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Houthis Capitalize on Spy Claims With More Arrests
The Houthi Security and Intelligence Service has continued airing forced confessions by former employees of the US embassy in Sana’a, making increasingly outlandish claims of decades-long US spy operations in the country. The latest episodes, aired June 29, July 14, August 17, and September 1-2, focused on purported efforts to influence Yemeni culture, society, politics, and the education sector. Previous segments detailed alleged efforts to influence Yemen’s economy and agricultural sector.
Regarding allegations of cultural interference, the Yemeni detainees (referred to as spies in the videos) discussed how the embassy’s cultural and media attachés worked in coordination with the CIA. English language courses offered by institutes such as the Yemen American Language Institute (YALI) and America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST) were designed to “erase Yemeni culture and promote American culture,” according to a readout of the confessions published by the Houthi-run Saba news agency. The detainees said that the US allegedly sought to promote homosexuality in Yemeni society. American machinations to change Yemen’s social reality targeted Yemeni youth and women through programs and projects implemented by civil society organizations, as well as through studies and surveys, according to the detainees. US intelligence agencies also tried to infiltrate Yemeni tribes and recruit sheikhs and other influential figures, they said. Another episode featured allegations of US infiltration of Yemeni political parties, parliament, and the 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference. Regarding American influence in Yemen’s education sector, the detainees discussed how US-funded scholarship programs to send Yemenis to study in America or at institutions like the American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo were designed to create a pro-US cadre in Yemen, including in government positions. The forced confessions began airing on June 10, following the detention of dozens of Yemeni activists and employees of NGOs, international organizations, and UN agencies by Houthi security forces as part of a broader crackdown on civil society. In the days before the campaign launched, the Houthi Specialized Criminal Court in Sana’a sentenced 44 people to death on allegations of espionage.
Capitalizing on the choreographed spy claims, Houthi officials have pushed forward with the mass arrest of Yemenis whose current or past work involved interaction with foreign countries. In early July, Houthi authorities abducted Ashraf Zabara, the Director of Family Health at the Houthi-run Health Ministry, from his home. Formerly an employee at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Zabara was appointed by the Houthis to oversee the World Health Organization (WHO) office in Sana’a governorate in 2016. Zabara’s arrest reflects the widening net the Houthis have cast to intimidate professionals in the aid sector and replace them with Houthi loyalists.
The UN strategy for securing the release of employees and ensuring the safety of the remainder of its staff in Houthi-controlled areas remains unclear. The UN Resident Coordinator Julien Harneis, who took office in February, has held multiple all-staff meetings in Yemen, during which he urged staff to continue business as usual and remain cooperative with the Houthi authorities. Houthi loyalists are embedded within UN teams, creating a general sense of distrust and fear of speaking out. One senior staff member openly objected to the UN’s handling of Houthi interference and has since left their post.
On July 17, the Houthi authorities’ Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHA) tightened its grip on the aid sector by demanding to know the job structure for each organization and requiring “prior approval from SCMCHA before completing the procedures for hiring any local or foreign cadres.” Again, the goal appears to be to intimidate staff, replace those who don’t toe the Houthi line with loyalists, and perhaps identify additional individuals to abduct as bargaining chips in the process. In early August, Houthi authorities reportedly barred all foreign aid sector workers from traveling outside of Sana’a and summoned all local and foreign UN staff in Houthi-held areas to attend mandatory meetings led by SCMCHA. At the meetings, Houthi officials reportedly encouraged UN agencies to issue statements condemning Israel over the war in Gaza, complained about their focus on providing opportunities for women, and publicized a hotline for people to report “espionage activities.” Attendees were also asked at the start of the meetings to join in shouting the Houthi slogan (known as Al-Sarkha). On October 9, Houthi authorities announced the abolishment of SCMCHA and transferred its responsibilities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
On August 13, Houthi security forces also raided the headquarters of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and forced employees to hand over all work materials. The newly appointed Houthi Foreign Minister Jamal Amer later announced that the OHCHR headquarters had been returned to UN control after an understanding was reached on “enhancing cooperation” with Houthi authorities.
Houthis Revamp Government, Judiciary
On August 10, nearly a year after Abdelmalek al-Houthi promised “fundamental changes” and fired then-Prime Minister Abdelaziz bin Habtour and his cabinet, the Houthi authorities announced a new downsized government of 21 ministers led by new Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi. The appointments preserve the veneer of a power-sharing government with the Houthis’ nominal ally, the General People’s Congress (GPC), the party of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, the overall number of GPC figures in the new cabinet dwindled, and only proven loyalists were picked – the Houthi ban on the annual celebration of the GPC’s founding later the same month underscored the pecking order in the partnership.
