Politics and Diplomacy

New US Administration Increases Pressure Against the Houthis

The year-long Houthi (Ansar Allah) campaign of military attacks on Red Sea shipping came to a halt on January 19, following news of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza. Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi announced a conditional suspension of the attacks on US- and UK-affiliated shipping as long as Western airstrikes in Yemen ceased. However, the group said Israeli-linked vessels would still be barred from Red Sea transit and threatened to resume attacks if the Gaza ceasefire deal was broken. Two days into the ceasefire, the Houthis released the crew of the Galaxy Leader, a cargo ship the group had hijacked in November 2023. Houthi officials said the move came at the request of Hamas and Omani mediators.

Despite the Houthi pause in maritime attacks, on January 22, newly inaugurated US President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing Secretary of State Marco Rubio to begin the process of redesignating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), to be finalized within 45 days. The State Department issued the formal redesignation on March 4, emphasizing the group’s targeting of US ships while sparing Chinese vessels. The Treasury Department subsequently issued six exemptions—covering food, medicine, remittances, fuel offloading, port operations, and diplomatic activities—and added sanctions on two entities and eight individuals, including Houthi political leaders and negotiators based in Oman. The move followed sanctions in the final days of the Biden administration on the Sana’a-based Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment, accusing it of facilitating Houthi money laundering and transactions linked to Iran. Houthi authorities reportedly responded by placing the bank’s leadership under house arrest to prevent them from relocating to Aden. The FTO replaced Biden’s January 2024 designation of the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity, which imposed sanctions while allowing humanitarian operations in Houthi-controlled areas. In the final days of Trump’s first term, the administration designated the Houthis as an FTO, but this was revoked shortly after Biden took office.

The Houthi suspension of shipping attacks did not stop the group’s ongoing detention of humanitarian, civil society, and other workers with alleged links to foreign powers. On January 25, UN Secretary-General António Guterres confirmed that Houthi forces had detained at least seven more UN employees, including staff from the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF. UN agencies temporarily suspended staff movement in Houthi-controlled areas, which Houthi officials said amounted to a violation of Yemen’s sovereignty. On February 11, the WFP confirmed the death of one of its staff members, an IT operations manager named Ahmed Baalawi, while he was in Houthi detention. The WFP was criticized for choosing not to publicly attribute blame for the employee’s abduction and death. The UN would later suspend all operations in Sa’ada governorate, the Houthi heartland, citing a lack of security and guarantees. Earlier in the month, Houthi forces also detained two former US embassy employees, Riyadh al-Saeedi and Mohammed Hussein al-Shalali, as well as former UK embassy employee Yahya al-Yemeni, during raids on their homes.

On February 23, a Houthi delegation attended the funeral of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, Lebanon. The head of the Houthi-aligned Yemen Religious Scholars Association, Mufti Shamseddine Sharafeddine, was among the high-level Houthi figures present. Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi held a memorial service in Sana’a the same day. In response to Houthi-affiliated reports claiming 27,000 Yemenis attended the funeral, pro-government Yemeni media said flights from Sana’a in the preceding days could not have accounted for the thousands of Yemenis in attendance and alleged a Houthi military brigade working with Hezbollah was already present in Lebanon.

US airstrikes on Houthi targets resumed on March 15, following the group’s announcement on March 11 that it would restart attacks on Israeli-linked shipping in response to Israel’s blockade of humanitarian aid into Gaza (see Military and Security). The US government has presented the airstrikes in Yemen as an effort to rein in Iran’s influence on the group. Trump warned on his Truth Social platform on March 18 that any future Houthi maritime attacks would be treated as Iranian actions and met with “dire consequences.” However, he later announced that the administration had agreed to negotiations with Iran over its nuclear weapons program. An initial meeting took place in Muscat on April 12, during which Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff discussed the positions of their respective governments. A second round is scheduled for April 19 in Muscat.

