Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Houthis (Ansar Allah) rapidly extended their support to the Palestinians, directly targeting Israel, along with Israeli and Western vessels in the Red Sea. This unprecedented crisis has bolstered the group’s regional status and resulted in the escalation of regional tensions and the emergence of a novel threat to global maritime security. Concurrently, it has provided the Houthis with added leverage at the negotiation table. The Houthis have essentially transitioned from being recognized solely as a local Yemeni actor to becoming a powerful regional player within the Iran-led Axis of Resistance. Drawing on key insights from Sana’a Center experts, this analysis follows a three-level approach to examine the impact of the Houthis’ attacks on maritime security, the reshaping of regional dynamics, and the implications for the Yemeni peace process.
Impact on Maritime Security and Global Transit Routes
The impact of the group’s attacks on maritime security was more prominent during the first months of the Gaza war. The Houthis initially targeted Israel through long-range missiles and drones but soon shifted to targeting Israeli-linked vessels and ships bound for Israel. By early 2024, they expanded their targets to include American and British vessels, intensifying their attacks in the Gulf of Aden and prompting a swift response by the US and the UK, who carried out retaliatory airstrikes against Houthi positions via Operation Poseidon Archer, launched on January 11. Although there has been a noticeable decrease in the Red Sea attacks, they continue to pose a threat to maritime security and have created a new status quo in the region, forming a means for the Houthis to pressure the international community. According to the International Monetary Fund’s Port Watch, the seven-day moving average of ships passing through the Suez Canal for July-September 2023 was 72 cargo and tanker ships, but this number plunged to an average of 31.6 ships in the same period for 2024. This suggests that despite a drop in the number of Red Sea attacks, the crisis will likely continue to affect global transit and shipping routes.
Among the most severe attacks in recent months was the assault on the Greek-controlled Sounion tanker on August 21, in which the Houthis detonated explosive devices that ignited fires aboard the vessel, heightening the risk of a major oil spill in the Red Sea. Towing operations were suspended due to spill concerns before the tanker was relocated to a safe area almost a month later, on September 16, with the assistance of the EU-led naval force operating as part of Operation Aspides. Other attacks included a Panama-flagged, Greek-controlled crude oil tanker, as well as a possible attack on a Saudi tanker, both on September 2, according to reports by the US CENTCOM. The alleged attack against the Saudi tanker would be a major point of contention in the Saudi-Houthi relationship, since the Houthis have so far refrained from targeting Saudi Arabia during the Gaza conflict. The Saudi company which owned the tanker refuted reports of the attacks.
Houthi Ties with Iran and the Axis of Resistance, and the Conflict with Israel
Regionally, the Houthis have managed to position themselves as prominent members of the pro-Iranian Axis, enhancing their coordination with other members of the alliance, especially Iraqi Shia groups. The Gaza war provided the Houthis with a pretext to showcase their increased capabilities and play a greater role in regional affairs. In July 2024, they launched a drone strike that hit Tel Aviv, killing a civilian and wounding roughly a dozen civilians, prompting an Israeli counterattack that resulted in a major fire in the port of Hudaydah. On September 15, the Houthis launched another attack, which caused a fire in a field where parts of it landed in central Israel, further showcasing their ability to threaten the country. Abdulghani al-Iryani, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center, said the Houthi actions in the Red Sea have had a twofold effect on their relationship with Iran and standing in the region. “Because of their action in the Red Sea, they have made new enemies, so the only protection they have is to be fully aligned with Iran and the Axis,” he said, noting that in becoming fully integrated into the Axis, they have also given up the margin of autonomy they previously enjoyed. On the other hand, “they are not only making decisions on Yemeni affairs; they take part in discussions on the collective action of the Axis, and their activity in Iraq has become much more visible.”
These developments have shifted dynamics within the Iranian alliance while also proving highly beneficial to the Islamic Republic. According to Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center, “Iran thinks the Houthis are a good investment, and they have proven that they can be effective and play a role in the Axis of Resistance. This has prompted Tehran to give them a greater role.” Shuja al-Deen did not exclude the possibility of Iran giving the Houthis more support or the group growing increasingly dependent on Iran.
