On August 1, a coordination center in Hudaydah run by the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) issued a statement on navigation in the Red Sea. In it, the group denied that it intended to impose fees on ships, and said its safe-passage service was voluntary and free of charge. At the same time, the Houthis asked shipping companies not to pay any other party for passage, and not to share their vessels’ information with any actors the group had not authorized. The press interpreted the statement as denying that the group would charge fees, as Iran, Oman, and the US have all proposed for the Strait of Hormuz. In fact, it said something else. It was a clear announcement that the Houthis want to monopolize dealings with ships in the area and assert themselves as the only party that can grant permission for safe passage. This is the least-discussed angle of the Red Sea crisis.

Over the past three years, media attention has focused on Houthi attacks, their number, their targets, the weapons used, and whether warships can intercept the group’s missiles and drones. The response has been a series of naval coalitions, a terrorism designation, intermittent American, British, and Israeli strikes, and an intense US air campaign. Yet maritime traffic through the Red Sea remains only a fraction of what it was before November 2023, because the problem is no longer simply attacks on ships. The Houthis are establishing a new paradigm in which the group decides who passes, who gets attacked, and who receives advance guarantees.

For this kind of control to work, the Houthis need three things: the ability to inflict harm; an authority that can grant or withhold approval for passage; and an international audience that treats this state of affairs as the new normal. They now have all three. Insurance companies calculate risk based on perceptions of Houthi intentions. Shipping companies reroute or look for guarantees of safe passage. And states themselves are repeatedly entering into direct or indirect negotiations over the safety of their vessels. The Houthis do not need to close Bab al-Mandab entirely, and most likely they cannot. It is enough to become the party whose approval must be sought, or whose threat must be factored in for each and every passage.

The Houthis’ ambition did not change in July when they restarted their maritime attacks, but the value of the ground they control did. As the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz declined because of the war between the United States and Iran, the Bab al-Mandab grew more important to Saudi Arabia. On July 20, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of the Kingdom, then struck the Jazan refinery on July 25, and hit a tanker off Yanbu on August 24.

For the first time since the start of the war in Yemen, the Houthis’ ability to apply sustained pressure on Saudi Arabia is no longer limited to targeting military and energy infrastructure or border towns. They can now threaten the route through which oil exports pass and the revenues the Saudi state depends on. This marks an important shift in the conflict.

The Saudi response came on July 30, when 14 states announced the establishment of a naval defense coalition, with a joint headquarters and a command and operations center on Saudi territory. On August 13, the coalition began operating out of Jeddah under a Saudi officer. It appears to be the most serious attempt yet to build a regional security framework in the Red Sea, with a clear command and operational structure. But perhaps more telling is who did not join. The United States is not a member, and neither are the UAE or Oman.

There is now a new coalition whose purpose is to protect freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most important sea lanes, while the United States, which has played the leading role in that protection for decades, stands outside it. The US Navy, the 5th Fleet, and Task Force 153 continue to operate in the region through a separate command. Washington’s absence from the coalition can be partly explained by its preoccupation with confronting Iran in the Gulf; by its desire, since the Oman-brokered truce with the Houthis in May 2025, to scale back its involvement in Yemen; and by its current reluctance to engage in international cooperation. But this is only part of the truth. A new security order is forming in the Red Sea from two directions at once. The Houthis are building a system of coercive control, and Saudi Arabia is building a new security coalition. So far, the United States has been unable to manage the former, and does not want to be part of the latter.

The first test of this new order may now have begun. In early September, the Houthis launched an offensive in western Taiz and southern Hudaydah, advancing on roads and positions leading to Al-Makha and increasing pressure on the Red Sea port city and the forces stationed along the West Coast. Government forces have responded by opening fronts in Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda, while heavy fighting has erupted in Al-Dhalea. According to field reports, some government forces have been backed by air support. The escalation is no longer confined to the coast but is spreading across several interconnected fronts.

