On July 13, Yemeni government forces, backed by the Saudi-led coalition, reportedly conducted airstrikes targeting the runway at Sana’a Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing, forcing it to divert to Hudaydah. The Houthis swiftly retaliated by launching strikes against Abha Airport in southern Saudi Arabia, marking the most serious escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis since the 2022 truce.

The trigger for the confrontation came on July 3, when an Iranian aircraft transported a Houthi delegation to the funeral of late Iranian Supreme Leader Al Khamenei without authorization from Yemen’s internationally recognized government (IRG). The IRG condemned the flight as a violation of its sovereignty, arguing that Sana’a Airport — reopened for limited commercial flights under the 2022 truce but closed again following repeated Israeli airstrikes — was not authorized to operate flights to Iran. The Houthis, in turn, vowed to end what they call a blockade of their airspace.

Despite the IRG’s offer to facilitate the delegation’s return on a non-Iranian airline, the Houthi delegation chose to coordinate directly with Tehran and return on an Iranian civilian aircraft, operated by Mahan Airlines, designated by the US Treasury Department in 2011 for its connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and for “secretly ferrying operatives, weapons, and funds on its flights.”

The confrontation unfolded against the backdrop of the signing of a US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in June, after which the Houthis intensified their calls for the immediate implementation of the UN-backed Roadmap, announced in December 2023. The MOU itself is currently under threat as Iran and the US continue tit-for-tat military action.

The following analysis presents perspectives from Sana’a Center experts on the significance and potential implications of these developments.

By activating the Yemeni front, Tehran reiterates the strategic value of that pressure lever and signals that attacks on Iran can produce costs elsewhere, particularly for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

The Mahan Air flight saga should be read as an Iranian escalation executed through the Yemeni theater. For Tehran, the dispute over access to Yemeni airspace offered a critical opportunity to restore the southern dimension of its “forward-defense” doctrine – a strategy designed to keep conflict beyond Iran’s borders, but one whose credibility was significantly undermined when Iran faced direct attacks during the war. While the Houthis have since become entangled in broader regional war and confrontation with Israel, they still primarily serve as the southern vanguard of Tehran’s forward-defense strategy, with Saudi Arabia and the Bab al-Mandab as their principal pressure points.

The episode immediately followed Iranian strikes on Jordan and several Gulf states on July 12 — attacks from which Saudi Arabia was conspicuously excluded. The ensuing Houthi-Saudi confrontation, which led to the strike on Sana’a Airport and subsequent retaliatory strikes on Abha Airport, is part of the same broader escalatory campaign pursued by Tehran.

The signing of the US-Iran MOU in June has raised expectations in both Tehran and Sana’a. Iran treated the agreement as a diplomatic success, emerging victorious after having faced an existential threat. Yet Tehran remains deeply distrustful of the United States and views the agreement as a temporary pause before a renewed US-Israeli military campaign. Its leaders have long rejected the prospect of negotiating under fire. Their aim is to retain the initiative, shape the terms of any subsequent negotiation, and ensure that pressure on Iran carries a regional cost.

The strikes on Jordan and Gulf states reinforce Iran’s strategy to put pressure on its neighbors, including states that have maintained workable relations with Tehran, such as Oman and Qatar. This has carried a limited diplomatic cost in the past, evident in the fact that strikes by Iran on its neighbors have remained separate from negotiations with Washington. Most Gulf states still paid their respects to Khamenei and sent delegations to attend his funeral. Tehran may therefore see regional escalation as an effective, low-cost means of pressuring Gulf states into lobbying Washington for a return to de-escalation.

The Houthis are central to this calculation. Their primary role within the “Axis of Resistance” is to counter Saudi Arabia and form the southern buffer for Iran. By activating the Yemeni front, Tehran reiterates the strategic value of that pressure lever and signals that attacks on Iran can produce costs elsewhere, particularly for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

The MOU also increased the scale of concessions the Houthis believe they can demand from Saudi Arabia through the stalled roadmap. They believe they have demonstrated restraint toward Riyadh in two key ways. During the Iran war, when Hormuz was closed, Yanbu became a lifeline for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and the Houthis refrained from strangling the Bab al-Mandab or targeting the port. They also allowed Saudi Arabia to carry out its internal rearrangements in the south without interference after the UAE withdrew. In the view of the Houthis, this restraint entitles them to a substantial political reward from Saudi Arabia, including sanctions relief, progress on the roadmap, and maximum concessions. The US agreeing to lift sanctions and release funds to Iran has further strengthened their belief that comparable concessions for the Houthis are within reach.