Overall, the US attacks do not seem to have taken out a significant tier of Houthi senior military leadership. The confirmed targeting of mid-level field commanders will have created problems for the Houthi operations, but the US is still far from incapacitating the group. The show of force was marred by a public relations fiasco when an Atlantic reporter revealed that Trump’s National Security Advisor Mike Waltz had inadvertently added him to a Signal chat discussing planning for missile strikes. The Yemeni embassy in Washington has publicly supported the US strikes and suggested reopening military efforts to retake the port of Hudaydah, which media reports suggest could be imminent. Tareq Saleh, commander of the National Resistance forces and a member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), has also voiced support for the US airstrikes, calling for precision and broader efforts to cut off Houthi funding. He discussed these topics in a call with US Ambassador to Yemen Steven Fagin and reiterated past statements that Yemen could follow Syria in ousting its regime. The broader PLC has not issued a formal statement on US military action.

Growing Rift Between the PLC Chief and Prime Minister

The struggle over executive control between PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi and Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak came to the fore in late January. Upon Bin Mubarak’s return from a high-profile visit to the US, during which he met with senior US officials at the World Bank, USAID, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and held a call with Secretary of State Rubio. Abdelwahhab al-Hajri, an ally of both Al-Alimi and Tareq Saleh, was appointed to replace Yemen’s ambassador to the US, Mohammed al-Hadhrami. The STC did not oppose the appointment, which was confirmed by the US and seen as a win for Al-Alimi. Bin Mubarak, who appointed al-Hadhrami as ambassador while serving as foreign minister, reportedly only learned of the replacement through US channels. Al-Alimi also pushed through additional ambassadorial appointments, including Luay al-Eryani to Germany and Ezz al-Din Said Ahmed to the Arab League.

In response to the Trump administration’s FTO designation of the Houthis, Al-Alimi sent Minister of Information Muammar al-Eryani to Washington, where he met with government and military officials and advocated for sanctions and media bans on the Houthis. While Secretary of State Rubio had earlier discussed the FTO with Bin Mubarak, implementation mechanisms and policy responses are still opaque. The EU has expressed hesitation over labeling the Houthis as terrorists due to associated legal constraints, but has shown growing openness to supporting the government’s security capabilities in light of the Red Sea attacks.

Amid the infighting, Saudi Arabia convened PLC members in Riyadh to address tensions between Al-Alimi and Bin Mubarak, and Western diplomats warned that failure to resolve internal disputes could jeopardize international support. Al-Alimi had earlier emphasized that all government institutions must operate from inside Yemen, a message echoed by donor countries. However, security concerns in STC-controlled Aden have kept many officials abroad. In a late January speech, STC-aligned Aden Security Belt commander Jalal al-Rubaie alleged assassination and kidnapping plots targeting the prime minister and his cabinet. PLC sources denied the claims.

Meanwhile, the interim capital Aden continued to face widespread blackouts, prompting protests in several districts. The collapse of basic services—including electricity, water, and healthcare—reflects the combined effects of internal dysfunction, erratic Saudi financial support, and the ongoing Houthi blockade on oil exports. Bin Mubarak and PLC members have traded blame for the crisis, fueling calls for the prime minister’s replacement. Despite the pressure from PLC members, Saudi Arabia has continued to back Bin Mubarak, arguing he should remain in office until at least the end of 2025. Western diplomats have echoed this view, noting that replacing him now, amid a corruption scandal implicating two key aides, would be destabilizing. Names floated as possible replacements include Foreign Minister Shayea al-Zindani, Finance Minister Salem bin Breik, Planning Minister Waed Badhib, and Central Bank Governor Ahmed Ghaleb al-Maabqi. Discussions in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also include a more radical proposal to restructure the PLC into a smaller executive body. Al-Alimi’s future in such an arrangement remains unclear. Tensions were further compounded by reports that Bin Mubarak had shared documentation on PLC-linked financial corruption with Western diplomats and possibly Saudi officials. The resulting rift has deepened mistrust between the PLC and the prime minister.

