In the first days of the military escalation that swept Yemen’s West Coast in early September, the front lines in Maqbanah and Jabal Habashi in Taiz and Hays in Hudaydah were not the only fronts that had opened. A second front unfolded virtually, no less consequential than the physical battlefield: the battle for who controls the narrative in a chaotic online battlespace overwhelmed by competing claims, recycled footage, and artificial intelligence, as civilians and soldiers fell victim to information warfare and the line between fact and fiction became difficult to discern.

In coastal villages, civilians deciding whether to stay or leave their homes often have little more than a phone and an intermittent internet connection to aid them as they try to navigate the deadly chaos of the fighting. The choice between waiting another day and leaving with what they could was often shaped by the latest information that arrived: a video clip, a map showing one of the warring parties advancing or taking control, or even an audio recording attributed to a well-known commander. There was little time to discern what was genuine and what was fake, what was breaking news and what was old footage, and what was legitimate reporting and what was generated by artificial intelligence.

This is the reality of the virtual battlefield: a fight for thefor the control of narrative, contested alongside the fight for mountains and cities. And much like the battle for territory, information warfare can determine whether soldiers attack or retreat and whether civilians flee or stay in their homes, influencing choices with deadly consequences. Perception itself has become fiercely contested in the virtual sphere – who appears as the victor, who appears defeated – with real-world consequences for how the battle is managed.

The Fog of War

For years, military media from the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) has relied on a consistent formula: carefully produced, regularly released footage of battles, training, and military capabilities designed to reinforce the image of an organized, formidable force. The media strategy mirrors that of other groups in the Iran-led Axis of Resistance who helped train the Houthis, most notably Hezbollah. This was clearly visible during the battles on the West Coast: pro-Houthi military media distributed around 39 minutes of footage purportedly showing surveillance, drone-enabled fire support, sniper activity, the storming of Jabal al-Nar, and the seizure of the forward command post in Al-Makha.

Pro-Houthi media accounts also use old footage to frame narratives. In the first days of the escalation on the West Coast, social media accounts circulated a video purportedly showing Giants Brigades equipment captured by Houthi forces. It later emerged that the footage was from a Houthi operation in Taiz in July 2018. On September 6, another video spread purporting to show a rapid Houthi advance east of Al-Makha; however, a reverse image search found that some of the shots appeared in a propaganda video published by Houthi military media in October 2021.

Government forces have lagged in the use of information warfare. That changed somewhat after a Houthi drone and missile attack on camps in Marib and Hadramawt in August 2026. The Armed Forces Media Center subsequently published successive recordings of drone strikes on Houthi positions. This boosted morale and appeared to show that government forces’ qualitative capabilities were approaching those of the Houthis. This coincided with the government’s declaration that it intended to retake Sana’a. But archival footage was also used to suggest victories and achievements that the clips themselves did not substantiate, in order to boost morale. Social media accounts circulated a video showing columns of government forces supposedly heading toward the port of Hudaydah. However, a CNN investigation found that the video had first been published in July 2018. On September 17, social media users circulated a video they said documented Giants Brigades, Southern Resistance, and Nation’s Shield forces taking full control of the Kahboub Mountains above the Bab al-Mandab after clashes with the Houthis. It was later revealed that the footage was from a Giants Brigades military exercise last July.

Distorted maps of the lines of control are also being disseminated. Popular social media accounts have circulated battlefield maps that deliberately distort what is happening on the ground. Other outlets have produced and published maps based on inaccurate reporting, misinterpretation, or a lack of local geographical knowledge. Even accounts and platforms specializing in conflict mapping, which provide near-daily updates, sometimes rely on the same news reports and circulating videos without verifying their veracity. Even where the location of fighting and the extent of an advance are correctly reported and identified, there is a fundamental military difference between reaching a position, controlling a road, and securing territory. On a hurriedly produced map, those differences can be lost.

Manufacturing Strength

The need to display power, intimidate an adversary, and impose the perception of control before establishing it on the ground is as old as warfare itself. ISIS offered a clear example in its “Clanging of the Swords” series, high-production videos showing operations conducted by the group before its capture of Mosul in 2014. This propaganda served as a weapon of psychological warfare, intended to intimidate the Iraqi army and break its morale through calculated messages, rumors of defeat, exaggerated losses, and footage of mass executions. By contrast, the Iraqi army made no comparable effort to bolster its soldiers’ morale. ISIS had won the psychological battle before the kinetic battle began. Mosul fell within days, as an estimated force of 30,000 Iraqi soldiers collapsed in the face of 8,000 ISIS fighters. While propaganda alone does not explain the fall, it was a powerful, inexpensive tool ISIS exploited to help it achieve victory.

