Analysis How Yemeni Religious Groups Recruit Fighters

This article was originally published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI).

Conflict in Yemen over the past two decades, including the war since 2015, has been dominated by parties with ideologies rooted in religion. Religious ideologies play a key role in the policies adopted by these movements toward the recruitment of fighters into their ranks. There are four main groups in question: the Sunni Islamist Islah party, the Zaidi Shia Houthi movement, the Salafi jihadists of Al-Qaeda, and government-allied Salafis fighting in paramilitary groups backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

These four currents have flourished in Yemen for decades, initially influenced by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Afghanistan jihad in the Eighties. Yemen proved to be fertile ground where they could capitalize on the fragility of the state and the inherently conservative nature of its society.

With Saudi backing, the Salafi current made significant inroads from the 1980s, developing an extensive network of religious institutions, including in Zaidi regions of north Yemen. This helped galvanize the growth of the Houthis as a Zaidi revivalist moment in the 1990s. In that decade, Islah was also able to garner a sizable support base as the Socialist Party in the south lost ground following the 1990 unification. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda established roots in mountainous regions of the south in the late 1990s and early 2000s, helped by its leader Osama bin Laden’s Saudi and Hadrami origins.

Marginalization in a vast, impoverished, and geographically diverse country favored the flourishing of these groups-. The Houthi movement in Sa’ada in north Yemen was able to tap into deep-seated resentment toward the central government in Sana’a, turning the surrounding governorates into a formidable stronghold. In a parallel strategy, Al-Qaeda built on similar feelings of alienation in southern and central isolated areas of Abyan, Shabwah, Al-Bayda, and Marib governorates, transforming them into safe havens beyond the reach of central authority.

Prior to the current war, Yemeni Islamic movements displayed three key strategies for recruiting members: First, personal outreach, involving direct individual engagement through educational initiatives conducted in mosques and both formal and informal religious educational institutions. Second, social welfare networks, established by charitable organizations run by Salafi groups and the Islah party, providing essential services to communities, and sometimes using covert networks.

The third method involved the dissemination of ideological propaganda through print media, cassette tapes, and, since the 2000s, online platforms. Al-Qaeda in particular has used this propaganda strategy to spread its revolutionary message to youth opposed to the communist ideologies that were well-established in the south from the 1960s. In the era of the Palestinian Al-Aqsa Intifada against Israeli occupation in 2000, the September 11 attacks in 2001, and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the jihadist movement shifted its messaging toward calls for action against “Crusaders and Jews,” meaning Western targets and local entities seen as supporting them.

The Civil War: A Surge of Mujahids and Jihadists

The 2011 uprising against the regime of longtime president Ali Abdullah Saleh created a political crisis that left a substantial security vacuum for these religious movements to exploit. By 2014, the turmoil had escalated into a full-fledged civil war after the Houthis seized control of Sana’a. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed the Arab Coalition with the UAE in an effort to reinstall the internationally recognized government, which had fled to Aden.

While the uprising allowed these groups to broaden their popular support base, the events of 2014-2015 enabled them to transform these bases into large armed movements by focusing on mass rather than individual recruitment. Sunni factions capitalized on grassroots opposition to Houthi incursions into predominantly Sunni areas. Conversely, the Houthis successfully mobilized a diverse and extensive popular base by framing their cause as a struggle against Sunni extremists – dubbed as takfiris, who denounce other Muslims as infidels – and a defense against a foreign war led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Approaches toward radicalization and recruitment have varied. Some Sunni Islamists and Salafis focused primarily on military training, while others such as Al-Qaeda emphasized ideological indoctrination to cultivate committed jihadists. Meanwhile, groups like the Houthis adopted a hybrid approach, combining both tactical training and ideological indoctrination in their recruitment processes.

