen’s population. Both authorities face a significant legitimacy crisis among the populations they govern. The parliament in Yemen, meanwhile, is no longer empowered to enact new legislation. Therefore, any agreements related to transitional justice, determining the fate of victims, accountability procedures, and compensation, will face fundamental questions about their legitimacy and legality. Yemen is not an exceptional case in this regard, as many post-conflict countries face similar conditions. Public participation and consultations should therefore be expanded to enhance the legitimacy of transitional justice.^[88]
Despite the challenges it is facing, Yemen’s judiciary remains an important refuge for many litigants, meriting a level of respect and legitimacy as a legal and judicial institution.^[89] This makes its presence and participation crucial in enhancing the legitimacy upon which transitional justice relies, along with the legitimacy of the procedures it follows.

Accountability for Serious Violations: Accountability is one of the cornerstones of an effective transitional justice framework. The violations accompanying the war pose a challenge to whichever authority manages the transitional phase. A successful vision for transitional justice cannot exclude those responsible for serious violations, even to a minimal extent. Some propose that the judiciary should be the mechanism for transitional justice accountability through the approval of the proposal presented by the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights (NCIAVHR ) for establishing a human rights court.^[90] This court could be responsible for investigating serious violations referred by a transitional justice and national reconciliation commission. This proposal aligns with the recommendations of the United Nations.^[91]

Expertise: Judges possess ample knowledge of Yemeni national and customary laws, acquired through extensive work investigating violations, assessing damages, determining compensations, and mediating between adversaries. This expertise is vital for the work of justice and reconciliation committees. Whether transitional justice in Yemen includes the principle of accountability for serious violations – as some activists advocate – or not, judges, as a cadre, have practical experience in resolving complex cases.

Judicial System Reform: Last but not least comes the reform of state institutions, including the judiciary, as one of the essential requirements of transitional justice and its outcomes. Accountability itself is not sufficient or possible in the absence of other effective democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary.^[92] This cannot be achieved without involving the judiciary in the desired reform.

6. Alternative Justice Mechanisms: Customary Laws

In the absence of solid justice frameworks, there is a growing trend toward greater recognition of legal pluralism globally, with an increasing number of legal scholars advocating for a hybrid legal system that incorporates both formal and informal laws.^[93] This allows traditional and complementary justice mechanisms used by local communities to settle disputes and address harm caused by violence according to established norms. They include methods like clan or customary courts and community-based dialogue.^[94] This trend reflects a growing acknowledgment of the value of customary law and the potential benefits it can bring to the justice system, in both normal life or post-conflict. However, the features of customary law do not mean it is without numerous legal and rights-based concerns and challenges, such as the intersections between formal and customary laws, especially in criminal cases, and questions about its compatibility with human rights principles.

Customary law is a broad concept that encompasses a set of traditional rules, customs, and procedures for dispute resolution, including reconciliation, mediation, and arbitration. It can enjoy community acceptance, especially in tribal and rural areas, where it is deeply rooted in the local customs . It offers considerable flexibility in resolving disputes and opens the door for apologies and reconciliation. Moreover, its procedures are characterized by transparency, less complexity, and swift resolution of disputes, often at a lower cost compared to the formal judicial pathway. These attributes have positioned customary law as a preferred mechanism for many disputants, making it a proposed tool for achieving justice and reconciliation in post-conflict settings.^[95]

In many developing countries, non-state justice systems handle most of the individual disputes, especially in conflict and post-conflict environments, where state institutions are often fragile and governing authority is disputed.^[96] Yemen is not an exception, its customary law has a significant role in settling conflicts, whether in urban or rural areas, even before the ongoing war, where approximately 80 percent of disputes were informally resolved through this informal system.^[97] Resorting to arbitration based on customary law is recognized within the Yemeni legal system and its rulings considered equivalent to court of first instance.^[98] This reliance on non-official mechanisms has become even more pronounced due to the onset of war, the breakdown of state institutions, and the halt of court activities, compounded by weakened law enforcement authorities.^[99]

Some observers see the potential of leveraging local customary mechanisms for transitional justice in Yemen. This involves utilizing traditional practices to achieve reconciliation through processes like apology and restitution via compensation. It is useful here to briefly explore a case study of Rwanda adopting alternative methods to the formal judicial system in the pursuit of transitional justice. From this, we can evaluate both the advantages and disadvantages and gauge its suitability for the Yemeni context.

6.1. Lessons from Rwanda: Gacaca Courts

The examination of how societies recovering from conflict manage the aftermath of severe human rights abuses is relatively new,^[100] and there have been only a limited number of instances where restorative justice has been applied in post-conflict settings. The most significant of these has been Rwanda's gacaca tribunals.^[101]

The Rwandan government reinstated its traditional community court system known as gacaca in 2005 to address the overwhelming number of accused individuals awaiting trial in the national court system. Gacaca involved the election of judges at the local level to oversee trials, excluding those accused of planning genocide. These community courts focused on achieving reconciliation by issuing lenient sentences to repentant individuals, and confessing prisoners often returned home without further penalties or were assigned community service. The gacaca system successfully processed more than 1.2 million cases nationwide and contributed to reconciliation by allowing victims to learn the truth and perpetrators to confess, express remorse, and seek forgiveness. The gacaca courts officially concluded their operations on May 4, 2012.^[102] When analyzing the gacaca case, and drawing lessons, several critical factors need to be taken into account.

First, this system was established by the state and worked under Rwanda’s Ministry of Justice.^[103] The state’s new version of gacaca bears little resemblance to the customary law practice.^[104] The new gacaca had a codified legal framework – the Genocide Law approved by the Parliament in 1996.^[105] Three core principles were integrated into the genocide law: the decentralization of justice through the establishment of multiple courts across various administrative units; the implementation of plea bargaining to enhance the quantity of evidence and information; and the categorization of offenses based on their nature.^[106] In other words, the state had modified the traditional gacaca, and transformed it into a structured, government-operated judicial system.^[107]

Second, gacaca was not the sole transitional justice mechanism, albeit it handled the largest volume of cases. Alongside it, there existed the national state legal system and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), each with its own mandate. Offenses were classified into four categories: Category 1 encompassed planners, leaders, organizers, and instigators of the genocide, as well as notorious killers and rapists; Category 2 involved individuals who committed homicide; Category 3 comprised those who caused bodily harm without intent to kill; and Category 4 included individuals who engaged in theft or property damage. Capital punishment was mandated for those judged guilty under Category 1, while varying prison terms and restitution were prescribed for the other categories. Additionally, the law introduced the practice of plea-bargaining, allowing courts to reduce sentences for those who confessed to their crimes and implicated their accomplices. Gacaca courts did not have the jurisdiction to handle Category 1 crimes, which included planners, organizers, supervisors, and ringleaders, as well as individuals known for committing murder, torture, or rape.^[108]

Third, transitional justice in Rwanda unfolded in four distinct phases. Phase 1 focused on international efforts, notably supporting the Arusha Peace Agreement (APA) and establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR).^[109] Phase 2 was marked by the Rwandan government's mass detention of genocide suspects and limited domestic criminal trials. Phase 3 introduced locally adjudicated accountability mechanisms through the implementation of gacaca courts on a national scale. Phase 4 shifted towards seeking justice, involving the transfer of ICTR cases to national jurisdictions, and the creation of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).^[110]

Fourth, the end of the war scenario determines the shape of transitional justice post-conflict. As the military victor, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had significant leverage in shaping post-genocide Rwanda's justice.^[111] The biggest criticism of transitional justice in Rwanda often focuses on how the gacaca process has bolstered the RPF's power, enhancing its ability to restrict investigations into human rights abuses and international crimes committed by its members before, during, and after the genocide.^[112]

In the context of Yemen, the benefits of this model include the localization of justice where community can be directly involved. With proper education and assistance, communities can effectively participate in this system. Conflicting testimonies from various participants can counteract biases and ensure fairness. The gacaca system also helped expedite the handling of genocide cases and combat impunity by identifying perpetrators.^[113]

On the other hand, potential drawbacks entailed in trying genocide cases in gacaca courts was lessening the gravity of these crimes. There were also inherent doubts about the ability of uneducated individuals in the gacaca to handle such serious offenses independently, in addition to concerns about partiality in trials due to familial and social connections, potentially hindering truth-telling. There was also the possibility of gacaca trials creating conflicts and tensions within local communities. Lastly, there were also questions regarding gacaca's alignment with international legal standards.^[114]

This examination of gacaca courts within the Rwandan transitional justice framework highlights the state's investment in traditional local mechanisms, formalizing and modernizing them into official channels. The state’s intervention, however, could yield unintended consequences. In Yemen, customary law's effectiveness is derived from its autonomy as a deeply rooted social force mechanism, and state interference may compromise its efficacy. Moreover, while customary law may be effective in some local areas, this does not necessarily mean it will work for every society in Yemen. Even if it proves successful at the local level, it may not be the right approach for achieving justice and reconciliation at the national level.