Several incoming cabinet officials are GPC members from outside the Houthis’ ruling clique of Hashemites (descendants of the Prophet Mohammed) from Sa’ada governorate. However, they are effectively empty suits. For example, new PM Al-Rahawi, who had sat on the Houthi Supreme Political Council since March 2019, hails from Abyan, a frontline governorate where the Houthis have sought to exploit divisions between the government and Southern Transitional Council (STC) for over a year. Seen as a weak figure without strong tribal connections, Al-Rahawi has served as the Houthi-appointed governor of Abyan throughout the war. Mohammed Hassan Ismail al-Madani, a relative by marriage to the Houthi family, was made deputy prime minister, and prominent Zaidi cleric Mohammed Ahmed Miftah became first deputy prime minister.
Outgoing Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein al-Ezzi was a prominent social media voice and gatekeeper for foreigners and even Yemenis engaging with the group. His replacement, Abdelwahid Abu Ras, is an Al-Jawf native with a military, security, and political background. He was a member of the Houthi delegation at the 2013-2014 National Dialogue Conference and is now a senior figure in the Houthi intelligence apparatus, where his responsibilities include coordinating Houthi activities with various African interlocutors, including Al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, Al-Shabaab. The new foreign minister, Jamal Amer, was previously a journalist, though it was an open secret that he also worked for Saleh’s intelligence apparatus. While he was close to former President Saleh, his loyalties ultimately shifted to Abdelmalek al-Houthi before the group killed the former in 2017. Amer has also served as a speechwriter for the president of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat. Prior to own appointment, Amer reportedly led a whisper campaign against Al-Ezzi and former Foreign Minister Hisham Sharaf, criticizing them for failing to defend the Houthi government internationally and push back against its isolation.
Some of the more surprising changes occurred in the education sector, with the removal of Abdelmalek al-Houthi’s brother Yahya as head of the Ministry of Education, now merged with the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training. The resulting Ministry of Education and Scientific Research will be led by Hassan Abdullah Yahya al-Saadi, who is reportedly one of the group’s main arms smugglers and an important financial official overseeing its private resources. The job comes with immense power. In addition to the role of indoctrinating the next generation with the group’s ideology, Al-Saadi will oversee the World Food Programme’s (WFP) School Feeding Program, which distributes a major portion of WFP’s food aid in Yemen, despite reports that significant amounts of the aid are diverted.
Following the cabinet reshuffle, the Houthi-controlled parliament amended judicial laws and unveiled new judicial appointments that together will reshape and politicize the judiciary. The amendments empower the Supreme Political Council to oversee judicial bodies, appoint new judges from outside the judiciary, and establish new courts without consulting the Supreme Judicial Council, which previously appointed judges. The amendments also diminish the role of the Yemeni Bar Association by giving the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor the authority to grant licenses to practice, allow judges to prevent lawyers from practicing for three years, and prevent lawyers from attending questioning of suspects in security cases. Most of the new appointees appear to hail from Hashemite families considered loyal to the Houthi authorities. The Yemeni Judges Club – one of the key republican institutions still based in Sana’a – denounced the changes as a “judicial coup by the so-called cabinet,” accusing Houthi authorities of trying to recreate the Islamic justice system of the pre-republican Imamate, in which there was no lawyerly representation in the modern sense, and judicial discretion was dominant. The Arab Lawyers Union issued a statement of support for the Yemeni Judges Club, saying the moves were a coup against political pluralism and a return to previous judicial systems. A statement from the Houthi-run news agency Saba, on the other hand, said the changes would correct faults in the justice system and redress rights for the wronged.
Ultimately, the appointments and legal amendments reinforce Houthi control over key security, judicial, and governance positions. The changes come at a time when the Houthis are villainizing foreign influence and arresting Yemeni workers with international ties as a means to further consolidate control over the humanitarian aid sector and civil society.
