In early December, armed forces affiliated with the secessionist, UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized control of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, displacing tribal forces led by Amr Bin Habrish and 1st Military Region army units affiliated with the Islah party. With its eastward expansion, the STC now controls nearly all of the territory of the former South Yemen state, including its most productive oil fields. The takeover has ushered in a new phase of the Yemen conflict, with the potential for territorial lines to be redrawn and the regional balance of power now in flux.
Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi and Prime Minister Salem bin Breik have left the interim capital for Saudi Arabia, where they have held a series of meetings with foreign ambassadors. Saudi-backed troops have pulled back from several locations, including the interim capital Aden, while Oman temporarily closed its border with Al-Mahra. While the outcome of the political and military transition remains unclear, the future of the internationally recognized government and the territorial integrity of the country have been thrown into question.
Sana’a Center experts Hussam Radman, Yasmeen al-Eryani, Abdulghani al-Iryani, and Maysaa Shuja al-Deen react to the latest developments and consider what the current escalation might mean for Yemen.
The Long Game: STC Goals and Calculations in Abu Dhabi
For STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi, the independence of a southern state begins, in practice, with full military control over all governorates, stretching from Aden to Al-Mahra. Independence will then be officially secured with international recognition.
For this reason, political and military mobilization for the “liberation of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra” has always been a key goal for the STC’s leadership, a sort of final frontier. This eastern ambition comes despite the significant political and power-sharing gains the STC has secured since the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which have cemented its role as a key actor within the internationally recognized government.
In 2022, the STC saw its first successes in expanding eastward, as its forces moved into Abyan and Shabwa, taking advantage of shifts in strategic balances in the south following the ousting of former President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the formation of the PLC, and the weakening of the Islah party’s influence.
At the start of 2023, the STC began moving into Hadramawt with a singular goal: the removal of 1st Military Region forces from the Hadramawt Valley, and the strengthening of the influence of southern forces and the Hadrami Elite, another UAE-backed group, in the governorate. But time and again, it ran into resistance from Saudi Arabia and Oman, which leveraged support from a Hadrami public that seeks greater autonomy and civil harmony.
For three years, the STC’s attempts to expand eastward failed, leaving the impression that Saudi Arabia’s stated red lines in southern Yemen would remain uncrossable. But this December brought a dramatic strategic surprise: within a few days, the STC swiftly took most of Hadramawt and advanced into Al-Mahra with virtually no resistance.
The STC could not have settled the conflict so decisively if its rivals hadn’t made strategic mistakes. On one hand, efforts by tribal leader Amr bin Habrish to establish a military force outside state institutions effectively marked the end of a long-held Hadrami consensus, firmly held since 2016, to avoid open conflict. This commitment to Hadrami unity has repeatedly been expressed and supported by nearly every local political and social actor, including those allied with the STC, such as the group’s National Assembly leader, Ahmed bin Braik, and PLC member and former Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani.
But when agitation by Bin Habrish and his newly formed Hadramawt Protection forces shattered this understanding and militarized the conflict, the advantage shifted to the more experienced player: the STC. It used Bin Habrish’s rebellion and his fighters’ storming of oil facilities as a political and legal pretext to deploy large military forces into the governorate.
Saudi Arabia made a similar mistake to Bin Habrish. Since 2023, Riyadh has defined its interests in Hadramawt as maintaining the delicate balance of power in the governorate: Abu Dhabi and the Hadrami Elite Forces would control the Coastal Region, and Saudi Arabia and the 1st Military Region would control the Valley and Desert Regions. But by 2024, Saudi Arabia, feeling threatened by a growing STC buildup and lacking confidence in the 1st Military Region’s ability to counter it, launched corrective policies, deploying a loyalist force which it saw as much more effective and disciplined: the Nation’s Shield.
Herein lies the paradox: the STC opposed the presence of the 1st Military Region because it viewed it as a northern force, while Saudi Arabia saw it as weak, compromised, and unable to stem arms smuggling. With this understanding, the handover of Seyoun becomes clear: Riyadh and the STC agreed to remove the 1st Military Region and suppress Bin Habrish’s rebellion. But they soon disagreed over who should fill the vacuum.
Within just a few days, Abu Dhabi and its allies on the ground demonstrated operational superiority, with STC forces swiftly securing the Hadramawt Valley and Al-Mahra. Meanwhile, Riyadh struggled to understand what was unfolding, shocked and angered by disregard for its red lines.
