In early December, armed groups aligned with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and supported by the UAE seized vast swathes of southern and eastern Yemen. After a short period during which they appeared paralyzed, Saudi-backed armed groups succeeded in rolling back these gains and inflicting serious losses on the STC. Until that point, both sides had been nominally aligned under the umbrella of the internationally recognized government, a coalition bringing together Yemen’s anti-Houthi forces. What effect will the dramatic transformation of the security situation have on the Houthi group (Ansar Allah)? And what are the implications of these events for the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Houthis’ main external backer, as it seeks to staunch the bleeding from successive geopolitical losses during a period of unprecedented domestic unrest?
Future Scenarios
First and foremost, Tehran wants to see the consolidation and institutionalization of Houthi power inside Yemen. This is the foundation on which it hopes to build and maintain long-term influence in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula. The Houthis have become even more important to Tehran in the wake of the significant geopolitical losses it has suffered over the past two years: the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and its own losses at the hands of the United States and Israel.
Will the events of recent weeks further Iran’s goal? It is difficult to offer a simple answer, given the widespread uncertainty around next steps; it is more useful to think in terms of scenarios. In early December, the prospect of an independent South Yemen likely caused anxiety in Iran. Should this new state have aligned with the United States, or perhaps even Israel, as some secessionist leaders were suggesting, Iran would have had cause to worry about the emergence of a stronger counterweight to the Houthis.
It rapidly became evident, however, that the STC would not be able to consolidate control over the south and build a strong state. The prospect of a weak South Yemen, awkwardly living alongside a rump and much-weakened internationally recognized government, would have represented a dream scenario for Iran, as it would have indefinitely locked anti-Houthi forces in a state of weakness and paralysis. This would have opened the door wide for the further consolidation and expansion of Houthi power.
Given the rapid and overwhelming success of Saudi-backed forces in defeating the STC in early January, the most likely scenario, at least in the short- to medium-term, is a new wave of instability. The weakening of the STC could benefit the government, but the Saudi-backed anti-Houthi coalition will struggle to consolidate and sustain its gains in the south, where grievances remain salient. And even though the internal dynamics in southern Yemen have changed, the balance of power that has favored the Houthis against a frail and fragmented government will endure, as fighting between Saudi and Emirati-backed factions has had the familiar overall result of keeping the anti-Houthi coalition weak.
At the other end of the spectrum is a scenario in which Saudi Arabia and its local partners consolidate control over the internationally recognized government, succeed in strengthening it, and build a coalition able to more decisively check, if not necessarily defeat, Houthi power. This path remains strewn with obstacles and would, at best, take time – but it is the only one that could challenge Iran’s interests in Yemen.
The View from Tehran
Several factors will shape how Iran views events in Yemen going forward. The first is the context of its relations with Saudi Arabia. Tehran has generally valued the efforts it has expended alongside Riyadh since 2022 to better manage bilateral tensions. Neither side is naïve; both understand that the sources of competition have not changed. But lower tensions provide Riyadh with more breathing space to negotiate its withdrawal from the war in Yemen. This is a goal that Tehran supports, as the result would be the further consolidation and legitimation of Houthi power. Tehran assessed the events in southern Yemen partly through this prism. That is likely why, for example, it came out in support of Yemeni territorial integrity and of the Saudi position.
Could the decisive Saudi-led victory against Emirati interests in Yemen mark the end, or at least the slowing, of the competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that has caused so much damage to the anti-Houthi coalition? In theory, this is plausible, but several obstacles stand in the way. First, there is a significant imbalance of power between the Houthis and their adversaries. For the newly unified Saudi-backed government to challenge the Houthis, it will need time to build its internal cohesion and military capacity. Realistically, the government will face severe challenges in doing so, including inevitable continued tension around unresolved southern grievances.
Iran’s interest in providing the space that Saudi Arabia needs to negotiate an end to its involvement in the war could well run up against a problem: the temptation for the Houthis to exploit the opportunity offered by instability in the south. Since early December, the Houthis have taken a wait-and-see approach, presumably enjoying the spectacle of their adversaries fighting one another. They have refrained, however, from launching attacks along frontlines that had been partially abandoned as Saudi-Emirati tension spiked. Prolonged instability in the south, however, could prove too tempting for the Houthis to continue exercising such restraint, given their ambition to expand the territory under their control, notably in Marib and Taiz.
Finally, Tehran’s perception of recent events in Yemen cannot be disentangled from the massive wave of protests currently shaking the very foundations of the Islamic Republic. The situation is highly unpredictable. The Islamic Republic appears likely to survive, at least until the next round of protests; it retains sufficient repressive capacity to avoid its collapse. But its growing domestic vulnerability, in combination with the heavy geopolitical losses it has suffered in recent years, implies that Tehran needs the Houthis more than ever before. The Houthis are now its strongest partner in the Axis of Resistance. A weakened Islamic Republic is therefore likely to increase, not decrease, its support for its Yemeni partner – and prolonged instability in the south and east of the country, through which some of its smuggling routes run, can only help.