On February 28, the US and Israel began a massive air offensive against Iran, targeting its leadership, command and control, and intelligence sites across the country. On March 1, Iranian media confirmed that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had been killed, by which point airstrikes had expanded to military targets and nuclear facilities, and Tehran had begun to retaliate, firing missiles and drones at Israel, American bases, and neighboring Gulf states.
Some of Iran’s regional allies, the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” have followed it to war, albeit in a limited fashion. The Lebanese military group Hezbollah fired rockets and drones into northern Israel, prompting waves of Israeli strikes. Hezbollah parliamentary leader Mohammed Raad was reportedly targeted and killed in Beirut on March 2, and numerous other Hezbollah positions were struck in the Beqaa Valley, South Lebanon, and southern Beirut. An Iran-supported Iraqi militia, Kataib Hezbollah, claimed attacks on US bases in the country and threatened others in Jordan. Another, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, claimed a drone attack on US forces at the Baghdad Airport.
But Iran’s most powerful remaining ally, Yemen’s Houthi group (Ansar Allah), has so far been quiet. Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi issued a taped statement affirming the group’s solidarity with Iran, but how and whether the Houthis will respond remains an open question. Though Iran has long sponsored the group and is responsible for its acquisition of sophisticated drone and missile technology, the decision will be informed by strategic considerations made in Sana’a as well as Tehran.
The timing and nature of Houthi involvement will likely depend on the duration and intent of the conflict, which began in the midst of US-Iran nuclear talks and with no apparent evidence that Iran was either speeding enrichment or planning preemptive action. Indeed, the administration’s mixed messaging and unclear objectives recall the launch of its aerial campaign against the Houthis last year. It does not appear to have sold the war successfully, either at home or abroad. US President Donald Trump has at times characterized the war on Iran as an emulation of the recent removal of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which left Maduro’s government intact and his vice president in charge. Trump has suggested that he might be willing to talk with Khamenei’s replacement, but also that he hopes for a broader transformation, urging the Iranian people to rise up against their government. The success of such uprisings typically depends on the widespread desertion or defection of a sympathetic military that elects to change sides, but powerful actors like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are unlikely to forfeit their privileged positions. Their units were responsible for the killing of thousands of protestors as recently as January. Trump’s exhortations could end up echoing the fateful suggestion given to the Iraqi opposition after the first Gulf War. What is more, the Iranian opposition is fragmented, and there is no clear answer as to who or what would succeed the current government. Regime change remains a risky business; while a popular uprising is possible, so is a civil conflict.
Iran’s military response has been rapid and expansive, and its public messaging remains defiant. Last year’s confrontation with Israel and the US war made clear the limited effectiveness of its drones and missiles against their air defenses, and widening their scope to softer targets in the Gulf, including energy facilities and oil tankers, allows Tehran to exact a higher cost for US action. Shattering the assumption of safety in financial hubs like Dubai, targeting oil facilities, and closing regional airspace will inflict substantial financial harm, and the US’s Gulf allies could ultimately press for a ceasefire. Closer to home, economic turmoil could raise the ire of a US electorate leery of regional conflict and sensitive to rising gas prices.
It seems probable that Israel, the US, or both will target the Houthis, whether or not the group fires first. But public statements from both Tehran and Sana’a suggest the group may be reticent to get involved. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al-Jazeera explicitly that Iran did not want assistance from allied militias: “We can defend ourselves by ourselves […] We do not want any party to help us in our self-defense.” Abdelmalek al-Houthi noted Iran’s strength in his own speech, and said Iran’s response would be “decisive” without laying out a role for his own forces or threatening a direct response. This stance has precedent in the last war between Israel and Iran. During the 12 Day War last June, the Houthis remained largely on the sidelines, resuming drone and missile attacks on Israel and commercial shipping after the conflict had concluded.
The Houthis are well-positioned to assist if they choose to. The group conducted a series of violent, coordinated attacks on commercial shipping during their Red Sea campaign, in which they attempted to enforce a blockade on Israel on behalf of besieged Gazans, and demonstrated a capacity to reach Israel with drones and missiles. They would be well placed to assist as Iran endeavors to do the same and drive up the material costs of the US-Israeli operations. Some 20 percent of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. If Iran moves to close the strait, the effect would be compounded if the Houthis simultaneously shut the Bab al-Mandab. Shippers are already diverting traffic away from both waterways.
The Houthis seem to be seeking a balance between public loyalty to their Iranian allies and the risk of involving themselves in a conflict from which they have little to gain. The actors’ respective capabilities have also changed since they fought last year. Despite numerous mishaps, US forces exacted a heavy toll on Houthi forces last spring, before an Oman-brokered ceasefire abruptly halted the operation. Israeli strikes caused even greater damage in the summer and fall, destroying the Red Sea port of Hudaydah along with strategic fuel reserves, military installations, and dual-use infrastructure. Israel was ultimately able to target and kill members of the Houthi-appointed government and other senior officials, though not the immediate circle around leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi. This type of intelligence gathering takes time, and there is little doubt that Israel and the US have been trying to acquire such information in the interim. Given their ability to track and locate members of Hezbollah, Iranian leaders, and Al-Qaeda elements in Yemen, it is very possible that their targeting data has improved substantially.
The Houthis’ Red Sea campaign brought the group international fame along with substantial domestic support. These were important as the group sought to legitimize its dominant position in Yemen, where Palestine is a salient political issue, and enabled a massive recruitment drive of new fighters. While Iranian support has been vital to the Houthis’ success and the expansion of military power, the fate of Iran is not a popular cause on par with that of Gaza. Experts have noted that Abdelmalek al-Houthi did not use the religious title “ayatollah” in his message of condolences after Khamenei’s death, and the Houthis themselves follow a different branch of Shi’a Islam. The group has always had a closer affinity, both politically and ideologically, with Hezbollah, a relationship the Iranians encouraged to expand their own influence.
Should the Houthis engage in open hostilities with Israel or the US, it could well put its leadership and military capabilities at risk, but without the benefits in popularity or legitimacy it received in the past. The Houthis are likely also considering their domestic position. Houthi-controlled territories are in the midst of an economic crisis, driven by a combination of sanctions and declining foreign aid. Hunger is rising. The ultimate solution to economic deterioration has long been seen as a negotiated settlement with Saudi Arabia, in which the group would agree to a ceasefire and other terms in exchange for financial support. Talks were halted during the Houthis’ Red Sea campaign, but the group had shown interest in reviving them. But with Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia souring the détente between the two Gulf powers, the “roadmap” is reportedly off the table. Riyadh is consolidating its control over Yemen’s fractious internationally recognized government, its hand now stronger than during negotiations with the Houthis in 2022. The Houthis may see this as a reason to limit their current exposure, as a weakened military would limit their own leverage over Saudi Arabia and reconstituted government forces.
A resumption of Houthi attacks would be no surprise – the group has demonstrated, perhaps above all else, a substantial tolerance for risk. But their calculus should not be conflated with Tehran’s. The group has its own political and economic motivations vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the other Gulf states, and its own points of pressure, including the Iranian oil imports and the Red Sea smuggling networks that sustain what’s left of its dying economy. For now, everything hangs in the balance.