China is emerging as a significant external player in Yemen, influencing both the country’s internal dynamics and the broader regional landscape. During a meeting with Saudi and Iranian officials on December 9, Beijing reiterated its support for a UN-backed political solution to the conflict. However, despite its official position as a proponent of peace and non-intervention, an increasing number of intelligence reports and geopolitical analyses suggest that China is providing indirect support to the Houthis (Ansar Allah) through intermediaries like Iran. This support, including dual-use technology such as missile and drone components, as well as satellite imagery, has arguably not only bolstered the Houthis’ military capabilities but also deepened the imbalance between the group and its opponents in Yemen’s internationally recognized government.
Materiel Support for the Houthis
The Houthis’ ties with international powers have been a subject of extensive debate ever since the outbreak of war in Yemen in 2014. Evidence of clear military, ideological, and logistical support from Tehran to the Houthis initially meant that all eyes were on Iran. But since Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea began in 2023, American and Western intelligence have increasingly focused on covert support by China. Several analysts believe that Beijing is exploiting tensions in the Red Sea and the region to enhance its influence and undermine that of the US, and is playing an increasing role in bolstering the Houthis’ war efforts.
In response, Washington has imposed a series of sanctions on Chinese companies for allegedly supplying the Houthis with advanced weapon technology, including satellite imagery and electronic components for drones and missiles. The US Department of the Treasury announced sanctions in April against the Chinese firm Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., accusing it of providing the Houthis with sensitive satellite services used to target international vessels in the Red Sea.
In the past two years, the threat posed by Houthi drone attacks has unquestionably increased, with China’s support playing a considerable role in the advancement of the Houthis’ military arsenal. The group’s drones rely on Chinese components, particularly for propellers and control units. In March, government customs authorities seized a shipment of 800 Chinese-made drone propellers that was en route to the Houthis. In August, drone kits were intercepted by the counter-terrorism authorities in Aden on a commercial ship originating from China.
An even more serious accusation is that the Houthis have been obtaining high-resolution satellite imagery from Chinese companies to identify and track the locations of commercial and military ships in the Red Sea, facilitating targeted attacks against them. Multiple reports have also confirmed that China facilitates Houthi access to advanced missile guidance system components through Iranian intermediaries and complex smuggling networks. Taken together, this evidence suggests that Chinese support, even if primarily indirect, has helped the Houthis transition from reliance on conventional or Iranian weapons to a more advanced stage that utilizes dual-use technology.
A Pragmatic Approach
In response to growing criticism, Beijing has publicly denied any wrongdoing and continued to promote a narrative of neutrality in Yemen’s conflict. The official line from China’s Foreign Ministry consistently opposes interference in the internal affairs of other countries and calls on all parties in Yemen to engage in “comprehensive political dialogue.” At least publicly, Beijing stands firm in aligning with the international community on maintaining stability in the Red Sea, through which a significant portion of its global trade passes.
Yet, behind this rhetoric lies the realpolitik that China applies in practice. The support reaching the Houthis through private Chinese companies and smuggling networks exemplifies the pragmatic approach that underpins Beijing’s broader strategy in the Middle East.
In Yemen, China has employed a dual approach. The first maximizes economic and security interests. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden form a strategic corridor for Chinese trade routes within its Belt and Road Initiative. Any disruption to these passages could have a direct impact on the Chinese economy. But supporting the Houthis—or at least turning a blind eye to the transfer of technology—also gives China an indirect way to pressure the West.
The second ensures plausible deniability: China allows private companies or commercial fronts to operate in this sphere—a strategy that enables the government to maintain an official narrative denying any involvement in Yemen’s conflict, thereby avoiding increased tensions with the United States or its Gulf allies. This also likely explains why the US sanctions imposed on Chinese firms, such as Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co. or Hubei Chica Industrial Co., Ltd., have not directly referenced the Chinese government.
China has clearly benefited from this balancing act. Chinese ships are often exempt from Houthi targeting in the Red Sea, with attacks mainly directed at Western vessels. This implicit exception reinforces the hypothesis of tacit understandings, whether direct or mediated through intermediaries, between the Houthis and Beijing.
Iran and China: A Meeting of Interests
As China increasingly serves as a technological supplier for the Houthis, Iran acts as the logistical and political intermediary to its Yemeni ally. For years, Tehran has been seen as the group’s primary backer in terms of training and conventional weapons. But with the introduction of advanced Chinese weapon components, Iran’s role has become more complex.
Intelligence reports indicate that Chinese shipments first arrive at Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas, before being re-shipped to the Houthis by sea or via land routes through Oman. In January 2025, two Iranian ships carried over a thousand tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Iran—a key ingredient in manufacturing solid rocket fuel. A portion of this was then redirected to the Houthis.
