In December 2024, the Ministry of Interior of the internationally recognized government (IRG) abruptly announced the launch of an identity card project, which is now mandatory in areas under government control. The project was presented as part of a pathway to modernize public administration and keep pace with technological developments adopted by many other countries around the world. It is one of the most prominent administrative modernization initiatives the government has launched; through it, a modern national identity card will be issued that includes comprehensive biometric data for citizens and advanced technical specifications, replacing the traditional identity card. The initiative, however, hasn’t been without controversy. While it was presented as a bold effort to modernize public administration and digitize data collection, it has generated widespread debate over data protection, digital sovereignty, and national security.

Drawing on official data and information, statements from government officials, interviews with legal and technical specialists and digital security experts, as well as testimony from citizens who have been imprisoned for holding biometric cards, this article examines Yemen’s biometric ID card project to show how an initiative intended to modernize public administration may instead deepen institutional divisions.

An Ambitious Reform

The biometric card system enables identity verification through facial and fingerprint recognition, facilitates passage through electronic checkpoints, and enables various financial transactions. Through this project, the government aims to address deficiencies and gaps in data collection, facilitate statistical tasks, and reduce manipulation, forgery, and corruption, while also developing its digital infrastructure and strengthening its security capabilities. With the government’s launch of the project, the vital data of Yemeni citizens becomes part of the foundational infrastructure of public administration and national security. Accordingly, the biometric card project has become a test of the government’s ability to collect and secure the data of millions of Yemenis, a massive challenge amid security, technical, and digital challenges, weak infrastructure, and political division.

Despite representing a qualitative shift in the trajectory of technological transformation and the digitization of government services in Yemen, the launch of the biometric card project sparked widespread controversy in Yemen’s political, legal, technical, and civil rights circles. Many view it not only as a modernization project but also as a sovereignty issue. Concerns have arisen over the fate of the data of millions of Yemenis and the reliability of the system, particularly following reports suggesting that the biometric card data is stored in a foreign country; that the names and national ID numbers can be easily read using scanning applications available to the general public; and that citizens in Houthi-controlled areas have been imprisoned, arrested, or pursued for holding the card.

Developmental Advantages

The biometric card system represents a technological improvement over the traditional ID card system, particularly in data collection and storage, as well as in the security architecture it provides. It relies on a biometric fingerprint system to record and collect citizens’ data, a system used in many countries worldwide. The term “biometrics” refers to the digital version of fingerprints, iris scans, facial photographs and profiles, and digital signatures. The card contains a smart chip that holds a person’s personal data paired with their biometric information, as opposed to a traditional card, in which identity is determined through visual recognition based on the person’s photograph and the name on the card.^[1]

The new identity card provides numerous services, including network connectivity and the ability to link the ID to a unified national database, preventing duplication and providing a non-repudiable means of identity verification in legal and financial transactions. The initiative also contributes to the digitization of government services in health, education, and finance. In addition, the biometric card can help the government strengthen national security and improve the efficiency of state agencies by limiting the movements of wanted individuals who use false identities and assumed names, and by combating corruption in the administrative and financial sectors by exposing duplication and manipulation in employment records and payrolls. It can also serve to meet international standards in the fields of civil and international aviation and the requirements of international organizations that request biometric documentation and identification.^[2] But despite its technical promise, issuing the new card has intensified institutional fragmentation in Yemen and imposed new burdens on its citizens.

Deepening Divisions

There are now two systems for issuing civil identity in Yemen: the biometric system, used in government-controlled areas, and the traditional identity card system, used in areas under Houthi control. The government requires citizens to obtain the biometric card as a prerequisite for obtaining a passport and travel documents, but the Houthis have warned citizens against the new card, and there are reports of Houthi leaders threatening imprisonment and detention for those who have obtained it. As a result, civil identity has become a source of suspicion across the zones of control. In mid-2025, a teacher by the name of Fahmi Mohammad was abducted at a Houthi-controlled checkpoint in the Hawban area of Taiz^[3] because he held a biometric card, which he had obtained to fulfill travel requirements for a medical trip to Egypt. Fahmi says he spent six months in detention, and the money he was carrying at the time — some two thousand Saudi riyals – was confiscated along with his biometric card. He was also reportedly subjected to repeated interrogations and charged with spying for government forces. His fate remained unknown to his family until a Houthi supervisor contacted his father to secure his release in exchange for a ransom of 700,000 Yemeni rials (old currency), which the family secured by selling gold jewelry. Upon his release, the Houthis refused to return his biometric ID card, alleging that it contained a location-tracking chip, and asked him to obtain a traditional ID card instead, given that he lives in areas under their control.^[4]

His ordeal reflects the scale of the complications facing citizens caught between two different administrative authorities. The practical need to obtain official documents for travel or medical treatment is combined with security or social risks upon returning to Houthi-controlled areas, making the biometric card both an essential document for some citizens but also a potential source of anxiety and danger. At the very time when the biometric card should be obviating many of the difficulties and bureaucratic procedures citizens face, it has reinforced the institutional division in the country.

