اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية
On May 23, Abdelmalek al-Houthi, leader of the Houthi group (Ansar Allah), announced that Houthi forces had begun coordinating military operations with Iran-backed Iraqi militant groups. The partnership was publicly unveiled as part of the “fourth phase of escalation” in the Houthi response to Israel’s war against Palestinians in Gaza. Under the fourth phase, the Houthis would expand the targeting of commercial shipping to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as continue to carry out attacks in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden. In subsequent weekly speeches, the Houthi leader repeatedly referenced progress in coordination and cooperation with the Iraqi groups.
This foreshadowing culminated in a June 6 announcement by Houthi military spokesman Yahya Sarea that the group had conducted two joint operations with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, targeting three ships in the Mediterranean, including two in the Israeli port of Haifa. The Houthis and Iraqi groups claimed six joint operations against Haifa port and allegedly Israeli-linked vessels during June. However, none of the claimed attacks were confirmed by Israel, nor the UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) or US CENTCOM, which typically broadcast updates on ships targeted in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This ambiguity raises questions about the effectiveness of these claimed joint operations by the Houthis and pro-Iranian Iraqi factions.
Coordination among members of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance is nothing new. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Al-Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have traditionally acted as the central nodes in the Axis, providing technologies, weapons, and expertise to allies, including in Yemen and Iraq, which serve as testing grounds for their paramilitary capabilities. This time was different, however, as Tehran’s allies in Iraq and Yemen directly coordinated amongst themselves, with indications that the Houthis played the leading role in initiating the joint action. It is not surprising that Tehran would promote synergies among its allies, but what is striking is the Houthis’ rush to declare bilateral cooperation so publicly, given its relatively new status as a regional military actor. This development has several crucial implications that warrant careful consideration.
Coordination on the Ground
The relationship between the Houthis and armed factions in Iraq goes back to at least 2015 when Abdelmalek al-Houthi appointed a personal representative tasked with focusing on political and financial relations. Iraq has always been a vital source of donations for the group, both at the popular level and through allied factions.
More recently, Abdelmalek appointed Houthi leader Abu Idris al-Sharafi as his new representative in Iraq. Al-Sharafi had been one of the most influential supervisors in the group and was previously responsible for overseeing the Houthi military manufacturing, as well as managing the movement of Iranian experts in and out of Yemen before the group established control over Sana’a in 2014. He later supervised the governorates of Hudaydah and Hajjah. Al-Sharafi now operates in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq, meeting local factions and tribal leaders and collecting donations.
Al-Sharafi’s appointment, given his close ties to Abdelmalek al-Houthi, signifies the increasing strategic significance of Iraq within the Houthi vision, particularly in relation to its growing regional role. In 2019, the bilateral relationship between the Houthis and Shia militias within Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces demonstrated opportunities for security coordination. The Houthis would claim bombing operations targeting the Saudi oil giant Aramco, but later investigations showed the attacks likely originated from southern Iraq or Iran. Now a paradigm shift has occurred in the relationship during the Israeli war on Gaza, reshaping dynamics within the Axis of Resistance. According to a source in Sana’a familiar with the Houthis’ regional relations, the IRGC oversaw the formation of a joint operations committee in March this year – consisting of the Houthis and representatives from Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, two Iran-backed factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces – to coordinate regional naval operations in response to the war in Gaza.
In an earlier statement on January 18, Abu Hussein al-Hamedawi, Secretary-General of Kata’ib Hezbollah, said that the targeting of the Houthis by US-British forces would be considered an attack on the Iraqi resistance. However, Al-Hamedawi was unable to fulfill this promise, as Iran reportedly instructed its Iraqi allies to cease attacks on US forces in February, following a tense standoff sparked by the killing of American soldiers in Jordan on January 28. Nevertheless, Al-Hamedawi resurfaced on May 24, reportedly emphasizing the “imperative of maintaining readiness and high coordination among the forces of the Axis of Resistance, particularly between Iraq and Yemen, to support the Palestinian people” during a phone call with Abdelmalek.