When the ability to create such images from existing footage is unavailable, attempts emerge to invent it from elsewhere. This happened in the first days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when the story of a Ukrainian pilot, later dubbed the “Ghost of Kyiv,” became popular on social media. The pilot was said to have shot down six Russian aircraft on the first day, but Reuters later found that one clip came from the simulation game Digital Combat Simulator.

Both “Clanging of the Swords,” which was produced, and the “Ghost of Kyiv,” which was invented, reflect the importance of images of power, either preceding its acquisition or compensating for its absence. Whoever masters the production and dissemination of these images—whether genuine or fabricated—can impose narratives, facilitating physical control. The same dynamics are evident in the battles on the West Coast and in Taiz, where the warring parties compete over image as much as they compete over ground.

Undermining the Adversary

“Have you ever seen forces possessing such an arsenal withdraw, or be defeated and then flee like this?” So reads the text accompanying on a video posted to the social media platform X, showing long rows of military vehicles, purportedly Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance forces retreating toward Aden. But an investigation later found that the footage was part of a 2024 military parade in Benghazi. Libyan military vehicles thus became props for a narrative judgment on the fighters and their leadership: the problem was a lack of will, not a lack of weapons. This is what distinguishes the second type of disinformation that has accompanied battles on the West Coast and in Taiz. It does not display the publisher’s own strength; it depicts the adversary as weak.

Pro-government media accounts have used the same tactic. Numerous videos purportedly show Houthi defeats, with one clip purported to show Houthi prisoners in Marib after a battle that reportedly left 80 Houthi fighters dead. Again, Libya was the real source of the footage, and it later emerged that the prisoners were members of the “Wadago gang” captured by the Libyan National Army. Another video was presented as showing defections from Tareq Saleh’s forces, with members joining the Houthis. The video was actually from 2020, when the Houthis received a battalion from the Republican Guard. Such propaganda disincentivizes participation through discouragement and delegitimization, sowing doubt that any contribution or sacrifice would be in vain, or that leaders or compatriots can be trusted.

Artificial Intelligence

Wartime propaganda has entered a new era, with the pervasive use of AI and deepfakes to manipulate reality. In one notable incident, an audio recording attributed to Tareq Saleh depicted him ordering a retreat and admonishing his pro-government allies and Saudi Arabia. Its spread may have contributed to the confusion that preceded the fall of the West Coast. The National Resistance forces denied that the recording was authentic and accused the Houthis of cloning Saleh’s voice. Another possible instance of AI being exploited to manipulate reality was in a video depicting a dead Houthi fighter being stripped by pro-government soldiers. Activists claimed it was manipulated by AI, the Ministry of Information claimed it was fabricated, and a source from the Taiz Military Axis denied the claimed involvement of its soldiers. Whatever the origin of the footage, the body of the dead fighter became material for a battle of narratives. Neither claim was independently verified.

Despite advances in AI, the distortion of real footage remains the most effective disinformation weapon on the digital battlefield. Recycled footage appears more authentic, lacks the distortions commonly found in AI-generated videos, and is more readily available. Likewise, the reputational risk is lower should one be caught, as a publisher can claim ignorance of the source of the material, rather than face accusations of having generated it maliciously.

The Importance of Care

The consequences of disinformation are felt everywhere in Yemen. Behind each clip is a recipient audience: a family following news from the front, knowing their son is there; a fighter wondering whether his comrades have really withdrawn; or a supporter sharing the clip out of enthusiasm or fear, then asking where it came from. Here, information warfare transcends into cognitive warfare. Civilians fearing for the safety of their families, or soldiers in the chaos of the battlefield, are presented with disinformation that manipulates their decision-making.

Wars differ in their timing, tools, and technologies. Still, the underlying logic remains the same: whoever controls the narrative that precedes and accompanies the battle possesses a weapon as important as control on the ground. What is happening today in Taiz and along the West Coast is not a transient digital phenomenon; it is the latest episode in a long continuum in which Yemen is not an exception, but a microcosm of the future of war and conflict.

This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country’s security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.