The Southern Transitional Council Returns to the Political Scene

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is making its way back to the center of Yemeni politics, following its disastrous attempt to seize control of Hadramawt last December. Despite the group’s official dissolution and the exile of its leader, Aiderous al-Zubaidi, it retains substantial domestic support, both among the public and among affiliated armed forces. The group has reopened local party headquarters across the country, organized numerous rallies in support of southern secession, and become increasingly critical of the role played by Saudi Arabia, which has been reorganizing pro-government forces and co-opting military units in an attempt to reduce the group’s power. The popularity of STC rallies and its ability to drum up anti-Saudi sentiment have likely been bolstered by the ongoing electricity and fuel shortages in government-held territory and the indefinite postponement of a promised Southern Dialogue in Riyadh to address the longstanding grievances and political aspirations of the South. Saudi attention is now firmly elsewhere, but southern resentment continues to fester.

The group’s political remobilization has not been without incident. On April 1, STC loyalists disrupted a rally in support of Saudi Arabia in the coastal city of Mukalla, leading to clashes between demonstrators. The situation escalated further on April 4, after dozens of STC loyalists took to the streets of Mukalla, raising the southern flag and displaying images of Al-Zubaidi, despite the deployment of security forces across the city and official warnings against public gatherings. Subsequent clashes left at least two STC supporters dead.

On April 1, thousands of protestors forcibly reopened the STC General Assembly building in Aden, which government forces had shut, and officials affiliated with the group have resumed holding regular meetings there. Meetings have also continued at branch headquarters in Lahj, Abyan, and Al-Dhalea. Al-Zubaidi is believed to be in the UAE, the group’s longtime sponsor. It has been speculated that his presence has not been confirmed because it could create a headache for his hosts, who could be accused of harboring an international fugitive – Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused Al-Zubaidi of high treason in January.

At issue is not just the STC’s stated political ambition of a revived southern state, but also the resources it controlled through its various military branches. In Al-Dhalea, Al-Zubaidi’s home governorate and a center of STC support, armed STC loyalists stormed the local authority headquarters on April 19, after Governor Ahmed al-Qubba ordered the dismantling of checkpoints run by STC-aligned forces that were collecting illegal tolls. The local military leadership also met in the governorate and reiterated their refusal to cooperate with government efforts to restructure their forces (see Military and Security). It is not clear whether the group is still receiving funding and support from the UAE, or to what extent, but Saudi Arabia’s rationalization and reorganization of government forces – and its payment of military salaries – represent a major institutional hurdle to the STC’s reconstitution as a serious political and military force. Conversely, if the situation is mishandled, it could lead to further mobilization. The Southern Resistance movement that emerged in 1994 was founded on a similar grievance – the reorganization of forces after the civil war saw many southern soldiers laid off or marginalized as the military was restructured.

In search of support, the STC sent a delegation led by Amr al-Beidh to the United States, where they met with US government officials and representatives from right-wing, pro-Israel think tanks. During a gathering of US-based STC supporters, Al-Zubaidi was patched in by phone and, in a brief statement, vowed to continue pursuing the Southern Cause. The group has repeatedly billed itself to the West as a bulwark against Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in Yemen, and willing to normalize relations with Israel, in line with its Emirati allies.

The STC’s continued popularity at home, at least in its traditional areas of support, is evident. Thousands of people rallied in Al-Aroudh Square in Aden’s Khormaksar district to mark the May 4 anniversary of the STC’s founding. The group subsequently announced that it would change its name to the Arab South Transitional Council, in line with its vision for the separate southern state of South Arabia. In a speech marking the event, Al-Zubaidi called for peaceful resistance, but also warned that southern armed groups should not be dissolved, saying they were the only guarantor against terrorism and that the Southern Cause must be dealt with in a way that meets the aspirations of the southern people.

Faced with mounting mobilization, the government has sought to financially constrain the STC. On June 17, the government’s Attorney General, Qaher Mustafa, issued a precautionary freeze on all STC funds and accounts at banks, money exchange shops, and other financial institutions (see The Economy). Yemen’s Representative to the United Nations, Abdullah al-Saadi, called on the Security Council to include Al-Zubaidi on its sanctions list for obstructing a political settlement. STC spokesman Anwar al-Tamimi described the measures as a preparatory step by Riyadh to facilitate an agreement with the Houthis.

The group’s agitation has nevertheless continued. On June 20, supporters organized fresh demonstrations in Aden and Hadramawt in opposition to what they described as Saudi “guardianship” and “occupation.” STC leaders have openly challenged Riyadh: the head of the group’s Al-Dhalea branch, Abdullah Mahdi, declared, “You have weapons, and we have weapons. You have armored vehicles, and we have armored vehicles…”

With Saudi Arabia now preoccupied with Houthi escalation, it remains unclear when or whether the Southern Dialogue will occur. The restructuring of pro-government military forces is a complex political undertaking, and service provision in government-held areas has deteriorated as supply chain disruptions have simultaneously driven up import prices. Without sustained support and attention from Riyadh, all augur the continuing mobilization of the STC.

