Analysis An Unsteady Path Forward for Yemen’s National Political Bloc

The formation of the National Political Bloc last November has raised pressing questions about the future of political parties and coalition-building in Yemen. The country has seen several such initiatives over the past two decades, most notably the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), launched in 2003, which effectively mobilized partisan opposition against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime in the years leading up to the 2011 uprising. However, its influence gradually eroded during the transitional period, eventually disappearing without an official dissolution.

Since the Houthis’ takeover of Sana’a in September 2014, the role of Yemeni political parties has sharply declined, resulting in diminished public engagement. Upon entering the capital, the Houthis immediately targeted party leaders. After they issued their “constitutional declaration” on February 6, 2015, some political and tribal forces attempted to form a counterbalancing alliance—the National Salvation Coalition. However, just days later, the Saudi-led coalition launched its military intervention, and the Houthis imposed a sweeping ban on political activity in Sana’a. These developments effectively prevented the coalition from taking shape.

Efforts to revive political life in government-held territories continued as the war dragged on, eventually leading to the 2019 launch of the National Coalition of Political Forces in Seyoun, Hadramawt. The coalition included 16 political entities but failed to generate substantive political engagement or presence.

The Yemeni National Political Bloc, announced in November 2024 in Aden, brought together 22 political parties and groups. Following the failure of earlier attempts, the emergence of a new national political coalition raises a host of questions about its purpose, tools, goals, and the motivations behind it. Is it fundamentally different from earlier, unsuccessful coalitions? To explore these questions, we spoke with political figures involved in the bloc’s founding.

War and the Crisis of Political Parties

The collapse of Yemen’s party system became evident after the Houthi seizure of Sana’a. The General People’s Congress (GPC) was split between President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had aligned himself with the Houthis. The JMP had fractured under the pressures of power-sharing and internal disagreement on key issues during the National Dialogue Conference (2013–2014), as factional competition took hold.

The war created space for the rise of a sectarian armed movement—the Houthis—as well as the emergence of new local actors such as the STC, the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC) and, later, the political bureau of the National Resistance forces. These shared three defining characteristics: local identity, regional backing, and a reliance on military power. Crucially, they all emerged from government-controlled areas, contributing to the anti-Houthi camp’s fragmentation and disunity. In contrast, the Houthis maintained a singular command, suppressed rival formations in their areas, and avoided internal division—an advantage that reinforced their position.

As a result, traditional political parties lost the capacity to reorganize, recruit new members, or maintain grassroots engagement. Yemen’s political landscape has since lacked a unified, credible counterforce to the Houthis—one defined by strength, clarity of purpose, and unity of decision-making. These elements are essential for any effective confrontation with the Houthis and restoring public trust in political representation.

But efforts to revitalize the political sphere continue. The Yemeni National Political Bloc was formally announced at a ceremony marked by a notable US presence, including Ambassador Steven Fagin. Its formation followed a series of consultation sessions held in Amman, Jordan, and in Aden, beginning in April 2024, and facilitated by the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

According to the bloc’s rapporteur, Safwan Sultan,^[1] the alliance was established to confront the Houthi militia, end the coup, and restore the Yemeni state. It differs from the political coalition announced in Seyoun in 2019 in that it is broader in scope, enjoys both international and domestic backing, and is more focused in its objectives.

Islah Party leader Abdulrazzaq al-Hajri noted that the bloc aims to revitalize political parties and movements by organizing meetings and various activities, while also expanding its membership to include groups previously excluded from the 2019 coalition, most notably the STC.^[2]

Early Fractures

The STC was one of the primary actors the bloc hoped to engage, but despite participating in preparatory consultations, it later withdrew from the alliance. STC spokesperson Salem al-Awlaki justified the council’s withdrawal by stating that, from the STC’s perspective, relations between political parties, forces, and components should remain within the formal frameworks of partnership established by the Riyadh Agreement (November 2019) and the Riyadh Consultations (April 2022). These frameworks include the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), its supporting bodies, the power-sharing government, and other official state institutions, which, according to the STC, constitute the legitimate platforms for political cooperation. As such, the STC claimed the formation of the bloc was a step backward from these agreed-upon mechanisms of partnership.^[3]

For his part, Islah’s Al-Hajri maintains that dialogue channels with the STC remain open and that the bloc’s role as a partner to the government does not conflict with the responsibilities of state institutions. He argued that the bloc serves a complementary role, enabling broader political mobilization beyond formal structures. It is important to note here that Islah and STC had engaged in military conflicts in 2019 and 2022, which may contribute to the prevailing sentiment of distrust between them.

