On July 20, the Houthi armed group announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia. Just days later, they said they had targeted two oil tankers, the Encelia and the Layla, with missiles and drones. Saudi authorities reported that one of the ships caught fire. Markets and shipping companies reacted immediately. Insurance costs for voyages through the southern Red Sea doubled, tankers changed course, and Saudi Aramco began making additional volumes of crude available through Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Sidi Kerir. The escalation widened to include defensive Saudi strikes following another Houthi operation in the Red Sea, as well as further Houthi attacks deep inside Saudi territory targeting the port of Yanbu and oil facilities in Jizan. This has further heightened the risks to shipping throughout the Red Sea, despite the temporary lull between Washington and Tehran.

In light of these developments, the declaration of the blockade can no longer be dismissed as mere Houthi propaganda, nor is it a routine threat in the group’s confrontation with Riyadh. What has unfolded over the past few days marks a clear shift in Houthi escalation. More dangerously, it represents an attempt to impose a new political and security paradigm in the region: an armed group, in control of part of an exhausted and war-torn country, now believes it can dictate who may pass through one of the world’s most vital waterways, and can compel regional states and the international community to accept its terms for safe passage.

The Houthis have mastered the art of asymmetric warfare. The group does not need to close the Bab al-Mandab entirely and may not possess the capacity to keep it closed for long. But it only needs to create uncertainty for insurers to reassess risk, tankers to alter their routes, fuel and shipping costs to rise, and the world to deploy costly warships and air defense systems. With the threat of violence, a dangerous and reckless non-state armed actor can impose enormous costs on the global economy and the regional security architecture, at very little cost to itself.

This is not solely the result of the Houthis’ capabilities; it is also the product of years of international hesitation and miscalculation. Since the Battle for Hudaydah in 2018, the international community has repeatedly signaled to the Houthis that threatening the use of force is more effective than de-escalation and dialogue. Their control of Yemen’s West Coast was viewed as something that could be contained, the buildup of their missile arsenal as part of the balance of forces in Yemen’s civil war, and their attacks on commercial shipping as temporally tied to the war in Gaza, which would halt as soon as the political circumstances changed. None of these estimations was correct.

The Houthis have never regarded the Red Sea as a temporary arena for military activity. They have instead used the strategic waterway as a testing ground for their ability to force the world to negotiate with them and to transform themselves from a local group into a regional actor. The result is that the Houthis have begun to overestimate their own power, a mindset reinforced by an international response that has treated each instance of escalation as an isolated issue instead of confronting the underlying source of threat.

Airstrikes may destroy launch sites and weapons depots, but they have not prevented the Houthis from reorganizing their capabilities. Years of Saudi airstrikes, followed by successive rounds of American, British, and Israeli strikes, have demonstrated that air power alone cannot eliminate a mobile and dispersed threat embedded in rugged terrain and supported by extensive smuggling networks and foreign military expertise. Even US officials have acknowledged that another confrontation in the Red Sea would consume substantial military resources at a time when Washington is preoccupied elsewhere in the region.

Recent reports that Iran had asked the Houthis to close the Bab al-Mandab and deploy missiles and drones in the highlands overlooking Hudaydah and the Gulf of Aden reveal the Houthis’ continued value to Tehran. The group’s military capabilities are the return on a long-term strategic investment, capable of threatening Iran’s adversaries and maritime routes, while allowing Tehran to disclaim direct responsibility.

For this reason, Red Sea security cannot be separated from policy toward Iran. There is no point in international negotiations with Tehran over Gulf security or its nuclear facilities while its capacity to shut the Bab al-Mandab remains off the table. Nor is it acceptable for the security of maritime navigation to become a bargaining chip that the Houthis—or Iran behind them—can repeatedly access for political and economic gains. Allowing this would establish a dangerous precedent: any group that could threaten a maritime chokepoint or disrupt international trade would push for political concessions. And this would not be confined to Yemen – it would encourage other armed groups in the region and beyond to target trade routes and civilian infrastructure to impose their demands.

What is required of the international community now is not just another naval coalition or another round of isolated strikes. What is required is a comprehensive strategy that links the protection of maritime navigation to the source of the threat on land. This means interdicting the flow of missiles, components, and military technology to the Houthis; pursuing financing and smuggling networks; strengthening the capacity of the Yemeni Coast Guard and state institutions; and supporting local forces capable of protecting the coast within a state framework, rather than through temporary or competing military arrangements.

It also means rebuilding the Yemeni political process on a clear foundation: the recent period of relative peace inside Yemen should not distract from the reality that one party continues to stockpile weapons, seize state resources, and use Yemeni territory to participate in regional conflicts. A truce that does not lead to a political transition and the reunification of state institutions does not end the war; it merely puts it on hold until the stronger party decides to resume fighting at a time of its choosing.

Yemenis cannot afford to keep paying the price of conflict. Protecting civilians, maintaining humanitarian assistance, and opening roads and ports are imperatives that must not be used to justify tolerance of the Houthi war economy. The international community must be able to make a distinction between protecting the population and empowering an armed authority that seizes resources and uses humanitarian need as a political shield.

It is still possible to prevent Houthi blackmail from becoming an entrenched system in the Red Sea, but doing so requires the international community to move beyond managing each crisis as an isolated incident. Every time their threats are rewarded, one conviction becomes further entrenched among the Houthis: that the world responds only when its own interests are at risk, and that the fastest way to get what they want is to launch a missile into the Red Sea.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.