For over a year now, the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) kept the world staring in amazement as they defied all odds and challenged the US, Britain, and a host of Western navies as they enforced a debilitating siege on the Israeli port of Eilat. With the announcement of a ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis have pledged to continue targeting Israeli vessels until all phases of the deal are complete, and the group’s undiminished capabilities provide a constant threat of new attacks.
Houthi missile and drone attacks on Israel caused little material damage and minimal casualties, but their economic and psychological impact is significant. The Houthis struck targets deep into Israeli territory – missiles and one-way drones have hit Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Ashkelon. Given these must fly approximately 2,000 km from Yemen to Israel, their payloads are reduced, but their message is still profound. An armed group from one of the world’s poorest countries has breached what is arguably the most advanced air defense system in the world, shaking an image of invincibility that Israel has crafted over decades. The Houthis have now taken the battle to Israel for much longer than any other member of the “Axis of Resistance,” including Iran.
Israel’s Response
Unlike the US and Britain’s targeted attacks on launch sites and weapons depots, Israel’s response has been closer to what it has been doing in Gaza for fifteen months, striking civilian infrastructure to punish the people of Yemen. However, its attacks were still measured. In its first strike on the port of Hudaydah, it destroyed some of the gantry cranes. An attack on fuel storage tanks near the port was the same; it spared some for future strikes. Israel apparently hoped to climb the ladder of escalation slowly to allow the Houthis the opportunity to reconsider. This has not worked. Israeli media has reported the frustrations of both the government and the people with the lack of progress in ending Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and Israel proper. It generally presents four options, each difficult to implement and each with potentially catastrophic consequences.
The first is a complete siege of Yemen, blocking all trade to and from it. The second is direct Israeli action to decapitate the Houthi movement by killing its leadership. The third is supporting individual Yemeni partners, presumably armed groups supported by the UAE, to fight the Houthis, and the last is encouraging the internationally recognized government to do so.
A siege would mean a Gaza model – starving the people of Yemen. But Houthi leaders would not starve, and a famine in Yemen would not weaken them. On the contrary, it would make it easier for the Houthis to recruit young tribesmen. This approach might ultimately force more Yemenis to stand with the Houthis.
The second option, decapitating the Houthi movement, would be equally disastrous. In Gaza, Israel deemed it acceptable to kill and injure hundreds of civilians to eliminate just one Hamas leader. Knowing the vindictive and bloodthirsty nature of the Israeli leadership, it’s unlikely it would be hesitant to carry out similar attacks in Yemen. The Houthi movement is several times larger than Hamas or Hezbollah, so even if Israel managed to kill many commanders – and likely thousands of civilians in the process – it would not destroy the group.
Supporting Yemeni factions is more complicated but equally foreboding. The first impulse of Israel and its Western allies was to contact the West Coast forces led by Tareq Saleh. He was even invited to London to discuss the Houthi Red Sea attacks and the possibility of a new government offensive. Southern Transitional Council (STC) leader Aiderous al-Zubaidi has also asked for support to stop the Houthis. But the popular backlash among Yemenis to the idea was strong. To fight the Houthis on behalf of Israel so as to stop them from coming to the aid of the people of Gaza was too much to stomach, even for the group’s most ardent enemies. Supporting subnational armed groups to gain ground and perhaps take the port city of Hudaydah would further weaken the already divided internationally recognized government and make the imbalance between it and the powerful and unified Houthi movement even greater. Such support would, in the end, serve the Houthis. Even taking Hudaydah would mean little in military terms, as forces there would be sitting ducks for Houthi fighters in commanding positions on the western escarpment overlooking the city.
Apparently, cooler heads in the US and Britain saw the pitfalls of these approaches and started talking with the internationally recognized government instead. However, this comes with its own set of problems. Government forces are badly divided. When Houthi forces closed in on Marib city four years ago, Al-Zubaidi announced that Houthi victory would be the ticket to achieving his group’s secessionist objective: the restoration of the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen. Elements of Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces believe that defeating the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah forces, a large component of the national army, is a prerequisite to defeating the Houthis.[1] To expect that an amalgamation of such divided forces operating under the banner of the government, which cannot even agree on a joint command mechanism, could conduct a sophisticated and sustained offensive and defeat a disciplined and agile military force many times its size is absurd.
