Yemen has entered its most dangerous phase of conflict since the 2022 truce. The Houthis’ September capture of Al-Makha and ongoing advances toward Taiz city have been met with counteroffensives from government-aligned forces, while a surge of Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia has underscored the regional stakes of this conflict. Across the region and the West, analysts and policymakers are struggling to keep pace with the magnitude of the fallout set in motion since September.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, the escalation in Yemen is a moment of reckoning, forcing regional capitals to confront the limits of containment and the absence of a unified Gulf strategy. The Houthi advance on the West Coast toward the Bab al-Mandab, coupled with instability around the Strait of Hormuz, leaves Gulf countries facing a dual chokepoint crisis with unprecedented ramifications for trade corridors and economic infrastructure. For Saudi Arabia, the threat is immediate. Sustained long-range strikes targeting Riyadh and vital energy assets have caused scores of deaths and wounded hundreds, demonstrating the Houthis’ expanding military reach.

The spillover of Yemen’s war will likely extend beyond Saudi’s borders. And despite efforts by pro-government forces to push back the Houthis on the West Coast, deep-seated fragmentation among anti-Houthi forces continues to expose crippling weaknesses in military coordination and divided chains of command within the anti-Houthi coalition. With consensus growing that political containment alone is no longer viable, attention has again shifted back to military action in Yemen as the primary lever for change. But does a renewed military campaign offer a credible path to bring stability in Yemen? And what role can the GCC countries play in creating the right conditions for a resolution to Yemen’s conflict?

To discuss recent developments and their broader implications for the region, the Sana’a Center brings together the perspectives of Ahmed Dahshan, the Editor-in-Chief of the Center for Arab Eurasian Studies, Yasar Qartaneh, an expert in strategic engagement, conflict diplomacy, and regional security across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and Khaldoon Abdulla, a Yemeni geopolitical and conflict analyst.

SC: What has fundamentally changed with this latest round of war?

Yasar Qatarneh: For years, Yemen and Bab al-Mandab have been treated as two separate files. Yemen was mainly seen as a political and diplomatic problem, involving ceasefires and negotiations. The Bab al-Mandab was treated mainly as a maritime security issue, involving naval patrols and the protection of international shipping. The Houthi offensive along the West Coast has shattered this divide. Even as control over strategic positions such as Al-Makha, Dhubab, and Mayyun (Perim) Island remains fluid and heavily contested between the warring parties, developments on land are increasingly shaping security at sea. The result is a blurred boundary between Yemen’s domestic conflict and the region’s broader security and global maritime trade.

SC: The government’s setbacks on Yemen’s West Coast have prompted accusations of betrayal and intelligence failures within the anti-Houthi camp. But to what extent do these failures explain the recent setbacks?

Khaldoon Abdulla: A decade of competing Gulf policies, divergent sponsorship networks, and the proliferation of regionally organized forces has left the anti-Houthi camp politically and militarily fragmented. As a result, the anti-Houthi camp has failed to convert available resources into concentrated strategic power. The lack of unified military leadership and competing chains of command weaken operational planning and coordination, intelligence sharing, reserve allocation, logistics, and the rapid concentration of force, creating gaps the Houthis have successfully exploited. This mechanism is central to understanding recent setbacks on the West Coast, rather than reducing them to betrayal or isolated intelligence failures.

SC: How should Gulf states and the Yemeni government respond to the Houthi threat against the Bab al-Mandab?

Ahmed Dahshan: The options available to the Gulf states differ between the Strait of Hormuz — where the conflict has become an international issue involving the intersecting interests of several regional and global powers — and Bab al-Mandab. In the latter case, coordinated military action by Saudi Arabia and its regional and international allies, combining airstrikes with a serious, organized ground operation by anti-Houthi forces, could shift the balance of territorial control. Large stretches of the West Coast are exposed and lack the rugged mountainous terrain that benefits the Houthis elsewhere. A similar military approach wrested control of Bab al-Mandab from them in 2015. The military option in Yemen must, however, be accompanied by broader political and economic measures. Foremost among these are reconfiguring the political structure of the internationally recognized government to reflect the forces actually present on the ground, restore the operation of its institutions from within Yemen, strengthen the government’s role in providing services to Yemenis at home, and safeguard the interests of those forced to exile the country because of war.

SC: Gulf states share clear maritime and economic interests in this conflict, yet their policies toward Yemen differ. Why has the bloc struggled to forge a unified response?

Abdulla: The Gulf states have struggled to translate the common threat posed by the conflict in Yemen and the region, geopolitical constraints, and existing collective institutions into a unified response. Oman has sought to keep channels open with Tehran and the Houthis. The UAE appears to be navigating the regional environment by pursuing détente, as reflected in recent meetings with Iranian officials in New Delhi during the BRICS summit. By contrast, Saudi Arabia is bearing the brunt of the escalation in Yemen, with regular missile and drone strikes targeting its oil infrastructure and airports, including the recently deadly attack against King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh. Exposed along its southern border and heavily affected by Red Sea instability, Saudi Arabia faces the sharpest dilemma. So far, Riyadh has increasingly combined burden-shifting toward pro-government forces, the selective use of air power, and wider multilateral deterrence. Such measures may, at best, constrain further Houthi advances, but they are unlikely to produce durable de-escalation or reverse the balance of power.

For the Yemeni government, if the objective is to restore a more sustainable balance, additional weapons alone are unlikely to be sufficient. Greater political integration, unified command and control, common operational planning, intelligence sharing, and the ability to concentrate forces across multiple fronts would be necessary to convert the government’s existing resources into a coherent strategy, helping to restore the balance in Yemen and, consequently, safeguard the Gulf states’ interests in the Red Sea.

SC: Looking ahead, what kind of regional political framework is needed to support a sustainable settlement to the conflict in Yemen?

Dahshan: The Yemeni government must shift its focus from chasing international recognition to building genuine domestic legitimacy. Ultimately, a hybrid approach appears necessary, combining organized military action with serious negotiations to secure the best possible terms for a political settlement with the Houthis. War is an instrument of politics, used to pressure an adversary when negotiations fail to produce results. But Yemen’s conflict does not appear amenable to a decisive military outcome that could, on its own, end the country’s political crisis and humanitarian catastrophe. The Gulf states can play a central role by providing meaningful military, political, and economic support to a Yemeni government that builds domestic legitimacy and the capacity to operate from within the country.

SC: How should broader international efforts to secure Red Sea shipping better account for the evolving relationship between maritime security and the conflict in Yemen?

Qatarneh: The strategic importance of the Bab al-Mandab is increasingly shaping the war itself. Control of the West Coast gives Yemeni actors more bargaining power, as regional and international security concerns feed more directly into Yemen’s internal conflict. This should change the way the issue is approached. The international community should not ask separately how to stabilize Yemen and how to secure Bab al-Mandab. It should ask how changes in territorial control inside Yemen affect behavior at sea, and how changes in maritime security affect military and political decisions inside Yemen. This does not mean merging Yemeni peace efforts and maritime security efforts into a single process. It means recognizing that the two increasingly shape each other and can no longer be addressed in isolation.

This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.