7. Conclusion

The discussions on transitional justice during the NDC marked a significant milestone in raising awareness on transitional justice, particularly given this was the first time it was formally addressed in Yemen. It’s important to underscore, however, that the outcomes derived from this historic conference were developed within a pre-war context. Since then, numerous grave violations have been perpetrated, surpassing both in nature and scale what had been addressed in the NDC.

Transitional justice discussions at the NDC also took place under very different political circumstances, at a time when there was only a single governing authority. Yemen today, by contrast, is a state in crisis. Nearly a decade of conflict has effectively disrupted Yemen’s judicial system, largely weakening its already fragile infrastructure, intimidating its judges, and further undermining its competence and credibility. Protracted conflict has also resulted in the fracturing of the state among various military-political factions, each with its own sphere of control. This has led to the emergence of conflicting judicial authorities, exacerbating the challenges faced by the judiciary in functioning effectively.

Given these challenges, the judiciary, in its current state, is not equipped to spearhead transitional justice in Yemen, and exploring alternative approaches is required. Still, it is crucial to involve the judiciary in transitional justice endeavors. This could entail the appointment of judges to justice and reconciliation committees and the establishment of a specialized court, similar to the Human Rights Court proposed by the NCIAVHR, to investigate the most serious criminal violations arising from the conflict.

The paper also stresses the importance of considering home-grown mechanisms, such as customary law, arbitration, and community mediations, as well as new bottom-up local initiatives focused on reconciliation. While drawing lessons from the experiences of other nations, specifically the use of local mechanisms and customary law in transitional justice processes in Rwanda, it argues that any consideration of the state resorting to traditional customary mechanisms in Yemen must involve a thorough evaluation of such an approach, carefully weighing the pros and cons, and taking into account Yemen's unique political, security, social, and economic context.

Ultimately, achieving transitional justice in Yemen will require a multifaceted approach that accounts for the complexities of the conflict, the diverse needs of the population, and the principles of transitional justice. The following recommendations seek to provide direction to relevant stakeholders, be they Yemeni or international, related to transitional justice in Yemen.

8. Recommendations

1. Prioritize judicial reform and the enhancement of judicial institutions as foundational to transitional justice.
2. Promote the fundamental principles of transitional justice as an integral step in reestablishing the rule of law. This is essential given that the rule of law cannot be fully realized without uncovering the truth, holding perpetrators accountable, compensating victims, reforming institutions, and achieving reconciliation.
3. Allocate financial support and professional development to the judiciary system to bolster its efficiency and capability.
4. Focus on rebuilding the credibility and the independence of the judiciary, restoring public trust in its integrity, and reinforcing the role of institutions upholding the rule of law.
5. Hold comprehensive consultations that involve a diverse range of national stakeholders, including experts, jurists, and victims and their families, in particular, when developing a vision for transitional justice mechanisms. This approach is crucial to ensure that their aspirations and needs are reflected and to contribute to strengthening the legitimacy of the transitional justice process.
6. Explore and evaluate alternative judicial mechanisms that could achieve justice and reconciliation, such as customary law, arbitration, mediation, and community reconciliation committees, ensuring compatibility with formal judicial systems and adherence to human rights standards.
7. Map all local reconciliation initiatives, identifying the opportunities, challenges, and lessons learnt from their experiences, while also exploring avenues to provide support and assistance to strengthen their efforts.

This report was produced as part of the Yemen International Forum 2023, organized by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with additional funding support from the European Union, the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Message from the YIF Director

About the Yemen International Forum

The YIF is the largest international annual conference bringing together Yemeni civil and political actors to engage in constructive dialogue on Yemen’s future. The conference offers a neutral space for Yemeni actors of all stripes to come together and collectively craft solutions for sustainable peace. The YIF conference is part of a larger initiative that includes consultations with Yemeni stakeholders and experts, the production of research based on the conference outcomes, and extensive regional and international shuttle diplomacy that takes place throughout the year. These Yemeni-Yemeni dialogues are intended to complement the formal UN-led peace process, ensuring the creation and maintenance of an inclusive multi-stakeholder platform to engage in envisioning and building a post-war Yemen.

A Platform for the Aspirations of Yemenis

Yemen’s peace negotiations have been largely confined to the warring parties, sidelining many national stakeholders, who have increasingly found themselves on the margins. The future of Yemen, however, rests on how well these different segments of society engage in the peace process, and how involved they are in shaping the country’s future. This is the premise of the YIF, which seeks to represent the multiple voices of Yemenis, including those dispossessed by the war. Designed to bring together women and men from a wide range of backgrounds, the YIF gathers members of different Yemeni political parties, along with youth, civil society organizations, trade unions, tribes, the private sector, experts, journalists, artists, activists, academics, and other vital stakeholders.

To provide a safe environment for dialogue to take place, the YIF utilizes a mixture of open plenaries and discussions held under the Chatham House Rule, as well as ad hoc side meetings in which participants are encouraged to engage in frank and constructive dialogue on the future of Yemen, while offering the space for participants to navigate their differences. As a multi-stakeholder forum, and to ensure that the world’s eyes on Yemen remain open, the YIF also engages key regional and international actors, including the United Nations, the diplomatic community, and diverse experts and human rights organizations working on mediation support and conflict resolution.

Pathways to a Just, Inclusive, and Sustainable Peace

The second Yemen International Forum was convened in the Hague, Netherlands, from June 12-15, 2023. More than 200 participants attended, traveling from Yemen and other parts of the world to collectively work toward more just, inclusive, and sustainable visions for peace.^[1]

Since the first Yemen International Forum was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 2022, important shifts have taken place on the ground. A UN-brokered truce, struck in April 2022, expired without further agreement between the conflicting parties. Despite its collapse, Yemen has witnessed a period of relative de-escalation, accompanied by significant diplomatic efforts to resurrect the truce and jumpstart peace negotiations. Peace, however, remains distant. Yemenis continue to struggle with a lack of basic services, salaries that have not been paid in years, an economy that is on the verge of collapse, healthcare systems that are overwhelmed, a fractured education system, and the radicalization of Yemen’s youth. Yemenis also continue to face severe violations and infringements of their rights, including gender-based violence, killings, arrests, the forced disappearance of activists and members of civil society, attacks against minorities, restricted freedom of movement for civilians, a stifling of the civic sphere and an alarming rollback on women’s rights aimed at limiting their participation in public life.

Against this backdrop, and building on the work of the first YIF, the 2023 Forum focused on a just, inclusive, and sustainable peace, which served as the three guiding principles that informed the different sessions and plenaries that took place over the four-day event. YIF 2023 focused on three main thematic files:

1. Political Pathways to Peace: Building an inclusive peace through a Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue across political divides while guaranteeing the meaningful participation of women, youth, minorities, and civil society actors.
2. Economic Recovery: Enhancing resilience and early recovery, focusing on the banking sector and pathways to revitalizing key economic sectors.
3. Justice and Reconciliation: Building a just peace, with redress for victims and respect for human rights, allowing for the restoration of social cohesion.

