اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية
In the early hours of April 26, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), citing a conspiracy against the southern cause, declared self-governance and a state of emergency across the entire former South Yemen, and called on the masses to rally around its political leadership. The first evidence of the STC implementing its self-rule declaration came at the Central Bank of Yemen headquarters in Aden, where its forces assumed security control of the bank’s outer entrances while the Saudi forces charged with guarding the facility stayed within the bank compound. Otherwise, the situation in the city stayed mostly the same. It appears the STC declared control over what was already under its authority.
The statement from the secessionist group followed months of failed efforts to implement a power-sharing deal between the STC and the Yemeni government, and came in the immediate wake of heavy flooding that struck the city, causing several deaths and crippling public services. However, the STC’s declaration of “self-rule” – the exact meaning and legal and administrative definition of which is not quite known – met with swift opposition across much of the south. The governorates of Al-Mahra, Socotra and Shabwa all issued statements rejecting the change in administration. Forces in Shabwa affiliated with the Yemeni government also raised their level of combat readiness. The most important condemnation came from Faraj al-Bahsani, the governor of Hadramawt – the south’s largest and most resource-rich governorate.
Hadramawt will likely witness more polarization than any other governorate as a result of the renewed STC-government confrontation. The United Arab Emirates – the former main political and military backer of the STC before withdrawing from Aden in October 2019 – is influential in Hadramawt and still has troops inside the governorate, controlling Al-Rayyan Airport in Mukalla. The UAE also pays the wages of the Hadrami Elite forces, which control security in the coastal part of the Hadramawt governorate, so it is not easy for Al-Bahsani to ignore Emirati influence or move to counter it. Meanwhile, Hadrami businessmen as well as tribal leaders in Wadi Hadramawt have close ties to Saudi Arabia.
Why this sudden escalation by the STC? The content of the STC’s self-rule statement appears to be mostly directed against Saudi Arabia, and reflects the deteriorating relations between the group and Riyadh. The text, which spoke about conspiracies, noted that wages had not been paid to the council’s military and security forces; frontline areas had not been supplied with weapons, ammunition and food; and support for the wounded and families of martyrs had stopped. Following the UAE pullout from Yemen and the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, the Saudis assumed complete control, meaning these responsibilities fell under their purview.
The conspiracy language is an indication of how the STC views itself as a Saudi target, even though differences that turned it against the Yemeni government in August 2019 were supposed to have been resolved through the Riyadh Agreement. There are, in fact, grounds for suspicion. Riyadh has been silently working to dismantle the STC’s strength on the ground – particularly around Aden – through a variety of measures, including buying the loyalty of military commanders affiliated with the STC, establishing new southern forces headed by commanders who are completely loyal to Saudi Arabia, and imposing their presence to control territory both inside Aden as well as in key areas outside the city, such as in Ras Alara in Lahj. Furthermore, depriving military forces affiliated with the STC from their source of income, could attract these fighters to groups where wages are regularly paid, altering the formula of power and influence in STC-controlled areas.
A series of events over the past two months served to escalate tensions between the STC and Saudi Arabia. The STC was publicly humiliated in March when Saudi Arabia leaned on Jordan to prohibit STC officials from returning to Aden from Amman. The recent floods in Aden also increased popular pressure on the STC. The Saudis tried to exploit the public outcry to push for the return of the entire Yemeni government to the interim capital, but the STC refused. Angry protests erupted in response to the deterioration of services as a result of the floods in Aden, and the STC found itself in the unfamiliar position of being on the receiving end of local discontent.
Pressure piled up on the STC: Its soldiers were not receiving wages, key officials were prohibited from returning to Aden, frontline areas were not receiving support, some of its military commanders’ loyalties were shifting, rival forces were encroaching on their territory, and now its own people were confronting it over public services. So it seems the STC tried to absorb all this by leaping into the unknown and dragging everyone with them.
It wasn’t necessarily a well thought-out plan. There are open questions about the fate of public institutions in areas under STC control, most importantly Aden port and the central bank, with the latter funding the import of all basic commodities and oil purchases using a Saudi deposit. This puts the STC in a difficult situation. How will it manage these challenges if the central bank shuts its doors? What does the cost of bearing public responsibility mean in addition to its military responsibility in areas under its control? If the STC cannot pay its soldiers’ wages, how will it fund the daily affairs of the South and provide massive, costly and difficult services that already suffer from serious deterioration, especially when Hadramawt’s oil resources remain out of its reach and the port revenues it controls are limited?
It’s possible that the situation will deteriorate further and escalate into a military confrontation between the government and the STC. The biggest risk of violence is in Abyan, where frontlines separating the parties remain from the last round of fighting. The situation, however, is more complicated for the STC as there is no clear information regarding to whom Abdullatif al-Sayed, the commander of the Security Belt forces in Abyan, is loyal. If Saudi Arabia can draw him to its side, the STC would have to fight the very forces that helped it score a key victory in the August 2019 battle to control Zinjibar, the governorate’s capital.
It is not expected that Saudi Arabia will directly engage in military confrontations between the Hadi government and the STC if they occur. Saudi forces are present in STC-controlled areas, especially Aden, and Riyadh would be unlikely to risk its own soldiers being killed, wounded or held hostage.
The STC, in addition to the questionable loyalties of its partners in Abyan, has complex relations with many southern parties. For instance, tension had been growing between the STC and Hamdy Shokry, a prominent commander in the Giants Brigades, a grouping mainly of southern Salafists, leading to clashes in Lahj. The STC’s relations with Al-Subiha tribes are also complicated, and Saudi Arabia has invested in a relationship with these tribes and heavily recruited its members. Disputes between the tribes and forces affiliated with the STC have created hostility between the two parties. While the STC still represents a potent military force, it does not favor a battle now, due in large part to a lack of clarity on which parties stand as allies or enemies in any looming confrontation.
The situation is also complicated for Saudi Arabia. Of immediate urgency is what to do with Saudi forces in Aden. Staying in the city amid the STC’s insistence on self-rule implies either Saudi approval of what the STC is doing, impotence in the face of a challenge from what is supposed to be an obedient proxy or a risk of being drawn into an armed confrontation. With no guaranteed end result, Saudi Arabia is in an unenviable position. Its relationship with the STC has been fraught with difficulties for four months now. The recent STC statement will only make matters worse if taken as an insult by a Kingdom that has propagated a great deal of optimism around the Riyadh Agreement. Riyadh, however, is unlikely to react publicly, which would run counter to its nature and to its desire to maintain an image of mediator rather than involved party.
Maged Al-Madhaji is a co-founder and executive director of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. He tweets at @MAlmadhaji.
The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies is an independent think-tank that seeks to foster change through knowledge production with a focus on Yemen and the surrounding region. The Center’s publications and programs, offered in both Arabic and English, cover diplomatic, political, social, economic, military, security, humanitarian and human rights related developments, aiming to impact policy locally, regionally, and internationally.