Military and Security

Hopes for Deescalation Come Undone

The first weeks of 2025 offered hope that peace in Gaza could offer a reprieve in Yemen, as Houthi (Ansar Allah) leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi announced on January 16 that the group would suspend its attacks on commercial vessels, and a January 19 letter to shipping companies stated that any future strikes in the Red Sea would be limited to Israeli-linked vessels. The decision seemed, at first, a watershed moment (attacks have been ongoing since November 2023), but experts familiar with Yemen were quick to note that little had changed in practice. While the strategy ostensibly brought the Houthis back to Phase One of their five-tier escalation strategy, the group has a well-documented history of mistakenly firing on ships that were not Israeli, American, or British. Moreover, even before the suspension of attacks was announced, there had been no confirmed assaults on commercial vessels since November 18.^[1]

Nonetheless, Houthi assurances seemed to placate shipping companies and promised a return to maritime traffic in the Red Sea that even the group’s redesignation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US could not spoil. On February 3, the Chrysalis, a ship attacked twice by the Houthis in July 2024, became the first oil tanker to transit the Red Sea since the Houthi announcement. Two days later, a liquid natural gas (LNG) carrier passed the Bab al-Mandab Strait for the first time in five months. Even the USS Harry S Truman crossed into the Mediterranean, where it underwent emergency repairs following a collision with another ship near Egypt. The USS Truman’s transit of the Suez Canal marked the first time since November that the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region was without an American aircraft carrier.

Within weeks, however, trouble appeared on the horizon. The shaky status of the Gaza ceasefire provided ample opportunity for Abdelmalek al-Houthi to backtrack from his earlier statements, and on February 13, he threatened to resume Red Sea attacks should negotiations with Israel fall through. The Pentagon reported that the Houthis had fired surface-to-air (SAM) missiles at US assets (this time a fighter jet and a reconnaissance drone, not ships) for the first time in a month, souring hopes of continued stability. By February 27, the USS Truman was back in the Red Sea.

The Israeli blockade of aid into Gaza on March 2, followed by the implementation of the FTO designation against the Houthis two days later, brought any de-escalation to a grinding halt. On March 7, Abdelmalek al-Houthi took to the pulpit again, delivering a fiery speech that ended with a four-day ultimatum to Israeli and American officials: allow aid into Gaza or face lex talionis – “we will meet a siege with a siege.”

US Expands Airstrikes with “Maximum Pressure Campaign”

The declared resumption of Houthi Red Sea operations was followed by the March 15 renewal of airstrikes under US President Donald Trump, dubbed Operation Rough Rider. The new campaign is a significant deviation from President Biden’s Operation Poseidon Archer.^[2] At face value, both operations shared a mission of “restoring freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea, but strikes under Biden were much more limited in scope and reactive in manner. Offensive strikes were focused mainly on weapons stockpiles far from civilian areas or at Houthi missile launch pads as they prepared to fire. In contrast, Rough Rider has directly targeted not only weapons depots and stockpiles, but also Houthi leaders in residential buildings and civilian vehicles, all of which appear designed to send a direct message to the Houthis that, should they refuse to cease operations, “they will be completely annihilated!”

The campaign’s initial wave reportedly hit more than 30 targets across seven different governorates, primarily in the group’s northern strongholds around Sa’ada and Sana’a, as well as military assets in coastal Hudaydah. There were also airstrikes in more seldom-targeted areas, including Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda. US officials said publicly that the initial round of bombings succeeded in killing “multiple Houthi leaders,” among them Abdelrabb Jarfan, Abdelmalek al-Houthi’s deputy chief of staff.

In the days that followed, American officials vacillated between threats of worse to come and offers to call it off. Top administration officials made clear early on that the attacks are directly linked to Houthi activity in the Red Sea, and that their cessation is a non-negotiable prerequisite to halting the airstrikes. However, leaders in Washington have also intimated that strikes are part of a larger effort to deter Tehran. Trump himself said, “Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences, and those consequences will be dire!”