Other themes – Gender equality and women’s participation, security reform, and the environment and water – were incorporated throughout the Forum’s agenda in different plenaries and side sessions.

Key Outcomes In Brief

1. A Roadmap for Transitional Justice: One of the boldest messages of the YIF 2023 was asserting the need for transitional justice to prevent future cycles of violence. A declaration endorsed by more than 30 civil society leaders was presented at the YIF, intended as a prelude to a more comprehensive transitional justice roadmap being worked on by the YIF team in conjunction with other civil society organizations and the international community. The roadmap will focus on key steps, including better documentation of violations and wider conversations between stakeholders on what shape transitional justice should take.
2. A Victim-Centered Approach: Victims of Yemen’s war were widely represented at YIF 2023, including victims of coalition air strikes, landmines, gender-based violence, persecution, arbitrary detention, and torture. The Forum offered a much-needed platform for their voices to be heard, but more needs to be done to strengthen victims’ associations and support victims to better organize themselves. In the short term, a mapping exercise of the various victims’ unions and associations will be conducted to identify their needs and priorities.
3. Renewed Pledge to Stop the Systematic Exclusion of Women: Faced with a worrying setback in women’s rights and an increase in gender-based violence since the start of the war, the international community and the UN must do more to use their leverage to address the exclusion of women. At YIF 2023, multilateral organizations operating in Yemen were urged to comprehensively collect data on gender-based violence and take an unequivocal public stance against restrictions on women's movement and participation in public life.
4. Protection of Minorities: Marginalized minority groups are increasingly facing a precarious situation in Yemen, with the conflict exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and eroding the already limited legal rights they enjoy. Clear mechanisms need to be adopted to secure their inclusion in the peace process and protection for minority groups in a post-settlement context. To that end, continued conversations around the importance of legal reforms to protect minorities must take place in order to raise the profile of their plight, and advocate for their access to education, healthcare, and security.
5. Deterring Armed Groups: As Yemen continues to witness an alarming rise in the number of armed fighters, options for security sector reform were discussed, ranging from strengthening the role of civil society and tribal leaders in local security oversight, including for localized ceasefires, to the need for a central coordination mechanism across governorates and warring parties areas of control, and exploring the possibility of a decentralized security sector where demobilization efforts are led by local authorities. A technical group composed of different national security experts was formed following the YIF to explore workable solutions to the rise of armed groups in the country.
6. Integration of Local Mediators: Local mediators continue to do the bulk of peacebuilding work within their communities, often faster and more efficiently than more conventional channels that work toward diffusing conflict. The rich tradition of local mediation in Yemen must inform national mediation efforts. The international community, and the office of the UN Special Envoy in particular, would benefit from creating synergies with local mediators and establishing mechanisms for more regular communication and coordination.
7. An Economic Truce: In tandem with a political settlement, Yemenis need an immediate economic truce. This should be brokered by the UN Special Envoy’s office, with key issues such as neutralizing the banking sector, and de-escalating the economic measures and countermeasures taken by the warring parties proactively addressed. A comprehensive economic matrix was developed by a group of experts, bankers, and economists attending the YIF, building on the outcomes of the YIF 2022 in Sweden. The matrix offers practical steps and actions to help navigate and address bottlenecks in the economic file, serving as an entry point to influence policy and bring different parties together to develop economic solutions.
8. Engaging the Private Sector in Economic Recovery: The private sector has played a vital role in mitigating the effects of the ongoing conflict and in filling gaps left by the collapse of the country’s public institutions. In the transition from humanitarian relief to economic recovery, coordination with the private sector will prove key. Strengthened collaboration between international actors, the government, and private sector organizations can better drive the rebuilding of infrastructure, the provision of public services, and the revitalization of strategic economic sectors such as fisheries and agriculture.
9. Addressing Yemen’s Water Crisis and Vulnerability to Climate Change: As the conflict has taken center stage, the country’s vulnerability to climate change has taken a backseat, as has its pre-existing water crisis. Yemen’s precarious environmental situation presents an existential risk to its future, and water scarcity is one of the primary drivers of conflict. Investment in early warning systems, reconstruction projects that take the environment into account, and access to climate financing were all priorities flagged at YIF 2023. Supporting technical solutions to reduce the agricultural sector’s water dependency was also deemed of paramount importance. To access the international support available for climate financing, recommendations were put forward to develop policy briefs on water governance, climate change adaptation, and climate finance.

From a Place of Peace

From the heart of the Peace Palace in the Hague, Maged al-Madhaji, Chairperson and Co-founder of the Sana’a Center, told participants that the convening the Forum did not mean peace was imminent, but that the YIF serves to reflect the aspirations of Yemenis and build consensus on practical visions and ideas for the future of Yemen. “We will never tire of reviving opportunities for dialogue,” said Al-Madhaji. “No matter how futile these attempts might seem, we believe that discussion and the development of ideas are the beginning of a path toward change.”

Drawing on the historical symbolism of the Peace Palace, which houses the International Court of Justice, H.E. Paul Huijts, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reminded the audience how Europe learned the hard way that unresolved grievances can become a breeding ground for future conflict, noting that there can be no lasting peace that is not inclusive, nor can there be peace without addressing justice and accountability. Setting the tone for collective discussions among the different stakeholders, he spoke about the importance of shifting focus, and rising above habitual narratives to envision how a peaceful society can emerge in Yemen. “You cannot build a better future if you don’t have a vision of what that future should look like,” he said, “and how it will differ from the past.”

Southern Solidarity and Dialogue

Unreconciled grievances were a dominant theme among YIF participants, notably among those attending sessions that brought different parties representing southern Yemen to the table. This year saw rich engagement and a wider participation from southern parties, including a high-level official delegation from the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Al-Mahra’s Sit-in Committee, the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference, the Southern Revolutionary Movement, Southern Hirak, as well as independent southern activists and prominent political figures. The discussions came against the backdrop of a trying year for the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which continues to suffer from discord and division among its members since its formation in April 2022. The YIF took place just weeks after the Southern Consultative Meeting was launched by the STC on May 4, 2023, bringing together a range of southern actors and leading to the announcement of the STC-led Southern National Charter.

Some YIF participants underscored the need for STC-led consultations to be more inclusive of the various southern parties, and in response, the STC noted that the Southern National Charter was a living document subject to revision. In its first opportunity to engage with a diverse variety of national stakeholders and diplomats present at the Forum, STC members reiterated the group’s commitment to unity among southern stakeholders and its support for the PLC, a statement welcomed by international diplomats present in the Forum who emphasized that the PLC is the only recognized governing body in Yemen. Despite divergent perspectives on the STC’s efforts to bring together different southern factions, and the contentious debate of secession versus unity, attendees agreed on the urgent need for a united southern front, and failing that, face up to the ramifications of further militarization of the south.

The Urgent Need for an Economic Truce

Yemenis cannot afford to wait for a peace agreement to address the failing economy. This was the overall message delivered by YIF participants attending various sessions on economic recovery, which featured as one of the three core YIF thematic issues. “The suffering caused by the failing economy is more painful than that of any military or political issues,” said Ali al-Hebshi, a prominent businessperson who was part of a panel on shaping the future of Yemen, noting that alongside political de-escalation, Yemen was in urgent need of an economic truce. “Economic challenges have impacted every single household in our country,” he added, citing the loss of jobs, the split monetary system, unpaid salaries, skyrocketing prices, stunted economic growth, and a banking sector on the verge of collapse. To mitigate the fallout from the war, participants urged the brokering of an economic truce to contain the warring parties' ongoing escalation over the banking sector. Such mediation, brokered by the UN Special Envoy’s office, should first focus on technical aspects in which parties to the conflict have joint interests and could implement separately, such as regulating money exchangers and supporting digital financial services.

