Regional war has forced Gulf states to confront urgent questions about their security architecture. They require defensive capabilities and frameworks that extend beyond their borders, preserve their strategic autonomy, and allow them to press ahead with their ambitious development agendas. It also revives a question that Gulf capitals have long left unanswered: Can a sustainable regional security order be conceived without Yemen as part of its design?

From November 2023 to September 2025, the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) attacked over a hundred vessels in the Red Sea, driving a 60 percent drop in shipping at the height of the crisis and costing the global economy tens of billions of dollars. A US military campaign, which included airstrikes on over one thousand targets between March and May 2025, eventually led to a ceasefire between the two parties, but it failed to eliminate the Houthi threat to shipping or deter attacks on Israel. The Houthis have since entered the regional war sparked by US and Israeli attacks on Iran by striking Israel, and have threatened to resume their Red Sea operations. Should they blockade the Bab al-Mandab in tandem with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, two of the world’s most critical trade arteries would be shut simultaneously — a scenario without precedent in modern economic history. These developments demand a fundamental rethink of what Gulf and regional security requires.

For decades, Gulf states invested heavily in building their economies and security systems, while managing their relationship with Yemen through containment rather than partnership. Since the Gulf Cooperation Council’s founding in 1981 (from which Yemen was excluded), Yemen has been treated as a geographic periphery, a security problem to be managed when necessary, or a sphere of influence to be maintained but not warranting any serious strategic investment.

While the primary responsibility for Yemen’s development and state-building rests with Yemenis themselves, regional actors have played a damaging role in deepening the country’s fragility. They have failed to recognize Yemen as an integral part of the Arabian Peninsula’s security environment, overlooked its strategic geographic location, and disregarded the dangers posed by local instability. Gulf states built islands of prosperity, believing they could insulate themselves from the poverty and violence spreading around them. This current war has shattered that illusion.

Weak economic development, the absence of meaningful investment, and political instability left Yemen with a power vacuum, and armed groups of every stripe moved in to fill it. Regional actors with destabilizing agendas found an easy footing. The Houthis grew out of this environment, and over a decade built military capabilities that now reach far beyond Yemen’s borders, threatening regional security and global supply chains as they sit astride one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. With over 2,000 kilometers of coastline along the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea, Yemen could have become the southern gateway to the prosperity of the Arabian Peninsula, a geographic asset connecting the region to global trade routes. Instead, it is a source of sustained and significant regional threat.

Gulf states possess formidable military capabilities, but a decade of conflict has shown that conventional military power has its limits against asymmetric threats posed by non-state armed actors such as the Houthis. The idea of prolonged conflict or the perennial threat of attack is a threat not to be taken lightly for the countries of the Gulf, which have staked their reputation on regional stability, with economies built on openness, investment, and long-term development. They have everything to lose from prolonged conflict or the perennial threat of attack.

For Yemenis, the Houthis’ most recent escalation abroad risks further deepening the suffering caused by more than a decade of war on the home front. Renewed strikes by the US and Israel, particularly against civilian infrastructure, could devastate an economy already on its knees. Whatever prospects remained for a political settlement to Yemen’s domestic conflict are fast disappearing, and a return to full-scale war, once ignited, could outlast the regional conflict that triggered it.

Over 18 million Yemenis are acutely food insecure. This year’s UN humanitarian response plan has received just 10 percent of its required funding. The World Food Programme has been forced to cut its beneficiary lists in half — a result of both funding shortfalls and the suspension of its operations in Houthi-controlled areas in response to continuing restrictions on humanitarian access and the detention of aid workers.

With Yemen’s oil exports at a standstill since the 2022 Houthi attacks against export terminals, the Yemeni government and economy are now run almost entirely on Saudi support. A recently announced national budget — the first in nearly six years — lays bare the scale of the imbalance: according to Sana’a Center calculations, the deficit could reach 1.4 trillion Yemeni rials (over US$890 million) if projected external grants fail to materialize, threatening the government’s ability to pay salaries and deliver basic services. The Saudi lifeline is itself at risk, as Riyadh may be forced to redirect its resources to deal with the fallout from the war. Further disruption to Yemen’s food supply chains or a rise in prices could tip millions of Yemenis into famine.

The Yemeni government now faces a reckoning. Amid declining external support and mounting pressure, government spending remains misaligned with current needs, continuing to serve large patronage networks at the expense of the most vulnerable. This moment of crisis is an opportunity to push through reforms that have been deferred far too long. Chief among them is redirecting resources toward basic food needs. Developing an emergency response strategy with the international community, before the food security situation deteriorates further, is paramount. The government’s responsibility in this regard extends to all Yemenis, regardless of which armed group controls the territory where they reside.

This moment also demands a fundamentally different approach from Gulf states. Yemen is not a problem to be managed — it is a neighbor that, by virtue of its geography and demography, is central to any viable project of regional economic development and stability. Yemen is the most populous country on the Arabian Peninsula, and by 2050, its population will be equivalent to roughly 85 percent of the combined population of all six other Gulf states. This human capital can be either an enormous asset or a liability. Which one it becomes depends entirely on the choices made now.

Any Gulf approach to Yemen must move beyond crisis response toward genuine political and economic engagement and investment in Yemen’s stability and development. This means backing an inclusive political process that does not sideline any faction or deepen fragmentation. It means channeling support into state institutions and shifting away from the default strategy of backing armed groups. Above all, it means treating support for Yemen not just as aid but as a strategic investment in stability and regional security. Whether they like it or not, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula share a stake in each other’s stability and, ultimately, a common fate.