اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربيةThe Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) seizure of Yemen’s southeastern governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra in early December marked a dangerous turning point, plunging Yemen into a political crisis with far-reaching regional implications. The STC’s rapid expansion — backed by the UAE and driven by its long-standing ambition to declare a southern state — posed a direct threat to the security of neighboring Saudi Arabia and Oman, at a particularly sensitive moment for the region. The move stoked anxiety among most regional states, already wary of the rising tide of fragmentation.
Yemen appears to have avoided the worst-case scenario of becoming the scene of a long-term regional battlefield between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The swift military resolution of the situation in early January has lifted the threat of another war in a country already worn down by a decade of conflict. The challenge now for the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia is how to turn this rapid resolution into sustainable stability.
Recent years have taught us several lessons. Foremost among them is that a state of stalemate, accompanied by fragility, insecurity, and political divisions among government factions, is not a viable formula for managing or resolving the conflict. The time has come to move beyond reactive policies of containment and crisis management and tackle the underlying structural issues fueling the conflict.
The latest developments have laid bare how closely Yemen’s fate is intertwined with that of its neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia, given their long, shared border and deep social and historical ties. The Kingdom’s standing as an influential regional power and a guarantor of regional security has been tested in Yemen, which has effectively fallen entirely under its sphere of influence in the wake of recent events. What comes next will be a decisive test of Riyadh’s leadership and its ability to navigate regional realignments, a task that can only be met by drawing from past lessons.
Saudi Arabia has historically wielded extensive influence over Yemeni politics by leveraging a wide-reaching network of tribal and social ties. Yet the confrontation with the UAE, and its unprecedented implications for Saudi regional influence, have exposed the limits of this approach. Relationships with patronage networks and non-state actors have proven to be liabilities rather than assets. Investing in Yemeni state institutions to protect them from fragility is ultimately a strategic necessity for both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The present moment, therefore, demands a reframing of the Saudi-Yemeni relationship, grounded in realistic expectations that safeguard the interests of both nations and enhance the cohesion and efficiency of the Yemeni state.
Despite ongoing risks, the current situation presents a crucial opportunity to empower and unite the Yemeni government, whose political and economic capacities were deeply undermined by the divide between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This divide left Yemen with a fractured and dysfunctional government, and the UAE’s sudden departure has now created a political vacuum while numerous political, security, and economic issues remain unaddressed. If these are not managed effectively and taken into account when drafting political settlements, they could become flashpoints for future conflict, jeopardizing stability, security, and social cohesion.
The situation in the southern governorates remains precarious. The STC continues to command a large popular base, particularly in its strongholds in Al-Dhalea and Lahj, including the Radfan and Yafea regions. Beyond the STC, a broader southern constituency spans all governorates, with varying degrees of support for secession, including in the East. This segment of the population harbors deep anxieties about the marginalization and the perceived liquidation of the Southern Cause. The hasty decision to dissolve the STC from Riyadh has fueled fears of exclusion, political marginalization, and even retaliation, reviving past southern grievances.
The planned South-South dialogue conference in Riyadh presents a crucial opportunity to dispel these fears, provided the Southern Cause is approached with care. Southern actors and concerns must not be dismissed, marginalized, or subjected to retaliation. Nor should the conference become a platform to negate the cause or favor one perspective over another. Instead, it should affirm Southerners’ right to determine their future peacefully, without hindering the process of a comprehensive Yemeni settlement.
More broadly, the recent developments appear to have brought an end to the divisions that long paralyzed the government. But this must not open the door to the return of unilateral governance. It is essential that all existing factions are represented and have a role in decision-making. At the same time, power-sharing arrangements should not come at the expense of the government’s ability to effectively manage state affairs and people’s livelihoods. Any future political arrangement must be anchored in clear legal and constitutional frameworks and uphold constitutional legitimacy — not only to regulate its functions, but to mark the boundary between state and non-state actors. Empowering and supporting official institutions requires resisting the temptation to create new political or bureaucratic structures. Instead, appointments should follow established legal frameworks and administrative practices, supported by robust oversight and accountability mechanisms to combat corruption.
However, reform cannot succeed in isolation from economic recovery. Yemen needs substantial economic support from its allies—delivered through official institutions rather than parallel or external frameworks. Improving the living conditions in government-controlled areas is not only a humanitarian imperative but a key prerequisite to restoring public trust. A functioning model of stability and service delivery in these areas would not only ease public frustration but also send a powerful message to Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas, demonstrating the difference between state authority and the governance of non-state groups.
To restore its credibility as a useful vector for financial support, the Yemeni government must seize this golden opportunity to improve its performance, fulfill its responsibilities towards its people, end internal divisions, and curb corruption and the negative practices that have plagued it since the start of the conflict. Doing so will solidify its position as an indispensable principal actor in Yemen’s conflict and its resolution.
These efforts must also contend with the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen, which has left significant gaps in the security, military, and service-provision sectors across vast areas, including in counterterrorism. Ensuring that UAE-sponsored military forces are integrated and their salaries paid, alongside maintaining the operation of services previously funded by the UAE, such as hospitals in Socotra, Shabwa, and Al-Makha, is crucial to the country’s stability.
Yemenis are ultimately all too familiar with the risks of political transition, as evidenced by the tumultuous experiences of 1990–1993 and 2012–2014. Periods of transition come with both the potential of a better future and the risk of descending into greater turmoil. Yemen stands at such a crossroads today. If the Yemeni actors leading this transition fail to demonstrate the competence and accountability required, the country’s narrow escape from the conflict that loomed just a month ago will be short-lived. Ultimately, national survival depends on the willingness of all Yemeni forces to engage at this pivotal moment and commit to the resurrection of inclusive state institutions capable of addressing the longstanding grievances of their constituents.