The outbreak of violent protests across Hadramawt since late July has plunged the region into chaos, as political, military, and tribal groups vie for control of Yemen’s largest governorate. Persistent fuel shortages have caused severe blackouts in the capital, Mukalla, and other cities across Hadramawt, as hundreds of people have taken to the streets for weeks of protests. Chief among the protestors’ grievances has been failing public services, primarily severe electricity and water shortages. While security forces have attempted to restore order, and electricity provision has improved, continuing widespread demonstrations and the lack of a coordinated response from Hadramawt’s milieu of political actors point to a deeper and more systemic crisis. Recent developments have left many reconsidering the future of local leadership and the governorate’s position within the broader Yemeni context.
At the heart of the political struggle in Hadramawt stands tribal sheikh and deputy governor Amr bin Habrish, whose leadership of the powerful Al-Hamoum tribe has propelled his meteoric rise in politics and established him as one of the governorate’s most influential figures. Through his affiliate organizations, the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) and the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC), Bin Habrish has challenged the authority of other influential actors across Hadramawt. These include the General People’s Congress (GPC)-aligned governor Mabkhout bin Madi, the Islah-affiliated 1st Military Region, the Saudi-funded Nation’s Shield Forces under the command of President Leadership Council (PLC) head Rashad al-Alimi, and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), 2nd Military Region, and Hadrami Elite forces. Bin Habrish’s rapid ascent has unsettled his opponents as he continues to rally support for an ambitious political project.
A Looming Blackout and Rising Dissent
Protests in Mukalla, which is primarily under the control of the STC and Hadrami Elite forces, are not a new phenomenon. For more than a year, the city has endured persistent electricity outages caused by fuel shortages, making daily life a challenge for the nearly one-third of Hadrawmawt’s population that reside there. The coastal capital has been the scene of demonstrations denouncing corruption, demanding improved economic conditions, and calling for better public services. Perhaps no Hadrami leader has capitalized on this discontent more than Bin Habrish, who has used his vast tribal network to wrest control of the oil supply chain in a bid to exert political leverage over Mukalla and Aden, which is suffering from its own electricity crisis. In little more than a year, he has gone from organizing makeshift tribal checkpoints that blockade oil tankers to leading a full-fledged political movement complete with its own military arm and even aspirations to form an autonomous Hadramawt. While his supporters hail these moves as efforts to increase transparency and localize control of the governorates’ resources, his repeated attempts to hold fuel hostage, often at the expense of Hadramis themselves, have led many to question his motives.
A tense situation was made worse when, in early July, highland areas in Mukalla such as Rabwat al-Muhandisin, Al-Dees Shaab al-Badiya, the Ba’jamaan neighborhood, and Rabwat Khalaf began to experience extreme water shortages. Residents, frustrated by what they called an unfair distribution of resources and the negligence of the local authority, protested by cutting off water supplies to other areas. The government-run Public Water and Sanitation Corporation attributed the shortages to insufficient fuel supplies, which echoed warnings of an impending electricity blackout from the local authority. Such finger-pointing did little more than deepen public distrust, as the lack of water and dwindling fuel reserves at power plants – critically low by late July – underscored the local authority’s limited and declining ability to provide for citizens’ basic needs.
In the absence of any official response, a group of volunteer community leaders intervened to form an emergency negotiating committee on July 25, calling themselves the Escalation Committee for the Youth and People of Mukalla. With no formal mandate or authority, the committee traveled to the HTA stronghold of Ghayl bin Yameen district to broker a deal with Bin Habrish for additional fuel supplies. According to sources present at the meeting, negotiations initially appeared promising as Bin Habrish pledged to provide Mukalla with sufficient diesel shipments, but these never materialized. The HTA has repeatedly contended that the local authorities have misrepresented how much fuel Mukalla and other cities need and receive, a problem it has attempted to remedy by closely tracking the delivery of fuel trucks to power stations via a daily bulletin.
As diesel supplies dwindled over the following two days, political infighting continued to paralyze any potential intervention. On July 27, the local authority announced that a complete blackout in Mukalla was imminent and attempted to shift blame to the HTA, but instead sparked a wave of recriminations. A member of the Escalation Committee accused the local authority and the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) of obstructing the delivery of petroleum products by failing to issue necessary permits,[1] which was denied by the Hadramawt Coast branch of the YPC.. While well-intentioned, the initiative by the Escalation Committee is reflective of Hadrami politics today, in which ad-hoc groups, often lacking organizational experience, frequently exacerbate instability and division rather than resolve it. Amid the political bickering, fuel supplies in Mukalla were quickly depleted and, on July 27, the city was plunged into near-total darkness, with power cuts extending up to 20 hours per day in some areas, and others witnessing a full 48-hour blackout.
Discord Erupts Across Multiple Cities
By the morning of July 28, angry protestors had blocked Mukalla’s main roads and stormed a local authority building. Government complexes shut down, and private businesses shuttered their doors as the city descended into chaos. Although Mukalla has experienced similar protests in the past, outbursts have typically been quickly contained. This time, however, none of the local security forces intervened during the first 24 hours – a first for the city and a clear sign of the breakdown of coordination between local authorities, community committees, police forces, and military units. By evening the following day, protesters were roaming across the city, burning car tires, and forcibly closing shops.
