Tensions Rise Again in Hadramawt
Following women-led demonstrations in Aden and Taiz in May and June, widespread protests erupted in Hadramawt’s capital, Mukalla, on July 28, leading to the storming of a local authority building and the Munawwira electricity plant. The unrest was sparked by severe power outages lasting up to 20 hours a day. Protesters blocked streets, and shops were closed as Hadrami Elite forces fired live rounds to disperse crowds. The Mukalla People and Youth Escalation Committee, which organized the protests, accused Hadramawt Governor Mabkhout bin Madi of corruption and marginalizing locals, demanding his removal under slogans such as “No oil without Hadramawt rights.” The Hadramawt Security Committee, led by Bin Madi, denied reports of casualties during the unrest and blamed “malicious actors” for attacks on security facilities and attempts to disrupt operations at the governorate’s PetroMasila oil refinery.
While neither the Southern Transitional Council (STC) nor the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference (HIC) appeared to lead the protests, both groups sought to capitalize on the unrest. The HIC-affiliated Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), led by Deputy Governor and powerful tribal leader Amr bin Habrish, voiced support for the protests and criticized government corruption, while the STC blamed local and national authorities for deteriorating services. The timing of the protests also coincided with Oman’s increasing political engagement in eastern Yemen and efforts to back allied groups in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra.
The protests soon spread across coastal cities and into Islah-controlled Wadi Hadramawt, where one protester was killed by security forces in Tarim. Security officials warned that Al-Qaeda and Houthi operatives might exploit the unrest to target military personnel. Meetings between local authorities and tribal leaders failed to ease tensions. Several tribal sheikhs submitted a formal letter through the HTA to the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), urging the dismissal of Bin Madi.
As protests continued into early August, Bin Madi faced mounting pressure from the HTA and HIC. PLC members, for their part, remained divided: President Rashad al-Alimi and Othman Mujalli reportedly favored retaining Bin Madi, while former Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani lobbied to reclaim the post, according to government sources. Amid the turmoil, Governor Bin Madi returned to the governorate after months away to restore calm, but local sources said his return was unlikely to produce lasting stability. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula issued an unusual statement praising the protests as an uprising against “US-UAE tyranny,” calling for armed resistance and echoing anti-government and anti-American rhetoric similar to that of the Houthis.
On August 13, Bin Madi met with HTA leaders to defuse tensions, offering cooperation while seeking to consolidate tribal support. Meanwhile, Al-Alimi reportedly accused HTA leader Amr bin Habrish of leading an “armed rebellion” after he appointed new commanders within the group’s military wing, prompting directives to dismantle unofficial checkpoints and seize weapons.
By late August, protests had largely subsided, but grievances persisted. At an August 20 meeting, Bin Madi highlighted recovery efforts, flood response, and plans to restructure the Water and Sanitation Corporation amid ongoing shortages. Water scarcity remained acute in Mukalla, one of the core issues behind the unrest. On August 21, fresh protests erupted in Tarim following the funeral of Mohammed Saeed Yadin, who was killed by security forces weeks earlier, with demonstrators demanding justice.
Veneer of PLC Stability Cracks Again
During the summer, media coverage of PLC head Rashad al-Alimi working from Aden appeared to be part of a coordinated Saudi-UAE effort to strengthen the government following concern over its divisions and ineffectiveness. Al-Alimi had been in the interim capital since June 1, having returned with newly-appointed Prime Minister Salem Bin Breik to unveil a 100-day plan to revive the economy and stabilize the collapsing rial. Most PLC members remained in Riyadh, including STC President Aiderous al-Zubaidi, who was in Riyadh for over a month despite earlier plans to return. Other STC-aligned figures, including Giants Brigades leader Abdelrahman al-Muharrami, were also absent from Aden at this time, suggesting that the STC was under pressure to give Al-Alimi and Bin Breik breathing room to carry out economic initiatives. The STC also refrained from obstructing a July 1 meeting between Al-Alimi and government-aligned Parliament Speaker Sultan al-Barakani at the Maashiq Palace in Aden, where clashes had recently occurred between STC and Presidential Protection forces.
However, the STC rejected Al-Barakani’s plan to send parliamentary committees to assess the performance of local government in PLC-controlled governorates, dismissing it as interference in southern affairs and an attempt to restore central authority. Three parliamentary committees were formed: one for Shabwa, Marib, and Abyan; one for Hadramawt and Al-Mahra; and one for Aden, Taiz, Lahj, and Al-Dhalea. Al-Barakani instructed Prime Minister Bin Breik to facilitate their work. In criticizing the move, the STC called it an attempt to revive a “clinically dead” parliament. Local STC branches, including in Shabwa, echoed the rejection.