On March 7, only three ministers attended a cabinet meeting called by Bin Mubarak at Al-Maashiq Palace in Aden, with 21 others boycotting—a stark sign of the prime minister’s isolation. Three days later, Al-Alimi returned to Aden after a four-month absence and directed Bin Mubarak to issue a circular requiring ministers and senior officials to obtain written permission before leaving Aden. Meanwhile, a leaked report published on March 12 revealed that PLC members collectively receive over US$2.98 million in monthly salaries, totaling more than US$104 million since April 2022, not including aid or expenses. The revelation has sparked public outrage amid deepening poverty, service collapse, and widespread corruption, threatening to further undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Tribal Bloc Emerges as Major Player in Hadramawt Crisis

On January 7, the PLC announced a plan to “normalize” the situation in Hadramawt in order to ease mounting tensions in the oil-rich governorate, where tribes led by Deputy Governor Amr bin Habrish have spent months calling for greater local autonomy. The plan originally included building two power plants fueled by Hadrami oil, integrating Hadramis into government security forces, and investigating potential corruption at the state-run PetroMasila oil company. Revenues from PetroMasila would also fund the construction of a new hospital. The plan emerged from a four-man PLC committee formed in August 2023 following an unpopular visit to the governorate by PLC chief Al-Alimi. Its announcement was issued shortly after reports about the formation of a new military force by the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), led by Bin Habrish.

On January 14, PLC member and former Hadramawt governor Faraj al-Bahsani walked out of a council meeting in protest over the lack of progress in implementing the January 7 normalization pledges. A day later, the HTA criticized the PLC for failing to produce a timeline for executing its promises. The Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC), also led by Bin Habrish, reiterated its call for self-rule, emphasizing that political, administrative, and security control should be locally determined. Amid ongoing economic dysfunction, Hadrami actors have increasingly emulated the autonomy exercised by groups like the STC in Aden and Tareq Saleh’s forces on the West Coast. Despite the animosity with the central government, the HTA announced on February 17 that it would resume fuel transfers to the interim capital during Ramadan, citing “humanitarian and fraternal” concern for Aden’s residents, who were facing prolonged power outages.

The February 27 unveiling of the Hadramawt Protection forces, a new military unit comprised largely of Hadrami tribesmen (see Military and Security), further complicated matters after UAE-backed groups in southern Hadramawt, including the 2nd Military Region and the Hadramawt Coastal Security Administration, condemned the new forces as destabilizing and a threat to the unity of existing Hadrami security structures. On March 6, Hadramawt Coast Police issued arrest warrants for six HTA leaders—including presidium member Sheikh Khaled Mohsen al-Amiri—on charges related to an attempt to seize oil tankers. The move was initiated at the request of PLC member Al-Bahsani, reflecting deepening rifts within the governorate’s leadership.

Political tensions spiked in mid-March when STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi traveled to Hadramawt as part of a wider tour across the south during Ramadan. On March 16, he visited a military hospital run by the 2nd Military Region in Mukalla and held talks with its military leaders, before meeting with local STC leaders in the coastal city. In a speech published March 17, Al-Zubaidi revealed tension between the STC and HTA-HIC leader Bin Habrish. Media reports of the speech noted that Al-Zubaidi stated that the STC had tried to open channels of communication with the HIC, “but the other side rejected that.” He went on to “question the direction” of the HIC, claiming that the STC enjoys a broad popular base in Hadramawt, which gives it authority to act there. “We possess a clear cause, and we will not give up on the rights of Hadramis,” Al-Zubaidi said. With its UAE backing, the STC is well-entrenched in the capital city Mukalla and elsewhere on the Hadramawt coast, but it has been unable to gain any significant influence in the Hadramawt Desert and Valley region, an HTA-HIC stronghold where the Islah party holds s. A warming of ties with Bin Habrish might have cleared the way for Al-Zubaidi to perform a symbolic act such as leading a convoy into Seyoun city, presenting himself as primus inter pares as he did in Mukalla in 2023. To add insult to injury, Al-Zubaidi warned of Houthi and Iranian involvement in Hadramawt – a comment largely understood to be a reference and threat to the HTA. In turn, Bin Habrish suggested on March 17 that the HTA would resume blocking fuel deliveries to Aden after Ramadan.

