اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية
Commentary by Salam Al-Harbi
Five years following the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition into the conflict in Yemen, the manifestations of destruction and war in the Yemeni capital Sana’a are evident. Intensive bombing by coalition aircraft in 2015, and to a lesser extent, lighter shelling during the subsequent war years damaged governmental and private structures. The Republican Palace, the president’s official residence, the army command headquarters and family homes of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh and some regime officials are no longer aesthetic attractions or formal landmarks, only ruins. In December 2017, Baghdad Street and the vicinity of Saleh’s house in Al-Thania neighborhood became part of a tapestry showcasing the aftermath of the war between the Houthis and their former ally. Checkpoints still exist all over the city, with the civilian attire of those manning them early in the war replaced by official uniforms after the Houthis took over the army and security services. In addition, armed men in tribal attire can still be seen wherever one looks.
The streets of Sana’a since 2015 have gradually turned into an exhibition of images of Houthi fighters killed in the war against the coalition, the internationally recognized government and Saleh. Walls of governmental buildings, schools, hospitals and ministries are adorned with Houthi religious slogans. Al-Sabeen Square and the Monument to the Unknown Soldier have been transformed from national republican symbols into a shrine for Saleh al-Sammad, former president of the Houthi-run Supreme Political Council and the most senior Houthi leader to have been killed in the war so far. Meanwhile, the car park surrounding Al-Saleh Mosque (renamed The People’s Mosque by the Houthis) has become an impound lot run by the Customs Authority, where owners must pay fees – in addition what was already paid when the vehicles crossed the border into Houthi-held territory – to release their vehicles.
Most public services, which were inadequate even before 2015, have almost completely disappeared under Houthi rule. Electricity and water were cut, and educational institutions were paralyzed after the suspension of public sector salaries in September 2016, with few exceptions. Hospitals now operate with budgets provided by international organizations. The rising price of fuel prices was one of the pretexts for the Houthi takeover of Sana’a; after years of intermittent fuel crises, the price has stabilized at double its cost in 2015, while the price of cooking gas has quadrupled since 2015. Obtaining gas also requires registering and queuing in front of the homes of the Aqel (Houthi neighborhood officials), who use this process to collect data on the population. Yemenis affiliated with the Houthis are rewarded with privileges in accessing services, while those who are not face obstacles — even if they do not explicitly oppose the movement.
On the other hand, Houthi affiliates have made large investments in these sectors, providing alternative services at double the price. Importing oil, distributing gas and generating electricity have become sources of obscene wealth for the group’s leaders. Meanwhile, private education has expanded due to lack of confidence in government educational institutions after most school principals were dismissed and replaced with followers of the Houthi movement. Moreover, unqualified Houthi volunteers were recruited to replace teachers who did not accept working without pay or those dismissed for anti-Houthi views.
After a halt to construction during the first year of the war, Sana’a has experienced a building boom. An unprecedented number of extremely lavish buildings have been constructed, especially on the outskirts of the city – mostly built by members of the Houthi movement as an outlet for their sudden wealth. Furthermore, currency exchange offices and money transfer companies have proliferated, mostly replacing banks whose activity has been constricted since the start of the war. The number of gas stations, freed from the complicated licensing requirements of the past, has also multiplied.
One of the reasons construction has flourished in Sana’a is the influx of displaced people from other regions of Yemen who fled armed clashes and frontlines, which increased demand for housing and, with it, rent prices. This is a reversal of the situation in 2015 when large waves of residents fled the city, leaving many houses and apartments empty. However, as frontlines and clashes shifted to other areas, Sana’a received hundreds of thousands of displaced people, particularly from Taiz, Hudaydah and Hajjah governorates. A senior source at the Ministry of Labor told the Sana’a Center that the city’s population, estimated at 3 million in 2015, had since doubled as a result of displacement.
Sana’a Becomes a Prison as Freedoms are Quashed
Popular demonstrations, such an integral part of the 2011 revolution, have vanished from Sana’a; only mobilization by the Houthis is permitted. No one has considered starting a demonstration in protest or to demand human rights since an attempt in October 2018, when the men and women who organized it were arrested and tortured. However, the Houthi movement mobilizes when and as it likes, filling the squares on religious occasions or to affirm political positions adopted by the group. The last time a public event was held that was not organized by the Houthi group was when supporters of Saleh and the former ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) gathered in August 2017.
