Yemenis have always known that the country’s politics are riven with corruption, but there’s nothing quite like scandalous revelations in the press to bring the point home. Tensions between the prime minister and president and a prolonged standoff between two veteran bureaucrats seem to have been the catalyst for a flood of media leaks that have dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s for observers and ordinary citizens alike on the deep corruption afflicting the state.
News media has published details from leaked official reports detailing corruption in the telecoms sector, lavish spending at the consulate in Jeddah and other diplomatic missions, and the establishment of a US$2.8 billion commercial entity in an Omani duty-free zone by state oil firm PetroMasila. And it’s not just the government in Aden – the Houthis have also been hit by corruption revelations, including leaks by a US-based social media influencer concerning misuse of funds at the central bank in Sana’a.
This is clearly just the tip of the iceberg. In 2023, a government report called the collapsing electricity sector, which cost a whopping US$2.27 billion to manage in 2022 alone, a “black hole swallowing public money as a result of corruption.” Government jobs have become sinecures in a quota system in which positions are parceled out to political factions. And some bureaucrats have been able to acquire inordinate power – one of the officials under investigation was acting chairman of the Land Authority alongside his main job as director of the prime minister’s office, the kind of stacking up of posts that opens the door to cronyism and grift.
Corruption has had catastrophic consequences for both public and donor confidence in the government. One reason Saudi Arabia has tightened funding over the past two years is concern over how its largesse is misspent in Aden and other areas under government control. Over the past two months, donor governments have begun to press for more action on the issue after the prime minister complained to diplomats about financial corruption in the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). As a result, there is now pressure on PLC members to spend more time in Aden, where the public can see them doing their jobs.
Conditions in government-controlled areas are dire, and while there are many factors at play, such as the Houthi blockade on oil exports and the deterioration of the economy, the deepening dysfunction of state institutions visibly impacts citizens in their daily lives. Officials blatantly acting in pursuit of personal gain or out of partisan interest have critically eroded people’s faith in the system. Some governorates are considering alternatives as the ship sinks in Aden, with Hadramis now aggressively pushing for greater local control.
Perhaps the worst consequence of corrupt governance has been the propaganda win it has handed to the Houthis. Despite the violence meted out to dissenters, the crushing of independent entities, including the judiciary, and the outrageous levels of revenue extraction the Sana’a authorities impose on an impoverished population – the corrupt, fractious government in Aden holds little appeal as a viable alternative. Yemenis and donors alike are increasingly losing patience.
Houthi authorities are aware of this, and it’s a key reason why they were able to start talks with Riyadh in which the government had no say. Faced with the results of their failure to rule, some members of the creaky anti-Houthi coalition have tried to use Houthi actions over Gaza to persuade external players to support a return to war. The risk remains that international players will simply lose interest in propping up a corrupt government, leaving an emboldened regime in Sana’a forever threatening a fragmented south.
In short, the government desperately needs to improve its standing if it wants to avoid such outcomes, and the root of the problem is internal corruption. The PLC tasked the Central Organization for Control and Accounting with probing the recently revealed corruption cases; it is imperative that these investigations are serious, neutral, and transparent.
From now on, political and bureaucratic appointments must be on the basis of merit. Senior leaders ought to be seen acting above the political fray and in the national interest. The parliament in Aden should be allowed to assume its full supervisory functions. Foreign pressure can do some good by squeezing top officials to make this happen.
With the Houthis boxed in by the Trump administration’s Foreign Terrorist Organization redesignation, now is the time for the government to step up, clean up its act, and present a real alternative to the group. It’s little exaggeration to say that the elimination of corruption is crucial to the future administrative and territorial integrity of the Yemeni state.