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Since 2022, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has been at the forefront of efforts to regroup UAE-backed forces in Yemen, including those that operate under its own banner. These efforts have accelerated in recent months, involving the appointment of new officials and increased cooperation with other UAE-backed actors in Yemen. There are three reasons for this campaign: to build a larger and more cohesive front to cope with possible future scenarios, from the resumption of large-scale fighting to a diplomatic breakthrough in the moribund peace process; to counterbalance the influence of the Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield forces; and to deal with persistent political-military tensions in Hadramawt, where the STC is attempting to increase its influence. Overall, the reorganization of these armed forces has been tactical, not strategic, as the specific identities and often competing agendas of the involved players remain the same. However, the map of anti-Houthi forces is gradually being redrawn, more than two years after the April 2022 truce.
The STC’s Moves
STC President Aiderous al-Zubaidi and the head of the National Resistance forces Tareq Saleh – both supported by the UAE – met on September 16, likely in Abu Dhabi. Both men are also members of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). According to an STC statement, the pair discussed cooperation and coordination “to counter Houthi militias and various terrorist and extremist groups,” and agreed to form “a joint coordination and communication committee” to follow up on this new arrangement.
A month earlier in August, Al-Zubaidi appointed Abdelrahman al-Muharrami (known as Abu Zaraa), another PLC member and leader of the UAE-backed Giants Brigades, to oversee security and counter-terrorism bodies in STC-run areas. This would involve restructuring and reorganizing security forces in southern governorates, according to an STC statement. Al-Muharrami had already been appointed as an STC vice president during a 2023 leadership expansion, which also saw Haytham Qasim Tahir appointed as a member of its presidium. A former defense minister from Lahj governorate, Tahir serves under Saleh as general commander of the Joint Forces on the West Coast and is a member of the PLC’s military and security committee.
Why Now?
There are three intertwined reasons for this tactical regrouping of UAE-backed forces in Yemen. First, these forces need to be ready in case the expired but informal truce falls apart. These southern and western forces, which, like other Yemeni actors, have been sidelined by the direct Saudi-Houthi talks, believe there could be a return to major fighting. This could even spring from their own dissatisfaction with the outcome of a future deal negotiated between Riyadh and Sana’a. Numerous frontlines remain active in Yemen, with clashes occurring regularly between the Houthis and opposition forces in several governorates, including Marib, Al-Dhalea, Lahj, and Hudaydah. Apart from Marib, frontlines in these governorates are primarily manned by UAE-backed forces. The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, told the UN Security Council in September that “the current dynamic is a stark reminder that the threat of a return to full-scale war remains ever-present.”
Moreover, persistent Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Gulf of Aden, combined with those against Israel, expose Yemen to international military retaliation, adding another layer of instability to the picture. Al-Zubaidi’s recent comments about the need for local, regional, and international stakeholders to come together and develop “a new strategy to tackle” the Houthis make the reorganization’s logic clearer. Since the beginning of the Red Sea crisis, anti-Houthi forces have repeatedly urged US forces to provide direct support against the Houthis on the ground, hoping to gain status as reliable allies. For Washington, a less divided southern camp could be a more credible partner for potential military cooperation.
The regrouping also aims to counterbalance the rise of the Saudi-funded and supported Nation’s Shield forces. This group, originally named the Al-Yemen Al-Saeed forces, was established in early 2023 by PLC chairman Rashad al-Alimi as a reserve unit under his direct supervision. They were initially based in the outskirts of Aden in Lahj and Abyan governorates but later organized into several brigades and deployed to frontlines in those governorates, as well as near the Saudi border in Wadi Hadramawt. It is mainly comprised of Salafi-oriented Subaiha tribesmen from Lahj.
Al-Muharrami’s task of reorganizing military forces in southern regions can thus be seen as an attempt by the STC to contain the Nation’s Shield local recruitment and expansion. Early recruits to the Giants Brigades came from Lahj, Abyan, and Al-Dhalea, and most are also Salafis. Al-Muharrami, a Salafi himself, is originally from the Yafaa district of Lahj governorate, where the core of the Nation’s Shield fighters hails from. The deputy commander of the Giants Brigades is Hamdi Shukri, a Salafi leader from Lahj who comes from the same tribe as the Nation’s Shield leadership. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has funded armed groups in areas where the Giants Brigades had withdrawn, such as in Marib.
Third, the reorganization is underpinned by political-military tensions in Hadramawt between the STC and Nation’s Shield forces, as well as between the STC and Islah-affiliated forces that are part of the pro-government national army’s 1st Military Region. Against this backdrop, Al-Muharrami’s new task could support the strengthening of a coalition aiming to contain the latter two’s influence. Since 2023, the Nation’s Shield has significantly expanded its military presence in Hadramawt, recruiting among locals to establish a brigade there. In mid-2023, the Nation’s Shield commander arrived in Hadramawt from Aden with a group of soldiers who deployed at the critical Al-Wadea border crossing, the only active crossing with Saudi Arabia, replacing the 141st Infantry Brigade. The 141st Infantry Brigade is part of the 1st Military Region, which is mostly staffed by northern officers affiliated with the Islah party. They are based in Seyoun in Wadi Hadramawt, much to the irritation of the STC, which has often threatened to deploy the Mukalla-based 2nd Military Region forces (of which the UAE-backed Hadrami Elite forces are formally a part) there.
Hadramawt represents the geographical heart of competition between Yemeni “national” and “secessionist” forces, which are backed respectively by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In mid-2023, the Saudi-backed Hadramawt National Council was founded in Riyadh as a political entity supporting greater Hadrami autonomy within a national framework, operating as an alternative to the STC and its secessionist aspirations. This was followed in July by the first official trip to the Hadramawt capital of Mukalla by PLC chief Al-Alimi to launch Saudi-funded development projects for the region.
At the same time, Al-Zubaidi has strengthened the Hadrami presence in the STC by appointing former governors Faraj al-Bahsani (who is also a PLC member) and Ahmed bin Breik as STC vice presidents last year. More recently, a second visit by Al-Alimi to Mukalla in July 2024 was contested by the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance. This alliance, which is increasingly positioning itself as opposed to Saudi interests in the governorate, has led protests over worsening living conditions. Its biggest issue is the potential resumption of oil exports without a new arrangement on the governorate’s share. To that end, it has set up a checkpoint west of Mukalla to restrict oil shipments.
A Dynamic Situation
The STC is fostering a tactical regrouping of the UAE-backed forces in Yemen, creating a new set of alignments and alliances in the country. Al-Muharrami’s appointment to oversee security and counter-terrorism responsibilities allows the STC to improve coordination with the National Resistance forces, as the Giants Brigades are also a component of the Joint Forces on the West Coast led by Tareq Saleh. As a result of the STC’s reorganization strategy, the UAE-backed members of the PLC (Al-Zubaidi, Al-Muharrami, Al-Bahsani, and Tareq Saleh) now look more open to coordination, as it would bring them greater benefits vis-à-vis their competitors (the Nation’s Shield forces) and rivals (the Houthis). Still, in the medium to long term, divisions are still likely to emerge among Yemen’s primary UAE-backed figures – the secessionist Al-Zubaidi, the nationalist Saleh, and the ambitious Al-Muharrami – who each have their own political agenda.
This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.