As the operation now completes its one-month tenure, it has remained decidedly aggressive in nature. Dozens of raids have been recorded each day in multiple locations, in what appears to be an attempt to scare (or at least overwhelm) the Houthi leadership and secure its capitulation. On April 6, the White House said it had launched more than 200 attacks on the Houthis, which the Sana’a Center has recorded in 11 different governorates. While experts have debated the campaign’s long-term effectiveness (The New York Times reported that estimated costs were over US$1 billion after just a few weeks), it does appear that the Trump administration has access to high-quality intelligence. Information from messages leaked between top defense figures in a Signal group chat revealed that US officials are even keeping tabs on the “girlfriends” of high-value targets. Dozens of Houthi commanders have been confirmed killed, but the airstrikes have yet to affect the group’s top leadership, with attacks thus far limited to lower-level generals and regional military figures. On April 14, the Houthi-affiliated Ministry of Health and Environment reported that 123 civilians had been killed in airstrikes, along with another 247 wounded. This is likely an undercount, given that over 100 civilians were reportedly wounded on the first day alone.

For their part, the Houthis have shown little interest in yielding or stopping their attacks, although ongoing negotiations with Iran could influence that decision (see Politics). As expected, the group responded to the resumption of airstrikes with a return to maritime assaults, claiming four attacks within 72 hours. Interestingly, attacks have been limited to US warships stationed in the Red Sea, with no offensives yet recorded against commercial vessels. But despite near-daily claims made about attacks on the USS Truman and its accompanying warships, top Pentagon officials have ridiculed the Houthis’ efforts, saying that several of the purported “successful attempts” were over 100 miles away.

Attacks against Israeli territory also resumed following the onset of airstrikes, but have also had no measurable impact. As in previous months, the Houthis’ Iranian-style missiles and drones have triggered warning systems across the country, but Israeli forces have reported that all projectiles have either been intercepted, fallen short, or crashed into unpopulated areas.

Looking forward, it appears that military action is likely to escalate further, notwithstanding either an Israel-Gaza or US-Iran political breakthrough. The arrival of the USS Carl Vinson to the CENTCOM region, along with the stationing of a battalion of Patriot missiles and nearly one-third of the US government’s fleet of B2 bombers within striking distance of Yemeni territory, all portend more violence.

West Coast and Marib Brace for War

The pickup of US airstrikes has overshadowed another dangerous military trend in Yemen: the sudden buildup of troops and remilitarization along Yemen’s frontlines, particularly in Marib, Al-Jawf, and along Hudaydah’s West Coast.

Both government and Houthi forces have raced to mobilize the desert region surrounding Marib city, as the Safer oil fields in the east of the district have long been eyed by Houthi forces. Local sources in Marib confirmed that clashes broke out on a number of frontlines in recent months, from Majzar district near the northern border with Al-Jawf to Hareeb district near the southern border with Shabwa. However, much of the fighting remains centered around areas to the north of Marib city, where the Raghwan front and the border region between Serwah and Medghal districts have been particularly hot.

There have also been multiple reports of Houthi-organized rallies in Marib, where locals have reportedly been coerced into participation. Tribesmen in Marib al-Wadi district even held protests opposing such events and the increasing Houthi mobilization. This has not stopped the Houthis from sending reinforcements to the area from Sana’a, or from pro-government forces rallying their own support. Local media sources told the Sana’a Center that Tareq Saleh held a virtual meeting with tribal sheikhs from Marib and Al-Jawf, where he called the governorates “a stronghold of the revolution and republican values.”

Data on frontline mobilizations remains more limited in Hudaydah, but reports indicate that the typical exchange of mortar fire in areas to the north and south of Hays district and along the border with Taiz has continued unabated.

Despite months of the US privately signaling that they are not interested in wading into Yemen’s domestic crisis, regional diplomatic sources and media outlets say that preparations for a ground operation may now be underway, with some estimating that as many as 80,000 pro-government troops could be preparing to march on Hudaydah. However, government-affiliated forces are hesitant to start an offensive without backing from either the US or Saudi Arabia, neither of which is yet publicly on the table. It seems that neither Washington nor Riyadh has much appetite for a direct involvement in a resumption of war. But the movements of military envoys – including independent tours by CENTCOM commander Michael Erik Kurilla and National Resistance forces commander Tareq Saleh, and meetings between the defense secretaries of Washington and Riyadh – hint at the possibility of closer cooperation. If implemented, such a campaign could see pro-government soldiers march on Hudaydah with the goal of taking the governorate’s ports, and possibly even push toward Sana’a in an attempt to retake the capital. However, absent the green light from either Riyadh or Washington, this latter scenario seems a far-off possibility.