Switching to the new card can also deprive residents of access to the telecommunications services provided by most companies in the country. Telecom, Sabafon, and Yemen Mobile ^[5] have all refused the new biometric card, and branches in Houthi-controlled areas only accept the old card for services. Some Yemenis say they have found it necessary to hold both the biometric and traditional cards simultaneously, with two national ID numbers instead of one. The difficulties created by the rollout of the new card raise questions about why the government chose to launch the project now.

External Storage

Because Yemen lacks adequate infrastructure to maintain a biometric identity system on its own territory, government authorities contracted with an outside company to establish the system and store data abroad. In a public interview, General Mohammed Baharoon, the Head of Civil Status and Civil Registry Authority, indicated that the service will be provided by a German company specializing in programming, computing, and protection systems, with a number of projects in other Arab countries, including Sudan. The company was selected with a guarantee from the German government. As for how data is stored and where, Baharoon added that the collection of biometric card data is carried out through electronic cloud computing,^[6] that there is a data storage system in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of printing the card and sending it, and that the Kingdom has provided a dedicated building for this purpose. Baharoon also explained the decision to place the biometric card database in Saudi Arabia by pointing to the fact that the system’s equipment requires uninterrupted electricity and other infrastructure, and said that if these became available in Yemen, the government would move the database into the country.

Sovereign and Security Risks

Some government officials have claimed that operating the biometric card system through an external company, and granting it an operational role, gives that company direct access to card data, raising the probability of data leakage. Further, they claim that it fails to guarantee the security and protection of that data, creating serious security risks and risks to personal privacy.^[7] Storing such sensitive data in a foreign country could have serious consequences, including the loss of the state’s sovereignty over its citizens’ data. It also means subjecting Yemen to the privacy laws and legislation of the host country (in this case Saudi Arabia) and the data leaving the state’s control.^[8] This, in turn, means that the biometric data of millions of citizens could be exploited, their personal information easily obtained, and individuals pursued for security and political reasons.^[9]

The Yemeni government has not yet disclosed the nature of its contract with the implementing company, the scope of its operational powers, its ability to access citizens’ data, or the extent to which data protection has been guaranteed. Nor has it disclosed the existence of a legal agreement with Saudi Arabia that specifies the terms, responsibilities, and access rights, or any assurances regarding the Kingdom’s compliance with international data protection laws. The launch of the biometric card project also came without a governing legal framework to guarantee data protection and citizens’ privacy. From a legal standpoint, the issuance of the civil identity card by the Ministry of Interior is allowed under current Yemeni law. Launching a project to collect biometric data and store it abroad, however, requires supporting legislation. According to Articles 50, 51, and 52 of Law No. 13 on the Right of Access to Information: “every citizen has the right to the protection of their personal data.” Any process of data collection or processing of biometric data must therefore be subject to clear legal parameters that guarantee citizens’ constitutional rights and ensure accountability in the event of a breach.^[10]

Storing biometric card data in a foreign country could also make it vulnerable to cyberattacks and breaches during the transfer of data between the two countries.^[11] Privacy risks could reportedly be further compounded by the technical vulnerabilities in the biometric card, as specialists say that data such as the cardholder’s name, mother’s name, and national ID number could possibly be read using scanning applications available to the general public. According to digital security specialists, the readability of biometric card data through publicly available scanning applications constitutes a vulnerability that transforms the biometric card from a “privacy document” into a “public notice.” In line with international digital security standards, biometric card data should be protected such that it only appears when scanned by a device or application holding an access license from the Civil Status Authority.^[12]

Conclusion

Amid Yemen’s political and administrative division, fragile security situation, and poor regulatory environment, the biometric card project has become a sensitive issue. Beyond its contribution to deepening institutional division, the project could threaten citizens’ privacy, rights, and personal safety. In principle, the project represented a step toward modernizing the systems and services offered by the government. However, the launch of the biometric system has contributed to deepening institutional division in the country, as it is only recognized in government-controlled areas.

Caught between competing jurisdictions, the biometric system has exposed citizens to security risks, imprisonment, and detention. Rather than serving as a tool of state building, the identity card has become another illustration of how it is Yemenis who ultimately pay the price for Yemen’s growing divisions.

This article is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The series explores issues within economic, political, and environmental themes, aiming to inform discussion and policymaking related to Yemen that foster sustainable peace.