Politics and Diplomacy

Houthis Seek to Fill Hezbollah Void, Pressure Riyadh, Stabilize Internal Politics

In response to dramatic regional developments stemming from the Gaza war and domestic pressure inside Yemen, the Houthis (Ansar Allah) pivoted on several fronts. Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi quickly stepped in to fill the leadership vacuum atop the Axis of Resistance following the September 27 assassination of his Lebanese ally and mentor, Hassan Nasrallah, which severely weakened Hezbollah in its fight with Israel. Over the next eight days, Abdelmalek delivered three recorded speeches, one mourning Nasrallah, the second following a missile attack on Israel, and the third marking the anniversary of Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Abdelmalek argued that among Iran-allied groups, the Houthis are the most capable, most influential, and most willing and able to sustain losses on behalf of the Axis of Resistance. Speaking as if he represented the views of the entire bloc, Abdelmalek was also unusually frank about Iran’s role as a supporter of the Houthis: “Iran stands with the Arabs before others do in confronting their Israeli enemy,” he said in his October 6 speech, which dedicated considerable time to defending Tehran’s regional policies.

At the same time, Houthi animosity toward Saudi Arabia flared up again.^[1] In his October 6 speech, Abdelmalek attacked Riyadh for pursuing normalization plans with Israel. Houthi commentators and journalists took the criticism as a cue to ramp up their own attacks. “To the brothers in Gulf states, good hellish evening to you: I advise those who live near oil fields, storage, refineries, and export centers to keep a safe distance,” Houthi war reporter for Al-Masirah TV, Yahya al-Shami, posted on X, alongside an image of a Jeddah oil depot on fire after a 2022 Houthi attack. The latest Houthi outbursts against Riyadh also have to do with delays in the implementation of a peace roadmap that the two had tentatively agreed upon prior to the start of the Gaza war. Specifically, the Houthis are eager to cash in on the financial rescue package outlined in the deal – which envisions the disbursement of years of unpaid public salaries, including for Houthi fighters – in order to ease mounting popular resentment against the group. In an October 29 meeting with the UN Special Envoy’s office, incoming Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer said that Saudi Arabia was holding back on the implementation of the so-called roadmap due to foreign pressure. A few days later, Houthi-run Saba news agency chief Nasreddine Amer reposted a photo on X showing him alongside a little-known Saudi opposition figure called Nader al-Shammari speaking in Sana’a in praise of the Houthis.

The anti-Saudi theme continued in a November 4 editorial piece, in which the Houthi-run Saba news agency attacked Saudi Arabia for its pro-Western role in the region. “Saudi Arabia is governed by an old monarchy built by the colonial powers to protect their interests, secure the exploitation of oil revenues, and transform Saudi territory into a market for their industrial products,” it said. During the same period, a Yemeni journalist reported that dozens of Saudi opposition figures and other nationals wanted by the Saudi government had arrived in Sana’a and Sa’ada over several months with the aim of forming a “military council.” The report claimed the recent arrivals included four figures associated with Al-Qaeda in Yemen, who came to Sana’a via Al-Bayda governorate.

In parallel with Houthi messaging shifts at the regional level, the group’s interactions with the international aid community took a sharp turn. On October 9, Houthi authorities announced the abolishment of the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA) and transferred its responsibilities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Formed in 2019, SCMCHA was designed to monitor aid operations in Houthi areas and became synonymous with the group’s interference in humanitarian work. Long loathed by humanitarians, SCMCHA’s image hit a new low in June when more than 60 aid workers and civil society members were forcibly disappeared amid fabricated spy allegations.

The sudden fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December dealt another blow to the Axis of Resistance. Government leaders, including Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, welcomed the fall of the Assad regime, calling it a “historic moment” for the rejection of foreign influence in the country and for Iran to end its influence in Yemen.

The unexpected regime collapse in Syria fueled speculation that the Houthis might be vulnerable to the same fate. Although there is rising dissent within Houthi ranks and among the population they govern, Houthi authorities still command a large fighting force driven largely by ideological conviction. However, widespread economic suffering in Houthi areas and infighting among the political and security apparatus and other elements of the ruling structure may be revealing cracks in the Houthi edifice. Houthi authorities arrested a number of people who celebrated the events in Syria. While it is still too early to gauge the fallout from the end of the Assad regime, both Yemen and Iraq seem set to rise in importance for the Iran-led Axis.