On March 20, Bin Habrish appeared suddenly in Saudi Arabia, where he met with Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman.^[1] The visit marked a significant shift in HTA diplomacy following the STC chief’s Hadramawt visit, given Bin Habrish’s repeated refusal of direct association with the kingdom. In response, a supposed STC-aligned faction of the HTA convened in Al-Ayoun near Mukalla, denouncing Bin Habrish’s leadership and calling for the appointment of a new HTA president. On March 27, prior to Bin Habrish’s return from Saudi Arabia, UAE-backed security forces in Mukalla detained a number of high-level officers in the 2nd Military Region, including Chief of Staff Mohammed Omar al-Yameeni. Local sources report that most of the detained officers, including Al-Yameeni, are from the Hamoum tribe, of which Bin Habrish is a paramount sheikh. In the days that have followed, Hadrami politics continue to fracture, with the HIC now openly calling for self-rule in the latest in a series of escalations between Emirati- and Saudi-backed groups for control of Hadramawt.

Other Developments

January 18: The Specialized Criminal Court of Appeals in Aden ordered the release of journalist Ahmed Maher from Bir Ahmed Prison following his acquittal. Maher was arrested in August 2022 and forcibly disappeared on charges of inciting unrest. He was sentenced to four years in prison in May 2023 before being cleared on appeal.

January 19: The Trump administration named Special Envoy to Yemen Tim Lenderking acting Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, before changing his title to senior bureau official. No new US envoy to Yemen has been named to replace him.

January 21: During the World Economic Forum, STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi publicly welcomed Trump’s return to office, praising his assertiveness and contrasting it with the Biden administration’s approach, which he claimed had emboldened the Houthis.

February 5: The Houthi-affiliated Saba News Agency hosted Australian academic Tim Anderson, known for his criticisms of Western policy in the Arab world. His visit included a meeting with the deputy speaker of the Houthi Shura Council, a lecture at Sana’a University, and a tour of the hijacked Galaxy Leader vessel, with media coverage emphasizing international support for the Houthi cause.

February 11: Residents of Taiz held a march to commemorate the 14th anniversary of Yemen’s 2011 uprising that led to the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Protesters chanted anti-Houthi slogans and reaffirmed support for the republic and democratic governance.

February 16: Houthi-appointed Attorney General Abdelsalam al-Houthi met with representatives from Chilean civil society groups, including the Salvador Allende and Raul Pellegrin Foundations. The event was part of an ongoing Houthi campaign to internationalize their narrative through global civil society networks.

February 20: Employees at Socotra Airport staged a protest against plans to privatize and transfer control of the airport to the Emirati Eastern Triangle Company. Demonstrators criticized the lack of transparency, loss of jobs, and erosion of national authority. Forces linked to the UAE-backed STC reportedly dispersed the protest. The takeover, allegedly ordered by STC-affiliated Transport Minister Abdelsalam Humaid and Socotra Governor Raafat al-Thaqali, would put all of Socotra’s entry points under Emirati control.

March 26: The Houthis concluded an international Palestinian solidarity conference in Sana’a. International participants in the event included former Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mehdi; Zwelivelile Mandela, grandson of Nelson Mandela; Irish politicians and former members of the European Parliament Mick Wallace and Clare Daly; and American social media influencer Jackson Hinkle.

March 29: The Yemeni SAM human rights organization reported that Houthi security forces had arrested more than 75 people following recent airstrikes in Sana’a and Sa’ada on charges of collaborating with the US. Some individuals were reportedly detained for simply using their phones around the time the airstrikes occurred.