This is where the real test of the naval coalition will be – not at sea, but on land. No serious answer to the Houthi threat can be limited to intercepting missiles. Air power has been tried for years: by Saudi Arabia during the early stages of the war, by the United States and the United Kingdom in 2024, in the high-intensity American campaign of 2025, and through various Israeli strikes. These operations weakened Houthi capabilities, but none were decisive. The reason is simple. The launch platforms that the Houthis use are mobile and scattered – Yemen’s geography helps conceal them – and the networks that smuggle components, weapons, and technology have persisted despite attempts at interdiction.

Forces capable of pressuring the Houthis on the West Coast already exist. These are not military formations outside the state. They are tied to members of the internationally recognized government’s Presidential Leadership Council and operate within a joint coordination framework. The question is therefore no longer whether ground forces are available, but whether the current operations reflect a political decision to employ them as part of a comprehensive strategy to alter the situation at sea with a battle along the coast. The ongoing operations suggest this may be Riyadh’s ultimate intent, but there is no clear evidence yet of a unified strategy or a commitment to a prolonged campaign.

Disagreements and political rivalries certainly exist among these Yemeni forces, but the balance of power has shifted in recent years. Since the UAE ended its direct involvement in Yemen at the start of the year, Saudi Arabia has become the only party able to bring these forces together, fund them, and manage their disputes. For the first time since 2015, Riyadh has become the center of decision-making in the anti-Houthi camp.

The Kingdom’s new international coalition carries its own contradictions. The presence of Yemen and Sudan within a naval security framework, while both countries are experiencing civil war, raises basic questions about the coalition’s function and limits. We cannot yet say we are looking at the future of security and order in the Red Sea. What we have is an organized framework awaiting a political decision on what it intends to achieve.

As for the United States, talk of protecting the “rules-based international order” is no longer enough. What is happening at Bab al-Mandab proves that a non-state armed group controlling a coastal strip near an international maritime chokepoint can, if it possesses the missiles, drones, and political will, impose a high cost on global trade. This sets a dangerous precedent for the future of the US-led maritime order.

More dangerous still will be if the Houthis can do this and remain standing, despite the numerous international military campaigns to stop them. They are proving that control over a small stretch of coastline can give an armed group global influence that far outweighs its size. Other state and non-state actors around the region and the world will no doubt take note, increasing threats to global trade.

This outcome was not unavoidable. It came from a long chain of misjudgments about the nature of the threat. Houthi control of the West Coast was treated as a problem that could be contained. The group’s missiles and drones were treated as part of the balance of power within Yemen’s civil war. Later, it was said that Houthi attacks in the Red Sea were tied to Gaza and would end with the ceasefire. Each time, escalation was treated as temporary, but the Houthis were adding new, permanent capacities to their military and political project.

What the region needs today is not a fourth naval coalition operating alongside those already in place. The first requirement is a single naval command or, at least, serious coordination among the international actors operating in the Red Sea. This means either the United States joining the new coalition, or building a clear relationship between it and American forces already in the region.

Second, Saudi Arabia needs to clarify the purpose of its current military support for Yemeni forces: is it limited to halting Houthi advances and protecting the West Coast, or is it intended to push the group away from the Red Sea and reduce its ability to threaten maritime traffic? The answer will determine whether the current fighting is a temporary defensive response or the beginning of a broader escalation.

Third, international military efforts to counter the Houthi threat must shift from chasing launch platforms to unraveling the networks moving the components, technology, and expertise that allow these capabilities to be repeatedly reconstituted.

Fourth, anti-Houthi forces in Yemen cannot be kept dependent on temporary funding and ad hoc arrangements made outside state institutions. If the goal is to build a stable and capable force, these forces must be integrated into state institutions and their budgets.

One final dimension is harder to talk about. Yemeni civilians are not beneficiaries of this new reordering – they pay its price. Protecting civilian populations is one thing; making deals with an extractive Houthi authority that robs them of their assets, property, and livelihoods to fund the war is another. Conflating the two has given the Houthis wide political and economic space to operate, with the pretext of avoiding an intensification of the humanitarian crisis.

The window has not yet closed, but every month that passes without a coherent strategy reinforces the Houthis’ conviction that the world negotiates with whoever has the power to exact a cost, and that the fastest route to political recognition is a missile fired at a tanker.