اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية
The widely expected victory of the Labour Party in Britain’s July 4 parliamentary elections came with a few surprises. As widely described, it was more a collapse of the Conservative Party than a Labour success, with the Labour Party gaining almost half a million fewer votes than it did in its equally historic defeat in 2019. Despite this, Labour will have an absolute majority in parliament of 172 seats, and the leadership will be able to ignore divergent views even among its own MPs. However, the party lost thousands of Muslim votes over leader Keir Starmer’s position on the Gaza war, at the cost of at least four seats, creating some pressure for course correction.
While there are signs that these losses could encourage the new government to take a more balanced position with respect to Gaza, such as possibly dropping a bid to delay the International Criminal Court’s decision on arrest warrants for Israeli war crimes, that is unlikely to extend to a deeper concern with the Yemeni crisis. Among the millions of supporters of an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, few are aware of Yemen; among those who are, many are positively impressed by Houthi support for Gaza through naval actions in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
In January, Starmer fully backed Conservative Prime Minister Sunak’s alignment with the United States in conducting air strikes against Yemen. “The attacks by Houthi rebels on commercial ships in the Red Sea threaten one of the world’s most important trade routes and put the lives of British civilians and military personnel in danger. They must stop, and it is right that Britain plays its part, alongside our allies, in deterring these attacks,” Starmer wrote in a British newspaper. And in February, he controversially manipulated a parliamentary vote to avoid calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
In the first days of his administration Starmer has focused on internal issues, but he has also reiterated his support for NATO and Ukraine, taking part in a NATO summit in the United States on July 9-11. During his first cabinet meeting, he said not a word about the Middle East, just as more than 100,000 people had assembled nearby in support of Palestine, calling for an immediate ceasefire and ending UK arms sales to Israel.
David Lammy, the new foreign secretary, is very close to US positions, as demonstrated by his participation in high-level, influential think tank meetings in recent years. His and the prime minister’s support for US policies, perpetuating the myth of the US-UK “special relationship,” indicates that neither is likely to take any initiatives that might challenge Washington or make significant changes to the previous administration’s policy on Yemen. Britain will continue participating in airstrikes on the Yemeni mainland whenever the Americans request it. Short of significant developments, Yemen is unlikely to reach the top of their agenda.
Although it is now no more than a medium-sized world power, Britain has certain assets that could enable it to play a more effective role in searching for a solution to the crisis. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council – a body that has taken a reactive role vis-a-vis the Houthi naval attacks without addressing the outdated Resolution 2216 of 2015, which demanded the Houthis withdraw from territories they seized, including the capital Sana’a.
Britain is in a position where it could promote a much-needed replacement resolution. For one, this could create a more positive perception of the UN Security Council among the Houthi leadership. It could also encourage the Houthis to consider the United Kingdom as a possible mediator rather than a mere sidekick of Washington, and in this manner, Britain would be able to support UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg in his efforts to persuade the Houthis to engage in a mechanism to bring the conflict to an end.
In addition, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs has traditionally been a position held by a Briton. A new appointment is due, as Martin Griffiths ended his term last month. This could be an opportunity for the new British government to propose a highly qualified candidate with experience in international humanitarian crises, ideally with knowledge of the Yemeni file.
More broadly, Britain prioritizes its relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states with respect to investments in its own economy. Alongside most other foreign policy positions, this is unlikely to change under Starmer. However, a more sophisticated approach could try to influence the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to adopt a more effective joint approach to the Yemeni crisis, thus ending the rivalry between the different factions of the internationally recognized government, which only further empowers the Houthis.
Remembering that millions of Yemenis are paying the price of this conflict daily, the new government should restore aid programs to a more significant level, refocusing on the primary needs of the population throughout the country and helping reduce morbidity and mortality rates. It could also improve the Yemeni people’s confidence in the international community and the UK in particular. Some Yemenis have high expectations of Britain due to its colonial past in the south, but these have not been borne out.
Appointing a new British Special Envoy would also increase Britain’s focus on Yemen, as this position has been vacant for some years now. It would demonstrate renewed commitment and could be an element of improved relations between Britain and the European Union. Such an envoy could help bolster international support for a political solution as well as relief and development activities at a time when a number of other crises command international attention. So, although the Labour leadership’s approach of recent years suggests there will be little change in British policy concerning Yemen, there is scope for small steps that could make a difference – if the new government can be pressed into action. The newly elected first MP of Yemeni origin might be able to bring about more focus on the issue.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.