The rapid Houthi military advance along the West Coast signifies a major shift in the conflict in Yemen and, given the ongoing regional escalation, could indicate a broader regional turning point.

The reported close supervision of the Houthi military operation by members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), together with the arrival of more than 100 US military advisers in Riyadh the day after the fall of Al-Makha, suggests that the consequences of these developments extend beyond Yemen. The strategic importance of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab means that further military escalation could have broader regional and international consequences, including additional pressure on global oil prices. After years of largely fixed and relatively quiet front lines, the Houthis’ breakthrough in Al-Makha signals a return to full-scale warfare in Yemen and a dramatic shift in the post-2022 status quo.

At home, the fall of the port city of Al-Makha has already led to heavy criticism of Tareq Saleh, a member of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), whose forces were defending the area. But focusing on Saleh conveniently reduces a broader political and military failure to the actions of a single actor and distracts from the underlying structural weaknesses on the government side that made the Houthi advance possible.

How Yemen Got Here

The roots of Yemen’s conflict lie in the 2011 uprising, which ousted longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh but failed to establish a stable political transition. Deep divisions over the future of the Yemeni state sparked a civil war when the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) seized the capital in 2014, prompting a Saudi-led coalition to intervene in 2015. What began primarily as a domestic political and military conflict subsequently became deeply regionalized, with the involvement of actors such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran shaping the calculation of Yemeni actors.

The creation of the PLC in 2022, which replaced President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi with a collective leadership structure, was envisioned primarily as a representative body focused on major strategic issues such as war and peace, leaving routine governance to the prime minister and cabinet. Instead, it created eight competing centers of power and a council chairman with limited political authority — a predicament further compounded by his weak leadership. Rather than consolidating the anti-Houthi camp, the PLC deepened its internal divisions.

A second major problem with the council’s formation was the absence of meaningful Yemeni agency. Saudi Arabia hastily convened a Yemeni conference in Riyadh, but the process was widely perceived as providing a cover for an externally determined political arrangement. While Hadi’s legitimacy was not constitutional, the GCC Initiative and the endorsement of his 2012 election by Yemen’s major political forces at least afforded him some political authority, whereas the PLC has lacked this legitimacy ever since its inception.

This matters because military effectiveness also depends on political cohesion. The Houthis’ growing role in wider regional conflict has made Yemen increasingly inseparable from developments elsewhere in the region. The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab give the country strategic importance far beyond its borders.

After more than a decade of Houthi control over Sana’a, the Houthis have not managed to build broad political or social alliances and have accumulated many rivals. Today, various Yemeni actors have the motivation and, arguably, the capacity to challenge the Houthis and shift the current balance of power. The challenge, however, lies in translating this fragmented opposition into a coherent political and military force. The anti-Houthi camp has struggled to provide this time and time again.

Saudi Arabia’s Miscalculations

The principal regional supporter of the anti-Houthi camp is Saudi Arabia. But the relationship between Riyadh and its Yemeni counterparts has been characterized by ambiguity and a lack of strategic clarity. Saudi policy tends to prioritize managing Yemeni actors over building genuine partnerships. In many cases, the Saudis choose Yemeni figures who are weak, easily manipulated, and willing to follow their orders. If they instead chose competent, strong actors who could implement a shared agenda, they would also gain the respect of other competent Yemeni figures.

This approach contrasts with the Iranian and Emirati models, which have generally given their local allies more room to maneuver while building relationships around specific objectives and clearer mandates. Saudi policy, by comparison, has often been clearer about what it does not want in Yemen than about what it ultimately wants to achieve and how. The creation of the PLC in 2022 perfectly illustrates these shortcomings.

The Saudi reluctance to become deeply involved in another war further complicates the situation. Observers have anticipated a significant Saudi military response to the Houthi gains in Al-Makha, but a large-scale military offensive would carry substantial economic and political costs and could undermine Riyadh’s long-standing policy of containing the Houthis. It could also damage Saudi Arabia’s effort to project itself as a peaceful, economically focused regional power after the reputational costs associated with its previous military intervention in Yemen.

This hesitation has also consistently been accompanied by poor management of the Yemeni file. The December crisis in southern Yemen was a recent example. Rather than prompting a comprehensive review of Saudi policy, much of the responsibility was largely shifted onto the UAE and the Southern Transitional Council. This left deeper structural problems largely unaddressed, not least the flawed design of the PLC and the lack of transparency between Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni partners. The current situation risks repeating the same pattern, with Tareq Saleh emerging as the latest scapegoat.

Time to Address the Shortcomings of the Anti-Houthi Camp

Saleh is not a particularly strong politician, but neither are the other PLC members. The fact is that Saleh was the only PLC member to spend significant time on the ground in Yemen with his forces and to attempt to use available resources to develop infrastructure in Al-Makha. Holding him personally responsible for the collapse of his forces ignores the broader inherent failures surrounding him.

Two factors were particularly important. First, the PLC, under the direction of council chief Rashad al-Alimi, failed to effectively coordinate the competing military forces within the anti-Houthi camp despite clear indications of Houthi preparations for an offensive. Second, Saudi Arabia remained hesitant to engage militarily and did not provide the necessary air support to protect government forces and prevent the Houthi advance.

Yemen’s war is ultimately no longer a local conflict. It has become a regional battleground with potentially wider international consequences. A military response alone is unlikely to produce sustainable results. Any renewed military campaign must be accompanied by a serious reassessment of past mistakes, meaningful reform of the Yemeni government, stronger coordination among anti-Houthi forces, and a more balanced relationship between Yemeni actors and their regional partners. Regional partners must finally recognize that security in Yemen cannot be imposed from above. It must be built from within through genuine local agency.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.