Since early 2026, the internationally recognized government of Yemen (IRG), with Saudi political and operational support, has been restructuring the military and security forces in the areas under its control. The initiative began soon after Emirati-backed secessionists of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) suffered a military defeat in January 2026. This reorganization process follows the establishment of the Supreme Military Committee by Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which aims to reorganize, equip, and unify the command of all military forces in government-controlled territories. But the Committee is formally under the control of the Saudi-led coalition rather than the Yemeni government.

The success of this restructuring is closely tied to broader political developments in Yemen and the region. On the one hand, the exchange of attacks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia this July — the first in four years, amid the broader context of the US-Iran war — is likely to strengthen cohesion in the government front. On the other hand, the growing risk of the truce collapsing, amid renewed clashes between the Houthis and pro-government forces, could disrupt the security and military restructuring process. Increased instability will also further delay Saudi Arabia’s plan to convene a Southern dialogue conference. This matters for the security sector, given that many of the formerly UAE-backed forces that the Saudis are integrating have historically been led by commanders with secessionist or at least autonomist aspirations.

Why Security and Military Reorganization Matters

Far from being only a technical issue, security and military restructuring and integration are key to stabilizing Yemen’s government-held areas for two reasons. The first concerns reducing the number of armed actors on the ground. A monopoly on force by the army has never been a realistic target in a country like Yemen, historically marked by tribal membership, security hybridization, and top-down paramilitarism. Nevertheless, reducing the quantity of non-state actors would improve state credibility, local stability, and accountability.

The second reason relates to Saudi Arabia’s consolidation of power in southern regions following the departure of Emirati personnel and the official dissolution of the STC between late December 2025 and January 2026. Riyadh is currently rebuilding influence and capitalizing on its renewed hegemonic status and economic power in southern regions. However, only time will tell if this influence can be transformed into enduring power. Multiple political and economic issues are still unresolved, and the strength of the UAE’s pull is uncertain. Given these conditions, effective security and military restructuring is a useful tool for supporting Saudi power in Yemen.

Trends in Restructuring and Integration

Some trends can be identified in the Saudi-led security and military restructuring. The first is the integration of security forces under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Riyadh and the IRG are working to increase manpower for internal security tasks, with an eye to local security governance, especially in cities where the STC held the upper hand for a long time, such as Aden and Mukalla. The Security Belt Forces, once affiliated with the STC, were renamed the National Security forces after the pro-government camp established control over Aden in January. The renamed force also absorbed other former STC forces, such as the Lahj Security and Aden Security forces. The goal is ultimately to integrate all these groups into the police-like Special Security forces of the MoI.

In April, the MoI began integrating personnel from the Hadrami Elite forces and the Security Support forces in Hadramawt. The governorate was the epicenter of the late 2025 military confrontation between the Saudi-backed government and Emirati-backed secessionist forces of the STC. The MoI also began integrating the Hadramawt Protection forces, the tribal militia led by Amr bin Abrish, who gained popularity as a proponent of Hadrami autonomy before aligning more closely with Riyadh and supporting the government’s battle against the STC.

The second trend is likely an attempt by the government and Saudi Arabia to push for extensive change in the military leadership, with a focus on high-ranking individuals. This has been particularly prevalent among groups formerly tied to the STC, as well as among pro-government and Saudi-backed forces, suggesting an intent to pursue deeper, more comprehensive military restructuring. In the case of newly co-opted groups, the appointment of new leadership accompanies the integration of forces, in an attempt to mitigate resentment toward top-down changes. New overall and local commanders were appointed for the rebranded National Security forces in Aden and Abyan, as well as for the Hadrami Elite Forces.^[1] A new commander was also appointed for the Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield forces, a paramilitary force formalized by Al-Alimi in 2023 and operating under his personal supervision rather than the Ministry of Defense, and for the First and Second Military Regions of the army, headquartered in Seyoun and Mukalla, respectively.

The third trend is the acceptance and management of security hybridization, in continuity with past reform attempts. The Giants Brigades, led by Abdelrahman al-Muharrami (Abu Zara’a), joined the Saudi camp after the UAE withdrew from Yemen and were tasked with overseeing security in Aden. They are now behaving like state actors, increasingly coordinating with the army and other pro-government groups, while still operating outside of the formal apparatus. Furthermore, new appointments in the army sometimes overlap with the leadership of paramilitary groups: the new commander of the army’s First Military Region is already in charge of a division of the Nation’s Shield forces. There is precedent for such dual roles: Faraj Bahsani led both the Second Military Region and the Hadrami Elite forces when the STC and the UAE were still prominent players in Hadramawt.

Salaries and the Southern Question

The durability and effectiveness of such restructuring will largely depend on two variables: the country’s economic situation and the political process for a Southern dialogue. These, in turn, largely depend on Saudi political choices. Riyadh’s financial support is vital for the government, especially since oil exports were halted in 2022 due to the Houthis’ attacks. The government struggles to regularly pay public salaries, including those of the military and police, and to provide basic services to citizens. The UAE succeeded in building strong alliances with southern armed groups and fighters in part because of regular, competitive salaries compared to those in the army.

Saudi Arabia has focused on the salary issue to boost cooptation and credibility. In January, Al-Alimi announced that Riyadh “has completed the payment of salaries for all military formations that were previously funded by Abu Dhabi.” For 2026, Saudi Arabia has budgeted nearly US$3 billion to cover public-sector salaries in Yemen, including those previously paid by the UAE to personnel affiliated with the STC. However, any financial support must be received and allocated properly, as aid absorption has often been a problem in Yemen.

For Saudi Arabia, the South’s political situation is even trickier than the financial one. As the STC was forced to withdraw, Riyadh announced the formation of a Southern Dialogue conference to bring together “all southern factions to discuss just solutions to the southern cause,” acknowledging long-standing local aspirations for self-determination and governance. However, the conference has yet to be organized.

Significant divisions exist between southern governorates and political parties, contributing to increased fragmentation. Saudi Arabia may attempt to delay a potentially divisive conference, given the uncertainty caused by this July’s confrontation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia and the broader resurgence of the US-Iran war. For years, the Saudis have tried to de-escalate with the Houthis to prevent the resumption of shipping attacks in the Red Sea, which could threaten the East-West pipeline to Yanbu, which has become key for Saudi oil export since Iran’s blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. During the first part of the US-Iran war, Saudi attempts to de-escalate with the Houthis, and the latter’s restraint in joining the conflict, were met with suspicion in southern regions. Concerns were particularly acute in Hadramawt, where leaders feared that they might be excluded from bilateral negotiations, and were worried that revenues from Hadrami oil fields could be part of a possible Saudi-Houthi political settlement.

Current developments at the domestic and regional level will eventually erode not only the status quo Yemen has experienced over the last four years, but also the Saudi-led focus on comprehensive reorganization in government-controlled territories. The questionable loyalties of many of the UAE-backed groups that the Saudis are now integrating, combined with disputes over unpaid salaries, could short-circuit the security and military restructuring process if the government and the Saudis do not deliver on their promises in a timely fashion. The reorganization of Yemen’s military and security sector is at risk, and with it, the consolidation of Saudi power in the South.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.