Pro-Govt Army Commander’s Disappearance Threatens STC
Public outcry over the early June kidnapping of a prominent pro-government commander from Abyan has mushroomed into a major challenge to STC control in Abyan and parts of Aden. Ali Abdullah Ashaal al-Jaadani, a commander of the pro-government Air Defense Battalion who hails from an influential Abyan tribe, was abducted by gunmen on June 12 in Aden’s Al-Mansoura district. Outrage over the prospect that Al-Jaadani had been forcibly disappeared quickly translated into street protests in the two governorates. On July 9, the government-affiliated Supreme Security Committee suspended the commander of the STC’s Counter-Terrorism Unit, Yusran al-Maqtari, and placed him under investigation as a suspect in the kidnapping. The security committee also ordered the arrest of several suspects, including Samih Aiderous al-Nurji, who was questioned weeks earlier before being released under Al-Maqtari’s order. On July 11, in a sign of the case’s rising profile, Attorney General Qaher Mustafa Ali ordered an investigation into the disappearance and tasked the heads of the Public Prosecution’s Prison Division with visiting all known detention centers in Aden to ensure that all detainees were being held justifiably and in accordance with the law.
By early August, protesters were calling for a “million-man march,” marking the first major popular challenge to the STC in Aden since the UAE-backed secessionist group gained control of the interim capital in 2017. In an effort to take the steam out of the protests and demonstrate it was taking the matter seriously, the council’s Aden security chief named Al-Maqtari as a primary suspect in Al-Jaadani’s disappearance but said he had fled the country. On the same day, Aden Governor Ahmed Lamlas ordered security services to prevent popular demonstrations, which prompted the director-general of security and police in Abyan, Abu Mishal al-Kazmi, to announce the suspension of the governorate’s security coordination with Aden. In the ensuing protests, STC security forces killed two people and wounded five in Khormaksar district’s Parade Square on August 3, before STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi ordered security forces to stand down.
STC opponents in Aden and Abyan have seized on the public outrage to score political points and highlight grievances. The Aden branch of the anti-Houthi Popular Resistance Council, led by Islah-linked Sheikh Hammoud al-Mikhlafi, issued a statement in solidarity with Al-Jaadani’s tribesmen and pushed for the broader release of forcibly disappeared persons held in secret detention centers. Long-time STC rival Ahmed al-Essi announced the establishment of a branch of his anti-STC Southern National Coalition (SNC) in Abyan in early September after reportedly registering 15,000 new members from the separatist group in previous weeks. Al-Essi, a prominent Abyani businessman affiliated with former President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, founded the SNC in May 2018. A source from the Yemeni business community claimed that money has also been funneled into Abyan by Saudi Arabia and the sons of former President Hadi to help organize further demonstrations. On September 7, another mass protest billed as a million-man march was held in Abyan governorate’s main city of Zinjibar. Ahead of the demonstration, organizers called on all families with relatives in STC custody to participate.
While the details of Al-Jaadani’s abduction and and his fate remain unknown, the case has underscored resentment in Abyan and Yafea region of Lahj toward the STC’s political and security leadership, which mainly hails from Al-Dhalea. For example, potentially lucrative businesses may only obtain licenses to operate if cronies of the STC leadership are brought in as partners, according to local journalists and activists. The case could become a catalyst for reforms in the security and judicial sectors.
Local Leaders Wrestle Over Hadramawt’s Future
In the wake of Israeli airstrikes on the port of Hudaydah and Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the Aden-based Central Bank’s pressure campaign on Sana’a’s banking sector, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi made a surprise trip to Hadramawt on July 27 that set the stage for a standoff between Governor Mabkhout bin Madi and his deputy, Amr bin Habrish. The timing of Al-Alimi’s visit fueled speculation about exploratory talks to restart oil exports from the oil-rich governorate as part of a potential revenue-sharing arrangement with Houthi authorities. Oil exports have been suspended since October 2022, when Houthi missile and drone attacks crippled export facilities in Hadramawt and neighboring Shabwa. A rumored deal could see the Houthis lifting their oil embargo in exchange for the Saudi payment of salaries. Hadrami groups seized on the visit to highlight perceived central and local government corruption and service provision failures and warned against diverting oil revenues to the Houthis.
Hadramawt is one of Yemen’s richest governorates due to its oil and gas reserves, and there have been tensions between local representatives and the central government regarding their disbursement and the extent of local autonomy. It has also been the scene of repeated political contestation between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their respective proxies. Emirati-backed STC and Hadrami Elite forces are present in the governorate, as are forces with ties to the Islah party and loyal to the internationally recognized government. The STC and Islah have frequently agitated against one another’s presence.
