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Foreign Minister Appointment Tests Anti-Houthi Unity
Ongoing Houthi maritime attacks and security crackdowns in northern Yemen have given Prime Minister Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak and members of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) plenty of reasons to band together and strengthen their position in the face of the common enemy. But popular protests over electricity shortages in southern governorates and disagreements over the appointment of a new foreign affairs minister tested the government’s willingness and ability to form a united front.
In late March, PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi signed a republican decree appointing Yemen’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Shaya al-Zindani, as the new foreign minister amid quiet disapproval from several PLC members and his predecessor, Bin Mubarak, who felt like the appointment was not in their best political interests. Bin Mubarak fears that Al-Zindani’s authority to staff diplomatic missions around the world could imperil years of appointments that Bin Mubarak oversaw during his time as foreign minister. The PLC members, for their part, had other candidates in mind for the cabinet position. In mid-April, Saudi officials summoned the entire PLC and the prime minister to Riyadh, reportedly to smooth over the tensions resulting from Al-Zindani’s appointment. In return for cooperation on the matter, several PLC members pushed for approval of the body’s internal bylaws, an issue that has been delayed since the council was formed in April 2022. The purpose of the bylaws is to delineate the authority and mandate of each PLC member. In the absence of clearly defined roles, Rashad al-Alimi has used his executive authority to unilaterally appoint a number of loyalists to key positions in the government, which has frustrated the other members. In addition to limiting the PLC chief’s power to issue decrees, the bylaws could also restrict his ability to spend government funds.
The disagreement over Al-Zindani’s appointment has been a distraction at a time when the government leaders are under pressure to respond in a coherent manner to Houthi maritime attacks and a banking crisis that threatens to spiral out of control. Despite their reservations, Al-Zindani comes highly qualified to the key ministerial office, with 40 years of diplomatic experience and a deep understanding of Saudi Arabia.
In late April and early May, Rashad al-Alimi sought to curry the favor of important political and military figures in Marib during an official visit to Marib city. As a strategic oil and gas hub in the crosshairs of Houthi forces, Marib is vital to the survival of the government. During a meeting with military commanders, community leaders, sheikhs, and social dignitaries, Al-Alimi expressed his thanks for their resisting Houthi advances in a rousing speech that described Marib as “the main gate in the ongoing sanctified battle for restoring the state’s institutions and recapturing the capital Sana’a and the entire the country’s regions from the terrorist Houthi militias.”
At the same time as the PLC chief’s visit to Marib, the US government-funded National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) organized a meeting of political parties in Aden aimed at promoting unity. Although Southern Transitional Council (STC) Secretary General Fadl al-Jaada attended the event, the secessionist group issued a statement condemning the meeting. Days later, STC chief Aiderous al-Zubaidi reasserted the group’s goal of restoring the south Yemeni state while hinting that their patience with peaceful options was running thin. “We will redouble our efforts in the coming period, both domestically and internationally, until victory is achieved for our people’s cause and their independent federal state is restored and rebuilt,” he said. “While the people of the south are committed to the approach of negotiations as the basis for resolving their cause, they are not oblivious to their readiness for any other options, if necessary.”
Meanwhile, as temperatures started to climb in May, government officials faced growing criticism over electricity shortages in Aden, Abyan, Hadramawt, and other areas outside Houthi control. STC leaders, who enjoy virtually uncontested rule in Aden, attempted to shift blame for the mismanagement of public resources there onto the government and the PLC. Chronic electricity shortages are a perennial source of criticism for the dysfunctional government.
Houthis Arrest “Spy Cells” to Deflect Failures
Accusations of foreign infiltration are the latest Houthi tool of choice to crush dissent and further consolidate power amid public scandals, governance failures, and other potential threats to the group’s rule. Three developments during the reporting period highlighted the focus on a foreign bogeyman as the source of Houthi shortcomings. In early April, following the official opening of Al-Makha airport on Taiz’s Red Sea coast for commercial flights, Houthi officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Hussein al-Ezzi, framed the new airport as a conduit for spies to enter Yemen, citing suspicion that Israeli intelligence elements may have already entered Yemen through the airport. In early May, Houthi media announced the arrest of the “400 Cell,” a group of Yemenis allegedly working on behalf of US and Israeli forces to identify and monitor missile, drone, and boat launch sites and assassinate military officials. The Houthis claimed that Ammar Saleh, a former intelligence official and brother of PLC member and commander of the UAE-backed National Resistance forces in Al-Makha, Tareq Saleh, led the cell.
On June 1, the Houthi Specialized Criminal Court in Sana’a sentenced 44 people to death on allegations of espionage. Among the most high-profile individuals receiving the death penalty was businessman Adnan al-Harazi, who ran Sana’a-based Prodigy Systems, a company that conducted monitoring and evaluation for international aid organizations in Yemen, before he was detained in January 2023.
Less than a week after the announcement of the death sentences, the Houthi’s Intelligence and Security Service launched an arrest campaign detaining more than 45 Yemeni aid workers and employees of local and international organizations, including at least 13 UN staff. Houthi officials claimed the arrests were aimed at breaking up a US-Israeli spy network, which allegedly took root in the US embassy before it closed in 2015 and then spread to international organizations. Houthi officials bolstered the claims by publishing five rounds of purported confessions by former Yemeni employees of the US embassy in Sana’a. The carefully scripted confessions blame the US and Israel for problems in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen. Purported confessions have focused on alleged American-Israeli influence on Yemen’s agricultural sector, economy, and culture.