The Houthis’ escalatory rhetoric and actions in the final months of 2024 can’t be understood without considering the looming threat posed by the incoming Trump administration. Although theories on Trump’s approach to Yemen and the Houthis are speculation at this stage, there are signs of a hardline stance, such as the reinstatement of the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation that the Biden administration removed in 2021. Given Trump’s aversion to costly military conflict shown in his first term, it is plausible that the incoming administration may give Israel the green light to spearhead attacks against the Houthis with US logistical support, but also possible that he would try to hold the Israelis back from a major escalation.

Government Infighting Reveals Dysfunction

Intrigue and dysfunction continue to grip the PLC and government, undermining efforts to tackle fuel shortages, provide electricity, pay salaries, and curb rampant inflation in southern governorates. The situation was exemplified by a personal rivalry between two veteran bureaucrats – cabinet secretary-general Mutea Dammaj and the prime minister’s office head Anis Baharitha. On October 27, Dammaj complained to Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak that Baharitha had stormed a cabinet meeting to demand an explanation for the disappearance of a number of checks from the Department of Financial and Administrative Affairs. On November 2, Bin Mubarak sided with Baharitha and ordered the government’s financial accountability apparatus to investigate the corruption accusations. Bin Mubarak has struggled to impose his authority since taking office in February, and speculation is already swirling that the PLC hopes to replace him as part of a broader cabinet reshuffle, which could include up to 10 ministers.

Baharitha, a powerful Islah-backed political veteran, long occupied a number of sensitive positions contemporaneously, including at the investment authority. Dammaj is affiliated with the Yemeni Socialist Party and is known to have good standing with journalists and intellectuals, as well as support from senior officials, who saw an opportunity to remove Baharitha. The tensions came to a head on December 18 when the PLC issued a decree dismissing both men along with a third figure, Ali al-Nuaimi,^[2] an assistant to Baharitha. The decision, which came from a committee headed by PLC member and Giants Brigades leader Abdelrahman “Abu Zara’a” al-Muharrami, added that corruption investigations concerning all three would be completed within a month.

The reporting period also witnessed some political openings. On October 29, Southern Transitional Council (STC) chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi met with prominent businessman Ahmed al-Essi in Abu Dhabi. Al-Essi is one of the wealthiest men in Yemen and is intimately involved in politics, having founded the Southern National Coalition in May 2018 as a political counterweight to the STC. On November 22, an Islah delegation met Al-Zubaidi in Aden under the slogan of uniting ranks in the face of “the Houthi Imamate project” and restoring the state. Following Al-Zubaidi’s talks with PLC member and National Resistance forces leader Tareq Saleh in the summer, the STC chief’s appearances with Al-Essi and Islah build on a trend over the past year of unifying parts of the anti-Houthi coalition.

To that end, on December 5, in Islah-dominated Taiz city, the Political Bureau of Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces and the Taiz branch of the General People’s Congress (GPC) party commemorated the seventh anniversary of the December 2 uprising, when forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (along with his nephew Tareq) battled their former Houthi allies. It was the first time that the Islah party in Taiz city allowed commemoration of the uprising, and events featured the participation of several Islah officials. In Marib, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a delegation from the Political Bureau of the National Resistance forces that was traveling to Marib city, which is also controlled by Islah, to commemorate the uprising. Although it would be presumptuous to call any of these developments political breakthroughs, the fact that longtime foes are meeting each other in public is a sign that a willingness to work together – however minimally – may be gaining traction.

These were not the only initiatives seeking to foster cooperation. American efforts to unify anti-Houthi political ranks produced the National Coalition of Political Parties and Groups in November. Spearheaded by the US government-linked National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the new anti-Houthi bloc consists of more than 20 political parties aligned with the internationally recognized government and is led by former prime minister Ahmed bin Dagher. The STC refused to join, seeing it as a dilution of its dominant position in the south and a threat to its ability to deliver on its promise of an independent southern state. Other groups seeking greater autonomy from the government, such as the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference, refused to sign on as well, believing the coalition was too hastily arranged to win genuine buy-in from the various political factions.