Security Roundup: Local Dynamics Threaten National Stability

A number of smaller internal disputes should serve as a reminder to Western officials and Gulf leaders that, at its heart, the Yemeni conflict is about Yemeni interests. Tribal ties, local politics, and hostilities from extremist forces continue to threaten the lives of everyday Yemenis and increase instability across both government- and Houthi-held territories.

As in previous months, Al-Qaeda is a regularly disruptive force in areas under the control of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), primarily in Abyan and Shabwa, where counterterrorism operations have worked to combat militants for years. Efforts to eliminate the group’s leaders received a boost in February when a number of attacks and drone strikes killed several prominent commanders. Among these was the February 7 killing of Abu Yusuf al-Muhammadi al-Hadhrami, after his motorcycle was booby-trapped by unknown agents in the Al-Samudha area of Marib’s eastern Al-Wadi district. On February 15, a suspected US drone strike in Shabwa’s Al-Saeed district killed Muhammad al-Hudhali al-Makki, a Saudi national and a prominent leader of the group’s Yemen branch. A February 26 operation by Arrows of the East forces, supported by a suspected American drone, succeeded in killing another senior leader, Abdullah al-Khader al-Atifi. These attacks follow a suspected US drone strike in January that killed Al-Qaeda leaders Abu Ali al-Disi and Saleh al-Dayouli.

The security situation is rapidly changing in Hadramawt as tensions rise between the UAE-aligned STC and political blocs led by Deputy Governor Amr bin Habrish, primarily the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) and the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC). A series of condemnations and inflammatory remarks between STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi and Bin Habrish (see Politics) have some worried that the dispute could devolve into violence. On February 27, the HTA formally unveiled the Hadramawt Protection forces, a new military unit composed largely of Hadrami tribesmen. Commanded by Mubarak Ahmed al-Awbathani, the group operates independently from existing military structures. Though Bin Habrish had hinted at its formation in late December, its size and sources of funding remain unclear. The group seems to have serious traction and has garnered a degree of Saudi support, as demonstrated by photos of Al-Awbathani posing with key Saudi statesmen and defense figures in Jeddah. Riyadh’s Joint Operations Command has committed to plans to recruit additional Hadrami soldiers, but it remains unclear whether these men would join the Hadramawt Protection forces or another group. Regardless, Bin Habrish’s growing military power has been enough to threaten Emirati-backed groups, who launched a campaign on March 27 to detain dozens of military leaders with tribal ties to the deputy governor. As tensions continue to rise in Hadramawt, those affected will not only be Hadramis, who continue to suffer from the severe energy crisis that lies at the heart of the ongoing dispute, but also Adenis and others across southern Yemen who rely on Hadramawt for electricity in the fast-approaching summer months.

Other Developments

January 26: Israel launched two simultaneous air raids on the Port of Hudaydah and the oil terminal at the Port of Ras Issa, destroying one fuel tank and causing light damage to port infrastructure and cranes. US forces also participated in the attack.

January 28: A soldier from the 2nd Marine Brigade of the Joint Forces was killed in the first recorded Houthi drone attack targeting the unit’s camp on Zubair Island in the Red Sea, according to local sources. Clashes ensued on the island following the drone strike, leaving casualties on both sides before Houthi forces withdrew to another nearby island. The Zubair Islands are strategically located in the Red Sea’s international shipping lane and lie only 20 nautical miles from Houthi-controlled Kamaran Island.

February 7: Saudi-funded and -trained Nation’s Shield forces in Lahj briefly clashed with one another after a commander, Osama Mohsen al-Radfani, was caught trying to “defect” with nearly all of his equipment and men toward the border with Aden, after a personal argument over nepotism with the unit’s leadership.

February 13: Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces released a series of videos detailing their involvement in operations to intercept illegal weapons and grain shipments en route to Houthi-controlled ports. The group also aired purported confessions disclosing the recruitment, training, and indoctrination of Ethiopians and Djiboutis by Houthi leaders as part of a smuggling network in the Horn of Africa.

February 27: Eyewitnesses say an unidentified military plane – possibly a Russian MiG – flew over Lahj and Al-Dhalea governorates. Some have interpreted it as a Houthi message to the STC to stay out of any upcoming conflicts on the West Coast or in Marib.

March 4 and 30: The Houthis reported shooting down two MQ-9 Reaper drones over Hudaydah and Marib, respectively, both times reportedly employing a locally-made SAM missile.