Saudi Arabia’s New Approach Toward Yemen’s Northern Tribes

Yemen has witnessed profound changes over the last decade as the country’s political geography disintegrated and non-state actors rose to prominence. It is now a fragmented state, where “Yemeni tribes—especially in the northern provinces … control large portions of the country’s territory and perform state-like functions.”^[1] With the collapse of state institutions, tribes have sought to become an alternative to state authorities in order to protect their members and material interests. In the words of political scientist Daniel Corstange, in some contexts, tribes have become the “second-best substitutes for an absent or weak state.”^[2]

Historically, intertwined connections and unstable dynamics have characterized relationships between Saudi Arabia and these tribes. The relationship “has been subjected to significant shocks and external and internal influences … including the establishment of the modern state […] and various security and demographic factors.”^[3] Saudi Arabia supported tribal sheikhs and any authority in Yemen that did not threaten its borders or national security interests, with its influence extending to both “state and non-state actors.”^[4]

In this context, the Hashid and Bakil tribes were particularly influential from the revolution in North Yemen in 1962 until 2011. The Hashid were the main political actors, but both were leading groups on the tribal scene. Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar (from the Hashid) and Sheikh Naji al-Shaif (from the Bakil) were close friends of Saudi Arabia. Al-Ahmar’s death^[5] in late 2007 and the death of Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz^[6] in late 2011 ultimately weakened the relationship. After the 2011 protests against then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh, a political vacuum emerged, driven by internal conflicts between elements of the former regime led by Saleh on the one side and Al-Ahmar’s sons and former Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar on the other.

The Houthi group exploited this division and began to target the Hashid, which historically occupied the center of tribal politics, and geographically occupied the northern approach to Sana’a.^[7] The Houthis saw the Hashid as both a threat and an impediment to their political and military project. The Houthis took Hashid territories by force, demoralizing the confederation and pushing it out of politics.^[8] No longer able to defend themselves, some tribal leaders moved to Saudi Arabia, including Sheikh Hashim al-Ahmar (son of Abdullah al-Ahmar) and Mohammed bin Naji al-Shaif (son of Naji al-Shaif) from the Bakil. Their presence in the kingdom allowed for the renewal of ties with their hosts and a new way forward for Saudi strategy.

Riyadh Resets Its Yemen Policy

Riyadh is now changing tactics once more and trying to unite Yemeni tribes under one tribal-military authority. With the tribes’ support, Saudi Arabia aims to foster an internal Yemeni political settlement and eliminate the Houthi threat, either via negotiated agreement or military action.

This shift marks a return to a Saudi strategy from the early 1970s. After Abdullah al-Ahmar and a delegation of Yemeni tribes met with King Faisal in Jeddah,^[9] Saudi Arabia recognized Yemen’s republican system and opened direct channels of communication with the tribes. A similar approach is now gaining renewed favor due to its perceived practicality: dealing with tribal leaders is often more straightforward than navigating fragmented Yemeni political parties.

However, Riyadh’s strategy is not without significant risk. Yemen today is markedly different from what it was between 1970 and 2004. The country has more local actors and interested regional and international parties. In the south and east, the UAE has established relationships with religious, military, security, and tribal groups.^[10] Observers have warned that “competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over influence in [Hadramawt] could lead to conflict between the two sides or their proxies, which risks provoking dangerous fragmentation.”^[11] Saudi Arabia could also face difficulties dismantling the Houthis’ own relationships with tribal leaders, especially those influenced by the group’s ideology.

Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia had focused on courting the tribes of eastern Yemen to prevent the Houthis’ expansion toward oil and gas-rich areas.^[12] Riyadh engaged extensively with the eastern tribes, and while internal divisions prevented the formation of a unified front, the engagement did contribute to curbing the Houthis’ advance toward the eastern and southern parts of the country. However, the absence of a unifying tribal figure was a key obstacle. In northern Yemen, Saudi Arabia has had some success co-opting tribal figures in Houthi-controlled areas, convincing them to join the internationally recognized government or remain neutral. ^[13]

There are reports indicating that Saudi Arabia may intend to support northern tribal figures and grant them influential positions within the government forces, positioning them as both military and tribal figureheads.^[14] The main focus is on Hashim Al-Ahmar from the Hashid tribal confederation, given his military background and status as Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar’s son. But his potential elevation raises questions: Does he have the capacity to serve as both a tribal and military leader? Will the tribes of northern Yemen place their trust in Saudi Arabia? And can the tribes still influence the future course of the conflict? To answer these questions, it is essential to understand the complexities of the current tribal landscape.

