On March 28, exactly one month on from the launch of the joint US-Israeli war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Houthis claimed two missile and drone attacks against Israel. There had been speculation since the beginning of the war that the Houthis would eventually join the hostilities on the side of their ally, Iran, but why did the group decide to intervene now?
One theory explaining why the Houthis waited four weeks was that they were on standby, calculating that they would enter the war at a time that would maximize their impact. Another reading of the events, not mutually exclusive with the first, is that the Houthis were cautious. US and Israeli strikes on Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen in 2025 caused significant damage, much more than the limited military action witnessed in 2024. The attacks last year showed a much greater US-Israeli intelligence penetration, hitting mobile missile launchers, weapons stockpiles, weapons production sites, and killing Houthi military and civilian leaders.
In this context, what is noteworthy about the Houthis’ decision to finally join the war is more what they did not do than what they did. While the Houthis have threatened to disrupt maritime shipping in the Red Sea again, they have so far refrained from doing so. A resumption of military operations against shipping represents the group’s most important source of leverage: in 2024 and 2025, Houthi attacks succeeded in forcing most ships to avoid the Bab al-Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea and one of the global economy’s most important maritime chokepoints, and to take instead the longer, and costlier, route around southern Africa.
By only launching missiles or drones on Israel, Houthi attacks cannot have a decisive impact on the balance of forces in the war. While it is worth noting that Houthi attacks targeting Israel can contribute to Iran’s strategy of aiming to deplete Israeli stocks of interceptor missiles, Israel can, for now at least, intercept the vast majority of Houthi missiles and drones. The physical damage in Israel from Houthi strikes will be, at most, limited.
For now, it is plausible to assume that the Houthis are hesitant to renew efforts to block the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea. They probably assess, correctly, that doing so would risk triggering renewed American and Israeli retaliation. It is highly unlikely that the Houthis are permanently deterred, but it is plausible that the damage inflicted on the group and its military assets by the US and Israel has altered their cost-benefit calculus and induced a degree of caution. The Houthis are the dominant military power inside Yemen, and there is currently no single force or coalition of Yemeni actors able to defeat them. But they are vulnerable, especially economically, and a decision to fully join the war by attacking Red Sea shipping would expose them to large-scale retaliation.
In the early phases of the current war, many analysts assumed that the Houthis were more likely to enter the fray if the fall of the Islamic Republic emerged as a serious possibility. As of now, such a scenario does not appear likely; the Islamic Republic is weakened but not defeated, and its collapse does not seem imminent. The Houthis may now be making a different calculus: they could be joining the war, in a limited way, to help increase Iran’s leverage in negotiations with the US to halt the conflict.
While the Houthis’ strikes on Israel are not a game changer in the wider conflict, they do, however, signal to the US, Israel, and others that the group retains leverage and an ability to expand the conflict. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea would exacerbate the already severe impact of the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz on the global economy. Since the Houthis have a strategic interest in supporting Iran’s effort to shape whatever post-war arrangements emerge, this threat can boost Tehran’s leverage by further increasing pressure on the Trump Administration.
The Houthis’ calculus is also likely shaped by their desire to manage relations with Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have been at war with the Kingdom since 2015, but violence has been mostly contained since the early 2020s, with the two sides now engaging in an on-again, off-again diplomatic dance to try to negotiate a new post-war arrangement for Yemen. If the Houthis renew attacks in the Red Sea, this would undoubtedly impact exports from the Saudi port of Yanbu, through which Saudi Arabia has redirected some of its oil flows to avoid the Strait of Hormuz. Limited strikes on Israel, therefore, allow the Houthis to avoid a potential major escalation with their Saudi neighbor, while nevertheless reminding Riyadh of Houthi power.
In addition, a recurring objective for the Houthis is scoring propaganda gains by positioning themselves as champions of the Palestinian cause. By attacking Israel, they can renew the claim of being the one Arab actor resisting American and Israeli actions in the region. The group’s information operations will no doubt leverage this narrative, as they have in the past.
Finally, in trying to understand the Houthis’ decision to attack Israel, it is worth emphasizing that they are not Iran’s proxy, in the sense of being a puppet or an arm of Iranian foreign policy. While analysts do not have a precise understanding of exactly how joint Houthi-Iranian cooperation functions, there is no evidence that Iran simply orders the Houthis into action. The Houthis receive significant support from Iran, and the two of them share many ideological and regional goals. The Houthis, however, are fiercely nationalist and aggressively protective of their autonomy. Their decision to attack Israel was likely taken in close coordination with Iran – but ultimately, it was their own.
This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program.