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The Sana'a Center Editorial Yemen’s Fragile Stalemate is Starting to Crack

اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية

The war in Yemen has entered a new, uncertain phase. Over seven years of fighting came to a relative halt in 2022 with a UN-backed truce that cemented the stalemate on the ground. Subsequent Saudi-Houthi talks to normalize ties and launch a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process were upended by the Houthis’ response to the Gaza war, as the group began launching drone and missile attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. Now, US President Donald Trump has returned to office guns blazing, relaunching the Biden administration’s anti-Houthi military campaign with a gusto that has raised the hopes of some parties that the rebel group could be brought to its knees. But even if Houthi power survives intact, the consequences for Yemen could be far-reaching, and the various domestic and external actors concerned with the country’s future would do well to begin considering the scenarios.

The goals of the US air campaign remain ambiguous. President Trump has cast his intentions toward the Houthis in the language of annihilation, but this is perhaps deceptive. The observable damage from the near-daily strikes shows the United States is trying to destroy Houthi military capacity by hitting what it believes are secret underground installations, especially in the Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada. The US is also trying to take out senior Houthi leaders, perhaps in an effort to replicate Israel’s assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and much of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon. With what success isn’t clear – the administration has given few details on its progress, and the Houthis are likely manipulating their accounts for propaganda purposes. But people are dying. The group reported that 123 civilians have been killed and 147 wounded in airstrikes as of April 14, while one estimate recorded 101 Houthi combatant deaths as of April 7.

The US administration has sent conflicting messages about its game plan. On the one hand, officials have said the military action could halt if the Houthis stop threatening maritime trade. But on the other hand, Trump has linked the campaign to ongoing efforts to coax Iran into a deal over its nuclear program – talks began with an April 12 meeting in Oman between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Trump envoy Steve Witkoff. This came just as the Yemen campaign began to garner greater scrutiny, with Afghanistan-style attacks on gatherings and reports of huge financial costs beginning to flood American media.

In short, the US intervention in Yemen seems to have limits that preclude direct action to bring Houthi rule to an end. Trump will deploy military force but without risking the “forever war” imbroglio he wants to avoid. There have been reports of some US encouragement of government-aligned military forces to take advantage of the situation by launching major ground operations to seize territory. But no one is going to stick their neck out without significant US commitment to back them up with weapons and air cover. The same holds for Saudi Arabia, which is primarily concerned with the threat of renewed Houthi drone or missile attacks inside the kingdom.

And yet, something has changed. A confluence of circumstances – be it the inspiration of regime collapse in Syria, Trump’s military campaign, or desperation as Riyadh continues to engage with the Houthis – has created a sense of expectation that something is about to change. Military factions across the country appear to be readying themselves for a shake-up to the current situation and are positioning themselves to take advantage. Fighting could break out between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces at familiar flashpoints (Hudaydah, Marib, Taiz, etc.), or involve newly armed tribal forces in northern Yemen.

In other words, we might see the lid finally blow off a political and military stasis that has largely been contained through Saudi efforts since the Presidential Leadership Council was formed in Riyadh three years ago. Since then, the government’s position has deteriorated amid a Houthi blockade of its ports, crippling infighting, and Saudi insistence on appeasing Sana’a at almost every turn.

Where could events lead? The dream scenario on the government side would be a coordinated multi-directional push toward Sana’a to force the Houthis from power. This seems inconceivable without a Saudi green light at the very least, as well as significant new military support. Some of the UAE-backed factions on the government side might be more eager for such a venture, but again, it would need Riyadh’s approval. More likely is an attempt to reorder the balance of power by reactivating certain frontlines and sowing insecurity in Houthi ranks as a means of cajoling them into a serious peace process. At present, it’s easy to see the group backsliding on its commitment to Yemeni-Yemeni talks if they secure the long-sought-after deal with Riyadh and a formal Saudi exit from the conflict.

Another factor in the equation – renewed US-Iran talks – complicates the picture even more. There have already been reports of Tehran removing military advisors from Yemen to appease the Americans and reduce the risk of a US attack. A protracted period of US-Iran talks, as now looks likely, could leave the Houthis more vulnerable as Tehran focuses on negotiations over its nuclear program and heading off a direct conflict with Washington.

Ultimately, the current moment of renewed pressure against the Houthis– with an ongoing US military offensive from the air and a Yemeni operation on the ground rumored to be in the works – has been engineered primarily by external actors. This reality underscores the urgent need for Yemenis across the political spectrum to assert a real vision for the future of the country now, before the “day after” finally arrives, so that the political trajectory charted ultimately serves Yemeni, not foreign, interests.