Addressing growing appeals by Yemeni participants for donors and the international community to support more long-term programming and transition from humanitarian relief to economic recovery, David Gressly, the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, said such a shift comes with risk. “We need to resist the impulse, that if peace is on the horizon, of moving immediately to development and drop humanitarian assistance,” Gressly said in the opening remarks of the YIF conference. “This is not a relay race. This is a transition that will take time, and humanitarian assistance will be required for a number of years going forward until we can find an economy that's truly recovered.”

Yemeni experts, however, reiterated calls for a shift from humanitarian aid to development and for more focus on state-building. “What Yemen needs is to transition from the relief phase to the development phase by relying on a three-pillar approach that consists of the private sector, local authorities, and civil society in all its components, including unions and political parties,” said Rafat al-Akhali, Fellow of Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University. In a plenary on shared economic visions for early recovery, Tania Meyer, the World Bank Country Manager for Yemen, said that “it does not have to be either humanitarian or development,” adding that embracing such a binary framework would do Yemen a disservice. Underscoring that recovery and reconstruction will ultimately need to be driven and led by Yemenis, she said the role of the international community is to “support, support, support,” with a particular focus on locally driven interventions, investing in Yemen’s youth, and supporting the private sector, whose entrepreneurial spirit has helped fill the absence of a functioning state.

In a session on the role of the private sector in economic recovery and reconstruction economists and business leaders urged the government to coordinate with the private sector, noting the vital humanitarian role it has been playing to mitigate the effects of the collapse of public institutions. Participants stressed the importance of building partnerships and supporting strategic collaboration between the public and private sectors, particularly in infrastructure and in the provision of public services, while working to keep the private sector neutral and separate from the conflict. In a session on revitalizing strategic and economic sectors, experts from diverse backgrounds held detailed conversations about how to revitalize two important economic sectors: agriculture and fisheries. Discussions were held on the importance of water harvesting programs, knowledge transfer, and the adoption of modern techniques to help farmers, along with innovative mechanisms to develop Yemen’s fishing industry, and the ability of these sectors to adapt to climate change.

No Peace Without Justice, No Justice Without Accountability

As one of the three core areas highlighted this year, transitional justice was a central topic of discussion, despite the hesitancy and resistance last year from both local and international actors concerned that such a contentious issue could risk derailing the peace process. This year witnessed broader endorsement and support for the need to discuss transitional justice, based on the understanding that the pursuit of justice and redress for the countless victims of Yemen’s war is a fundamental principle underpinning peace. But what does transitional justice mean to Yemenis? Does it start now or after a peace settlement? Will it entail redress and reparations for victims of Yemen’s war, and in what form? Will it be punitive or conciliatory? Will it tackle criminal accountability? These were just some of the delicate issues addressed during sessions that brought together victims and survivors to share their stories and exchange ideas on what justice could look like.

“From this symbolic place, a place for peace, we demand that there is a comprehensive peace. There cannot be peace without justice. And there cannot be justice without accountability,” said Amat al-Salam al-Hajj, in one of the opening plenaries on the first day of the conference. The founder of the Abductees’ Mothers Association, an organization formed at the gates of a prison in 2015, she warned the audience that cycles of violence and revenge will continue if accountability and reconciliation are not addressed, adding: “These victims are a ticking time-bomb.” Echoing Al-Hajj’s cautionary tone, a high-ranking representative from the international community said in a side session, “what we should never do is accept a peace process with an amnesty.” The fear of civil war and deterioration, which has driven Yemenis to accept flawed peace agreements in the past, has come back to haunt them, he said. Narrating his own experience in witnessing the Yemeni peace negotiations in 1994, along with failed efforts to address reconciliation or transitional justice, he pointed to the current situation as the price paid for failing to address difficult issues in the past. “The failure of the UN in 1994 is one of the factors why we are here now. The failure of the National Dialogue Conference is also the cause of what we see now,” he said, referring to what he called the “disastrous choice” of granting former president Ali Abdullah Saleh immunity from prosecution, and maintaining the power of the old elite more broadly, under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative in 2012.

Despite a clear demand for justice, how this would take shape in the Yemeni context needs further consensus, agreed participants. However, the importance of strengthening victims’ unions, coordination amongst NGOs, and documentation efforts were seen as foundational steps in the path towards transitional justice. Documentation, not just as an investigative mechanism for criminal accountability, but also for the purposes of history and memorialization, was discussed passionately by attendees, with debates on whether formalizing its process and working towards a centralized database for human rights violations could potentially do more harm than good given the sensitivity of the material. One former detainee and victim of torture said that regardless of whether criminal accountability is sought, restoring the dignity of victims is paramount. Describing his own experience of being released from prison, and the inhumane way he was approached to give testimony of his detention, he estimated that half of such cases are poorly documented because many, like him, refuse to give evidence due to the inexperience of those in charge of documentation. He urged the CSOs and members of the international community present at the session to consider how to provide better guidance and support on documenting human rights violations in order to preserve and restore the dignity of victims.

Members of the international community were urged to create more fertile ground for transitional justice. Noting that language advocating for transitional justice is often absent from Security Council and other UN resolutions, an expert on transitional justice urged the international representatives present to take action. “You need to mention this [transitional justice] in your briefings. If you're not putting it out there, you are making it difficult for progress,” she said, urging them to be bold and press on even if the appetite for it is not present internationally. Discussions on a transitional justice roadmap for the pursuit of Yemen culminated on the last day of the conference, where a draft joint declaration to advance justice and reconciliation in Yemen, developed collaboratively by more than 30 Yemeni CSOs and local and international experts, was announced at the concluding session and distributed to participants.

Security Sector Reform and Mediation

Building on extensive discussions on the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of fighters that took place at last year’s Forum, YIF 2023 sessions revisited the viability of disarming a population that is heavily armed and has a deep local tradition of bearing weapons. “We had a quasi-organized army and now we have armed groups that are not organized and not under anyone's control,” said one expert attending the session on stabilization and security sector reforms, estimating the current number of fighters in Yemen at roughly 2 million, many of whom have resorted to joining armed groups to earn an income in light of Yemen’s dire economic situation. Traditional DDR processes, he added, are unfeasible in the Yemeni context, and will create a financial burden that will frustrate economic development, given that some regions in Yemen traditionally rely on security sector jobs.

The idea to decentralize the security sector to the governorate level, proposed during YIF I, was further discussed in an attempt to find “out-of-the-box” solutions to this dilemma. To deal with the huge numbers of fighters, at the least possible cost and in the least disruptive manner, experts discussed the possibility of establishing a civil defense reserve force in each governorate, with some participants expressing backing for the proposal and others viewing it as unfeasible and risky.

Top-down security sector reform, however, will not happen any time soon. In the absence of the state, civil society and communities in Yemen have stepped in to fill gaps in the oversight of the security forces, promoting the rule of law, limiting violations, and mediating conflicts. Countless examples of civil action by tribes and civil society were brought up by local mediators gathered at the YIF, ranging from initiatives that helped open blocked roads, reopen closed airports, mediate prisoner exchanges, sensitize the police force to human rights, release detainees, close down secret prisons, and establish codes of conduct for security forces in Taiz and Aden. Many of these initiatives were led by Yemeni women. “Yemenis, by nature, tend to be mediators,” said one participant in a session on scaling up local mediation practices, noting how traditions of mediation have played a key role in maintaining social cohesion and protecting civilians from the effects of war. Mediation, argued civil society actors, can be more effective, flexible, and adaptable than formal negotiation processes, since it does not require lengthy protocols and relies on traditional customs and norms. Ensuring a more direct line of coordination between mediators and the formal peace process led by the UN could help shift the focus toward building upon local models of resolving conflict. The Office of the UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (OSESGY) in particular could play a positive role by building on the work and feedback of local mediators.

Gender-Based Violence and the Marginalization of Women

The marginalization of Yemeni women took center stage at this year’s YIF, in response to the worrying increase in violations of women’s rights since the war began. “The dignity of Yemeni women has been directly attacked,” said Wedad al-Badawi, a Yemeni TV presenter and a well-known media personality who spoke as part of a panel on missed opportunities to tackle women’s exclusion and multifaceted forms of gender-based violence.