This period of relative calm ended in September when Al-Zubaidi refused to accept the replacement of pro-STC Land Authority officials demanded by the head of the Public Land Authority, Thabet al-Awlaqi, seeing the move as an attempt to weaken the STC chief’s position by removing loyalists from the institution. When Al-Awlaqi submitted his resignation, Al-Zubaidi pressured Prime Minister Bin Breik to accept it, prompting Al-Muharrami, the PLC member and Giants Brigades head, to intervene and deploy forces to the Land Authority building. The brief tenure of Al-Awlaqi as head of the Public Land Authority reflects a growing rivalry between Al-Zubaidi and Al-Muharrami. Al-Zubaidi suspended Al-Awlaqi’s new appointments after pressure from close associates, despite an earlier meeting Al-Zubaidi held with Al-Awlaqi on August 4, in which he praised the latter’s reforms. On September 10, Al-Zubaidi issued 11 unilateral appointments, bypassing PLC chief Al-Alimi, who had just returned to Aden again with PLC members Sultan al-Aradah and Abdullah al-Alimi.
Al-Zubaidi’s appointments included deputy and assistant posts across several southern governorates, ministries, and state companies, as well as a new Land Authority head. The next day, he named a new office manager for himself. The STC accused unspecified parties of marginalizing the south through delayed salary payments, arguing this violated the 2019 Riyadh Agreement that ended infighting in southern Yemen. The STC also called on southerners to prepare for November 30 Independence Day celebrations – marking the 58th anniversary of independence from Britain – as a show of strength.
Within the STC, senior figures expressed unease over Al-Zubaidi’s actions, fearing backlash from international partners and the public. On September 15, British Ambassador Abda Sharif warned that divisions within the PLC only benefit the Houthis. Al-Alimi, who was in Doha for a summit on regional tensions following Israel’s strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha, favored a non-confrontational approach, wary that a clash in Aden could reverse recent economic improvements.
Al-Zubaidi has faced mounting pressure over economic decline and political upheaval in STC-held areas, as well as the group’s failure to consolidate control in the eastern governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra. His growing rivalry with Al-Muharrami—appointed an STC deputy president in 2023 and overall head of security in 2024—has added to tensions. On September 17, Al-Muharrami made an apparent jab at Al-Zubaidi by publicly calling for adherence to PLC decision-making procedures, while PLC member Faraj al-Bahsani criticized the council for delaying the adoption of internal bylaws.
Al-Zubaidi’s assertive moves risk reinforcing perceptions of him as a spoiler in an already divided government. His actions could push Saudi Arabia toward reviving the roadmap with the Houthis, who are viewed as more cohesive. Although Saudi- and UAE-backed groups have prepared for potential offensives against the Houthis, none have materialized, leaving the Saudi-led coalition’s intentions unclear. Al-Zubaidi may nonetheless see advantage in this ambiguity, having argued that the West should accept the reality of a divided Yemen—Houthi-run north and STC-run south—a view now echoed by some US commentators.
The crisis over Al-Zubaidi’s September 11 decrees faded into the background following Saudi Arabia’s September 20 announcement of over 1 billion riyals in new government support to stabilize finances through the payment of salary arrears and fuel costs. The announcement emerged after PLC meetings in Riyadh on September 17 and 18, during which PLC chief Al-Alimi reportedly proposed that the PLC’s legal committee vet all decisions before ratification.
Nonetheless, Al-Zubaidi’s actions exposed dissent within the STC. On September 21, STC deputy leader and former Hadramawt governor Ahmed bin Breik called for “a national project” guided by experienced advisers and a clear economic plan. Without naming Al-Zubaidi, he warned that “those who think they can make history alone condemn themselves to irrelevance.” His comments, seemingly reflecting dissatisfaction with STC performance in Hadramawt, may signal internal maneuvering or an attempt to channel growing frustration among southern constituents.
Houthis Continue to Target the GPC
Houthi authorities continue to pressure the General People’s Congress (GPC) in Sana’a. Founded by former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the GPC split during the conflict, with one faction now a formal partner in the Houthi cabinet. Sana’a-based GPC Secretary-General Ghazi al-Ahwal was detained by the Houthis on August 20. Reports indicate the Houthis pressured the GPC to cancel celebrations for its 43rd anniversary, viewing them as rival political activity, and to cut ties with Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, who was sentenced to death in absentia by a Houthi court in July.