Iran also plays a political role in providing cover for China’s indirect presence in Yemen. While Tehran absorbs most of the international criticism for backing the Houthis, China operates in the shadows. The arrangement reveals a clear division of labor: Iran provides weapons, logistics, and other direct support, while China furnishes the technology that enhances their precision and effectiveness.
Such indirect cooperation highlights a distinct overlap of interests. Iran seeks to expand its influence in Yemen by using the Houthis to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia and the United States. Meanwhile, China benefits from the Houthis’ ongoing presence, as they serve as a threat to Western influence and disrupt maritime traffic, all without Beijing paying a direct political price.
Reshaping Houthi Capabilities
Chinese assistance has equipped the Houthis with the necessary “eyes” and “muscles” to accelerate and refine their combat decisions, reducing their reliance on external intermediaries. This qualitative leap has assisted the Houthis’ transformation from an armed group in a civil conflict into an actor capable of projecting threats across the region.
The results of such advancements could arguably have a significant impact on local dynamics in Yemen, which will become clearer in any future battle between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. Before 2023, the hallmark of Houthi capabilities was their reliance on weapons seized from government stockpiles and conventional Iranian support, characterized by standard weapons, relatively low-precision missiles, and limited technical and training support.
The Houthis’ access to dual-use technology—including drone parts, guidance systems, and satellite data —has proven to be a strategic game changer. The seizure of 800 drone propellers demonstrates that the Houthis are developing a “production capacity” that allows them to deploy drone swarms continuously rather than in sporadic, isolated operations.
Overall, these technical components not only serve as essential parts of Houthi weaponry but also transform the mechanics of warfare, shifting from traditional battles that rely on large battalions and ammunition to more sophisticated campaigns driven by information and accurate intelligence, as evidenced by their attacks against Red Sea shipping since November 2023. Access to satellite imagery or precise location data—whether through commercial intermediaries or private firms—reduces delays in decision-making. Such autonomy enables real-time surveillance, rapid target updates, and coordinated drone strikes, leaving governmental and international responses a step behind.
Chinese support, often masked through civilian companies or commercial supply chains, enables a more discreet approach to engagement. Components arrive as civilian goods, repackaged and routed through intermediary ports before reaching the battlefield. This mechanism means that diplomatic pressure or conventional strikes are ineffective, because what is being bombed or sanctioned is not necessarily a clear military base but a shipping office or a multi-branched trading company. The result is a continuity of supply through alternative routes, faster production, and enhanced resilience for the Houthis.
Local Power Shifts
On the ground, these new developments have decisively tipped the balance of power between the warring parties, which now depends less on missile count but on each side’s ability to produce immediate intelligence and convert it into repeated, organized strikes. If open conflict were to resume, the parties within the internationally recognized government remain in a weak position, even in the event that it were to receive external air and naval support, given that it relies on intelligence from regional partners, whose commitment is fickle and requires lengthy political approvals. Meanwhile, the Houthis, equipped with dual-use technology, are redefining operational independence, capable of taking initiative and winning future battles, while creating prolonged crises in maritime navigation and imposing new negotiating terms without requiring a larger partner to dictate their positions.
The political dimension of this disparity is crucial: the technological capability gap translates into an effective bargaining chip. The longer the maritime crisis continues and the higher the costs of protecting shipping become, the more likely it is that international powers will turn to diplomatic solutions acceptable to the Houthis instead of a costly military solution for the Yemeni government. In this sense, technological support may not immediately translate into regional control, but it alters the risk-reward calculations for international actors, granting the Houthis political gains that could later be translated into recognition or concessions in their favor, leaving the Yemeni government as a bystander.
Low-Cost Support
The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait serve as a vital artery for Chinese trade. With the escalation of Houthi attacks on ships since late 2023, signs of a tacit agreement have emerged between the Houthis and China, where Chinese vessels are exempt from targeting, while Western and regional ships face repeated attacks.
From a geopolitical perspective, China’s indirect support for the Houthis is likely viewed as part of a “low-cost proxy warfare” strategy against the United States. Every attack increases the cost of the American role in securing sea lanes, exposing the limits of Washington’s ability to impose stability. This dynamic allows Beijing to test new pressure tactics without engaging in direct confrontation, especially as the US focuses on its competition with China in East Asia.
China, which relies heavily on energy imports from the Gulf, is also careful not to compromise its relationship with Gulf partners, while using Iran to play a central intermediary role in funneling Chinese technology and weapon components to the Houthis. In this careful balancing act, China does not view the Houthis as a strategic ally as much as a multi-functional bargaining chip to protect trade and secure Belt and Road Initiative routes, undermine US influence in the Red Sea, test the effectiveness of civilian technology as a political weapon, and maintain a balance with the Gulf by using Iran as an intermediary.
With this approach, Beijing can exert profound influence in Yemen’s conflict without bearing the full consequences of a direct role. However, continuing support for the Houthis risks increased tensions with the Gulf and the United States, ultimately undermining the very pragmatism that defines its approach in the region.