She recounted her own challenges traveling to the conference from Sana’a, where the Houthi authorities now require a mahram (male guardian) for women to travel in territories under their control. Al-Badawi said she felt let down by the international community and appealed for support lest women’s silence be understood as complacency. “We have to appeal to them because the political parties don’t listen to us. But the reality is that they listen to the international community,” she said. Addressing disturbing trends such as the increase in gender-based violence (GBV) in Yemen public policy expert Sawsan al-Refai urged those present in the audience to ensure GBV is being adequately reported on and its prevention prioritized. Failing to do this, she added, will mean that “this issue is being erased from the collective memory of the international community.” Echoing Al-Refai and other panelists, Sherine El Traboulsi-McCarthy, Director of the National Center for Research in the UK, said, “We need a much more authentic understanding of the priorities and authenticity of the failures,” noting that despite clear shortcomings in the international community’s approach to aid in Yemen, there has been little change, with international programs maintaining “a very naive, linear approach,” lacking nuance and shorn of context, with an over-emphasis on capacity building.

In side sessions, the legacy of southern women and the feminist experience prior to unification was said to have been demeaned by southern political parties, which have few women among their ranks, mostly relegated to special desks for “women’s affairs.” “We are not living our best days,” said a human rights lawyer and southern activist, who accused political parties of “forgetting the history of southern women.” In another session on local mediation, one female community leader asked, “Who is starting the fire, and who is extinguishing it?”, noting that women have stood at the epicenter of social cohesion initiatives in their communities.

Climate Change and Building Resilience

Yemen is ranked 22nd in a list of the countries most vulnerable to climate change, and is the 14th least ready to adapt, said Jeehan Abdul Ghaffar, an independent development expert and advisor to the World Bank Group, speaking as part of a panel on climate change and its impact on livelihoods and economic recovery. Climate change is estimated to account for more than 10 percent of the population displacement that has taken place in Yemen since the conflict began. An increase in temperature, flash floods, tropical cyclones, desertification, and prolonged droughts are just some of the extreme weather events increasingly taking place in Yemen, said Anwar Noman, a representative from the Climate Change Unit at the Ministry of Water and Environment.

The conflict in Yemen, argued the panelists, is diverting resources away from the adaptation and mitigation efforts needed to confront the effects of climate change. These include the need for early warning systems, nationwide advocacy campaigns, rain-fed agriculture, and reducing deforestation, among other initiatives. The reconstruction of Yemen must entail building back better and greener, said Leoni Nimmo, Research Associate at the Conflict and Environment Observatory, adding that reconstruction funds need to have long-term environmental stability in mind. The relevant Yemeni institutions on the ground, however, are finding it difficult to access crucial global climate investment funds, which tend to be risk-averse and not easily accessible to conflict-affected states. The shift to humanitarian relief following the crisis, which has drastically reduced donor funds to climate change programs, also poses a challenge. “From 2010-2017,” said Noman, “Yemen got less than $2 per capita per year for climate adaptation measures.” Noting how countries in the region such as Morocco and Egypt have been more successful in accessing global climate funds, panelists stressed the need for Yemen to draw lessons from the experiences of other developing countries in the throes of climate change. To secure more financing, more data needs to come from inside Yemen, urged Nimmo.

Scenario Building to Help See Beyond the Current Deadlock

This year, the YIF incorporated elements of an internationally validated, innovative methodology known as the transformative scenario process (TSP).^[2] TSP is gaining traction as a way of engaging with complexity and uncertainty, and involves diverse stakeholders engaging in dialogue about the future.^[3] Participants are invited to hold back the impulse to advocate for a desired future, and instead explore how the future might unfold.

During the YIF, a series of workshops introduced TSP as an approach that can help diverse stakeholders plan for the future despite the uncertain and volatile context in Yemen. TSP can help lower the barrier for people with diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives to engage with one another, and forces the immediate focus away from the conflict and shorter-term considerations to longer-term trends and the broader context. It can help broaden the conversation to include people whose voices are often not heard in more traditional dialogue formats, and encourages participants to set aside wishful thinking, engage the imagination to explore new ways forward, and build trust.

Five scenario building sessions, involving over 100 participants, were conducted on the following themes: The Role of Women in Public Life; Stabilization and Security Structures; Justice and Reconciliation; The Political System and Civic Life; and The Economy. Central to each workshop was the discussion of various “driving forces”^[4] that are likely to shape how each one of the five themes will unfold over time. YIF participants engaged in two exercises: an individual assessment of the relative impact and relative unpredictability of each driving force;^{[5] [6]} and a group discussion identifying different possible outcomes for each particular driving force, telling a small story about each of these.

The emerging pattern from the participants’ assessment of the driving forces suggests that one of the driving forces with the highest impact is the supporting role that civil society and local communities could play in justice and reconciliation. Other factors with high impact and relatively low-level of unpredictability are identity-based conflict and security conditions and incitement against women in the public sphere. Participants in multiple scenario building workshops underlined the high impact of wealth-sharing and resource distribution to resolve political, economic, and security issues, indicating that it is a cross-cutting driver. Other driving forces that were assessed by the participants as relatively unpredictable include the weaponization of the economy, the continued influence of human rights violators on political decision-making, conflict dynamics and the role of armed groups, the power balance between domestic actors, and the role of civil society in shaping the political process and the security sector. Their characterization as unpredictable indicates that these driving forces may go in unexpected directions and could be influenced, either positively or negatively.

The Way Forward: Three Messages from YIF 2023

1. Peace Must Be Inclusive

YIF 2023 delivered a strong message, cautioning that no single group in Yemen can claim broad, national representation. This message is particularly poignant, given ongoing political developments in the country. Recent Houthi-Saudi negotiations represent a significant breakthrough, and an opportunity to push forward a national cease-fire, but any settlement that emerges will reflect the interests of the powerful, excluding the vast majority of Yemenis, and thereby court failure. The “big tent” approach adopted by the YIF, a methodology not unlike the National Dialogue Conference, secured broader participation and engagement of key political actors this year, encouraging trust-building between parties while providing an influential platform for marginalized actors to articulate their visions of peace. These actors include women, half of Yemen’s population, who are being sidelined and shunted into the private sphere; political parties, whose historical legitimacy can act as a bridge between various sub-groups; southern stakeholders, whose demands for self-determination will prove critical to a sustainable peace process; civil society organizations, tribes, and local mediators, who, in the absence of a functioning state, have taken charge of delivering humanitarian relief and maintaining the social cohesion of communities; minorities, who have been brutally persecuted by the warring factions; and last, but not least, youth, Yemen’s greatest asset and the generation who will ultimately become responsible for rebuilding the country.

2. Peace Must Be Just

In a blow to thousands of victims, on October 8, 2021, the UN Human Rights Council rejected a resolution to renew the mandate of the Group of Eminent Experts assigned to investigate war crimes in Yemen. The YIF delivered a bold message that peace in Yemen cannot come without addressing justice and accountability, and that for the first time in the country’s history, the grievances of the countless victims of war must be addressed. “Do we want a generation that keeps repeating the same mistakes, or aim for a new way of thinking?” asked a victim attending the Forum. Without redress for victims, trust in the rule of law and governance and the relationship between the state and people in Yemen will ultimately remain broken, as proven by previous settlements in the region that bypassed accountability (such as the 1989 Taif Agreement, which helped end Lebanon’s civil war). Those present at the justice sessions agreed, however, that the road towards achieving justice won’t be easy. To start with, a common understanding of what justice means for Yemenis still needs to be reached. The intense discussions that took place at the YIF this year, however, represent an important step towards the normalization of transitional justice discourse on Yemen, and in so doing, break the deafening silence surrounding it in international forums. The importance of documenting violations, and supporting victims’ unions, were among the most important outcomes of this year’s discussions on transitional justice, which culminated with a presentation of a justice declaration eventually endorsed by more than 30 Yemeni civil society organizations, endorsing the fight to advance justice and reconciliation in Yemen. This declaration forms part of a wider roadmap for transitional justice currently being worked on by civil society organizations, with the facilitation of the YIF team.

