اقرأ المحتوى باللغة العربية
The death of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, as well as the foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, in a helicopter accident on May 19 raises the question of the impact of their disappearance from the scene on the country’s foreign policy regarding Yemen. The answer for the short term is straightforward: Raisi’s death will have a marginal impact on the country’s foreign policy, in general and specifically in Yemen. In the mid to longer term, however, the situation becomes less clear because of the eventual succession to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 85 years old and has had cancer. Because Raisi was a potential candidate to succeed him, his death changed the dynamics and added some uncertainty. Continuity remains the most likely outcome of the eventual transition to a new leader, but in the event of a more difficult transition, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy will likely be impacted. In light of the significant importance that Iran’s support for the Houthis has had for the evolution of Yemen’s civil war, it is relevant to break down this assessment further.
The conclusion that Raisi’s death will not have a noticeable short-term impact is due to how foreign and national security policy-making plays out in the complex system of the Islamic Republic. The Supreme Leader is the ultimate decision-maker, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also having a pivotal role in policy development and implementation. The president has a say in foreign policy, but his voice is only one among many in the constellation of actors and institutions that forms the regime. Along with the foreign ministry, the president is mostly responsible for implementing foreign policy, and he also plays a role in setting the tone, thanks to the bully pulpit he occupies.
In the short term, we should expect continuity in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. The election in the second round of the presidential election on 5 July of Masud Pezeshkian, the lone reformist candidate, will not lead to significant change: the Supreme Leader and his conservative and hard-line allies, especially in the IRGC, will remain in control of the state’s key levers of power, including in foreign policy. Recent trends in Iranian foreign policy, notably efforts to deepen relations in Asia and with Russia and to better manage tensions with Saudi Arabia, will continue. Khamenei has clearly made it a priority during the presidential transition to signal continuity to both domestic and international audiences, with the objective of projecting an image of strength and resilience.
Iran’s approach to the war in Yemen will be no different: in the short term, it will not change. Support for the Houthis has provided the Islamic Republic with a significant return on what remains a limited investment. There does not appear to be important differences within the regime on Yemen policy. In addition, ties with the Houthis have become deeply institutionalized: the Houthis, for example, have become integrated into the Islamic Republic’s global smuggling networks, through which it provides them with advanced parts for weapons systems such as missiles and drones. Because the IRGC, which reports to the Supreme Leader, manages Iran-Houthi ties, the identity of the new president will not have a notable impact on this support. By the same logic, the arrival of President Pezeshkian will not change Tehran’s policy of supporting the political process between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Because the Houthis have de facto won the war in Yemen, the Islamic Republic calculates, correctly, that this process will not lead to national reconciliation; instead, it will help the consolidation and legitimation of Houthi power, an outcome that it fully supports.
In the longer term, the implications of Raisi’s death are more uncertain, as the structural constraints that explain this short-term foreign policy continuity could shift, even if only mildly. Raisi was widely viewed as one of the leading candidates to replace Khamenei, and he was involved in the process of searching for candidates. It was far from guaranteed that Raisi would win: even before his death, the leadership race was shrouded in uncertainty, with its results highly unpredictable. Nevertheless, there was some support for his candidacy inside the regime. He was, to some extent, a lowest common denominator type of figure: a weak and pliable candidate, loyal to the system, who would ensure the status quo without threatening the power and privilege of key power centers. His death changes these dynamics. There was already a risk that the succession process would bring more than limited instability, and a smaller risk that it could be highly disruptive. Raisi’s death does not cause this level of risk to skyrocket, but it does, arguably, raise it somewhat.
That said, this uncertainty and the potential instability it could provoke should not be exaggerated: the Islamic Republic is more resilient than is often thought. It indeed suffers from important vulnerabilities, notably because of mounting economic struggles and growing popular dissatisfaction with the regime’s heavy repression, brutality, and corruption. But the system was born in crisis and has consistently faced and survived crises for 45 years. In recent years, one of the most critical priorities of the current Supreme Leader has been to ensure the regime’s durability, elevating conservatives and hard-liners to positions of power and marginalizing relative reformists and moderates. His eventual death presents the Islamic Republic with one of its most important challenges since its inception, but the system has a significant capacity to absorb the shock. While key individuals and factions will fight hard to position themselves and support their favored candidate, they all have a deep vested interest in the system’s survival.
As much as Khamenei’s death will shake the system, the most likely scenario is continuity. One plausible scenario, for example, would see key regime power centers agree on a weak candidate, similar to Raisi, who would not threaten their position. This scenario could over time lead to an intensification of regime infighting, with a more vulnerable Supreme Leader less able to manage it. Scenarios whereby a highly contentious transition would see the regime turn inward, distracted by infighting, are also within the realm of the possible but seem less likely.
The foreign policy implications of these scenarios are difficult to forecast. The most likely long-term outlook is that the eventual leadership transition will not cause significant changes in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, in Yemen and in general. Even in scenarios of intense jockeying among factions in a complex succession or the succession of a markedly weaker leader, the Islamic Republic will likely continue to view its support for and close ties to a wide range of armed non-state actors throughout the region, including the Houthis, as prized assets that are essential not only for power projection but, crucially, to protect the regime itself.
Still, under the most challenging and contentious – albeit less likely – transition scenarios, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy could change more than marginally, though the direction of this change is unpredictable. Prolonged domestic instability in the wake of a highly contested leadership succession could, on the one hand, lead to retrenchment: in this scenario, an inward-focused Islamic Republic would cut down on some aspects of its foreign policy. Here, support for the Houthis could plausibly be reduced. Iran’s penetration of Yemen has brought it tangible benefits, but it is not as vital for its national security as its support for Lebanese Hezbollah or Iraqi Shia militias on its western flank. Moreover, the Houthis are relatively self-reliant compared to many other Iran-backed groups.
On the other hand, prolonged domestic instability could lead the regime to double down instead of drawing down. Fearing that its adversaries would exploit its vulnerability, the Islamic Republic might instead increase its support for its armed non-state partners. This would be consistent with one of the pillars of its defense doctrine: to project insecurity outwards, away from its borders, by developing the means to retaliate against adversaries and raise the costs of policies aimed at pressuring the Islamic Republic. Given Tehran’s success in imposing major costs on Saudi Arabia through its support for the Houthis, one might expect in this scenario that the Islamic Republic could increase this support and work with the Houthis to deter Riyadh from seeking to exploit Iran’s vulnerabilities. In so doing, Tehran would try to send a clear signal of resilience to its adversaries as well as its partners.
In sum, in the short term, the death of President Ebrahim Raisi and the election of Masud Pezeshkian will likely not produce any significant shifts in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy in Yemen. In the longer term, however, his death will raise the level of uncertainty when the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, passes away. Even though the consequences are unpredictable, the Islamic Republic’s policy of supporting the Houthis could then undergo some changes.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.