The recent attacks on Riyadh Airport demonstrate a key aspect of the Houthi threat: the ability to impose costs that far outweigh and outlast the attack itself. Repairing the damage and improving defenses are not enough to restore air traffic. Airlines, travelers, and investors are reassessing the risks associated with Saudi Arabia. The airport will regain operational readiness long before people regain confidence in its safety. This confidence gap gives the Houthis leverage beyond the potential damage of further strikes and raises a fundamental question: How did the Houthis build this capability during a prolonged period of de-escalation with Riyadh, one intended to reduce their threat?

A Misguided Logic of Containment

The problem partly lies in how the success of UN and Saudi containment efforts has been judged. Following the 2022 UN-backed ceasefire, the decline in attacks and the intensity of frontline fighting, combined with continuing negotiations, were interpreted as signs of success. A more important question was neglected: whether the Houthis’ ability to return to war was diminishing or growing. If pressure on a belligerent side is eased without commensurate limitation on its sources of power, a lull in fighting can facilitate its military preparedness for another round of warfare on more favorable terms. De-escalation can stop attacks in the near term, while facilitating drivers of further escalation.

Saudi Arabia had reasons to seek an end to its involvement in the war in Yemen, most notably to protect its economic agenda. But betting that the Kingdom could secure itself independently of the balance of power inside Yemen carried risk. The weaker its Yemeni partners on the ground became, the more Riyadh felt pushed to reach an understanding with the group. And the more the Houthis gained the initiative, dictating whether to sustain or end the lull in violence, the higher the price of that understanding became. This created a cycle in which Saudi Arabia’s allies weakened, the Houthis gained negotiating leverage, and containing the group became progressively more costly.

The lethargic pace of Saudi conflict management worked entirely in the Houthis’ favor. It gave them time to learn how Riyadh responds, how much escalation the Saudis could tolerate, and the limits of coordination among its Yemeni allies. Saudi’s reliance on its local partners, whose limitations had become evident, made it easier for the Houthis to anticipate their opponents’ response, which accounts in part for the group’s boldness. Experience has taught them that raising costs will push other parties to negotiate.

The years of de-escalation since April 2022 gave the Houthis a crucial window to turn this knowledge into military preparedness. Covert economic engagement and expanding trade networks enabled the Houthis to circumvent international sanctions and restrictions tied to its US designation as a terrorist organization. The group’s supply and smuggling networks kept finding viable routes. Restrictions on Houthi activities eased, without parallel measures to prevent the group from acquiring weapons, military components, or raw materials. Occasional seizures of Houthi shipments indicated a diversification of supply routes and a growing capacity for domestic arms manufacture, but little was done to check this growth.

Iranian Patronage and Ideological Resolve

Iranian backing and coordination have been key factors in facilitating the group’s access to resources. This support goes beyond sending weapons – it includes the training needed to operate and maintain them, maximize their effectiveness, and manufacture them domestically. Once the group embeds this expertise in its operations, airstrikes are less likely to permanently weaken it. It can replace lost or spent munitions, adjust its performance, and learn from its mistakes. The number of Houthi weapons depots destroyed is not a sufficient indicator to measure military success; what matters more is the group’s ability to rebuild its strength and resume attacks.

Houthi ideology may also help explain the limits of diplomatic concessions in altering the group’s behavior. The Houthis see force as the basis of establishing their right to rule, and confrontation as a means of improving their political standing. They are as likely to use economic concessions to finance efforts to expand their influence and military power as they are to utilize them for material benefit or humanitarian relief. The enduring relationship with Iran also ties their calculations to interests beyond Yemen. Houthi activity offers China, Russia, and other actors opportunities to undermine Western alliances. Overall, Houthi demands in negotiations may not reflect their next moves, and their willingness to negotiate does not mean they accept the same limits their opponents envisage.

On this basis, the Houthis can further their advantage even without further advances in their weaponry. Repeated attacks at their current level may be enough to prolong disruption, impede recovery, and keep the risk of escalation hanging over the region. The group’s campaign against commercial shipping forced companies to adopt and maintain precautionary measures well after the Houthis stopped striking. Once again, there is rightful concern that even if the fighting de-escalates, the Houthis will leverage the threat of renewed disruption whenever they want to secure their demands inside Yemen or exert pressure that serves their regional allies.

This has regional significance, as the Houthis can extend this threat to other parts of the Gulf without even attacking. If each party seeks separate guarantees for its security or trade, the Houthis can exploit economic competition between them to weaken a common Gulf position. Bilateral understandings may limit short-term violence, but they leave the Houthis an opportunity to change their terms later. The security of the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman depends on the outcome of this confrontation with the Houthis, even if their current exposure to the threat differs.

Forcing A New Regional Order

With all that said, the Houthis’ ability to disrupt does not guarantee their ability to dictate terms. Attacks may push Saudi Arabia and its allies toward closer cooperation and dramatically increase the costs of escalation. The Houthis require supplies and assistance to sustain their threat, while Yemeni resistance on the battlefield places some limits on the group’s expansion and its ability to retain its gains. But retaking recently lost territory is not enough to change the long-term trajectory of the situation. The real measures of success are the Houthis’ continued ability to wage war and their opponents’ ability to prevent it.

If the Houthis make it through this new round of fighting and retain their territorial gains and the ability to threaten their neighbors and disrupt their interests, they will emerge even more dangerous and more confident in their ability. The group will see their survival as evidence that raising the stakes is an effective means of protecting their political project and press for greater concessions in the next confrontation. They will emerge further emboldened and better positioned to write the rules of the security order in the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa, forcing states to account for their power when making decisions, building alliances, and developing major projects.

The outcome of this war will reshape the region’s balance of power for at least the next decade. If this conflict ends on the Houthis’ terms, we may be looking at a new regional order in which the group decides what sovereign states are permitted to do and what they are forced to concede.

This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.