The renewed focus on Ahmed Ali follows his efforts to reassert himself as leader of the Saleh family and the GPC after UN sanctions against him were lifted last year. In an August 24 speech marking the party’s anniversary, he criticized the Houthis for obstructing peace and detaining GPC members but avoided reference to his father’s December 2017 killing by the Houthis. Some media described the speech as a “stinging and direct” rebuke. On August 28, the GPC’s Sana’a wing voted to dismiss him from the party. GPC sources in Sana’a fear a broader crackdown if the Houthis perceive the party as a potential fifth column.
Fallout From Taiz Murder Puts Pressure on Islah
The murder of Iftehan al-Mashhari, Executive Director of the government’s Cleaning and Improvement Fund in Taiz, has drawn attention to the issue of lawless military factions operating with impunity in government-held areas (see the Sana’a Center Editorial and Military and Security) and directed public anger toward Taiz local authorities and the Islah party, which dominates Taiz city. Islah has generally avoided taking action against military units engaged in corruption or criminal activity, allowing them to operate unchecked. However, following mounting public pressure following Al-Mashhari’s September 18 assassination at the hands of gunmen linked to senior commanders of the 170th Air Defense Brigade, Islah’s branch in Taiz condemned the murder, calling it a “shocking incident against an innocent woman” and urging security forces to arrest those responsible. An arrest campaign launched in late September failed to stem public anger as protesters demanded the arrest of senior military officials allegedly involved in the incident. Meanwhile, PLC President Rashad al-Alimi, who is from Taiz, commended the Taiz police for the operation that resulted in the arrest of Al-Mashhari’s killer and told the police chief that he should continue investigations until “all wanted people are arrested, state authority is reestablished, and citizens are protected.”
Other Developments
July 3: Houthi forces killed 72-year-old Quran teacher Sheikh Saleh Hantoos after raiding his home in Al-Salafiyah district, Raymah, following a shootout that injured his wife. Houthi authorities banned attendance at his funeral and framed him as a subversive, while many Yemenis and Muslims abroad condemned the killing. Information Minister Muammar al-Eryani criticized the UN envoy for failing to denounce the act.
July 5: Schools in Sana’a held mandatory Ashoura commemorations, drawing criticism from opponents who viewed them as sectarian. Images showed new Husseiniyyat (worship halls) and Shia mourning rituals uncommon among the Yemeni Zaidi sect.
July 9: Former Houthi Foreign Minister Hisham Sharaf was arrested at Aden airport while attempting to flee on a forged French passport. He had maintained ties with both Houthi and anti-Houthi factions. He was later permitted to travel after two weeks; Sharaf then returned to Sana’a in September as part of a deal that saw the Houthis release a Jordanian national, Lana Shukri Kataw, who was among 19 UN staffers detained by the group in late August.
July 15: PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi announced that security forces had foiled an assassination plot against UN Envoy Hans Grundberg by men linked to previous killings in Taiz and Aden.
July 24: Parliament accused Hadramawt authorities and the STC of obstructing an anti-corruption commission, prompting condemnation from the Hadramawt Inclusive Conference.
August 11: The family of Ali Abdullah Saleh held a wedding in Cairo for the former president’s youngest son, Sakhr Saleh, and other relatives, attended by Tareq and Ahmed Ali Saleh.
August 23: Businessman Mohsen al-Attas was released from a prison in Hadramawt after being kidnapped in Marib in March 2024, following tribal mediation between the Nahd and Al-Abidah tribes.
August 28: An Israeli airstrike killed Houthi-appointed Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and ten others who were gathered in a meeting of Houthi-appointed cabinet members and other officials.
September 4: US Ambassador Steven Fagin returned to the US Embassy to Yemen after nearly three months in Baghdad, where he was serving as interim Chargé d’Affaires.
September 10: An Israeli airstrike killed more than 30 journalists in an airstrike on the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Defense. The journalists worked for the 26 September and Al-Yaman newspapers, whose headquarters are located in the Moral Guidance department of the defense ministry.
September 15: PLC chief Al-Alimi attended a Doha summit on Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders; participants urged legal measures against Israeli actions.
September 16: UN Humanitarian Coordinator Julien Harneis announced his office’s relocation to Aden; Yemen’s government urged all UN agencies to follow suit. Several days later, the STC ordered NGOs in the south to register with its authority before quickly rescinding the directive.
September 23–25: A Yemeni delegation led by PLC chief Al-Alimi and STC head Al-Zubaidi attended the UN General Assembly, meeting global leaders and calling for
action against the Houthis.
September 27: Houthi leaders commemorated deceased Hezbollah figures Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine, praising their fight against Israel.
September 28: Reports emerged that the Houthis have held Indian national Anil Kumar Ravindran, a crew member from the sunken MV Eternity Sea, for over 80 days.
September 29: The Houthis abducted teachers’ union leader Abdelqawi al-Kumaim in Sana’a after his activism for unpaid teachers’ salaries.