Fighting in western Taiz and southern Hudaydah rapidly escalated last week, resulting in the collapse of government lines and a shocking advance by Houthi forces (Ansar Allah) down the western coast of Yemen. The group captured the important historic port city of Al-Makha, the coastal town of Dhubab, and the strategic island of Mayyun (Perim) in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. They now control nearly the entirety of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and retain broad access to the international shipping lane.

The fighting came as part of a broader escalation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government that began in July. Taking advantage of the recurrent disruption of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz wrought by the US-Iran conflict, the Houthis have been pressuring Riyadh to lift what they describe as a “blockade” of northern Yemen by announcing one of their own, targeting Saudi energy infrastructure and shipping diverted to the Red Sea. Fighting soon resumed on frontlines in Yemen itself.

The fall of the West Coast is the largest territorial shift in Yemen’s civil war since the signing of a temporary truce in the spring of 2022. Until this summer, that truce had largely held, with violence limited to small-scale operations and limited incursions. The rapid transformation of the situation raises numerous questions about the future of the conflict and the region’s security architecture.

Al-Makha was the base of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member and National Resistance forces leader Tareq Saleh, and the withdrawal of his and other pro-government forces will raise questions about the recent reconstitution of anti-Houthi forces under Saudi guidance, and the military and institutional effectiveness of the government.

For the international community, the Houthis are now a familiar problem that grows in stature each time they look away. The group’s expanding footprint on the Red Sea poses a recurrent threat to maritime shipping, and could facilitate the expansion of smuggling networks and closer ties with non-state armed actors in the Horn of Africa. More pressingly, Yemen’s already severe humanitarian crisis is deepening with tens of thousands of civilians displaced by the fighting, many of whom have already fled conflict before, and whose needs are likely to be unmet in an environment of declining humanitarian aid.

In this collection of analyses, experts examine the implications of the recent Houthi offensive and how it has altered the strategic landscape, the trajectory of the conflict, and the prospects for peace.

The Houthis’ capture of territory around the Bab al-Mandab marks a turning point in Yemen’s 12-year conflict, one with implications that extend beyond the country’s borders. It could reshape the domestic balance of power while creating new risks in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

The withdrawal of government forces led by PLC member Tareq Saleh significantly weakens the anti-Houthi camp, which is mired in an environment of deep division and mistrust. The recent setbacks call for drastic reform of the government’s political and military leadership, as well as its media strategy, to avoid further disaster. For civilians, the consequences of the sudden territorial change are likely to be severe, potentially triggering another wave of displacement in areas that have already endured repeated rounds of forced displacement.

The broader strategic significance lies in the Houthis’ proximity to the Bab al-Mandab. If they consolidate around the strait, Iran will gain additional strategic leverage against the United States and its allies, complementing its influence in the Strait of Hormuz. This would give both Iran and the Houthis greater capacity to threaten global shipping and energy flows.

Control of Mayyun is particularly significant. Its location at the entrance to the Bab al-Mandab gives the Houthis the potential to threaten or disrupt maritime traffic even with limited military capabilities. Their presence could also complicate the security environment of the United States and its allies in Djibouti, and of any Israeli military footprint in Somaliland, which the Houthis have repeatedly threatened. It could also enable them to expand their presence in the Horn of Africa and strengthen their connections with Al-Shabaab and other non-state armed actors.

Beyond actual attacks, the perception that the Bab al-Mandab is unsafe could itself be enough to drive shipping companies to reroute vessels around Africa, increasing costs and reducing traffic through the Suez Canal, with direct implications for the Egyptian economy.

The Houthis’ territorial gains also provide the group with greater strategic depth and access to new population centers. This could potentially facilitate recruitment and ease the movement of weapons and smuggling networks, while putting further pressure on Marib, Shabwa, and Hadramawt. Marib, with its oil and gas reserves, is likely the group’s next strategic objective.

Saudi Arabia faces an acute dilemma; accepting the new reality risks conceding control of a strategic chokepoint, attempting to reverse it militarily could trigger an escalation with the Houthis, potentially leading to more attacks on the Kingdom, including potential ground attacks along the border.

The Bab al-Mandab is therefore not just another front in Yemen’s war: it is becoming a test of regional and international power, and of the security of one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries. It is not just a dilemma for Yemen or Riyadh, but for the world.