It is important to differentiate between the concept of the mujahid and the jihadist. A mujahid is an individual compelled by circumstances to engage voluntarily in combat, primarily motivated by religious convictions rather than a revolutionary political agenda. These individuals are typically willing to operate within a structured, state-affiliated framework, effectively transitioning from their role as a mujahid, or resistance fighter, to that of a regular soldier. Importantly, they are generally prepared to relinquish their arms once their combat responsibilities have been fulfilled. In contrast, a jihadist is driven by the concept of perpetual revolution, perceiving combat not as a temporally or geographically limited mission but as an eternal duty. This endeavor extends beyond local conflicts, encompassing global efforts to establish their envisioned Islamic state and challenge Western hegemony. Jihadists consistently favor operating through clandestine armed organizations to pursue these objectives.^[1]

Sunni Mujahideen and Resistance Fighters

The intensification of the civil war, combined with the deepening sectarian polarization between Yemen’s Sunnis, who are predominantly of the Shafi’i legal school, and Zaidi Shias has resulted in a complex interplay of motivations for resistance. Since 2014, political factions opposing the Houthi group have issued calls for popular resistance. Local communities have invoked religious jihad and tribal solidarity to mobilize citizens, encouraging them to take up arms in defense of their cities and villages.

In this scenario, official military units loyal to the government fought alongside diverse groups of volunteers driven by various motivations: some were politically inspired, identifying themselves as “resistors,” while others were religiously motivated, calling themselves “mujahideen.” Frequently, these motivations were not mutually exclusive, with many volunteers driven by a complex blend of political and religious convictions.

Sunni combatants, particularly those adhering to puritanical Salafi doctrine, which emphasizes obedience to authority, found it relatively easy to assimilate into the state’s military and security structures. They readily pledged allegiance to the government and maintained cordial relations with the Saudi and UAE-led Arab Coalition supporting it. Many of these fighters have opted since around 2020 to resume their pre-conflict roles, either in Islamic outreach or various professional sectors. For them, jihad was a transient obligation that ended once the immediate Houthi military threat to their regions was neutralized.^[2]

At the beginning of the war, these combatants integrated themselves into the “popular resistance” movement. As the war progressed, they evolved into an essential component of the military units aligned with the Aden-based government. Now, the landscape is characterized by military forces whose leadership and a significant portion of their membership adhere to Salafi religious doctrine while operating within the broader framework of the national armed forces.

The Mobilization of Salafis: Three Distinct Pro-Government Groups

The Salafi bloc that has fought in Yemen is now integrated into three distinct military structures loyal to the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC):

1. The National Army forces: stationed in Marib and Taiz, they are politically aligned with the Islah party but officially operate under the Ministry of Defense.
2. The Giants Brigades: Deployed across Shabwah, Abyan, western coastal areas, and parts of Marib, these brigades played a pivotal role in resisting Houthi advances in Marib, Shabwah, and Hudaydah. They are led by Brigadier General Abdulrahman Al-Muharrami, a prominent southern Salafi leader from Abyan and a member of the PLC who has good ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Since 2023, Al-Muharrami has also been a vice president in the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates for the independence of southern Yemen. The Giants Brigades serve as the primary strike force within the anti-Houthi coalition, with arms and funding from the UAE.
3. The Nation’s Shield forces: Present in Hadramawt, Al-Dhalea, Lahj, and Aden, these brigades were established by Riyadh in 2022. Modeled on the Giants Brigades, they are led by Salafi leader Brigadier General Basheer al-Mudrabi.

The mobilization of Salafi fighters has been relatively straightforward, as large numbers of volunteers sign up for formal military training within regular brigades, though the exact regions and districts where this is happening are unclear. Their combat doctrine combines a government-directed national orientation with sectarian animosity toward the Houthis.

The Giants Brigades, which also incorporate sympathy for the principle of southern independence, have a pitch for winning young recruits that extends beyond their combat doctrine, since they have built a reputation for steadfast opposition to the Houthis and a refusal to engage in the disputes between the government and STC. They have also been involved in STC-led counterterrorism operations against Al-Qaeda in Abyan.

The Nation’s Shield has also emerged in recent years as a formidable force on the government side. With reliable salaries provided by Riyadh in Saudi riyals, it offers more economic benefit to recruits than other military entities (such as the National Army or STC forces).

The Salafi Jihadists

The formation of a jihadist element rarely results from mass mobilization efforts. Rather, it typically involves a meticulous, individualized process of indoctrination and training, with sometimes rigorous loyalty tests and assignments as extreme as suicide missions.