Walking through the streets of Sana’a, one invariably sees the latest car models, but struggles to find a recent edition of a book in any library. Books are no longer imported into Yemen, and most bookstore owners have replaced their bookshops with other businesses. Newspapers have almost completely disappeared; instead of the dozens of daily or weekly newspapers that were published in Sana’a prior to the Houthi takeover, there are only about five newspapers today — all of which are affiliated with the Houthis, and people are not keen to buy them. Print and electronic media in Yemen have been massacred, with journalists arrested, pursued, persecuted and left unemployed. Local radio and satellite channels have been directed toward supporting the Houthi war effort, with the exception of two radio stations that have survived by not addressing public affairs.
There are no longer any political activities in Sana’a, with the exception of limited meetings of the remaining members of the GPC in Sana’a, who are subject to supervision and direction by the Houthis. This followed the Houthi takeover of the party’s headquarters and its media in December of 2017 after disposing of its former ally, Ali Abdullah Saleh. A single doctrine has been imposed on the capital; anyone suspected of opposing Houthi policies is arrested and most political leaders have fled Houthi-held territory, either to areas outside the group’s control in Yemen or abroad.
Absolute Domination Within State Institutions
Since 2015, the Houthis have gradually consolidated their control over the capital and the state institutions in it. This began when they formed the popular committees and imposed the informal authority of the group’s supervisors (mushrif) over these institutions. They then worked to consolidate their partnership with the GPC to take advantage of its human resources, relationships and popularity. The Houthis stacked civil and military institutions with loyalists in parallel with the expulsion and exclusion of public servants affiliated with parties opposing the group and former president Saleh, such as the Islamist Islah party. Members of the GPC were next on the chopping block as a concerted effort was made by the Houthis to remove party affiliates from public institutions without disrupting their activity and to attract former GPC members to the movement. This continued until the Houthis’ relationship with Saleh and his party reached the breaking point in December 2017, when direct clashes ended with Saleh’s killing and the designation of all of his supporters and GPC members as targets for arrest, assassination or exclusion from the public service. Since consolidating unilateral power in Sana’a two years ago, Houthi commanders, particularly those closely affiliated with its leader, have dominated decision-making, from within these institutions and from outside. Those whose undivided loyalty comes into question are swiftly and quietly eliminated, often by accusing them of treason or collaboration with the coalition (the “aggressor” as they describe it), which was recently the case for a number of intelligence officers.
At the same time, because it is extremely difficult to maintain control over all of these public positions, especially those requiring specialized human resources, the group has sought to informally incorporate public sector employees through a systematic plan it calls “cultural courses”. These sessions – exclusively for men – are held according to the status of the person and the nature of his work, in closed and isolated places whose locations are unknown even to those who attend them. Before departing to these courses, all of the person’s belongings, even watches and phones, are confiscated, and they are transported in blacked-out cars to locations where they receive religious lectures from Houthi figures. These “courses” may last for several days or even weeks, during which time participants’ responses are monitored and their loyalty is assessed. Attendees may come out of them with the trust of the group and win promotions within the public institutions, or they may have to repeat the courses several times and their workplace mandates are diminished.
In recent years, especially after breaking with Saleh and the GPC, the group has begun articulating and imposing its religiously-based ideology more forcefully. It has imposed gender segregation in public places, schools, universities and even restaurants, and has begun harassing women on the basis of their clothing. Whenever the group finds that the public does not accept certain restrictions, the Houthis claim the policies are the actions of individuals and temporarily retract them, only to try to implement them again later, such as the attempts to impose the niqab on female students at the university and the ban women from wearing pants with belts.
Through the group’s repressive policies, revenues to official institutions have multiplied. Merchants are targets for extortion on any occasion relevant to the group (such as religious holidays like the Prophet Mohammed’s birthday), or according to the whims of Houthi leaders. The aggregation of illegitimate wealth by members of the Houthi movement has become one of the most prominent features of life in Sana’a since 2015. Conversely, the group has abandoned all its obligations toward citizens as a de facto authority. The salaries of public sector employees are not being paid, poverty rates and the suffering of vulnerable citizens are on the rise, and expressing an opinion has become the fastest route to detention centers. Schools, mosques, radio stations, television channels, newspapers and universities have all been rendered means of spreading the group’s beliefs and combating all others. Propaganda and intimidation are the most important tools at the group’s disposal, and are used to impose and maintain their grip on Sana’a and across northern Yemen.
Salam Al-Harbi is a resident of Sana’a whose true identity is being withheld for security reasons.
This commentary appeared in Five Years Since Decisive Storm – The Yemen Review, March 2020.
The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies is an independent think-tank that seeks to foster change through knowledge production with a focus on Yemen and the surrounding region. The Center’s publications and programs, offered in both Arabic and English, cover diplomatic, political, social, economic, military, security, humanitarian and human rights related developments, aiming to impact policy locally, regionally, and internationally.