The STC’s stance has drawn criticism, especially given its prior involvement in the bloc’s preparatory phase. A senior party figure remarked that the STC’s withdrawal reflected its broader reluctance to revitalize political life and tendency to shut down any space for political activity. He added that the decision was largely a response to hardline voices within the council—figures who remain opposed to engaging with other political actors in a shared national framework.^[4] The ambiguity surrounding the STC’s position deepened when it reportedly threatened that it would not permit the bloc to hold meetings in Aden.

The HIC initially signed the bloc’s founding declaration but also later withdrew. Some attributed this decision to internal disorganization, some to pressure from the STC, which wanted to avoid being the sole southern group absent. Bloc leaders suggested the withdrawal may be temporary, linked to rising tensions between the HIC and the Hadramawt National Council.

The timing of the bloc’s launch coincided with heightened tensions in Hadramawt between the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and the Hadrami Tribal Alliance, a group widely regarded as the social and tribal extension of the HIC. According to the bloc’s rapporteur, these dynamics suggest that the HIC’s withdrawal may be temporary and that the conference could rejoin the bloc if the current polarization in Hadramawt is resolved.

Foreign Facilitation or Foreign Imposition?

The international presence during the bloc’s launch—and the role played by the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) in its formation—opened the door for criticism and cast doubt on the bloc’s motivations. Some critics question whether it genuinely reflects a “national” will. They argue that if the bloc truly originated from a Yemeni-driven initiative, why did it require such intensive international involvement?

Members of the bloc hold a different view. Abdulrazzaq al-Hajri has asserted that the initiative was entirely Yemeni in origin and was first proposed by Mohammed al-Yadoumi, Secretary-General of the Islah Party, at the party’s most recent conference. He emphasized that the NDI’s role was limited to facilitation, a core function it has fulfilled in Yemen since it began operating in the country – the NDI previously supported preparatory meetings for the JMP. NDI had suspended operations in Yemen for a decade due to the war and resumed work under a donor-funded program focused on supporting political actors. According to its Yemen country director, the organization facilitates without influencing substance or outcomes^[5].

Basem al-Hajj, the Socialist Party’s secretary in Taiz, affirmed that his party’s Secretary-General, Abdulrahman al-Saqqaf, had long expressed the need for a historic political front to confront the Houthi movement.^[6] However, launching this coalition in Aden would have arguably been difficult without international support and endorsement, and faced potential resistance from the STC.

Structure, Goals, and Fragile Prospects

According to Safwan Sultan, the bloc is still in the process of finalizing its bylaws and internal structure. Its founding document outlines eleven goals, including restoring the state, unifying national forces, ending the Houthi coup, and resolving the southern issue. These goals are ambitious, and it has yet to articulate concrete mechanisms for achieving them.

The bloc has largely depended on US funding. Through the NDI, USAID pledged support for four quarterly meetings of the bloc’s Supreme Council. However, the February 2025 session was not held due to budget cuts. With USAID funding frozen under the Trump administration, the bloc is now facing a serious resource crisis. Unless alternative funding emerges, perhaps sourced internally from member parties, the bloc’s political future remains doubtful.

Its prospects hinge on its ability to convene regularly, organize political programming, and reanimate public engagement. Funding aside, serious challenges remain—including the resistance of armed groups to political competition, deepening regional polarization, and dwindling financial support. As a result, the bloc risks mirroring the dysfunction of the very government it seeks to reinforce. Unless it can overcome these constraints, the National Political Bloc will become another footnote in Yemen’s fragmented political history.

This analysis was produced as part of the Supporting Political Dialogue for Peace in Yemen program, implemented by the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies and CMI-Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation and funded by the European Union.