At the local level, the STC undoubtedly had its own motives for the eastern advance, but it would not have dared challenge Saudi Arabia and Oman without strong Emirati backing. Regionally, Abu Dhabi’s gains are no less significant than those of its ally. Almost overnight, it became the Gulf actor with the greatest geopolitical influence in southern Yemen, stretching from the interim capital to Al-Mahra in the east. The developments in Al-Mahra and Hadramawt also came as a pre-emptive move against any regional attempts to revive the Yemeni political process or the Saudi-sponsored “roadmap” to end the civil war.
Looking forward, Abu Dhabi will likely seek to secure two key objectives in negotiations with Riyadh: greater authority for its local allies, and serious agency in shaping Yemen’s future political process. In turn, the UAE may pressure the STC to offer assurances to Riyadh and Muscat by withdrawing recently deployed southern forces from Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, deploying lighter local forces to the two governorates, and accepting shared military influence with Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis the Nation’s Shield Forces.
However, if Abu Dhabi fails to reach bilateral understandings with Riyadh, or if the STC feels it is entering a phase of attrition (politically in Aden, through government paralysis and rising economic burdens; and militarily in Hadramawt), both could move toward other options, such as imposing self-administration or forming a mini southern government. The UAE might support these steps as a bargaining tactic, but the STC would treat them as a strategic step toward its ultimate goal.
STC Shake-Up Sets New Parameters for a Settlement
Events in Yemen’s eastern governorates over the past two weeks amount to a complete shake-up of the balance of power in government-controlled areas. They reflect a culmination of unrest that has been building since early 2023, with protests over deteriorating living conditions and electricity cuts, and local mobilization driven by tribal leader Amr bin Habrish, who has demanded greater Hadrami autonomy. But what transformed simmering tensions into a rapid takeover by the STC was a sudden realization that the window of opportunity to redraw the parameters of any future peace settlement in Yemen was quickly closing.
In that sense, the haste to publicly – even if no official process resumed – discuss the revival of the peace “roadmap”, which stalled in 2023, served as an accelerant. For the STC, the prospect of negotiations resuming without its guaranteed presence at the table posed an existential risk.
The roadmap, which centers on bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah), had generated anxiety among Yemeni allies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE alike, who found themselves excluded from the process. From their perspective, the Kingdom, eager to turn the page on the troublesome Yemen file, appeared infinitely accommodating to Houthi demands, including, reportedly, sharing oil revenues from eastern governorates. Although the precise terms were never disclosed, the implications were clear. For the STC, whose leadership has repeatedly insisted that its place is in Track I negotiations, and not Track II talks, any settlement that ceded what they see as southern resources would undermine its project for an independent southern state.
Had the roadmap proceeded, the STC, arguably the only actor combining territorial control, military capacity, and an independent political project with solid momentum, would have been positioned as a spoiler. Having learned from that lesson, a decisive move in the eastern governorates was a way of making its exclusion structurally impossible.
When the Houthis abruptly stepped away from an anticipated settlement in October 2023 to seize the opportunity for an elevated regional role, Saudi Arabia found itself in an awkward position after it had signaled not only a readiness to accommodate Houthi demands but also to grant the group what they had long sought: recognition. The Houthis, characteristically overconfident, appeared to assume they could resume the roadmap where they left off. But Riyadh still wanted guarantees that it would be spared from Houthi drone and missile attacks, but after the events of 2023, entering into further talks with an unreliable partner carried reputational risk.
In this regard, Saudi intentions on the return to the roadmap appeared deliberately ambiguous. Rather than rushing back to the table, Riyadh seemed to be buying time, waiting for events on the ground to shift and ensuring it had options. But in two years of waiting, the PLC failed to capitalize on the opportunity to articulate a unified negotiating position, or even designate a negotiating team. Riyadh likely concluded that, while a return to bilateral talks was no longer an option, a crowded negotiating table was also impractical.
Reducing the field to those who could demonstrate effective dominance on the ground, regardless of their affiliation, could be seen by Riyadh as a pragmatic if imperfect alternative. Remember, this is a long game. Few realistically envision Saudi Arabia being displaced by the UAE in Yemen, particularly given Abu Dhabi’s historically limited appetite for carrying the political (and financial) burden of the Yemen file.