The June arrests occurred a few months after the Houthis released the head of the now-disbanded teacher’s union protests, Abu Zaid al-Kumaim. Al-Kumaim was detained in October as the teachers’ demands for unpaid salaries in Houthi-held areas were inspiring other segments of society to speak out. The crackdown that followed took the wind out of the protest movement as the group rallied public opinion behind its intervention in the Gaza war. Releasing Al-Kumaim appeared to reflect the Houthi conclusion that the teachers’ strike had been neutralized. However, with no current prospect of reviving a Saudi-Houthi peace deal that envisions the payment of public salaries by the kingdom, the Houthis are simply kicking the can down the road. The current crackdown on alleged spies has sent a similar warning to others thinking about challenging Houthi rule – particularly as the Aden-based central bank has ordered Sana’a-based financial entities to relocate their headquarters to the interim capital, which would marginalize Sana’a in the international banking system.
The crackdown also serves other purposes. First, amid ongoing US-British airstrikes and domestic troubles, they provide the Houthis with justification to further consolidate power by casting anyone suspected of opposing the group as infiltrators or fifth columnists. Second, the ensuing paranoia has allowed Houthi hardliners to test loyalty within the group to its leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi. Third, by targeting individuals who work in aid monitoring and evaluation, the Houthis will gain more control over the information that forms the basis of Yemen’s global humanitarian aid response. As a result, the Houthis will be able to further shape narratives about humanitarian crises (real or imagined) in areas under their control and benefit from the resulting aid. Fifth, Houthi authorities can use recently detained aid and NGO workers as bargaining chips to make demands on their various employers to secure favorable new terms for their release, all while diverting attention from other long-standing issues.
Taiz Siege Lifted After Nine Years
Growing pressure on Houthi authorities may have played a role in the group’s decision to reopen key roads between Sana’a, Marib city, and Taiz city after neglecting the issue for years. On May 10, more than three months after Marib’s government-aligned governor, Sultan al-Aradah, reopened sections of main roads leading from Marib city to Sana’a and Al-Bayda governorates, Marib’s Houthi-appointed governor, Ali Mohammed bin Taiman, announced the opening of a southern stretch of the Al-Bayda-Marib city road.
On June 13, Houthi forces announced the reopening of the main road for passenger cars into and out of Taiz city, which had been blocked since the early months of the war in 2015. Renewed access to the main thoroughfare shortens travel time between the Houthi-controlled Al-Hawban industrial area and Taiz city from roughly 5-6 hours to 15 minutes and is a much safer alternative than the rugged mountain road that travelers were forced to take through the Al-Aqroud front in Al-Misrakh district. Reopened in the days before Eid al-Adha, the new route witnessed an influx of Yemenis from Houthi-controlled areas into Taiz city to reunite with their families for the holiday. The Houthis also agreed to reopen the Al-Siteen-Bir Basha road northwest of the city, which is designed for heavy transport trucks.
Amid the jubilation over the Taiz city road reopenings, which reportedly occurred due to Omani pressure over the issue, security and military forces in Taiz city arrested a number of individuals accused of entering the city to establish Houthi spy cells. Some observers have accused the Houthis of lifting the siege to move officials and fighters there, or perhaps as a way to smuggle hard currency from government areas to Sana’a to stave off liquidity problems and increasing US sanctions.
Other Developments in Brief
March 28 & 31: Emergency measures were put in place in Aden and Sana’a to combat an emergent cholera outbreak. By June 21, more than 30,000 suspected new cases were reported in both government and Houthi-held territories.
April 5: The General Authority of Civil Aviation and Meteorology in Taiz announced the official opening of Al-Makha Airport to commercial flights. Funded in part by the UAE and under the control of PLC member and commander of the National Resistance Forces Tareq Saleh, the airport had previously only received military aircraft and a lone humanitarian flight transporting Yemenis stranded in Sudan’s civil war in January. The Houthi leadership has accused the government of using it to let Israeli spies infiltrate the country.
April 20: Abdelmalek al-Houthi inaugurated the group’s annual summer camp program, aimed at indoctrinating children with Houthi ideology through sectarian lectures on a range of topics, including jihad. Houthi opponents argue that the goal of the camps is to brainwash children and prepare them to fight other Yemenis under the pretext of preparing for conflict against the US and Israel.
May 6: The local authority in Hadramawt reached an agreement with teachers following several weeks of strikes across the governorate over the disbursement of salaries and poor working conditions. However, low-level protests would continue in the following weeks.
June 26: Yemenia Airways suspended all flights to Sana’a after the Houthis grounded four planes from its fleet at Sana’a airport. The grounded planes had been transporting Hajj pilgrims back from Jeddah. Following widespread criticism on Yemeni social media for the stranding of more than 1,300 pilgrims in Saudi Arabia, the Houthi-run Ministry of Transport justified the move as a response to illegal measures taken by the Yemenia Airways management in Aden at the behest of Riyadh and the internationally recognized government.