As a fragile ceasefire takes hold in Gaza, questions are being raised about how it might influence the Houthis’ confrontation with Israel. For nearly two years, these unlikely adversaries have been locked in an unprecedented war of attrition—a conflict that began with symbolic and propagandistic strikes by the Houthis but has since escalated into sustained engagement.
The Houthis have thrust themselves into the Gaza war with growing force, escalating from alleged acts of solidarity with Palestinians to increasingly bold attacks. In response, Israel has expanded its retaliation, from attacks on Yemen’s energy infrastructure, ports, and cement factories to the targeted assassination of Houthi leaders and more sensitive administrative, military, and security targets, resulting in civilian deaths.
Developments in the region have further fueled the conflict. Israel’s confrontation with Iran, the resulting sanctions, its attack on Doha, and the Trump administration’s role in bringing about a tentative end to the war in Gaza all affect the evolution of tensions between Israel and the Houthis. While it remains uncertain how the ceasefire in Gaza will affect the behavior of both parties, the rules of engagement are likely to remain in flux. This article provides an overview of the escalation between Israel and the Houthis over the past two years, highlighting the underlying dynamics fueling this conflict.
From Symbolic Resistance to a Veritable Threat
Just days after the events of October 7, 2023, the Houthis entered the Gaza conflict head-on. On October 19, the group launched several drones directed towards Israel, but the US Navy intercepted these launches. Initially, the attacks were perceived as symbolic and relatively weak, leading many to doubt the Houthis’ actual ability to strike Israel. Their early focus was on the southern port of Eilat, the closest point to Yemen, and the majority of their attacks were intercepted before reaching Israeli territory.
Houthi operations gradually escalated through five distinct phases, during which they developed methods to target both Israel and international shipping. Global powers, including the United States and the United Kingdom, intervened by launching military campaigns against the Houthis, particularly as international attention grew following the seizure of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship on November 19, 2023, and the surge of maritime attacks in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Gulf of Aden. A significant turning point came on July 19, 2024, when the Houthis successfully struck Tel Aviv for the first time with a drone, killing one person and injuring ten. Following the operation, Abdelmalek al-Houthi announced the beginning of a “fifth phase” of escalation against Israel, claiming that this stage would involve more advanced weaponry and combat capabilities.
There is no doubt that the Houthis’ capabilities have significantly evolved since the start of their military operations against Israel. Their attacks have, over time, demonstrated increasing reach and impact. The Houthis appear to have introduced new, more sophisticated weapons than those used initially, announcing the deployment of supersonic missiles and missiles with multiple warheads. On September 7, 2025, in quick succession, they struck the arrivals hall at Ramon Airport in southern Israel, causing minor injuries and a temporary disruption of flights, and hit another target in Eilat, injuring 22 people. These incidents demonstrate a clear transformation, showcasing the expanded reach of the Houthis and the impact of their recent attacks compared to their earlier beginnings. But along with the Houthis’ celebration of each successful attack, anticipated retaliation and an ongoing state of war contribute to Yemen’s increasing economic isolation, exacerbating the humanitarian suffering of its population.
Disproportionate Force, Heavy Costs
Israel commenced operations against Yemen on July 20, 2024, after the Houthis’ deadly attack on Tel Aviv, retaliating with an attack on the port of Hudaydah. At the time, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant stated, “The Houthis attacked us over 200 times. The first time that they harmed an Israeli citizen, we struck them. And we will do this in any place where it may be required.”
Initially, the strikes concentrated on the ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ras Issa. They then expanded to other targets. In December 2024, the Hezyaz and Dhahban power plants were hit. The scope of the attacks widened further on December 29, with a partial bombing of Sana’a International Airport that destroyed the control tower and departure hall. In May, Israel broadened its scope of targets again, striking the Bajil and Amran Cement Factories, which the Houthis used to build tunnels and military infrastructure. Israel then targeted Sana’a airport again, this time disabling most of its facilities, along with three aircraft operated by the Houthis. This came after a Houthi-launched rocket landed at Ben Gurion Airport.
Subsequently, Israel focused on maintaining the gains from its operations. When the Houthis attempted to reopen Sana’a airport, Israel responded on May 28 by destroying their last remaining aircraft. Similar strikes were carried out against ports, power plants, and fuel stations following attempts to bring them back online.