The trilateral meeting on December 9 in Tehran between China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, during which the three countries jointly reiterated support for a comprehensive UN-led peace process in Yemen, further illustrates the link between diplomatic momentum relating to the roadmap and shifts on the ground. The emergence of a second revamped roadmap appears possible. The more consequential questions are: whether the Houthis will bite the bullet and concede to a new setting at the table, how other armed actors, including Tareq Saleh, will position themselves within this evolving landscape; and, ultimately, what all this means for the PLC.
Saudi Arabia’s Options
Despite a multitude of blind spots in the developments that took place in eastern Yemen during the first week of December, we can make a few safe assumptions about what options Saudi Arabia is likely to consider. The first assumption is that Saudi Arabia is strategically committed to the unity of Yemen. Ever since the Houthis acquired the missile technology to threaten the Saudi heartland, it has become clear that containing them is vital for national security. That containment requires as broad a Yemeni anti-Houthi coalition as possible. Taking the South out of the equation would significantly reduce the size of that coalition.
The second assumption is that the Kingdom has no designs of its own on Hadramawt. The long-standing strategic objective of gaining access to the open sea through eastern Yemen is now more likely to be achieved through a Yemeni-Saudi agreement once the country is stabilized. Yemen will likely emerge from the conflict as a highly decentralized federal state, as agreed in the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference. That will allow for a special relationship to evolve between Hadramawt and Saudi Arabia without impugning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yemen. Trying to wrest such access now would result in long-term instability that would be costly both to the people of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Surely the Saudis remember that it took nearly seven decades to overcome the bad aftertaste of the border war of 1934.
The third assumption is that the Kingdom recognizes the risk of signing an agreement with the Houthis before the anti-Houthi camp becomes sufficiently credible as a deterrent that could compel the Houthis to accept a meaningful power-sharing agreement. This can be achieved only if infighting among the forces under the PLC is halted and a unified command is established.
Based on these assumptions, we can rule out the option of Saudi Arabia using military means to force the STC to withdraw from Hadramawt and Al-Mahra. The STC’s takeover is reversible by peaceful means. The Kingdom has many diplomatic and economic tools to make the STC see the wisdom of withdrawal, and to get the UAE to cooperate in that regard.
It has already taken the first step in a statement by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China, calling for a comprehensive settlement in Yemen based on accepted international standards and supervised by the UN. The accepted international standards include UN Security Council resolutions affirming the unity and territorial integrity of Yemen. Saudi Arabia can shift back the burden it had assumed from the Emirates of paying STC fighters. It can impose sanctions on the STC and push for international sanctions as well. Direct diplomatic pressure on the UAE is another tool at the Kingdom’s disposal. The warm welcome Qatari Emir Tamim al-Thani received at Riyadh airport from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on December 8 hints at the regional isolation Abu Dhabi could face if the situation continues to escalate. Efforts by several Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to isolate Qatar from 2017 to 2021 provide a precedent. But this time, the shoe could be on the other foot.
A Catalyst for New Regional Alliances
Although the consequences of recent developments in Yemen’s eastern governorates remain uncertain, some facts on the ground will be difficult to reverse.
One of the most evident is the transformation of the Saudi-UAE relationship from tense competition into open hostility. While the alliance between the two nations during Yemen’s war has witnessed multiple periods of friction, the current confrontation marks a defining turning point. This new escalation makes it far more difficult to return to the usual ways of containment or compromise to balance the interests of both intervening powers.
In the past, armed action has been used to reshape political arrangements within the internationally recognized government, such as when the STC took control of Aden in August 2019, leading to the Riyadh Agreement in November of that year. That agreement addressed several of the STC’s demands and incorporated them into the government structure.
This time, however, the situation is fundamentally different, not because the STC has raised its demands, but because of Saudi Arabia’s reaction, characterized by deep feelings of betrayal and shock. From the Saudi perspective, the UAE has openly challenged the Kingdom without showing even minimal respect for Saudi interests. Yemen is a sensitive matter for Riyadh, as the country is directly tied to Saudi national security and shares a 1,400-kilometer border. Moreover, Hadramawt holds a particularly special place for the Kingdom, given the Hadrami diaspora’s historical influence and a shared tribal identity. In Saudi eyes, the UAE has crossed a critical red line.
This moment marks a breaking point between the two states, which had already found themselves on opposing sides in other regional conflicts, such as in Sudan. Yet for Saudi Arabia, no theater is more vital than Yemen. The result is the potential for a new political order in the Gulf, with Yemen once again at the core of these emerging shifts. As tensions grow, Saudi Arabia will likely draw closer to regional powers expressing support for Yemen’s unity, including Oman, Qatar, Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, and away from those who do not.