Despite being portrayed in some reporting and analysis as Iranian proxies, the Houthis maintain a significant level of independence, actively pursuing their own agenda and goals. For the time being, this agenda largely aligns with that of Tehran, but this could change in the future. The question is, will Iran be able to prevent a potential escalation by the Houthis that would create further tensions with Israel and Saudi Arabia? Shuja al-Deen believes that “the Iranians and the Houthis [have been] in harmony until now. The Houthis will not oppose any orders coming from Iran. The Iranians always support the Houthis, even if they claim otherwise. They have some leverage and can use it if they want. But they are not serious in stopping the Houthis.” Al-Iryani concurs and believes that Iran still has significant leverage over the group. “They [received] more sophisticated technology from Iran to carry out the attacks. If they do not follow the rules, Iran will stop supplying them. They have become more controllable,” Al-Iryani said.
While the Houthis may continue to rely on Iran, it is important to recognize that they are also in a position to escalate their rhetoric and attacks against Israel. Even though they have not yet acted on it, they have expressed their intention to avenge the killing of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Iran on July 31. Their ability to absorb potential counterstrikes from Israel, the United States, and their allies allows them to adopt a bolder stance, while Iran remains in a position of calculated caution. This position serves Iranian interests, providing Tehran with plausible deniability regarding any role in Houthi attacks, as was the case in the September 2019 attack against Saudi oil facilities.
The recent escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese front, including increased airstrikes across the country and the launch of Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, has further complicated the position of the Houthis and the strategic calculations of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli attacks, which included the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, have triggered a response from the Houthis, who targeted the Israeli cities of Tel Aviv and Ashkelon with missiles on September 27. In retaliation, Israel conducted airstrikes on power plants and oil storage facilities in Hudaydah. Iran, seeking to maintain its regional influence, launched a missile attack against Israel on October 1 in an effort to send a message to both its adversaries and its allies. As the situation continues to evolve, Hezbollah’s weakening could open the door for the Houthis to take on a leading role within the Axis of Resistance.
Implications for the Yemen Peace Process
The attacks on the Red Sea and the enhanced regional role of the Houthis have also had an impact on their leverage in the ongoing peace process in Yemen. In July 2024, the Houthis scored a major win in the central bank crisis when Saudi pressure on the Yemeni government forced the central bank to stand down in its campaign to have Sana’a cut off from the international banking system. This development served as proof of the effectiveness of the Houthi strategy and its tangible gains in the Yemeni domestic arena. However, whether these gains will lead to a long-term increase in Houthi power in the country is debatable. Despite the group’s military leverage against the Saudis, their Gaza-related attacks have drawn condemnation from the international community. Even though their support for Palestinians in Gaza has enhanced their regional standing, it has simultaneously undermined the possibility of the Houthis being accepted by the West as part of any future peace settlement in Yemen.
Al-Iryani believes the Houthis have become an international problem for the United States. “The Americans will not allow the [peace] process to continue. They will not allow the Saudis to hand over power in Yemen to the Houthis,” he says. So even if Riyadh aligns with Houthi demands, the fact the group is now seen as a threat to international security has at least partially compromised their position in the negotiations. Further, as Al-Iryani points out, “the Saudis have realized that despite the deal they’ve provided the Houthis with, the group has aligned more strongly with Iran.”
Since the war on Gaza began, the Houthis have gained significant momentum that they will continue to exploit, irrespective of the outcome of the war. The escalation between Israel and Iran and its allies has strengthened the group’s regional standing without reducing its ties to Iran. Although their Gaza-linked attacks have resulted in an increase in the Houthis’ regional status and a strengthening of their position within the Axis, their gains might not be reflected in a future Yemeni settlement, as the international community could oppose a more accommodating Saudi stance. In other words, the Houthis have taken a major step forward in integrating themselves into Iran’s regional network, but this has also brought with it a new set of challenges.
This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.