Even when security forces finally intervened the following day, the response was weak, uncoordinated, and largely reactive. The Hadrami Elite forces, who initially refrained from confronting demonstrators, deployed around the city’s main roads, as protestors raided an electricity plant and destroyed a military vehicle. Security forces deployed more systematically on the third day, and by the end of the week, were reopening roads with the help of local community leaders. In the ensuing chaos, rumors abounded of armed individuals opening fire on military police, and vice versa.
Protests spread to other cities in the Coastal and Valley regions, including Seyoun, Tarim, Shibam, Al-Qatn, Ghayl ba Wazir, and even the Al-Hamoum stronghold of Al-Shihr. A civilian was killed in Tarim on July 30 when security forces attempting to disperse protestors fired shots into the crowd. Police claimed the incident was accidental and have promised to investigate, but it quickly sparked a new wave of outrage and demonstrations. In other cities, protestors blocked main roads and prevented the entrance of qat and other supplies.
In a desperate attempt to contain the crisis, a new delegation called the Community Committee was formed at the recommendation of the former director-general of Mukalla district, Salem bin al-Sheikh Abubakr, to inspect power stations, monitor fuel shipments, and hold talks with Bin Habrish. Negotiations secured an emergency diesel shipment from the HTA, restoring electricity to Mukalla on a rolling two-hours-on, two-hours-off basis. By then, however, the demonstrations had taken on a life of their own, and protestors had continued to roam the streets even after electricity was restored. Demonstrations have occurred on a more sporadic basis in August, as citizens stand firm in their calls for the improvement of services and increased government transparency.
No single entity seems to have instigated the protests – demonstrators burned photos of STC leader Aiderous al-Zubaidi, Governor Bin Madi, and HTA leader Bin Habrish – but several groups have tried to capitalize on their momentum, releasing statements warning of the consequences of political neglect. Leaders from both the STC and the HTA condemned security interventions, framing them as attacks against civilians.
Looking Forward: The Future of Hadramawt’s Political Scene
While the recent protests have underscored an unprecedented level of social and political discord in Hadramawt, they have also shown local unity in confronting major local players. Within a matter of days, protests spread to nearly all of Hadramawt’s major cities, challenging STC-, Islah-, and HIC-backed authorities. The depth of public discontent, while tragic, has cut across political, tribal, and regional divides and is challenging political norms in Hadramawt.
But while the protests champion a legitimate cause, the risk of malignant groups taking advantage of the chaos remains a real possibility. Early on, the local authority’s Security Committee warned of intelligence indicating that malicious actors, including Al-Qaeda operatives and Houthi infiltrators, were attempting to use the demonstrations as cover to target military personnel and incite further unrest. In a rare statement on such a local event, Al-Qaeda later released a video praising the demonstrations and urging protestors in Hadramawt and Mukalla, which the group controlled in 2015-16, to rise up against government oppression.
For its part, the STC suffered a significant setback. The group failed to co-opt protestors to serve its political agenda and wave the southern flag, and public calls for the withdrawal of STC-affiliated forces reflect resentment on the ground. The HIC, whose followers actively fueled protests by urging demonstrators to storm government buildings on social media, likely stands to benefit from the STC’s diminished standing, consolidating its newly established role as a key broker in Hadramawt’s shifting political landscape.
Behind the scenes, the unrest in Hadramawt has fueled speculation over changes in the local authority’s leadership. Several tribal sheikhs, via the HIC, submitted a formal letter to PLC chief Al-Alimi, calling for the dismissal of Governor Bin Madi. The latter’s return to Mukalla on August 9 (after a nearly four-month absence from the governorate) has helped move forward stalled projects and restore water services, but is unlikely to establish lasting calm. Combined with the local authority’s failure to respond to the crisis, the governor’s absence precipitated a political vacuum in Mukalla that rivals are now keen to exploit.
Among those floated as potential successors is Deputy Governor for Valley and Desert Affairs Essam bin Habrish al-Kathiri, who is backed by a bloc of tribal sheikhs led by Abdullah bin Saleh al-Kathiri, a prominent leader of the influential Al-Kathir tribe and member of both the government’s Shura Council and the Hadramawt National Council.[2] Another contender is Akram al-Amiri, Vice Chairman of the government’s Consultation and Reconciliation Commission (CRC) and Secretary-General of the HIC, who has the support of several prominent members of the group. Some have even speculated that Bin Habrish himself could be under consideration, though a past plan to install him was reportedly shelved following opposition from an unidentified member of the PLC. Perhaps the worst outcome would be the selection of a compromise figure who is acceptable to competing factions but incapable of implementing reforms or addressing the structural drivers of instability.
Most concerning is the possibility of the political battle turning kinetic. Multiple actors, each with competing domestic agendas and divided among UAE- and Saudi-backed forces, now race to claim the mantle of Hadramawt’s voice. Such entrenched divisions risk raising tensions to the brink of confrontation, as in 2023 when UAE-backed forces faced pushback after moving a battalion toward Seyoun. Should Bin Habrish feel endangered, he could seek alliances with the Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield forces or Salafi groups to expand his influence. He has already turned to Riyadh once, despite previously signaling a reluctance to do so. Ultimately, without a political settlement, Hadramawt’s competing power centers may increasingly test one another’s limits, blurring the lines between rhetoric and reality, and risking a dangerous slide toward a more confrontational and volatile phase.
This analysis was produced as part of the Supporting Political Dialogue for Peace in Yemen program, implemented by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and CMI-Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation, and funded by the European Union.