Divided Against the Houthis

At the political and social levels, the majority of Yemen’s northern tribes are deeply divided due to the ongoing war. Once influential tribes, including the Hashid and Bakil, have been stripped of their political, social, and traditional roles.^[15] Prominent tribal figures who were once part of the political process no longer wield the influence they did before the fall of Sana’a in 2014. Most tribal leaders are either in voluntary exile, in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government, or under a form of house arrest in Houthi-controlled territory.

There are minor tribal figures who have sent their tribesmen to fight alongside the Houthis—either out of fear, personal interest, or because they adhere to Houthi ideology.^[16] There is also a marginalized tribal class that has been driven by poverty and necessity to fight alongside the group.^[17] Some other tribes have aligned with the Houthis due to a sense of abandonment by the internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia.^[18]

Still, other tribes have shown a willingness to fight against the Houthis on the condition that they receive serious and sustained support. In February, scattered tribal gatherings took place across Marib, and attendees affirmed their readiness to support the national army in confronting the Houthis.^[19] But some tribes are still haunted by past disappointments in terms of assistance, and do not dare take a public stance. This hesitation has grown since the Houthis broke the tribal establishment’s authority, assassinated former president Saleh, replaced influential tribal figures with loyalists, and targeted tribes seen as a threat to their project. Houthi forces have attacked the Sufyan, Al-Osaimat, Odhar, and Hashid tribes in Amran,^[20] the Arhab in Sana’a,^[21] the Utmah in Dhamar,^[22] and tribal areas in Al-Bayda.^[23] The Houthis use a strict security policy to control the tribes and closely monitor their movements. Tribal areas have been divided into security zones, each overseen by an individual linked to the group’s security apparatus.^[24] Any tribal action, no matter how minor, is swiftly suppressed and labeled treason or support for the United States and Israel. The Houthis have reportedly detained 75 people on charges of collaborating with the US in recent months.^[25]

Moreover, it is not clear if the tribes would respond to calls to confront the Houthis in light of recent US and UK airstrikes and ongoing Israeli military operations. While the tribes are in a dire situation and are eager to rid themselves of Houthi rule, the group’s stated support for Palestinians amid renewed Israeli military action in Gaza, in addition to the group’s affirmation of its confrontation against Western imperialism,^[26] pushes them to endure the oppression.^[27] Overall, direct US military action against the Houthis in Yemen has complicated Saudi efforts to win tribes’ loyalty.

Future Prospects

Any effort to extricate Yemen from its current predicament must focus on how to unite the forces opposed to the Houthis. It must also avoid relying on direct American support, given local opposition to Western intervention. Riyadh is therefore in need of its own unifying figure who can overcome the tribes’ existing reservations. As noted previously, Hashim al-Ahmar^[28] has emerged as the most likely candidate for the job. He is the son of Abdullah al-Ahmar and his maternal uncles descend from a Hashemite family. This status may help unify tribes around him and allow him to make guarantees to the Hashemite class, which previously supported the Imamate and now largely backs the Houthis. Hashim al-Ahmar is also a military figure with combat experience, having battled the Houthis in eastern Yemen before his dismissal and subsequent resettlement in Saudi Arabia. His return to political and military prominence could face opposition from some larger tribes, particularly the Bakil confederation, but this could be overcome with sufficient Saudi support. Riyadh could further accommodate any opposition by involving other tribes in decision-making. Military success will depend on how serious Saudi Arabia is about applying military pressure on the Houthis. If Riyadh supports Hashim and other tribal leaders and successfully incorporates them into government institutions, the balance of power could shift in the government’s favor.

If there is an active Saudi effort to support government forces under the leadership of Hashim al-Ahmar and other military, tribal, and security figures, it could break the barrier of fear, and tribes could engage alongside government forces. But Saudi Arabia may not want to confront the Houthis militarily. Still, it might seek to unify Yemeni tribes and other military and political groups under a leadership allied with Saudi Arabia. Either way, the ultimate goal is to reach a political settlement that strips the Houthis of the power to threaten Saudi Arabia. Unifying the tribes is not just a military tactic; it reflects a broader, long-term Saudi plan to secure strategic influence in Yemen and protect the kingdom’s national interests.

This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Any views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.