Introduction
Turkey’s meaningful engagement with Africa began during the rule of the Justice and Development Party in 2008. That year, Turkey hosted the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit. Ankara’s quest for new horizons in its political and economic relations came during a period of notable economic growth, and over the past 15 years, it has successfully carved out a substantial presence in Africa, a continent ripe with economic prospects.
Turkey’s particular focus has been on the Horn of Africa countries, where economic initiatives have an added geostrategic dimension. A key element here is Turkey’s military presence in Somalia, where it established its first military base, Turksom, in 2017. The same year, the ambassador to Turkey from Djibouti signaled a willingness to host Turkish troops. Both countries oversee the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, the crucial maritime trade corridor currently that has become a major international focus due to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, purportedly in support of Palestinians during the ongoing conflict in Gaza. These attacks prompted Western powers to form naval coalitions to protect shipping, while the US and UK have also launched airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Still, Houthi attacks on shipping have continued. Ankara’s response to these major developments unfolding near the Horn of Africa, as well as its evaluation of the security and economic implications, bear further scrutiny.
On 12 January, Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan expressed dismay over the attacks carried out by Washington and London against Houthi assets inside Yemen. He characterized the US-British response as disproportionate and indicative of a Western desire to create a “bloodbath” in the Red Sea. This critical stance was notable from the leader of the second-largest country in NATO, but it aligned with public sentiment in Turkey, which sympathizes with Palestinians and sees the Houthi attacks as a legitimate form of support in reaction to the Israeli assault on Gaza. However, there is a prevailing consensus among Turkish political and media circles that the conflict in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab Strait directly undermines Turkey’s strategic interests and vision for its investments in the Horn of Africa.
First, the strategic significance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait for the Turkish economy and maritime trade cannot be overstated. The economy is heavily reliant on exports, which were estimated to amount to US$255.81 billion in 2023. The Red Sea is a vital conduit for its trade activities, facilitating the exchange of goods with China and Africa. In addition, it is a critical route for the import of raw materials for critical industries, including the Turkish automotive, chemical, and manufacturing sectors.
There is a possibility that while Ankara grapples with the implications of disruptions in the Red Sea, the crisis could still turn into an advantage. Turkey stands to benefit from an uptick in trade with European Union nations as they seek to mitigate risks and surging transportation costs associated with Red Sea routes. Turkey is also eyeing this as an opportunity to exert pressure on the EU for a reevaluation of the longstanding Customs Union agreement, a key objective for Turkish policymakers.
Turkish concerns are not solely focused on balancing immediate economic gains and losses resulting from the developments in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab strait; there is also a perspective that views the Red Sea confrontations as part of broader efforts among international powers to reshape global power dynamics. Control over international trade routes, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative or the Western-led Development Corridor, are pivotal aspects of this global strategy. Ankara meticulously evaluates its options in both projects, considering their implications within the framework of Turkey’s strategic vision, geographical importance, and its position between East and West. Ankara strategically avoids overreliance on the Western NATO alliance or alignment with the Eastern counterparts like China and Russia. Instead, Turkey sees an opportunity to pursue its own agenda. By navigating this intricate diplomatic landscape, Ankara aims to transition from a regional player to an international influencer within the global calculus.[1]
Secondly, Turkey wants to protect its military presence and geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa countries. In February, the Somali Minister of Defense, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, visited Ankara to sign a framework agreement for defense and economic cooperation with his Turkish counterpart, Yaşar Güler. The framework agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, spanning over ten years, covers various important and strategic matters. This includes providing training, technical, and equipment support to the Somali army, as well as taking unilateral and joint measures to combat various threats in Somali maritime areas, such as terrorism, piracy, and smuggling. This hastily drafted agreement came shortly after the signing of a deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, the self-declared independent region of Somalia, that would give landlocked Ethiopia a 20-kilometer foothold on the Gulf of Aden for a port and military base. The Somali government rejected that deal, labeling it illegal; however, in early July, in an example of its growing influence on the Horn of Africa, Turkey began mediating between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa over the issue.
The third element in Ankara’s interactions with the Red Sea developments is its media policy of linking a cease-fire in Gaza to resolving the Red Sea dispute. Over the past eight months, Ankara has consistently linked this in its political and media discourse. The Turkish political narrative persistently rebukes the West while refraining from explicitly condemning the Houthi attacks. Although many Turkish political analysts understand the Houthi policy through the lens of its close ties to Iran and a play to alter the regional balance of power, the government is careful not to clash with public sentiment. Additionally, the substantial Western support for Israel and the extensive violations committed in Gaza have placed many Arab and Islamic countries, especially those with regional influence, in an ethical and ideological dilemma before their peoples, creating potential crises of legitimacy.
Overall, Turkey’s response to the ongoing conflict in the Red Sea has been shaped by a strategic reading that intertwines economic, political, security, religious, geopolitical, and geo-strategic factors. This conflict has profound international and regional dimensions, as it entails a potential reshaping of the global and regional landscape by competing power blocs vying for dominance over critical waterways worldwide, chief among them the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.