This is a strategic inflection point. The Houthis’ capture of Al-Makha and Mayyun and their advance into Dhubab cements the group’s position as a regional player. It must now be addressed in its own right. Describing the group as Iran-backed is accurate, but analytically incomplete. This places Iran at the center of the explanation and obscures a more consequential development: a locally rooted Yemeni insurgency has evolved into a hybrid military and governing actor with expanded regional reach.

The latest gains give this transformation a territorial dimension: taking Al-Makha removes an important logistical and military buffer, Dhubab provides positions overlooking the approaches to the strait, and Mayyun places the Houthis on the waterway itself. Together, they increase the Houthis’ capacity to threaten or disrupt a vital maritime route, giving them leverage over Riyadh through their ability to target Saudi shipping and oil exports, with potentially grave consequences for global oil markets.

The advance also exposes the costs of fragmentation within the anti-Houthi camp. The Saudi-Emirati rivalry and Abu Dhabi’s subsequent withdrawal from Yemen weakened the West Coast military architecture, while the rapid collapse exposed persistent failures of command, coordination, and morale among government-aligned forces.

What follows remains uncertain. Iran’s regional position has strengthened, but its interests do not necessarily coincide with the Houthis’ own local and regional calculations. Saudi Arabia faces difficult choices. Despite the new defensive alliance with Turkey and Pakistan, neither has shown an inclination to enter the conflict, and the US remains reluctant to intervene directly, leaving Riyadh to manage the Houthi challenge itself. A wider war would expose its infrastructure to further attacks, while negotiations would mean dealing with the Houthis from a weaker position. Riyadh is likely to combine military pressure and the rebuilding of anti-Houthi forces to regain leverage, before reopening indirect negotiations with the Houthis and seeking a parallel regional understanding with Iran.

For Riyadh, the evolving situation in Yemen is arguably the largest security dilemma it has faced in years. What exacerbates this situation is that the Houthis’ escalation is part of a multifaceted and multi-front sustained pressure campaign from Iran. There is no question that Riyadh will have to respond, but how?

Riyadh seems to be building a response to the Houthi expansion on the West Coast of Yemen by trying to utilize their international partners and allies. This response has two aims: to employ as much power as possible in tandem with a planned ground operation, and to gain support for a future Saudi air campaign against the Houthis. The Saudis are wary of how controversial their 2015 intervention was, but a negative international perception of the Houthis might now allow them to be more assertive against the group.

Air campaigns alone never win wars and, unfortunately, a sustained air campaign should be expected in the future. But the extent of a future campaign will rely on regional dynamics with Iran, which the Saudis know is trying to overstretch them through their support for proxies on multiple fronts. We can expect ebbs and flows of limited air campaigns in the short and medium term.

The capture of Al-Makha, Dhubab, and Mayyun by the Houthis marks a fundamental change in the military and regional balance. Control of this geography allows the group to move from threatening maritime traffic through intermittent, long-range attacks to applying more persistent pressure at a lower cost. Mayyun Island is particularly important. Its position within the Bab al-Mandab allows the use of cheaper and more varied means for threatening shipping. It also creates new opportunities for the Houthis to support smuggling networks and develop connections with armed groups operating along the African coast.

This advance was enabled by fragmentation and disorganization within the anti-Houthi camp, an exceptionally weak military response, and an unusually visible level of Iranian operational supervision, particularly in communications and command and control. It is therefore difficult to view the offensive as merely a local Houthi operation or an opportunistic move. It is directly connected to Tehran’s wider confrontation with the United States and its allies.

The result gives Iran and the Houthis greater leverage over a principal artery of trade between Asia and Europe and increases pressure on shipping, insurance, and energy markets. It also threatens the viability of Saudi Arabia’s reliance on its Red Sea ports as an alternative outlet when transit through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted.

Retaking Al-Makha is not militarily impossible, but it becomes more difficult with each passing day. The Houthis are consolidating defensive lines, communications, and supply routes that link the coast to areas under their control further inland. Without a rapid, coordinated response backed by substantial airstrikes and intelligence, their territorial gains could become an established, sustainable reality. At present, there is little evidence of an effort on that scale, and time is working in the Houthis’ favor.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.