The high cost of Israeli air operations against seemingly low-impact targets in Yemen prompted a shift to more cost-effective tactics. Israel began issuing warnings of impending strikes on the ports of Hudaydah, Al-Salif, and Ras Issa, similar to tactics employed in operations in Gaza and southern Lebanon. By threatening strikes in advance, Israel could maintain a constant threat and disrupt port operations without incurring the expense of repeated attacks. The Israeli navy, a less costly alternative to air power, was first utilized in the conflict on June 10, 2025.
The most significant shift in Israeli targeting patterns, however, was the move from striking infrastructure to carrying out assassinations. This began with the attempted assassination of Mohammed al-Ghamari, the Houthi military chief of staff, on June 14, 2025, followed by an operation that killed the prime minister of the Sana’a-based government, Ahmed al-Rahawi, and at least 11 cabinet members and other officials on August 28. The Houthis initially denied Al-Ghamari’s death until confirmation of his passing on October 16, though it is unclear whether he succumbed to injuries from the June or August strike.
Since the start of its operations, Israel has conducted approximately 20 different strikes. The recent surge in Yemeni casualties indicates that Israel has become less concerned about collateral damage. This is especially evident in the operations conducted in September 2025, which included targeting the Moral Guidance headquarters and launching strikes on the Security and Intelligence Agency sites. Although these strikes were allegedly aimed only at administrative buildings, the number of casualties reported by the Houthis was high. The strikes were carried out in densely populated areas, including the Old City of Sana’a and the Tahrir neighborhood.
A Laboratory for Regional Power Plays
Beyond the Gaza war, other factors have influenced the confrontation. During the outbreak of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, from June 13 to 25, the Houthis shifted their narrative. They became more actively involved in supporting the Iranian effort through attrition and diversionary tactics. Tehran seemingly gained insights from Houthi attacks by identifying gaps in Israel’s air defense system. Yemen’s geographical location offers a unique advantage for testing long-range weapons systems—revealing vulnerabilities that cannot be found using projectiles fired by Hamas, Hezbollah, or even Iraqi groups. Iran also used the Houthis to test new weapons. The Yemeni front has transformed into a veritable laboratory for Iranian capabilities, further integrating the Houthis into Tehran’s regional equation.
There are other examples of Yemen serving as a proxy battleground. On September 10, 2025, Israel conducted airstrikes on Sana’a and Al-Jawf governorate, one day after targeting Hamas leaders in Doha. The Israeli military pointed out that the strike, at a range exceeding 2,350 kilometers, was the longest flight carried out by its air force since the conflict began, and served to illustrate Israel’s capacity to reach anywhere in the region. On September 16, one day after the Arab summit held in Qatar following the targeting of Hamas leaders in Doha, Israel launched raids on the port of Hudaydah. These strikes had no strategic value and were more likely an extension of Israel’s show of force in the region.
No Clear Endgame
As the fragile ceasefire in Gaza takes hold, the contours of the conflict between the Houthis and Israel remain complex. It is unlikely that the cessation of hostilities in Gaza will be sufficient to extinguish the flames of this confrontation.
The Houthis, driven by a perpetual need to bolster their anti-American and anti-Israeli resistance narrative and to evade their domestic obligations, will likely find other justifications to continue the fight. The Iranians, for their part, will seek to maintain the state of tension in Yemen. For them, it is a low-cost arena sustained by revenues from smuggled oil—in which the Houthis have a share—supplemented by Iranian weapons and expertise.
Israel will strive to reinforce its deterrent capacity and protect its borders. Given its hostile surroundings, with adversaries ready to exploit any perceived weakness, Israel will be motivated to prevent other groups from repeating the Houthis’ massive expansion of military capacity.
Compounding this is a complex international dimension and significant new American maneuvers in the region. It is unclear whether these are directed toward a renewed confrontation with Iran, Yemen, or both. The Houthis have crossed a dangerous red line by attacking international shipping lanes—a threat that will not completely vanish even with the end of the Gaza war.
As of now, there are no immediate signs of an end to the chaos in Yemen and the wider region. The crises are intertwined, and the lines between the various fronts are blurred. Without a political solution that addresses the root causes of the conflicts in Yemen and the broader region, this battle remains open to endless possibilities, with no fixed rules of engagement.
This analysis is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace. Any views expressed within should not be construed as representing the Sana’a Center or the Dutch government.