3. Peace Must Be Sustainable

Nine years of war have demonstrated that Yemenis cannot wait for a political settlement to start rebuilding their country. For durable peace to be achieved, there are fundamental priorities that must be addressed immediately. Demands for an economic truce - for warring parties to cease escalatory economic measures and countermeasures - were on every participant’s lips, and were universally supported. As the warring parties inch closer toward potential political settlements, the outstanding points of contention are predominantly economic. On the ground, as households struggle with the dire economic impact of the war, experts are becoming increasingly concerned about the sustainability of an economy built almost entirely on humanitarian aid. A group of economic experts will begin studying how to transition to economic recovery and longer-term development, ways to save the banking sector, and how to better coordinate with the private sector, as they push the OSESGY to ensure the economic situation is given the necessary attention. In parallel, the YIF highlighted how the impact of climate change is part and parcel of economic sustainability, underlining the importance of designing a recovery process from an environmental perspective that takes into account Yemen’s depleting water resources and the increase of extreme weather events.

Building on conversations that took place last year, the need to create multiple deterrents to the excesses of armed groups in Yemen was a central theme discussed at this year’s YIF. Experts who participated in the YIF in Stockholm in 2022 and in The Hague this year focused on practical and ‘out of the box’ solutions to integrate fighters in civil and military sectors, and provide them with economic incentives to steer away from militias. Some articulated a vision for a decentralized security sector that offers a reasonable level of balance among armed groups, local authorities, and the central government. Such a balance, if supported by international and regional actors, could set the foundation for a durable and sustainable peace.

Distinguished International Attendees

• H.E. Hatem Abdul Qader, Egyptian Ambassador to the Netherlands
• H.E. Hafeez Mohammed Salem Al-Ajmi, Kuwaiti Ambassador to the Netherlands
• Rawan Salim Al-Busaidi, First Secretary to the Omani Ambassador to the Netherlands
• H.E. Falah Al-Hajraf, Kuwaiti Ambassador to Yemen
• H.E. Abdullah Salim Al-Harthi, Omani Ambassador to the Netherlands
• H.E. Sarhan Al-Minaikher, Saudi diplomat and Gulf Cooperation Council Ambassador to Yemen
• H.E. Wolfgang Amadeus Brülhart, Swiss Special Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa
• Peter Dalby, Acting Deputy Head of Mission for the UK Embassy to Yemen
• Renaud Detalle, Representative of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Yemen
• Cosmin Dobran, Director of Peace, Partnerships, and Crisis Management at the European External Action Service (EEAS)
• H.E. Peter Derrek Hof, Dutch Ambassador to Yemen
• H. E. Hubert Jäger, German Ambassador to Yemen
• Kris Kvols, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy to Yemen
• H.E. David Gressly, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen
• H.E. Hans Grundberg, UN Special Envoy for Yemen
• H.E. Paul Huijts, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Guusje Korthals Altes, Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Tania Meyer, Country Manager for Yemen at the World Bank
• H.E. Gabriel Munuera-Viñals, European Union Ambassador to Yemen
• Andrea Niklaus, Political Affairs Counsellor for the Canadian Embassy to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain
• Anna-Maria Panagiotakopoulou, Head of Division for the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, European External Action Service
• H.E. Jean-Marie Safa, French Ambassador to Yemen
• H.E. Peter Semneby, Swedish Special Envoy to Yemen
• Muin Sherim, Deputy Head of Mission for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
• Andrea Slørdahl, Political Secretary at the Norwegian Embassy to Saudi Arabia
• H.E. Nawaf Tell, Advisor to His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan
• H.E. Jan van Zanen, Mayor of the Hague
• H.E. Shao Zheng, Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Yemen

Plenary Speakers

• Jeehan Abdul Ghaffar, Senior Advisor to the Executive Director representing MENA and South Asia at the World Bank Group
• Rafat Al-Akhali, Fellow of Practice – Strategic Projects at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University
• Wedad Al-Badawi, President of Culture Media Center, TV presenter, and journalist
• Bassem Al-Hajj, First Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party
• Afraa Al-Hariri, Human rights lawyer, Southern Hirak activist, and Regional Director of the Peace Track Initiative
• Ali Al-Hebshi, CEO and member of the private sector
• H.E. Sarhan Al-Minaikher, Saudi diplomat and Gulf Cooperation Council Ambassador to Yemen
• Linda Al-Obahi, Advisor on Yemeni Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Senior Mediation and Liaison Officer at the Peace Track Initiative
• Nader Al-Sakkaf, Representative of the Baha’is in Yemen
• Amat Al-Salam Al-Hajj, Director of the Abductees’ Mothers Association
• Mohammed Al-Shuwaiter, Co-founder and Executive Director of Qānūn and legal expert
• Sawsan Al-Refaie, Development consultant and expert in equity, public policy, and advocacy
• H.E. Wolfgang Amadeus Brülhart, Swiss Special Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa
• Kristine Beckerle, Clinical Lecturer at Yale Law School
• Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Director of NatCen International
• Rana Ghanem, Assistant Secretary-General for the Nasserist Unionist People’s Organization
• H.E. David Gressly, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen
• H.E. Hans Grundberg, UN Special Envoy for Yemen
• H.E. Paul Huijts, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Guusje Korthals, Deputy Director for North Africa and Middle East, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, Expert at the Facility on Justice in Conflict and Transition
• Tania Meyer, Country Manager for Yemen at the World Bank
• H.E. Gabriel Munuera-Viñals, European Union Ambassador to Yemen
• Leonie Nimmo, Project Coordinator and Research Associate at the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBs)
• Anwar Noman, Advisor at the Climate Change Unit at the Ministry of Water and Environment
• Mahmood Qaiyah, Project Manager at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
• Anika Seggel, Climate Finance Expert at the Food and Agriculture Organization
• Samah Subay, Lawyer and human rights activist
• H.E. Jan van Zanen, Mayor of the Hague

Moderators

• Rafat Al-Akhali, Fellow of Practice – Strategic Projects at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University
• Abdulwahab Al-Kebsi, Managing Director for Programs at the Center for International Private Enterprise
• Ghadeer Al-Maqhafi, Corporate governance expert and former acting Executive Director of the Yemen Business Club
• Safaa Al-Watari, Co-founder and Chief Operating Officer at Your ECHO
• Khaldoon Bakhail, Senior Yemen Adviser and Country Coordinator at DCAF
• Dalia Barsoum, Head of Yemen Unit at the Berghof Foundation
• Mille Bojer, Director at Reos Partners
• Dina El Mamoun, Yemen Country Director at the Center for Civilians In Conflict (CIVIC)
• Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid, Senior Advisor with the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Yemen representative
• Marie-Christine Heinze, President of the Center for Applied Research in the Orient (CARPO)
• H.E. Peter-Derrek Hof, Dutch Ambassador to Yemen
• Nadim Houry, Executive Director of the Arab Reform Initiative
• Yassir Khudayri, Senior Program Officer at Open Society Foundations
• Michelle Koo, Water Governance Department at the IHE-Delft Institute for Water Education
• Marta Mendes, Independent consultant and researcher on transitional justice
• Kate Nevens, Facilitator and consultant at the Yemen Policy Center
• Saba Nowzari, Senior Desk Officer at the Folke Bernadotte Academy
• Michelle Parlevliet, Senior Associate at Reos Partners
• Thanos Petouris, Regional Adviser at the European Institute of Peace
• Yasar Qatarneh, Consultant with CMI - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation
• Ethar Shaibany, General Coordinator at CivTrack Initiative
• Ewa Strzelecka, Researcher at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• Barbro Svedberg, Senior Advisor at Folke Bernadotte Academy
• Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House

YIF Collaborators

• Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
• Berghof Foundation
• Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)
• CMI - Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation
• Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBs)
• DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
• DeepRoot
• Development Champions
• European Institute of Peace (EIP)
• Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)
• IHE-Delft Institute
• Open Society Foundations (OSF)
• Reos Partners
• Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• Your ECHO

The Hague, Netherlands – The second Yemen International Forum (YIF) came to a close on June 15, after four days of dialogue and workshops featuring a diverse group of local and international actors. The conference, hosted by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, is the largest of its kind, and welcomed more than two hundred and fifty delegates to address numerous issues related to the ongoing conflict in Yemen and pathways to an inclusive, just, and sustainable peace. The final day included sessions on transitional justice, economic reform, political transformation, and southern priorities, capping a comprehensive program examining transformative solutions to the country’s protracted crises.

