The Houthis’ stunning advance down Yemen’s West Coast has put to bed brewing optimism that the group’s star might be fading. Since Emirati troops disembarked from Yemen in December and their local military partners were brought to heel, speculation had grown that pro-government forces, now under Riyadh’s sole sponsorship, would be better organized and coordinated. With a unified political project and military command, it was hoped that the internationally recognized government might retake the military initiative in Yemen.

Such expectations were bolstered when the conflict escalated in July, with airstrikes on Sana’a Airport demonstrating a newfound assertiveness from Riyadh and reorganized pro-government forces showing a greater aptitude for drone warfare. The frontlines held. Economic conditions in the Houthi-held north, already abysmal, had been deteriorating due to a combination of sanctions, declining aid delivery, and interruptions to Iranian oil shipments. With fewer spoils to dole out, the Houthis’ extractive taxation had become increasingly onerous, and their relationships with the tribes, an important source of recruits, had grown troublesome. There were growing public signs of deprivation, and an open question of whether such misery might turn to dissent. As late as last week, government officials publicly announced they had decided to retake the capital from Houthi forces.

Such optimism has surfaced before. Successive US, British, and Israeli airstrikes in 2024 and 2025, and the massive escalation under Operation Rough Rider, were each accompanied by hopes that the Houthis might finally be pushed out of Sana’a. Pro-government commanders toured Western capitals, begging for the necessary material and air support to march north. But each time, a lack of trust, political will, and coordinated strategy nixed the prospect of either a sustained ground offensive or a diplomatic solution. Washington cut its own deal, the Israelis launched retaliatory strikes, and both turned to other priorities.

It seems that this time will be little different. It is now clear that the much-discussed Saudi reorganization of government forces was either insufficient or incomplete. A joint command-and-control center on the West Coast – something that had been discussed for years – was hastily set up in the midst of last week’s fighting. Disregarding the recriminations and finger-pointing now underway, serious problems appear to have existed in coordination and chain of command among various pro-government forces, who, even if they now share a single paymaster, still retain parochial political loyalties. The Saudi-Emirati rivalry had undermined the unity of the internationally recognized government for years, but UAE-backed forces enjoyed battlefield successes against the Houthis, both on the West Coast in 2018 and in Shabwa and Marib in 2022. After last week’s chaotic retreat, there is little expectation that a domestic ground force capable of countering the Houthis will soon reappear.

The Saudis are left with the same problem they had when the war began – how to manage a belligerent and expanding military power on their southern border. As attested by a dozen years of conflict in Yemen, it is not a problem that is easy to solve. For context, the US spent over US$2 trillion on its war in Afghanistan, at one point had over 100,000 troops on the ground, and after twenty years was still unable to forge a viable domestic force to counter the Taliban. Washington disbursed some US$25 billion reconstituting and equipping the Iraqi army in the decade before it collapsed in less than a week to ISIS.

Riyadh has had relationships in Yemen for generations, and likely understands its adversaries far better than the Americans did. Unlike the US, they will never be able to walk away. Perhaps most vexing and disorienting for Riyadh is that in its hour of apparent need, the US administration appears disinterested, both in Houthi attacks on the Kingdom and in the resolution of its destabilizing conflict with Iran and its allies. Saudi ships have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, and its pipelines targeted by Iraqi militias. Riyadh has looked elsewhere for help, but its recently signed defensive alliance with Pakistan and Turkey has yet to become operational.

The Houthis expansion into the Bab al-Mandab is not without precedent – Nasser’s seizure of the Suez was once met with similar paroxysms of horror in the West – along with an abortive military response. But the Houthis’ totalitarian ideology, detention of humanitarian workers, predilection for torture, and widespread use of child soldiers make it difficult for Yemenis or the international community to accept them as a legitimate authority, and the group’s appetite for military escalation and aspirations for domestic supremacy and regional power make them hard for Saudi Arabia to accept as a neighbor.

For now, the conflict between Houthis and Saudi Arabia has yet to escalate to the levels of bloodshed seen before the 2022 truce, and the sides appear to be negotiating the terms of a future relationship through airstrikes and drone and missile attacks. The Houthis are intent on ending what they describe as a Saudi blockade of northern Yemen, which could relieve economic pressure in Houthi-held territories and facilitate arms shipments from Iran. Riyadh is loathe to comply, as this would further entrench the group and expand its military capabilities. The Kingdom must ultimately decide whether it wants to legitimize and empower the Houthis through accommodation and diplomacy, or whether it wants to re-enter a phase of wider conflict against an opponent whose military capabilities are now far more extensive than they were four years ago, and without ready allies or ground forces it can depend on. For too long, Saudi Arabia – and the international community – have tried to have it both ways, creating a steady stream of dashed hopes and Yemeni dead, with no progress toward a sustainable peace.

This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country’s security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.