Yemen’s government has taken more decisive action than it has in the past. It has escalated its rhetoric, mobilized multilateral channels, and, with Saudi support, struck Sana’a Airport. Yet it is still widely perceived as a government with limited options. For many Yemenis, regardless of political affiliation, the flight saga will register as a display of carefully executed political maneuvering by the Houthis. The Houthis understand the value of such spectacles and remain highly effective at exploiting them.

The IRG will face pressure to demonstrate agency while avoiding steps that could widen a confrontation, particularly if Saudi Arabia remains unwilling to pursue a sustained military campaign. Its room for maneuver will depend on political coordination with Riyadh, control over its own response, and its ability to contest the Houthi narrative without starting a confrontation it cannot carry out alone.

The immediate question is whether the missiles and drones launched toward Abha mark the limit of this episode or the first step on an escalatory ladder. A gradual widening of attacks against Saudi and Gulf assets is the more likely course, while mobilization on Yemen’s internal fronts cannot be ruled out. Combined, this escalation would sharply raise the risk of renewed full-scale war and draw Saudi Arabia into a distraction it is keen to avoid. The Bab al-Mandab remains the highest-value option available to both the Houthis and Tehran, more valuable as a card to wave than to burn. Its closure, particularly while the Strait of Hormuz remains shut, would constitute their most consequential regional escalation.

The Houthis’ retaliation for the Sana’a Airport strike—targeting the regional Abha Airport rather than Riyadh—signals that their immediate priority is not to re-ignite all-out war, but to pressure Saudi Arabia into delivering on the roadmap’s political and economic concessions.

Although the latest escalation in Yemen was triggered by the arrival of two unauthorized Iranian aircraft at Houthi-controlled airports, its real catalyst lies in the US-Iran MOU signed in June and the broader regional context. Since its signing, Houthi media have intensified their rhetoric against Saudi Arabia, demanding the immediate implementation of the roadmap and the fulfillment of political and financial concessions expected from Riyadh.

The MOU is viewed by Iran and its allies as a decisive political victory. Its first provision addressed one of Tehran’s principal demands by explicitly connecting the bilateral ceasefire between the US and Iran to a cessation of military operations in Lebanon. As a result, Iran’s long-standing slogan of the “unity of fronts,” which emphasizes solidarity and mutual defense among members of the Axis, has gained broader recognition, even among its adversaries. Building on this perceived achievement, the Houthis have sought to capitalize on the momentum to secure additional political leverage both domestically and regionally. This escalation also serves as an effective tool for mobilizing domestic support and diverting attention from tribal unrest in Al Jawf and growing public anger over the worsening economic situation in Houthi-controlled areas.

A statement from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the incident supports this interpretation. In the statement, Tehran emphasized its support for implementing the Yemeni roadmap. Likewise, the Houthis’ retaliation for the Sana’a Airport strike—targeting the regional Abha Airport rather than Riyadh—signals that their immediate priority is not to re-ignite all-out war, but to pressure Saudi Arabia into delivering on the roadmap’s political and economic concessions.

Two major obstacles currently impede the implementation of the UN-led roadmap. First, it remains highly unlikely that any settlement with the Houthis can be finalized before a broader regional agreement is reached between Iran and the United States. A premature settlement would hand the Houthis significant political advantages, thereby handing Tehran fresh leverage in its wider geopolitical negotiations. Second, the landing of the Mahan plane represents a dangerous precedent in the use of coercive power. Any concession by Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government in response to such pressure would likely be interpreted as weakness, encouraging further coercive demands and creating a cycle of escalating concessions.

The sequence of recent events ultimately confirms the extent to which the Yemeni conflict has become intertwined with broader regional dynamics. Yemen might have remained a surprisingly quiet front during the broader regional conflict in recent months, but the Iranian flights episode has shattered this fragile status quo, threatening the resumption of war.