Thanking participants for their valuable contributions to the conference, often after making a long and difficult trip, Waleed Alhariri, the Director of the Yemen International Forum, noted the diversity of the conference and its commitment to the underrepresented groups who lack a place at the table. “This forum was designed based on the aspirations of the Yemeni people, because the people of Yemen know its problems best,” he told the audience. “This is and always will be a platform for you, all Yemenis, and all marginalized groups, to discuss the future of their country.” Alhariri noted that the Sana’a Center’s work to facilitate and center Yemeni-Yemeni discussions was just getting started: “We won't stop here - the dialogue that we aspire to promote must remain a sustainable and evolving process of renewal.”

Rana Ghanem, Assistant Secretary General of the Nasserite Party and a member of the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission, spoke passionately about opportunities afforded by dialogue: “The war confirmed that there can be no victor from violence, and there is no way for us, as Yemenis, except to return to the dialogue table, and we must keep it permanently open to solve our problems and reach a just and sustainable peace.” Ghanem asserted that diplomacy and intervention could not succeed if they did not meet Yemenis’ aspirations for their own future, and asked participants to build on the work of recent days: “The implementation of the ideas, solutions, and visions proposed in this forum, to pave the way toward the future and plan for it, is a shared responsibility among all of us… that we may extricate our country from the devastation, destruction, and dispersion that has afflicted it, and move toward peace, security, and prosperity you deserve.”

During the closing remarks, Ghanem highlighted the participation of members of the Southern Transitional Council in this year’s forum as an indication of “their willingness to engage in bold dialogues that touch the roots of our problems in Yemen, foremost of which is the southern issue, to develop perceptions, proposals, and ideas to face all challenges and reach a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace for all.” She expressed regret that Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement) failed to “attend and participate in such dialogues and platforms that bring together Yemenis to think openly and freely about the peace we seek for our country, instead of continuing the intransigence and isolation that distances them every day from the different Yemeni spectra and components." 

Ghanem ended on a hopeful note, echoing a perception among participants that the conference represented the beginning of the broader movement for Yemenis to shape the narratives and parameters of a future settlement. “I hope the day comes when we achieve peace in my country, and we can talk about this forum as an inspiration for other people around the world.”

The closing session also saw the announcement of a declaration for justice and reconciliation, signed by over forty Yemeni NGOs. The declaration was a result of numerous discussions between local organizations to set common principles and address new and existing grievances in order to halt the cycles of violence in the country. Transitional justice was a major theme of this year’s forum, and Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center, discussed how the pre-forum consultations had informed the declaration: “The discussions stressed the importance of a victim-centered approach, so we must support them and design transitional justice centered on this approach.” Such work is extremely difficult in a country that remains politically and militarily divided, with generations of victims from the eight-year-old civil war and a series of conflicts in recent decades. Shuja El-Deen emphasized the importance of undertaking such efforts now, with an eye toward the country’s long-term stability and reconciliation: “Documentation must be addressed, as documentation is important not only for accountability, but most importantly, it is vital for memorializing and historical narrative.”

During the closing remarks of the forum, Mayor Jan van Zanen welcomed delegates to The Hague, the ‘City of Peace,’ and praised the inclusiveness of the talks: “Renewed efforts have been made to strengthen mutual trust, and mutual trust is always the start of community building: of living and working and studying and thinking in peace together.” Van Zanen said the city was honored to host the event: “You have my full and profound respect for your efforts and I am very proud that you chose to do this in our city.”

He joined other prominent international officials that addressed the participants over the four-day event, including H.E. Paul Huijts, Secretary General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; H.E. David Gressly, United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen; H.E. Ambassador Peter-Derrek Hof, Dutch Ambassador to Yemen; H.E. Guusje Korthals, Deputy MENA Director at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Gabriel Munuera-Viñals, EU Ambassador to Yemen; H.E. Sarhan Al-Minaikher, GCC Ambassador to Yemen; H.E. Hans Grundberg, UN Special Envoy for Yemen; and H.E. Wolfgang Amadeus Brülhart, Swiss Special Envoy to MENA.

The YIF 2023 was organized by the Sana’a Center of Strategic Studies, an independent think tank focused on Yemen, with the support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Union, the Kingdom of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. The first YIF, held in Stockholm in June 2022, was attended by over 200 Yemeni and international actors invested in the promotion of peace in Yemen.

The Hague, Netherlands – The third day of the Yemen International Forum (YIF) saw participants detailing the growing challenges faced by Yemeni women and environmental experts warn of increasing risks from climate change.

Over 250 participants from inside and outside Yemen, including members of the Yemeni government, party representatives, activists, civil society members, academics, diplomats, and international mediators, have come together in The Hague to discuss the current state of the conflict, with a particular focus on challenges and potential solutions related to politics, the environment, and transitional justice as part of a just and sustainable peace in Yemen. 

“The dignity of Yemeni women has been directly attacked,” said journalist Wedad al-Bedawi during the first plenary session of the day, describing the rollback of women’s freedoms and civil space during the conflict. These include requirements for a mahram (male guardian) to accompany women during travel and harassment of women working in the public sphere.

Al-Bedawi noted that the Forum provided a unique opportunity to convey the daily experiences of Yemeni women and discuss the critical issues of women’s participation and rights directly with the international community, as “the political parties don’t listen to us.”

Members of the panel unanimously called for the international community to adopt a different approach when it comes to their engagement in Yemen, notably the need to comprehensively confront oppressive measures enacted against women and gender-based violence. 

“I understand how difficult it is for aid agencies and the international community to work in Yemen,” said Sawsan al-Refai, a public policy and development expert. “But if it was easy we would not need the presence of the international community. The fact that the situation is difficult is not an excuse for the UN and the international community to not be present in the country.” 

A second plenary session focused on how climate change has compounded Yemen’s economic woes and human suffering, and explored how green investment could build resilience, promote sustainable development, and create new economic opportunities. 

Anwar Noman, an expert on climate change at the Yemeni Ministry of Water and Environment, noted that the country has witnessed an increase in extreme weather events such as cyclones and deadly floods, which have destroyed property and livelihoods. Floodwaters have swept landmines and unexploded ordnance into civilian areas, bedeviling removal efforts.

Panelists acknowledged Yemen’s challenges accessing international climate financing and explored avenues for unlocking such funds. “Most green financing takes the form of loans rather than grants… and there is a preference for large infrastructure projects,” said Leonie Nimmo from the Conflict and Environment Observatory. “These are barriers for conflict-affected states.”

Nimmo suggested combining remote data collection on the impact of climate change in Yemen with field data gathered by local communities, and conferring with potential donors on “what evidence they will accept.”

Another YIF session saw prominent Yemeni social figures and activists detail their experiences with local mediation, which has led to the release of thousands of detainees during the conflict, and discuss how the international community could better support such efforts. In a panel focused on security sector reform, Yemenis and international practitioners explored the pros and cons of local versus centralized control of armed forces, and how fighters could be reintegrated into civilian life and provided with economic opportunities in a post-conflict setting. 

Working groups were held focused on challenges facing the banking sector and the priorities of Yemenis from southern governorates. A scenario-building workshop on the potential for transitional justice processes in Yemen invited Yemeni and international stakeholders to engage in dialogue and envision different futures for the country. 

