Yemenis and the wider world are watching closely to see what the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) will do if Iran asks them to participate in its defense and join other members of the “Axis of Resistance” in fighting against the military aggression of the United States and Israel. There has been a heated debate over the Houthis’ relationship with Tehran between those who believe that the group follows Tehran’s instructions and executes plans conceived in the Iranian capital, and those who contend that the group maintains an independent strategy and that its decisions often merely intersect with Iran’s interests. To shed light on this question, it is useful to compare the Houthis with the other members of the Axis of Resistance that have already engaged in the current regional war.
The Houthis have key differences from other Axis members. The level of doctrinal affiliation is an important distinction. Houthis are Zaidi Shia whose theology is so similar to that of the Shafi’i Sunni majority that they are often described as “the Sunnah of the Shia and the Shia of the Sunnah,” in essence positioning them in the middle of the great sectarian divide of Islam. The main difference between Zaidism and Shafi’i Sunnism concerns the leadership of the Umma, the body of Muslim believers. The Zaidi school reserves the right to rule over the descendants of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, grandsons of the Prophet Mohammed through his descendants Ali and Fatimah Al Zahra’a – a bloodline to which the Houthi leadership traces its roots. As such, Zaidis believe in the leadership (wilayah) of Abdelmalek al-Houthi. In contrast, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq are both Twelver Shia groups that subscribe to the concept of wilayat al-faqih, a jurisprudential concept that can grant political and religious authority to Islamic jurists, including those who may be outside the Prophet’s bloodline. Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first Supreme Leader and the primary proponent of the doctrine, was not descended from the Prophet, while his successor, the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was a descendant (sayyid).
Some militants on both the Twelver and Zaidi sides consider the other to be heretics. Although a notable proportion of the group’s mid-level leadership has reportedly adopted Twelver Shiism,[1] the majority of these do not pledge allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Moreover, their connection to the Shia concept of wilayat al-faqih is looser than that of their counterparts in Lebanon and Iraq, and is based more on politics and values than on doctrine and ideology. For the Zaidis, Abdelmalek al-Houthi is seen as the learned guardian and imam who meets the conditions for political and religious leadership. There are also cultural distinctions due to the geographic distance between Yemen and Iran. Iran and Iraq share a border and a long history of contact. Iran and Lebanon’s Shia communities have links stretching back to the Safavid Empire, and, in more recent decades, Tehran has actively fostered political, social, and cultural connections with Lebanon’s Shia community, particularly since the emergence of Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Yemen’s geography places it more squarely into the geopolitical and religious sphere of Saudi influence.
However, the decisive difference is political. Hezbollah and the Popular Mobilization Forces have no viable alternative to their alliance with Iran. Hezbollah would not find support from any other party if it abandoned Iran; its military power would dissipate, and it would dissolve into the sectarian Lebanese state. Likewise, the Popular Mobilization Forces, which have leveraged Iranian support to control important revenue streams, would lose access to those resources.
The Houthis, by contrast, have an alternative: the proposal put forward by Saudi Arabia during negotiations in 2023, under which the group would agree to distance itself from Iran in exchange for Saudi support and legitimation of its power. It is important to remember that the demographic base from which the Houthis emerged has historically been more socially and economically tied to Saudi Arabia than to the rest of Yemen. Until the mid-1980s, the “Arab riyal” (i.e., the Saudi riyal) was the dominant currency north of Sana’a, starting from Amran, just 50 kilometers away. In some northern regions, it is still used more than the Yemeni rial. While sectarian radicalization may have distanced the Houthis’ demographic base from Saudi Arabia, peace and normalization after the war could restore those ties, offering a reasonable alternative to the alliance with Iran.
The organizational differences between the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Popular Mobilization Forces are even more pronounced. The Houthis control state institutions in Sana’a and most revenue streams, including taxes and zakat. Their reliance on Iran is largely based on military cooperation—arms, training, and planning—which is useful in wartime and constitutes Iran’s primary instrument of leverage on the Houthis. In peacetime, however, Iran lacks the capacity to provide financial and developmental support. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, can offer economic and developmental aid—as it already does in most government-held territories—along with something Iran cannot provide, regardless of its economic strength: employment opportunities for millions of Yemeni workers and professionals. Remittances from Yemeni expatriates in Saudi Arabia have been among the most important sources of national income over the past fifty years. It is difficult to imagine a successful Yemeni economy without such revenues and a special Yemeni-Saudi relationship.