Kata’ib Hezbollah is one of the largest factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces and maintains close ties to the IRGC. It was officially established between 2005 and 2007 by the merging of groups overseen by the IRGC’s Al-Quds Force and was listed by the United States as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group in 2009. Since October of last year, Kata’ib Hezbollah has been the most active faction targeting US interests in Iraq. After temporarily halting attacks in February, the group shifted focus in April to directing drone strikes at Israel.
Tactical Maneuvers
In May, Iranian foreign policy took a new tack following the death of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter accident. Indirect negotiations were held with the United States aimed at de-escalating the Houthi operations in Yemen in exchange for ceasefire efforts in Gaza. However, now Iran is betting on a heating up of regional tensions and obstructing US initiatives in Gaza. There have been a number of indications of this shift: These include a show of force in Tehran by holding a meeting of the IRGC and Al-Quds Force with representatives from Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces; intensified attacks by Yemeni and Iraqi groups in May; the Houthi announcement of direct coordination with Iraqi factions in early June; and heightened military escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese front. In addition, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made several hawkish statements praising the Axis for its response to the Gaza war, claiming that US efforts to bring about Saudi normalization with Israel have failed, and warning against hopes for a Gaza ceasefire agreement. “History is on the side of the Resistance front,” he declared.
Strategic Focus
Tehran has likely orchestrated the operational collaboration between the Houthis and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq to achieve two key goals. The first is strategic, reconfiguring its regional influence to be more flexible and effective. The second goal is tactical, involving the management of regional conflicts and the conveyance of escalatory messages.
Apart from its daily management of the conflict, Iran is restructuring its regional axis. There are two geopolitical pivots: a north-south pivot extending from Iraq to Yemen, led by the Houthi group with its operations hub in Sana’a, and an east-west pivot from Syria to Lebanon to Palestine, led by Hezbollah with its operational hub in Beirut. Since January, the Houthis have shown significant resilience and adaptability in the face of Western military strikes. Tehran will seek to capitalize on this to help safeguard its exposed geopolitical assets in Iraq.
In its restructuring, the Axis of Resistance could be following a model previous adopted by Al-Qaeda, which transformed its strong branches into regional leadership centers. For example, its Yemen branch was also given responsibility for the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This approach allows greater leadership flexibility and operational effectiveness. Iran’s motivations for taking this step are likely three-fold.
First, Tehran is convinced of the need to leverage the ongoing Gaza war to enhance or retain the capabilities of the Palestinian resistance, given that Iran has been shut out of talks regarding post-war scenarios. In this context, Tehran is keen to mobilize the resources of Lebanese Hezbollah to pressure Israel to wind down military operations in Gaza while still avoiding an all-out war.
A second motivation stems from the increasingly influential role of the Houthis within the Axis and their potential to play an equivalent leadership role to Hezbollah. Iran has rediscovered the strategic importance of the Yemeni front and realized significant returns on its long-term investment in the Houthis’ military, technological, and organizational capabilities. Tehran has now intensified its geopolitical investment in the Houthis, granting them even greater leadership responsibilities.
The third and most critical motive was to reinforce a doctrine of active deterrence in response to progress in the US-Saudi defense partnership talks, which have kept the normalization project with Israel alive despite the Gaza war. If realized, Riyadh would find itself in a better defensive position vis-a-vis the Iran-led Axis. So, the Iranian leadership is furthering its policy of engineering a ring of non-state militias surrounding Saudi Arabia. It has even activated armed Shia groups in the Gulf countries, such as Bahrain’s Al-Ashtar Brigades, which are linked to the IRGC and claimed an operation against Israel in May. The Houthis have also begun transforming Sana’a into a hub for Gulf dissidents, a move explicitly advocated by Houthi leaders at the end of May.
In recent speeches, Abdelmalek al-Houthi has devoted substantial attention to reaffirming the core message of Khamenei’s statements and cautioning regional states against seeking protection from the US and Israel, warning that this strategy will backfire. With the growing encirclement of the Gulf by Iran-backed armed groups and new operations on the Iraqi and Yemeni fronts, a US-Saudi partnership agreement could provide a pretext for the Axis to launch future attacks, even after the cessation of the war in Gaza. The alliance could continue to justify such actions by citing the need to counter US influence exercised by Washington’s Gulf state puppets. Iran’s ultimate aims in response to the Gaza war go far beyond Gaza itself.