Yemen’s tribes have long suffered the consequences of the country’s political and armed conflicts, and the current war has proven no exception. Despite this, they remain committed to their traditional customs and norms. In June, a matarih – an armed tribal mobilization – convened in the Al-Rayyan district of Al-Jawf, in response to a perceived Houthi violation of urf, the rules and code of honor that tribes adhere to.

The matarih demonstrated that tribes can still organize at scale, but their ability to convert mobilization into military and political power and confront the Houthis remains dependent on backing from the internationally recognized government and regional actors like Saudi Arabia. In a discussion with Sana’a Center, tribal leader Abdelwahid al-Qibil Nimran warned that “the tribes cannot confront the Houthis militarily without support from the state.”

Shortly after the matarih was established, fighting broke out between its participants and the Houthis, with tribal and government forces cooperating as they advanced in Al-Jawf. This cooperation could provide another challenge to the Houthis and an opportunity for the government and its Saudi allies.

The Gathering

A matarih is a tribal customary practice rooted in the collective defense of a member, or of anyone who seeks the tribe’s protection. It is undertaken in response to a tribal call for support, known as a nakaf. The impetus for the Al-Rayyan matarih was a plea for help from a woman claiming to be the daughter of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. In May, a woman going by Mira Saddam Hussein approached tribal sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham, seeking protection and assistance in recovering property from US-sanctioned arms dealer and former Sa’ada Governor Faris Mana’a and his Houthi associates. Mana’a publicly denied the claims.

Bin Fadgham said he attempted to mediate to recover the property, but the Houthis kidnapped him and Mira Hussein. Bin Fadgham was held for 50 days before he was let go. Following his release, Bin Fadgham traveled to the Al-Rayyan area and declared a nakaf. The tribes responded not just in the name of honor, but to defend tribal autonomy and customary norms and to support tribal solidarity. The matarih was conditioned on the release of Mira Hussein, who remains in Houthi custody.

The Politics of the Matarih

The Houthis have extended their authority over the tribes by incorporating them into the Houthi supervisory system of (mushrifeen) and military structures. Tribal networks are utilized to recruit and mobilize fighters and secure local support. Some tribal leaders have had their traditional social roles curtailed, while others have been displaced or marginalized. These policies have fueled resentment.

In this context, the Al-Rayyan matarih reflects broader opposition to Houthi interference in tribal affairs. The tribes are governed by urf, a system of customary law that governs social affairs, disputes and their mediation, and collective security. By contrast, the Houthis adhere to the doctrine of wilayah, which proclaims the exclusive right of the ahl al-bayt – those who claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed – to hold political authority, and all are expected to submit to the directives of the group’s leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi. The core tension lies between tribes seeking to preserve their customs and autonomy, and the Houthis’ efforts to subordinate and reshape society in line with their political and ideological doctrine.

The scope of dissatisfaction with this relationship was evident in the breadth of attendees at the gathering. The matarih brought together tribes from different and sometimes conflicting political backgrounds, demonstrating tribal networks’ capacity to mobilize around a shared cause despite political and geographic division. Its strategic location reinforced this point: Al-Jawf is a governorate with substantial tribal influence, and the matarih was held on open terrain in government-controlled territory near the frontline with Houthi forces.

Militarization

The size and duration of the encampment directly challenged Houthi authority in Al-Jawf and offered an opportunity for cooperation with government and Saudi-backed forces. Similar mobilizations have been militarily significant in the past. In Marib in 2014, tribal encampments stopped the Houthis’ northern push. As researcher Ahmed Al-Arami recounted:

“When the Yemeni state itself was threatened following the Houthi seizure of Sana’a in September 2014, Marib’s tribes largely threw their lot in with the internationally recognized government… The first matarih took place in Nakhla and Al-Suhail, north of Marib city, on September 18, 2014. It later became known as the ‘popular resistance’ against the Houthis. The tribes have kept the matarih active to mobilize a standby force in case the Yemeni government performs poorly militarily or collapses.”

Momentum from the Al-Rayyan matarih soon escalated into direct confrontation with the Houthis. On August 14, tribal sheikh Abdelbasit al-Da’am announced that tribesmen would move from Al-Rayyan to the Murais district in Al-Dhalea to support pro-government forces on frontlines against the Houthis. On August 16, Bin Fadgham moved the main encampment from Al-Rayyan east to Al-Atham, along the front lines, calling it a tribal escalation in response to the Houthis failing to meet the matarih’s demands. On September 6, Bin Fadgham announced that tribesmen, in coordination with pro-government forces, had clashed with the Houthis, and said that any area captured by the tribes would be handed over to the pro-government forces.

The Limits of Autonomy

The Al-Rayyan matarih highlights a paradox in Yemen’s tribal dynamics: while tribes maintain strong social cohesion, cultural identity, and the potential for mobilization, they lack autonomous power in warfare. Decades of fragmentation have diffused tribal loyalties across competing political and military factions and regional patrons. Consequently, tribal actors are often used to advance political agendas, further weakening their influence. In Yemen’s ongoing war, tribes have been unable to act independently and lack the strength to declare open conflict with the Houthi group.

Nonetheless, mobilization in Al-Jawf has revived the symbolic authority and collective solidarity of urf. The scale of the mobilization also makes the tribes an attractive partner for the government. Tribal fighters remain indispensable to any future campaign against the Houthis, but to be effective, their military engagement must occur through formalized state and coalition command structures, rather than as an independent vanguard.

The Al-Rayyan matarih may also create opportunities for Saudi Arabia to deepen ties with local leaders in Al-Jawf, following Riyadh’s established tribal engagement in Marib, Hadramawt, and Al-Mahra. For Riyadh, cultivating tribal alliances serves national security interests by countering Houthi dominance in the borderlands. Recent Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure and shipping in the Red Sea could compel Riyadh to find new methods of pressuring the group, which could involve tribal alliances.

Ultimately, the Al-Rayyan matarih shows that while tribes retain a significant capacity for mobilization, converting this into military or strategic power depends on their political, financial, and logistical backing.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.