The Houthis actively supported Gaza in alignment with the Axis of Resistance, disrupted international shipping in the Red Sea, and entered into direct confrontation with Israel, the United States, and the West. Despite the magnitude of the challenge, they endured a massive US military campaign until Washington decided to halt operations against them. The source of their resilience was popular support from Yemenis, given the central place of the Palestinian cause in the public imagination. But despite the casualties it has suffered, Iran does not elicit similar sentiment. Most Yemenis supported Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War, and many even fought alongside the Iraqi army.
The Houthis are aware that they became a card in Iran’s hand due to the mismanagement of Yemen’s political elite during the Sa’ada wars. A faction of that elite—aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh—sought to use them to weaken a rival faction led by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and his allies in the Islah party. Saleh’s faction supported the Houthis in the first five Sa’ada wars, even supplying them with anti-tank missiles, which they used to defeat the 1st Armored Division led by Ali Mohsen. In the sixth war, however—when Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali, commanded government forces—the support came from Ali Mohsen’s faction, which handed over at least 10 fully equipped military camps to the Houthis.
The Houthis also know that Iran understands that its influence will not retain the same value after the war in Yemen ends. Iran is not blind to the fact that the Houthis nearly concluded a deal with Saudi Arabia in 2023, which would have weakened Iranian influence. During nuclear negotiations with the United States in Vienna in 2021, Iran even offered their assistance in ending the Yemen war, but the Americans refused to engage in side discussions at the time.[2] The prospect that Iran may make a concession on its support of the Houthis in its negotiations with the United States is a significant possibility with historical precedent.
Another reason for the Houthis’ reluctance to fully join the battle alongside the Axis of Resistance lies in the restraint shown by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Despite being targeted by roughly a third of Iranian missiles and drones, they have refrained from participating militarily. They are aware that Israel and the United States want to drag them into a confrontation with Iran that would exhaust both sides, allowing Israel to emerge as the dominant regional power and continue advancing its “Greater Israel” project. If the Houthis were to engage seriously in the conflict, their role would likely involve disrupting Red Sea shipping and closing the GCC’s only remaining maritime outlet—thereby contributing to the American-Israeli plan to draw Gulf states into war. This would eliminate any future opportunity for a deal with Saudi Arabia and make a military resolution the only option for dealing with the Houthis, which the US and Israel have already shown a preference for.
The Houthis understand that their long-term survival depends on reintegration within their Arab neighborhood. Several Yemen observers reported that the group reassured Saudi officials that it would not participate in the war in a meaningful way unless the threat to the Axis of Resistance became existential.
In the early days of the war, Houthi media focused on the need to reach a deal with Saudi Arabia, coupling calls for agreement with blunt threats to strengthen their negotiating position. This reflected their concern that a crushing Iranian defeat might embolden their Yemeni rivals to the south, now fully backed by Saudi Arabia, to confront them militarily. While such an outcome would not serve the primary interests of Yemen or Saudi Arabia—namely restoring stability in Yemen and rebuilding the countries’ special relationship—it is a rational concern from the Houthi perspective. Saudi Arabia has wisely kept the door to peace ajar at this critical moment. However, it is clear that the agreement proposed by the Houthis in 2023, which would have enshrined Houthi control over northern Yemen, is no longer viable. Riyadh now realizes the risks posed by the Houthis’ adventurism and their ideological commitment to controlling Mecca. Looking forward, the Houthis are likely to continue participating in some action against Israel in the coming period, but take no impactful measures to block maritime commerce in the Red Sea. Such action would kill any chance to be part of a peaceful settlement to the Yemen conflict and could instead risk prolonging it and, even worse, could ultimately lead to the disintegration of the Yemeni state. In the coming period, the group will be faced with a decision that determines their fate – and that of Yemen as a whole.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country’s security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.