Iran’s unusually overt support for the Houthis also sends a direct message to Saudi Arabia: accommodate new political realities through greater concessions or face renewed pressure on your southern flank. Should Yemen slip back into full- scale war, it will serve as an arena for testing the boundaries of Iranian and Saudi competition and defining the rules of their rivalry.

Despite their dogmatic fervor, the Houthis are pragmatic enough to see that Yemen cannot be economically viable for the long term without Saudi support.

The Houthis’ ploy of flying an Iranian plane to Yemen without prior permission from the Saudis and the IRG is an attempt to capitalize on the spectacular Iranian success in repelling the US-Israel offensive. What follows gives us some clues to the real objective. Mobilizing the street for a showdown with Saudi Arabia — a risky tactic that could get out of control and start a full-fledged war — indicates the Houthis’ assessment of their standing in the overall strategic confrontation. The Houthis’ desire to reopen Sana’a Airport and end Saudi control of Yemeni airspace is only a small part of what they hope to achieve.

Their ultimate objective is to secure a deal with Saudi Arabia before an Iranian-US deal. They calculate that when the US and Iran negotiate their deal, Yemen and the Houthis will be on the menu for Iran to trade in exchange for more sustainable concessions in Iraq and Lebanon. An Iranian foothold in Yemen is nearly impossible to defend in peacetime since the instrument of leverage would be development aid, which Saudi Arabia is much more able to provide.

Despite their dogmatic fervor, the Houthis are pragmatic enough to see that Yemen cannot be economically viable for the long term without Saudi support. They seem to be convinced that they can have special relations with Saudi Arabia while keeping their close ties with Iran. This would only be possible if they made a deal with Saudi Arabia before Iran could offer them as a concession to the US. This sense of urgency explains their reckless provocation of the Kingdom at such a critical moment. Their bellicose rhetoric should be taken in this context, not as a threat, but as a desperate appeal to the Saudis to make a deal. However, they haven’t squared the circle with this logic: Saudi Arabia is unlikely to grant them their wish, given that they have proven over the past two years to be untrustworthy.

A prolonged situation of ‘no war, no peace’ has raised public expectations for tangible economic and living improvements, generating growing internal pressure […] reviving narratives centered on the ‘blockade’ and ‘Saudi aggression’ becomes an effective way to restore mobilization and redirect public attention toward an external adversary.

With Iran’s other regional allies weakened, the Houthis have emerged as Tehran’s most valuable piece on the regional chessboard. In this context, the most significant aspect of the Mahan Air flight episode was not that the delegation reached Yemen, but how it returned—and what that choice may have signaled.

Despite the availability of alternative logistical arrangements, the delegation insisted on returning directly to Sana’a aboard an Iranian aircraft. According to the Houthi-appointed Minister of Transport, the Houthis also prepared Hudaydah and Sa’ada airports as contingency options in the event Sana’a Airport came under attack. Iran, for its part, accepted the political and security risks of flying a civilian aircraft and crew into Yemen despite widespread objections.

The incident is difficult to separate from renewed tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the apparent collapse of the US-Iran MOU, and the return of military confrontation. These developments have increased the costs of relying on Hormuz as Iran’s primary instrument of strategic pressure. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become increasingly important by using its Red Sea ports to export large volumes of oil and to facilitate the movement of goods into the Gulf, helping to mitigate the disruption caused by instability in the Strait of Hormuz. From this perspective, Bab al-Mandab—an option repeatedly referenced by Iranian officials in recent months—becomes a more effective alternative for restoring pressure on global energy markets and the Gulf, while placing Saudi Arabia at the center of that equation. This, in turn, enhances the Houthis’ strategic value as the actor best positioned to operationalize it.

From the Houthis’ perspective, however, the calculation extends beyond alignment with Iranian interests. A prolonged situation of “no war, no peace” has raised public expectations for tangible economic and living improvements, generating growing internal pressure on the group. Under such conditions, reviving narratives centered on the “blockade” and “Saudi aggression” becomes an effective way to restore mobilization and redirect public attention toward an external adversary. This may help explain the recent escalation in Houthi political and media rhetoric against Saudi Arabia despite Riyadh’s continued commitment to preserving the current de-escalation. The tensions surrounding the aircraft incident also provide a more credible domestic justification for any future escalation—whether directed at Saudi Arabia or Bab al-Mandab—than framing such actions as support for Iran or the broader “Axis of Resistance.” Slogans such as al-hisar bil-hisar “blockade for blockade” and al-udwan bil-udwan “aggression for aggression” offer a far more effective domestic narrative, presenting escalation as a continuation of a Yemeni conflict rather than an extension of a regional one.