From 2014 onwards, Al-Qaeda’s leadership strategically shifted its focus to recruiting a substantial number of young volunteers, both from within Yemen and abroad, to combat the expanding Houthi forces. Integrating them into the organization’s clandestine structure also created a pool of potential operatives for the organization’s broader jihadist agenda against the government, which it viewed as apostate and illegitimate, as well as Western interests and their regional allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

By relaxing its rigorous recruitment measures, Al-Qaeda in Yemen took a risk that was to prove costly. The influx of new recruits included infiltrators who compromised the organization’s security, leading to the assassination in 2015 of its leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi and other key founding figures in a US airstrike.

In 2018, Al-Wuhayshi’s successor Qasim al-Raymi took measures to stop the infiltration and return to stringent recruitment standards. The organization came to realize the inherent challenges in reconciling its rigorous jihadist indoctrination process with a broader and more inclusive strategy aimed at appealing to a wider pool of potential mujahideen. The Houthis, meanwhile, were to be more successful in this approach, using their position as effective ruling authority over a wide area.^[3]

Houthi Shia Jihadists

The Houthi group employs a rigorous recruitment process to cultivate dedicated mujahideen, whose ideological commitment is similar to that of the Salafi jihadists. These individuals undergo intensive doctrinal and psychological training from a young age, with a strong preference for those from the Hashemite class who claim direct descent from Prophet Mohammed, as opposed to the majority of Yemenis who are of tribal origin. Most of the recruits hail from Sa’ada, the birthplace of the group’s founder, or other northern regions. The Preventive Security Agency, a specialized branch within the Houthi structure, is tasked with monitoring and evaluatiing the loyalty of fighters appointed to the group’s security apparatus or elite military units, which operate under the direct command of the group’s current leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi.

Faced with an urgent demand for combat-ready personnel across multiple fronts, the Houthis resorted to large-scale recruitment efforts. In contrast to the Sunni fighters allied with the government, the Houthis employed coercive recruitment tactics, imposing quotas on allied tribal leaders and requiring them to provide specific numbers of volunteers. Moreover, the Houthis exploited humanitarian needs by conditioning access to food and aid on the volunteers to engage in combat.

The Houthi movement does not prioritize specialized doctrinal training for their combatants. Instead, they subject these fighters to “cultural courses,” which are essentially brief military orientation sessions. These rudimentary preparations are conducted prior to integrating the recruits into infantry or reserve units. Combatants are often dispatched to the front lines without adequate training.

In Houthi areas, a popular distinction is made between long-standing members of the Houthi group, referred to as “Houthis,” and recent recruits, known as “Mutahawwitheen,” or those who have “become Houthi”. The group has faced significant challenges in maintaining its fighting force in recent years, partly due to its reliance on human wave tactics in combat. Consequently, the group has increasingly turned to recruiting children, viewing them as more malleable and easier to command. This strategy also serves a long-term purpose, as it aims to cultivate a new generation of devoted fighters from a young age, ensuring the creation of a new generation of Houthi fighters.

October 7 and the Revival of Jihadi Recruitment

In 2023, Al-Qaeda and the Houthis were encountering substantial challenges in their efforts to mobilize, recruit, and enlist new members. These groups even began to experience internal dissent and rebellion among their lower-ranking members. However, the Israeli war against Gaza provided these organizations with a lifeline, reinvigorating their recruitment brand.

Notably, the Houthis established dozens of training camps in their regions under the name “Al-Aqsa Flood” – the same name as the Hamas operation carried out on October 7 against Israel– to welcome young volunteers. Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi claimed that around 300,000 fighters had been recruited in 2024. After closing its open-door policy in 2018, Al-Qaeda cautiously resumed accepting young volunteers, motivated by the daily scenes of violence against Palestinians.

Conclusion

Yemen has long provided armed religious groups with fertile ground for recruitment, but the ongoing war and the past year of escalating political crises in the region have given them renewed momentum, spurring a new wave of mobilization. The growing number of combatants will be a major obstacle to future peacebuilding in Yemen and pose an extra set of challenges for efforts to reduce the attraction of militia life and to reintegrate some of their ranks into civil society. This is where understanding the difference between the mujahid and jihadi becomes crucial, since while the mujahid is prepared for rehabilitation according to circumstance and interest, the jihadist is too committed to ideology to compromise utopian dreams for a political settlement.