On July 31, the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), led by Bin Habrish, issued a statement warning Al-Alimi that if the governorate’s electricity crisis was not resolved, it would suspend oil shipments to the rest of the country. When Al-Alimi ignored the statement’s 48-hour deadline to respond, tribes affiliated with the HTA set up checkpoints in oil-producing areas to prevent tankers from transporting crude outside the governorate. The tribal checkpoints also prevented Al-Alimi from making a trip to the PetroMasila oil company, among other sites, during scheduled visits in the company of Governor Bin Madi, whom many Hadrami tribal leaders would like to see replaced with someone they view as more independent of Saudi Arabia and the PLC.
Another group headed by Bin Habrish, the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC), announced its own escalatory measures after a 30-day deadline for the PLC to address deteriorating services and living conditions expired on August 11. Similar to the HTA, the HIC had demanded that PLC members act on behalf of Hadramis or face resistance. The group announced they would begin public protests and demonstrations, the first of which took place on August 13 in Mukalla. The HIC, which is a political bloc composed of tribal representatives, politicians, academics, religious leaders, and activists, issued a report at the end of July alleging a systemic pattern of corruption and mismanagement by Bin Madi.
On August 17, the HTA reportedly allowed the passage of diesel tankers from PetroMasila to coastal power stations after the oil company and the General Electricity Corporation accused the tribal alliance of responsibility for electricity outages. In September, a number of tribes held sit-ins and meetings that subtly rejected Bin Habrish’s approach in favor of Bin Madi’s position of “unity” among Hadrami actors. On September 12, Siban and Al-Amoudi tribesmen signaled their support for Bin Madi and the local authority. Al-Attas tribesmen echoed similar sentiments on September 17. On the same day, Bin Madi met with Thaeen tribesmen, who presented him with their “unify the ranks” initiative, which included removing HTA roadblocks and replacing them with Hadrami Elite soldiers.
On September 14, the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) and the Ministry of Oil and Minerals sent a letter to the director of PetroMasila, the commander of the 2nd Military Region based in Mukalla, the head of the Joint Operations Center, and Bin Habrish, updating them on the situation. The document alleged that a total of six tankers allocated to supply power stations had been detained since August 28 and are still being prevented from entering loading stations.
Other Developments
July 9: The Houthi group opened an office in Baghdad. Located in the Iraqi capital’s Green Zone, the office was inaugurated by Abu Idris al-Sharafi, Abdelmalek al-Houthi’s personal representative in Iraq, who previously headed the group’s military manufacturing.
July 25: Yemenia Airways flights resumed from Sana’a after Saudi Arabia intervened in a weeks-long dispute between its government- and Houthi-controlled offices. Shortly after the reopening of the airport in Sana’a, anti-Houthi media reported an undeclared Yemenia flight landed in Beirut, Lebanon, before returning to Sana’a, fueling speculation of the transfer of personnel, weapons, or money from Hezbollah or Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
July 30: The UN Security Council removed former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, from its list of sanctioned individuals and entities. Ahmed Ali, who was commander of the Republican Guard during his father’s rule and appointed Yemen’s ambassador to the UAE in 2013, was added to the sanctions list in April 2015. He has spent the intervening years under house arrest in Abu Dhabi. The lifting of sanctions has the potential to shake up politics on the government side.
August 25: Local mediators in Marib negotiated the release of two Doctors Without Borders (MSF) employees who had been abducted and held by an unidentified armed group for over a year. The German and Myanmar nationals were kidnapped in August 2023 as they were traveling from Seyoun city in Hadramawt to Marib city.
August 27: PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi made the first visit to his home governorate of Taiz since he took over the presidency in April 2022. Al-Alimi used the trip to announce multiple humanitarian and infrastructure projects, including a hospital, power station, and improvements for the Industrial Technical Institute. He also took steps to resolve simmering tensions over government and private buildings that have been occupied and, in some cases, looted by members of the Islah-affiliated Taiz Military Axis. Nonetheless, online criticism focused on the choreographed nature of the PLC chief’s visit and the fact that he arrived in a heavily armed Saudi motorcade.
August 27: The Houthis’ new minister of foreign affairs, Jamal Amer, received the credentials of the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Mohamed Ramadani, in Sana’a. The post had remained vacant following the December 2021 death of Iran’s former ambassador to Yemen, Hasan Irloo, who died after he was evacuated from Sana’a to Iran, reportedly due to Covid-related health complications.
September 26: In the days leading up to the annual celebrations of the 1962 Republican Revolution, Houthi forces arrested dozens of would-be celebrants. The crackdown was harsher than in past years, reflecting the group’s growing intolerance for political opponents.