Saudi Arabia is politically and financially exhausted after five years of conflict against the Houthis. Tired of the 200 million Saudi riyal per day cost of the war, Riyadh offered a unilateral cease-fire April 8 and then extended it two weeks later, part of its attempt to pivot to a negotiated solution after continued territorial losses.

One of the most important agreements the Houthis struck was with the Al-Awad tribe, which is large, prominent in the governorate and traditionally hostile to the Zaidi imamate. Sheikh Ahmad Abdo Rabbu al-Awadi is one of the tribe’s most notable members.

On May 11, forces loyal to President Hadi launched a massive military attack against Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in Yemen’s southern governorate of Abyan. The pro-government forces are attempting to seize Zinjibar, the governorate’s capital, which would put them in position to advance toward the interim capital, Aden.

The COVID-19 virus is rapidly spreading in northern Yemen and the response of Houthi authorities – to publicly deny this reality and silence those who contradict them – has ensured vastly more Yemenis will needlessly suffer and die in the months to come. 

In January 2020, demonstrators heckled a delegation of bankers leaving Lebanon’s central bank. What was unique in this situation, however, was the identity of the banking delegation. These bankers were not Lebanese but Yemeni.

In separately defined containment measures, authorities in Sana’a and Aden closed sea, land and air ports as a precaution prior to the April 10 official reporting of Yemen’s first confirmed case of COVID-19. Since then, they have — separately — suspended school and university classes, set up quarantines and imposed social distancing measures.

Kuwait and Oman have carved subtly different niches for themselves in the maelstrom of Gulf politics, in contrast to the muscular approach to regional affairs taken by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Oman, during the long rule of Sultan Qaboos bin Said (1970-2020),

Five years of civil strife in southern Yemen has given rise to southern centers of power, some oriented toward secession and others seeking the semi-autonomy of a federal system. Their views and causes were contained, however, until the dynamics of the current war increased southern autonomy

In the early hours of April 26, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), citing a conspiracy against the southern cause, declared self-governance and a state of emergency across the entire former South Yemen, and called on the masses to rally around its political leadership. The first evidence of the STC implementing its self-rule declaration came at the Central Bank of Yemen headquarters in Aden

It is usually a losing game to predict how many days or years an Arab leader has left in power — even those entering their 80s or 90s. Nevertheless, locally, regionally, and internationally, officials and stakeholders involved in the Yemen file have been increasingly asking in apprehensive whispers: “What if President Hadi dies?”