The consequences of this option could be even more disastrous than those of the first three. A return to all-out war against Houthi forces that have scaled up their military capabilities and acquired new, advanced technology would result in numerous casualties. Western or Israeli support would result in the disruption of food and humanitarian supplies and could trigger a famine. And any offensive is likely to fail. The US and its Western and Arab allies will ultimately throw their hands in the air and acknowledge the facts on the ground, as they did in Afghanistan, and work out a deal that will be good for the Houthis and their own interests, but not for the people of Yemen. Yemenis who advocate this approach should keep in mind that the defeat of the Houthis is not necessary to achieve the objectives of Israel and the US. It is enough to keep the Houthis busy for a year or two while they sort out the situation in Palestine. At the end of the fighting, Yemen will be further fragmented, weaker, and still dominated by the Houthis and other armed groups.
A Better Option
While Houthi military capabilities are impressive, their economic situation is dire. Their draconian rules, their extortionist tax regime, and the milking of businesses, both to support their war effort and for personal gain, have drained the economy and caused major capital flight, emigration, and displacement. For the past few years, the Houthis’ unadvertised economic plans were anchored on gaining control of the oil and gas resources in government-held areas. Their inability to take these areas illustrates a valuable lesson. For the government, defense is easier than offense. Defense in place requires sophisticated logistical support but can survive, at least for a while, the divisions in the top command. Houthi offensives on the oilfields in Marib and Shabwa were broken, often by one or two separate components of pro-government forces.
The reason this failure didn’t push the Houthis to accept negotiations for peace is that they saw opportunities yet to come. They saw the lack of a plan on the government side, and this weakness gave rise to hopes for another chance to take the oilfields. Then, the Saudis started talking to them and telling them that they were fed up with the corruption and incompetence of the government and wanted to make a deal. Just prior to October 7, the Houthis were anticipating signing a deal with the Saudis that would let Riyadh extricate itself from the conflict and leave its allies to their fate. In a way, October 7 has given the government another chance..
A stick-and-carrot strategy anchored on defense might bring the Houthis to the negotiating table. Such a strategy would involve making government forces a credible deterrent to the Houthis, so they know that they cannot retake the oilfields. The first step is unifying the anti-Houthi military command structure. Since the underlying cause of division is competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has made such unification impossible, the US must convince the two to cooperate in good faith in such efforts. Emirati obstructionism, while unfortunate for Yemen, is driven by legitimate security concerns, which only the US can allay. The second step would be to provide defensive capabilities to government forces. It is enough for these forces to stand their ground and break the inevitable Houthi offensive.
In the past, the Houthis have not demonstrated goodwill in negotiations or accepted sharing power with fellow Yemenis. But a radical change in the dynamics on the ground in the form of a unified government defense force and increased pressure on the group could make them realize that this is the only way to survive. Faced with a deteriorating economic situation and a military stalemate, the Houthis might be receptive to the carrot of funding from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council for reconstruction and putting Yemen on a track of economic viability. The Houthis know that the bulk of the population under their control survives on remittances and humanitarian assistance from their Arab and Western enemies. Once their grandiose plans of conquest are set to rest, they might see the wisdom of giving up some control of a failing part of a failed state and agree to a power-sharing agreement that offers a chance of viability.
The Houthis’ honorable effort to support the people of Gaza will not stop until the genocide stops, and the ceasefire in Gaza remains tenuous and incomplete. But Western concerns about the Houthis retaining the capability to disrupt Red Sea shipping can only be allayed by other Yemeni parties.
The weakness of the government, its lack of a unified military command, and the competition between its two main backers, Saudi Arabia and UAE, give the Houthis hope for future military expansion and control over Yemen’s hydrocarbon resources. Were these obstacles to be overcome, the Houthis might have no choice but to enter into serious negotiations with other Yemeni parties for a peace that will bring in funding for reconstruction and economic development. Creating the conditions for a power-sharing agreement with other Yemenis is the most feasible way to check Houthi military adventurism and put the interests of the Yemeni people first.