Iran’s Axis of Resistance is on the ropes. The degrading of Hamas during the ongoing Gaza war, the recent Israeli-Iranian confrontation, the weakening of Hezbollah during Israel’s war in Lebanon, and the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria have significantly reshaped dynamics in the Middle East to the detriment of Tehran and its allies. There is one exception, however: the Houthis in Yemen.
Despite Iran’s losses elsewhere, the Houthis continue to hold power in Yemen and appear largely unaffected by a year and a half of military action carried out by the US and Western allies, and by Israel. For many observers, this would make the Houthis a priority for continued Iranian support. While this argument holds some logic, there may be an opening to alter Iranian policy in Yemen as part of broader efforts to decrease regional tensions and achieve a settlement to the Yemeni conflict.
Diplomatic Tensions
Official diplomatic ties between Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Iran were suspended in October 2015, following a prolonged period of rising tensions that reached a peak after the Houthis captured the capital Sana’a in September 2014 and the onset of the Saudi-led military intervention in March 2015.
Historically, Iran and Yemen have had far from a stable diplomatic relationship. During the Iran-Iraq War, Yemen was divided into two states. Both officially supported Iraq, aligning with the stance of most Arab states. While North Yemen sent thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Iraqi army, South Yemen, which had strong ties with Syria and Libya, in reality leaned toward Iran and facilitated weapons smuggling during the conflict. Following the war, bilateral relations between Iran and the newly unified Republic of Yemen improved. Several official visits were conducted in the early 2000s, and Yemen expressed support for Iran’s nuclear program.
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 ushered in a new era. Iran’s regional role expanded sharply, often by exacerbating sectarian divisions across the region and supporting proxies in several states, undermining the authority and power of their central governments. In 2004, internal conflict in Yemen escalated with the outbreak of the Sa’ada Wars between the government and the Houthis. In 2007, the Southern Movement began to gain momentum, calling for the secession of the former South Yemen. The government accused Iran of supporting both the Houthis and the Southern Movement, allegations that Tehran denied. Tensions deepened again during Yemen’s transitional period (2012–2014), especially after the government seized two Iranian ships, the Jehan 1 and 2, smuggling weapons.
Capitalizing on an Alliance
Since the fall of Sana’a in 2014 and the outbreak of wider conflict in Yemen, the question has shifted from whether a Houthi-Iranian relationship exists to how deep and strategic it has become. The alliance is not just motivated by religious and ideological alignment but also by Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Tehran has benefited from the tense relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, while the Houthis have adopted a hostile discourse against Riyadh since their emergence in the 1990s.
Iran’s support for the Houthis grew as its relationship with Saudi Arabia deteriorated, particularly after the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which Saudi Arabia viewed with suspicion. Saudi-Iranian tensions peaked in January 2016, when Saudi Arabia executed 47 individuals, including the prominent Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Iran protested by summoning the Saudi chargé d’affaires, and angry demonstrators in Tehran stormed the Saudi embassy. This led Riyadh to cut diplomatic ties with Tehran.
Amid this diplomatic rift, Iran’s support for the Houthis intensified, helping to improve Houthi missile and drone capabilities, which the group used more and more frequently to target Saudi territory. In a key moment for the region, the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile and drone attack against Saudi energy infrastructure in September 2019, though investigations indicated that the attacks likely originated from the north, whether from Iraq or Iran. This event highlighted the depth of Iranian-Houthi ties and further inflamed regional tensions.
Meanwhile, Iran and the Houthis moved to establish more formal relations. In August 2019, Iran officially received a Houthi ambassador, Ibrahim al-Dailami. Almost a year later, in October 2020, Tehran sent Hassan Irlu—an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer—to be its ambassador to Sana’a. In December 2021, Irlu passed away; it was announced that he died due to Covid-19, but other reports claim he was killed in an airstrike. Iran did not replace him until October 2024, when it appointed another IRGC member, Ali Mohammed Ramdhani, to the post.
Facing a stalemate and continued attacks against its territory, Saudi Arabia was forced to reconsider its approach in Yemen and, by extension, its relationship with the Houthis’ primary backer, Iran. In 2021, Iran and Saudi Arabia began direct talks in Baghdad aimed at decreasing tensions between the two countries. In April 2022, a truce was declared in Yemen—a major Saudi precondition for continued dialogue with Tehran. Ultimately, this paved the way for the restoration of diplomatic ties in a deal brokered by China in March 2023.
A New Era
On June 13, Israel launched a military campaign against Iran, with Israeli jets utilizing airspace over Syria and Iraq. Ironically, these two countries—where Iran invested heavily in building influence—were used as launchpads for attacks against it, while Gulf countries refused to allow the use of their airspace. Tehran’s years of investment in undermining certain Arab states for geopolitical leverage ultimately backfired when its local allies were not able to assist Iran during its time of need. This underscores a broader lesson: attempts to gain regional dominance by weakening neighbors are unsustainable and can yield long-term negative consequences.
Meanwhile, ongoing Houthis missile and drone attacks against Israel and attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea have failed to force Israel to back down from wars in the region. The long distances involved and the limited capabilities of the Houthi missiles mean that threats from the group are of limited strategic value for Iran in a direct confrontation with Israel. Rather, the Houthis’ primary value for Tehran lies in the group’s ability to threaten Gulf countries.
Overall, the policy of proxies did not save Iran and prevent direct military action against it by Israel and the US. There are many indications that this confrontation may resume. On the other hand, the Gulf and Iran have strong incentives to pursue continued rapprochement, based on respecting states’ sovereignty and supporting increased stability in the region.
Yemen offers a good starting point and critical opportunity for trust-building. Iran can demonstrate goodwill by ceasing military support for the Houthi group and reengaging diplomatically with the internationally recognized government. Recent developments underscore the need to de-escalate tensions, making it an ideal time to shift the regional relationship toward cooperation rather than conflict and competition.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Any views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.