Ultimately, the significance of this flight may lie not in its return of a Houthi delegation to Yemen, but in what it reveals about how both Iran and the Houthis are repositioning their strategic priorities amid a shifting regional landscape. Its declared destination was Sana’a, but its political and strategic messages were directed equally — if not more — toward Riyadh and the Bab al-Mandab.

Airports have been the sites of spectacular attacks in Yemen’s recent history, from the Houthi bombardment of arriving government members in Aden in 2020 to Israel’s destruction of the last Yemenia planes operating from Sana’a last May. The coalition’s high-profile attack on the airport reflects a Saudi insistence on its control over negotiations and an assertion of its preeminent position in dictating Yemeni affairs.

The US-Iran war has upended the Gulf’s security architecture, creating an environment conducive to instability and the renegotiation of relations through violence. The MOU is on the verge of collapse as the US and Iran try to shape negotiations through further strikes. They are not the only ones with this idea. The attack by the Saudi coalition on Sana’a Airport and the Houthis’ retaliatory attack on Abha is the most serious escalation between the two sides in years, illustrating the fluidity and desperation of the situation and the willingness of the parties to press for advantage through military means.

Ongoing US strikes on Iran mirror those Washington conducted against the Houthis in 2024 and 2025 as it sought to limit attacks in the Red Sea – in both cases, they have been successful in diminishing their opposition’s military capacity, but not its political resolve. US negotiations with Iran also have parallels in the protracted talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis – Washington and Riyadh are afraid of entrenching and empowering their respective opponents by removing sanctions and political pressure, but do not want to endure the economic costs of uncertainty and instability associated with open hostilities. Saudi Arabia would like to put the Yemen adventure behind it and pursue development projects; the US is anxious over the rising cost of gas ahead of elections in November.

Across the table, both Iran and the Houthis are desperate for economic respite. The US-Iran MOU would have provided significant sanctions relief for the Islamic Republic; this is still likely to be part of any final deal. Likewise, the Houthis’ prospective deal with Saudi Arabia would entail major economic concessions. Talks have focused on public-sector salaries, including payments to Houthi fighters, and the reopening of ports and airports. Riyadh has allegedly been sending money to Sana’a in exchange for military forbearance – the Houthis have so far refrained from targeting shipping in the Bab al-Mandab and completing the encirclement of Gulf shipping lanes. Until this week, they had not followed Iran in attacking the Kingdom directly.

Buoyed by a defiant Iran and a grateful Saudi Arabia, the Houthis pressed for advantage. If they can reassert control over Yemeni airspace, it would facilitate military, political, and economic links with Tehran and exact an important concession from Riyadh. This would improve their coercive capacity and leverage in further negotiations. The group was also motivated by the deteriorating economic situation in the north, where hunger is on the rise, and its potential to precipitate social unrest, evidenced by recent tribal mobilization in Al-Jawf. The group has pushed a narrative of resistance to foreign occupation since the launch of the 2015 coalition intervention. Extending this to the “blockade” of its airspace resurrects familiar rhetoric while redirecting anger over food shortages toward its northern neighbor, transforming a grievance into a locus of mobilization.

Airports have been the sites of spectacular attacks in Yemen’s recent history, from the Houthi bombardment of government members arriving in Aden in 2020 to Israel’s destruction of the last Yemenia planes operating from Sana’a last May. The coalition’s high-profile attack on the airport reflects a Saudi insistence on its control over negotiations and an assertion of its preeminent position in dictating Yemeni affairs. The Houthis’ calculated response is a warning not to stall talks as the economic situation becomes dire. But it is the Houthis’ willingness to once again jeopardize their negotiations with Riyadh that is most surprising, speaking both to the level of desperation in northern Yemen and to the group’s seemingly bottomless appetite for risk.