Analysis Houthi Authorities Undermine Judicial Independence with Major Reforms

In a new assault on the judiciary, the Houthi-controlled House of Representatives approved several amendments to the 1991 law on judicial power in mid-September 2024.^[1] This is not the first infringement on judicial independence since the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) staged a coup, taking control of Sana’a in 2014. They are systematically tightening their grip over the judiciary along racial and sectarian lines.

The Houthis deliberately changed the legal structure of the judiciary and introduced what they called a “justice system” – a special committee tasked with overseeing the functions of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). The committee is headed by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of the Houthi Supreme Political Council. They also created unofficial posts of “supervisor” (mushrif) within the courts, tasked with overseeing the courts and even exercising their functions when the sitting chief justices are not affiliated with the group.^[2] This blatant interference constitutes a direct infringement of judicial independence and opens the door wider for the use of the judicial branch – especially the criminal courts – to settle political scores, suppress dissidents, and seize property through sham trials.^[3] Death sentences are already being handed down without due process.^[4]

Previously, the Houthis began appointing figures to the judiciary based on their lineage. This can be seen in the names of those appointed to SJC, the Supreme Court, and faculty members and students at the High Judicial Institute (HJI).^[5] This was particularly obvious for the figures appointed to the SJC in 2017^[6] and in September 2024.^[7] The majority of the SJC’s members now come from Hashemite families, while the rest – with the exception of a very few- are either Houthi loyalists or people affiliated with the group. The same applies for appointments to the Supreme Court,^[8] and Presidents of Courts of Appeal in the governorates under their control.^[9]

The Houthis clearly do not recognize the principle of “separation of powers,” which functionally distinguishes between executive authority and judicial authority. They have continuously used the judiciary for political mobilization in governorates under their control, most notably during the “Yemen Hurricane Campaign to Mobilize and Confront Aggression,” a Houthi recruitment drive. The SJC has been active in pushing individuals and young people to engage, participate, and donate to war propaganda.^[10]

Among the recent amendments, several undermine the principle of separation of powers and give the President of the Houthi Supreme Political Council (a position considered by the Houthi authority to be equivalent to the President of the Republic), currently Mehdi al-Mashat, free rein to appoint members to the SJC without nomination by the SJC. The amendment to Article 104 stipulates that: “The President of the Republic shall appoint three members, chosen from among professors of faculties of Sharia and law in Yemeni universities or scholars of Islamic [Sharia] law who hold ijazah^[11] in Islamic jurisprudence.” Before this amendment, the same article required such appointments to be made “on the basis of nominations by the SJC.” Moreover, the amendment of Article 57 now stipulates that “the President of the Republic may, for public interest considerations, issue a decree to appoint members to the judiciary – in different positions and at various levels [within three years from the date of promulgation of the law]. This could include appointees from outside the justice system, including Islamic scholars who hold ijazah in Islamic jurisprudence.

The authorities in Sana’a did not need to pass these amendments, as they already effectively controlled the appointment of judges through the SJC. But codifying this practice normalizes blatant interference by the executive authority in the selection and appointment of judges and represents an attempt to legitimize encroachment on one of the most important cornerstones of the judiciary – its independence. The salient motive of these amendments is to clear the way for the appointment of specific individuals and to accommodate graduates of Houthi-affiliated religious centers who do not hold the requisite qualifications to assume positions in the judiciary.

This reshuffle will have a profound impact not only on the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary but also on the application of the law. The amendment eliminates the requirement of academic competence and legal knowledge. Prior to its amendment, Article 57 of the Law on Judicial Power stipulated that anyone who holds the position of judge “must have a second degree from the HJI, after the first degree in Sharia and law – or in law – from one of the recognized universities in the Republic of Yemen.” However, based on the recent reshuffle, appointees are eligible with only an ijazah in Islamic jurisprudence.

There is a clear sectarian bent to the justification for this reshuffle, which has been instituted on the pretext that it is compatible with civil law, which is actually derived from Sharia. The explanatory memorandum of the draft amendment states, “Anyone who has the slightest understanding will recognize that 90 percent of this law [i.e., the Yemeni Civil Code] derives – in letter and spirit – from the book Sharh al-Azhar – the jurisprudential reference of the Zaidi doctrine; especially in applications and general theory.”^[12]

The explanatory memorandum further states that law professors have been ignorant, altering legal principles to conform to the Latin republican system and detaching the law from its Zaidi jurisprudential heritage. Prerequisites for becoming a judge include a certificate from the HJI and a university degree in law according to Article 57 of the Judicial Authority Law, but the memorandum argued that this has deprived the judiciary of those who received traditional Islamic education, who may have more experience than formally trained judges.

This ideological dimension has been added with disdain for civil law, which the Houthi movement founder Hussein al-Houthi described as “imported cultural influences,”^[13] and adopts Zaidi religious doctrine as a reference for the law. It follows the governing paradigm of the Mutawakkilite Imamate that ended in 1962 in imposing Zaidi doctrine on the judiciary, even in predominantly Sunni areas that follow Shafei law (one of the four Sunni schools).^[14]

The reshuffle also reveals class prejudice and the monopoly of the judiciary by a certain stratum of society. The explanatory memorandum praised the practice whereby they would “trace the judge’s family history to the fifth grandfather and to verify its probity and status.”^[15] In a similar vein, the Houthis were inspired by the Mutawakkilite Imamate’s governance model in imposing the khums tax, which gives Hashemite families the right to 20 percent of the natural resources in areas under the group’s control.^[16]

This reorganization of the judicial system lacks legality and legitimacy. It violates the Yemeni constitution, the Law on Judicial Power, which affirms the separation of powers and basic principles of judicial independence.^[17] It also undermines the competence and professionalism of the judiciary and judges.

This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.