Open war has broken out once again in Yemen. On October 4, Rashad al-Alimi, head of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, publicly announced the launch of a new campaign against the Houthi group (Ansar Allah). The announcement came in response to an ongoing Houthi offensive that has seen the group capture Yemen’s southern Red Sea coast along the Bab al-Mandab and restart missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia, the government’s primary backer.

Yemen has been here before. In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition launched a campaign against the Houthis, aiming to push back the group on fronts across the country and reinstall the internationally recognized government in the capital, Sana’a. This continued until 2018, when fighting bogged down and Saudi airstrikes began to draw international criticism for growing numbers of civilian casualties. Pro-government forces backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE were ultimately pressured by the international community to halt an offensive against the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah as part of a ceasefire to protect the delivery of food and humanitarian aid. So what is different about this new round of escalation, and will it lead to a breakthrough in the country’s decade-long civil war?

A basic diagnosis of the Houthi problem now appears to be shared by several key actors. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, Saudi Arabia, and the international community have each concluded that the threat posed by the group cannot be contained indefinitely. However, it is currently unclear whether these actors share common objectives for a renewed campaign against the group or a commitment to deploying the resources needed to achieve them.

Crucially, for the first time since the Stockholm Agreement 2018, Saudi Arabia appears willing to impose sustained costs on the Houthis. Riyadh’s strategy of containing the group and offering concessions that would allow it to exit the conflict has failed. For years, the Kingdom negotiated with Houthi officials, outlining a peace “roadmap” with substantial economic and political incentives in order to encourage the group to make peace with Saudi Arabia and enter talks with its Yemeni opponents in search of a durable settlement to the conflict. However, no deal materialized. The Houthis used the reprieve offered by the 2018 ceasefire in Hudaydah to regroup, before breaking the accord and counterattacking in 2021. Then, the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the start of Houthi operations against shipping in the Red Sea put Saudi-Houthi negotiations on ice. In recent months, the Houthis have abandoned the 2022 UN-backed truce with renewed offensives against pro-government forces and attacks against Saudi interests. Riyadh now appears to have concluded that no level of accommodation will dissuade the Houthis from keeping Saudi Arabia permanently under threat.

The recent escalation in Yemen is also inextricably linked to the broader regional war pitting the US and Israel against Iran and its allies in the Axis of Resistance. Houthi attacks targeting Saudi Arabia, including key energy infrastructure, and renewed threats to shipping in the Red Sea serve as a source of strategic leverage for Tehran, increasing the sense of instability for Riyadh and piling on uncertainty for the global economy. As a result, Saudi Arabia’s shift from containment to confrontation appears to have political backing from the international community, including the US and the United Kingdom, as well as from the trilateral defensive alliance it entered into with Pakistan and Turkey.

In some corners of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, the desire to confront and defeat the Houthis has existed for years. They have long argued that the Houthi threat ultimately needs to be addressed militarily, but political fragmentation, competition over resources and power, and the absence of a coherent unified strategy have regularly undermined the internationally recognized government’s credibility and military capabilities. Some of these longstanding divisions can be attributed to the Saudi-Emirati rivalry inside Yemen, which persisted until the UAE’s departure from the country at the start of this year. However, it remains to be seen whether removing one source of fragmentation will translate into a more unified and effective political and military opposition to the Houthis.

Pro-government forces, backed by Saudi airstrikes, have already made gains since the launch of Operation Dawn on October 4. But the Houthis will not be easy to defeat. The group has built up significant military capabilities, and if they see their own survival as being at stake, they will use everything at their disposal. Intense fighting is ongoing in Taiz and Lahj, as pro-government forces attempt to halt Houthi advances aimed at cutting Taiz city off from other government-held areas. But holding ground and counterattacking will require financial resources, political commitment, and resolve, particularly from Riyadh, in what could be a long campaign.

Saudi Arabia’s track record does not inspire confidence that it has the stamina to carry a long war through to its conclusion. Its current calculus could shift in response to other regional developments, such as the US-Iran war or progress in talks to end the conflict. Riyadh may seek an off-ramp if the war’s costs continue to mount. However, these potential developments do not change the fact that many ordinary Yemenis have had enough of having their lives repeatedly upended by insecurity, displacement, and economic degradation. And now want decisive action.

The government’s stated intent to rout the Houthis across the country and liberate Sana’a may seem like a long shot at present, but regaining lost ground and pushing the Houthis out of strategically important territories would fundamentally change the dynamics of the conflict. Putting the Houthis on the back foot on multiple fronts and imposing real costs has the potential to temper their maximalist demands and establish the internationally recognized government as a more credible opponent in the eyes of the Houthis, and as a more legitimate ruling authority in the eyes of Yemeni citizens, regional actors, and the international community.

War has returned to Yemen. What remains to be seen is whether pro-government forces can fulfill their vow to retake control of the country, whether Saudi Arabia will support them in this endeavor, or whether either can force the Houthis to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. The anti-Houthi coalition has long been handicapped by the diverse loyalties and objectives of its constituents, with the result that the Houthi threat has continued to grow. If they do not act in concert to alleviate this threat, there will be further cycles of conflict, and a return to the violence and the fear of violence gripping Yemen and the region today.

This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.