Other Developments

October 3: The US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on prominent tribal figure and Islah-affiliated businessman Hamid al-Ahmar for funding Hamas’s military and governance activities in Gaza through a vast network of businesses and charitable organizations he owns in Yemen and abroad. Given the Al-Ahmar family’s legacy and established patronage networks – Abdullah al-Ahmar was the paramount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation and a major player in Yemeni politics during the Saleh era – the sanctions may impact the political landscape, alienating some factions while consolidating support among others.

October 14: Thousands of people gathered in Hadramawt’s Seyoun city for the 61st anniversary of the October 14 Revolution, which celebrates the uprising against British rule in Aden. Local media reported that STC branches across Yemen encouraged their constituents to travel to Seyoun for the celebrations in an effort to strengthen the STC against the Islah party, which is influential in the city.

October 15: Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas – former prime minister of south Yemen, prime minister after unification in 1990, and prime minister of the brief breakaway southern state in 1994 – returned to Aden for the first time in 30 years. Al-Attas was accompanied by PLC chief Al-Alimi in what looked like another Saudi-choreographed message to the STC that it will not be able to impose its agenda on the south.

October 15: A Russian delegation led by the director of the MENA department of the Russian foreign ministry, Alexander Kinshchak, met separately with Prime Minister Bin Mubarak, Aden Governor Ahmed Lamlas, and STC National Assembly President Ali Abdullah al-Kathiri to discuss the reopening of the Russian consulate in Aden. All the Yemeni representatives promised to support the consulate’s return, but it was notable that the move came amid reports that Russia may be considering a weapons deal with the Houthis.

November 11: The Aden office of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor threatened to suspend the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate’s (YJS) work in the interim capital until it moves its headquarters to Aden. The move came as part of a larger ministry initiative to force unions to relocate from Sana’a. The YJS criticized the move as part of what it called “arbitrary and illegal measures” to target syndicates and unions. Prime Minister Bin Mubarak instructed the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to cancel its suspension of the YJS, saying the government must respect its “historic symbolism.”

November 19: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Yemen envoy Mikhail Bogdanov met with Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, son of Yemen’s late former president. The two reportedly discussed the UN-led peace process and humanitarian and security efforts. In late July, the UN removed Saleh, who lives in the UAE, from its sanctions list. In December, he traveled to Cairo to meet with the exiled Yemeni leadership of the General People’s Congress (GPC).

November 19: Representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China met in Riyadh to reaffirm the Beijing Agreement, a 2023 Chinese-brokered deal that restored relations between the two Middle Eastern powers following seven years of severed ties.

November 25: Ali Hussein Badreddine al-Houthi, a son of the movement’s founder, was appointed head of the Sha’ab Football Club in Sana’a. The move appears intended to use sports to create a support base among Yemeni youth for the younger generation of the ruling Houthi family.

November 26: The Swedish government announced its intention to end development aid to Yemen due to what it called the Houthi group’s “destructive actions” – a reference to continued attacks on commercial vessels and the mass detention of employees of the UN, INGOs, and their local affiliates. Development aid to Houthi-controlled territories will end as early as the start of 2025 and be phased out in government-held parts of the country by June.

November 30: Dozens of cities in southern Yemen commemorated South Yemen’s Independence Day, marking the withdrawal of British forces from Aden in 1967 and the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Demonstrators in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra demanded the removal of what they called Saudi and UAE “occupiers.”

December 2: Canada added the Houthi group to its list of terrorist entities, making it illegal for Canadian citizens or parties to knowingly interact with or provide resources to the group in any way.

December 9: The US Treasury Department sanctioned the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners Affairs and its chairman, Abdelqader al-Mortada, for human rights abuses in Yemen. The designation noted that Al-Mortada, who represents the Houthis in UN-brokered prisoner release negotiations, has been directly implicated in the torture of prisoners. Upon release from a Houthi prison in 2023, Yemeni journalist Tawfiq al-Mansouri accused Al-Mortada of fracturing his skull during an interrogation.

December 12: Socotra’s STC-leaning national assembly declared self-rule with what it said in a statement was the UAE’s blessing, adding it would pursue talks with the PLC in that regard. The UAE placed military forces on the archipelago during the war, making it the de facto power there, although Saudi Arabia is also known to maintain a small presence.