The YIF 2023 was organized by the Sana’a Center of Strategic Studies, an independent think tank focused on Yemen, with the support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Union, the Kingdom of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. The first YIF, held in Stockholm in June 2022, was attended by over 200 Yemeni and international actors invested in the promotion of peace in Yemen.

The Hague, the Netherlands – United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg opened the second day of the Yemen International Forum (YIF) with an address to more than 250 attendees, including some of Yemen’s most prominent political and civil actors. Grundberg noted that the ongoing informal truce between the warring sides has provided a respite from prolonged cycles of violence, but sounded a note of caution: “While the parties have taken some steps forward, they have unfortunately also taken some steps backward.” He noted that economic warfare had intensified, and said escalating retaliation was damaging Yemen’s already struggling economy, with devastating effects for civilians. 

Rafat al-Akhali, a fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University, echoed this concern in the first plenary session of the day, dedicated to creating a shared vision for economic recovery. Warning that the banking sector was on the brink of collapse, Al-Akhali cautioned, “If we lose our banking sector, our struggle will be immense.” The panel, which also included World Bank Country Manager for Yemen Tania Meyer and GCC Ambassador to Yemen H.E. Sarhan al-Minaikher, discussed the keys to facilitating Yemen’s transition to economic recovery, including moving beyond short-term interventions;  increasing Yemenis’ resilience; supporting the private sector; and investing in Yemen’s youth, whom Meyer called “Yemen’s greatest asset.” 

A later session discussed avenues for revitalizing Yemen’s agriculture and fisheries sectors. Participants underscored the unrealized potential in both sectors, and advocated for the development of a comprehensive strategy that encourages investment and brings together the private sector, the public sector, and donors. 

Other YIF sessions invited participants to exchange ideas on topics such as protecting minorities, building trust between communities and security forces, and the role of art in reimagining Yemen’s future. “In the last two years artists are getting more aware of their value and are starting to have an impact,” said one artist, adding that they are “not just doing it as a hobby;  art can be a tool to get a message across.”  

Two scenario-building workshops were held on Yemen’s security sector and women’s participation.  Scenario planning is gaining popularity as a tool to explore future uncertainties in conflict-affected countries. Utilizing this approach, Yemeni stakeholders were invited to engage in dialogue and envision different possible scenarios for the future of their country. Other bilateral and side meetings took place between participants, as well as working groups focused on challenges facing Yemen’s banking sector and the perspectives of the Southern Transitional Council. 

The YIF 2023 was organized by the Sana’a Center of Strategic Studies, an independent think tank focused on Yemen, with the support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Union, the Kingdom of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. The first YIF, held in Stockholm in June 2022, was attended by over 200 Yemeni and international actors invested in the promotion of peace in Yemen.

The Hague, the Netherlands — The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies launched its second Yemen International Forum in The Hague on Monday, with an appeal from the opening speakers for participants to use the rare gathering to begin thinking about practical steps toward a sustainable peace as the country stands at a crossroads after eight years of war. 

“What is it that we want to do here? We want to collectively create a possible path for a comprehensive, lasting, and unbreakable peace, a peace that, for the first time in Yemen’s history, is focused on justice and the addressing grievances for the victims of this and previous conflicts,” said Chairperson of the Sana’a Center Maged Al-Madhaji in the opening address at the Peace Palace, set up in 1913 to house international courts of arbitration and justice. 

Over 250 participants from inside and outside Yemen, including members of the Yemeni government, representatives of the various parties, activists, civil society members, academics, diplomats, and international mediators, have come to discuss the current state of the conflict, after a year of de-escalation that has kindled hopes of peace.

“The history of Yemen is present here,” said Waleed Alhariri, Director of The Yemen International Forum, referencing the 1998 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that ended a dispute between Yemen and Eritrea over the Greater Hanish island in the Red Sea.  “The Yemen International Forum is more than an annual conference,” said Alhariri.  “It is a process of ongoing consultations and engagement with various actors and peace practitioners.”

“After so many years of conflict, it may be hard to shift focus and start thinking about how a peaceful society could possibly emerge. But this is exactly what is needed. And this vision needs to emerge from within Yemen, not from elsewhere,” said Paul Huijts, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

David Gressly, the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, said Yemen had inched significantly closer to peace since the first YIF held in Stockholm last year: “That hope runs a little brighter today, though there is no guarantee.” 

Although a formal truce brokered by the UN lapsed in October last year, an informal truce has taken hold since then, while talks also began on establishing a formal peace process. 

“Many countries have gone through similar transitions from conflict to peace; some succeed, some don’t. Many struggled. I hope and believe Yemen will be that exception,” Gressly said, adding: “I have instructed our country team in Yemen to prepare for peace.” 

Ambassadors from the permanent member countries of the UN Security Council as well as representatives of Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other members of the international community will join the discussions at the forum alongside Yemeni political and civil actors. 

A host of plenaries, parallel sessions, and workshops will take place over the four days of the conference, from 12-15 June, during which participants will be encouraged to engage in constructive dialogue, exchange ideas, envision future scenarios for the country, and develop practical pathways toward peace in Yemen.

The first plenary session heard warnings of the need to address justice for victims of the war as the basis for a sustainable peace that avoids the risk of a return to conflict.

Amat Al-Salam Al-Hajj, director of the Abductees' Mothers Association, spoke passionately of the suffering of some 12,000 people seized by warring parties during the war, 8,000 of whom were released after undergoing severe physical and mental harm. 

“We as mothers will continue to advocate for and demand justice. There needs to be justice, and we will not remain silent,” Al-Hajj said, eliciting a round of applause from attendees. “Many mothers died before their sons were released. This is the disaster we are facing.” 

“I’d like to warn the local, regional, and international community,” she added. “If peace is to be real, comprehensive, and provide security and stability, there must be justice and redress. Otherwise, these victims are a ticking time bomb; the cycle of revenge and violence will continue.” 

The YIF 2023 is organized by the Sana’a Center of Strategic Studies, an independent think tank focused on Yemen, with the support of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Union, the Kingdom of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). The first YIF, held in Stockholm in June 2022, was attended by over 200 Yemeni and international actors invested in the promotion of peace in Yemen.

EU ambassador to Yemen Gabriel Munuera-Viñals told a second plenary session that he believed Yemen would remain an international priority. “As far as the European Union and its member states go, Yemen remains high on the agenda and the readiness is there to continue supporting and doing what we can."

The Hague, the Netherlands— The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies will launch its second Yemen International Forum (YIF II) on Monday, June 12, 2023, at the Peace Palace in The Hague.

Over 250 participants from inside and outside Yemen, including members of the Yemeni government, representatives of the various parties, activists, civil society members, academics, diplomats, and international mediators will congregate in The Hague to discuss peace efforts in Yemen and current and future issues facing the country.

“The YIF aims to contribute to building Yemeni ownership of the peace process, supporting Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue, and widening the conversation on peace in Yemen,” said Waleed Alhariri, Director of the YIF, with this year’s theme focusing on Pathways to Inclusive, Just, and Sustainable Peace.

H.E. Paul Huijts, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, David Gressly, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Samah Subay, a lawyer and human rights activist, and Maged Al-Madhaji, Chairperson of the Sana’a Center, will address the opening session.

Ambassadors from the permanent member countries of the UN Security Council as well as representatives of Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other members of the international community will join the discussions at the forum alongside Yemeni political and civil actors. A host of plenaries, parallel sessions, and workshops will take place over the four days of the conference, from 12-15 June, during which participants will be encouraged to engage in constructive dialogue, exchange ideas, envision future scenarios for the country, and develop practical pathways toward peace in Yemen.

The YIF 2023 is organized by the Sana’a Center of Strategic Studies, an independent think tank focused on Yemen, with the support of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union, the Government of Norway, Open Society Foundations, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). The first YIF was held in Stockholm in June 2022 and attended by over 200 Yemeni and international actors invested in the promotion of peace in Yemen.

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