Prisoner Exchange On Hold

On May 14, Houthi and government representatives signed an agreement for the largest prisoner exchange in the conflict’s history, following 14 weeks of negotiations in Amman. The deal will involve 1,680 total detainees, with the Houthis agreeing to release 580 prisoners, including seven Saudis and 20 Sudanese nationals, in exchange for 1,100 Houthi-affiliated detainees held by government forces. As with previous exchanges, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will oversee implementation. The last exchange occurred in April 2023, when the two sides agreed to release nearly 900 prisoners. The UN released a statement attributable to Secretary-General António Guterres, congratulating both sides on reaching a deal and urging them to work toward implementation as swiftly as possible.

Despite initial enthusiasm for the deal, the agreed exchange date has now passed amid recriminations from both sides. The Houthis’ escalation in the Red Sea has cast a further pall over the negotiations. The swap has been postponed indefinitely, though the UN has said both sides remain committed to its completion.

Early pronouncements about the deal were positive. On May 21, the head of the Houthis’ National Committee for Prisoners and Missing Persons, Abdelqader al-Murtada, stated that an agreement had been reached and was scheduled to be implemented on July 10. He said that the largest number of prisoners would be released from fronts near Marib, followed by those held in Saudi prisons, the southern fronts, coastal regions, and Taiz. Al-Murtada called the deal a major humanitarian step that could pave the way for further progress on the issue.

But familiar issues quickly complicated the deal. The fate of senior Islah figure Mohammed Qahtan, who was forcibly disappeared in 2015, has been a sticking point for the government’s Islah Party in successive rounds of prisoner-exchange negotiations. In an attempt to address these concerns, a sample from human remains that the Houthis claim belong to Qahtan was sent abroad for independent examination. Islah Party officials ruled the case inconclusive, saying the remains were incomplete.

Qahtan was detained in February 2015 in Dhamar while traveling to Aden to join President Hadi, who had fled there from Sana’a. He was placed under house arrest until April 5, when plainclothes gunmen removed him to an unknown location. One of Yemen’s most prominent political figures, Qahtan held several positions within Yemen’s Islamist movement and fought on the government’s side against the leftist National Democratic Front until the early 1980s. He joined the Islah Party when it was established in 1990 and subsequently served as head of the party’s political department. Alongside other opposition leaders, he helped establish the Joint Meeting Parties in early 2003, the most significant opposition coalition in Yemen’s modern history. The wait for the examination results, along with the tense security situation, has delayed the implementation of the exchange. As in previous negotiations, both sides used the delay to point fingers at one another.

Rumors that individuals implicated in political assassinations and terrorist attacks would be included in the swap also drew criticism across government-held areas. The most contentious included suspects in the March 2022 killing of senior military commander Thabet Jawas, regarded in some quarters as a national hero because of his association with the killing of the founder of the Houthi movement. Tribesmen from Radfan, the area to which Jawas belonged, traveled to Aden under the stated justification of preventing the release of those accused of assassinating him. Members of the Radfan tribes reportedly met in Aden on July 8 and called for a march toward Aden. Armed men loyal to the STC joined the mobilization, and participants headed toward Khormaksar district’s Al-Aroudh Square. The crowds withdrew the following day after receiving assurances that the suspects would not be released.

Tribes Rally in Al-Jawf

In late June, the Al-Rayyan area in Al-Jawf governorate witnessed the start of one of the largest tribal gatherings Yemen has seen in recent years, prompted by tribal sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham’s call for tribes to rally in his support in protest of violations he said were committed against him by the Houthis.

A month earlier, a woman claiming to be Mira Saddam Hussein, the daughter of late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein sought refuge Bin Fadgham, cutting a lock of her hair, a Yemeni custom by which a woman appeals for protection or protests injustice. It subsequently becomes the duty of the person she has turned to, and of his tribe, to protect her. Bin Fadgham accompanied her to Sana’a to resolve her dispute with the Houthis, in which she claimed that Yemen’s most famous arms dealer, Houthi-aligned Fares Manea, had confiscated her villa along with documents proving her identity. Manea was compelled to make a rare public appearance to deny the claims.

The Houthis subsequently arrested the pair and imprisoned them in Sana’a. But the detentions sparked such social media backlash that the Houthi-affiliated Ministry of Interior released an official statement denying the woman’s claims, and Houthi authorities published a DNA test purporting proof that she was a Yemeni citizen, registered as Sumaya Ahmed Mohammed Issa al-Zubairi.

Bin Fadgham was subsequently released through tribal mediation, but the woman remained in custody. He departed Houthi-controlled territory for areas belonging to the Bani Nawf tribe, requesting their protection and support in pressuring the Houthis to release the woman and to restore his honor against those who had allegedly insulted and threatened him during his imprisonment. The dispute, which had become a media sensation, escalated further after Bin Fadgham declared a tribal nakaf, a call to mobilize and rally other tribes in his support. The Al-Rayyan area in Al-Jawf subsequently saw thousands of tribesmen respond to the call.

The gathering soon took on a political dimension, as political parties began to co-opt the event as a stage to challenge Houthi authorities. Islah-affiliated media outlets took a particular interest in covering the event and rallying their loyalists. Houthi leader Mohammad al-Bukhaiti accused Riyadh of inciting the participants to evade its commitments to peace in Yemen. For his part, Bin Fadgham stated that he had no political motive and did not wish to see his cause politicized.

The massive outpouring of support for Bin Fadgham, in defiance of Houthi authorities, is rare. Tribal mobilization is relatively common in disputes with governing authorities, but not on this scale, and its popularity could reflect broader tensions over how the Houthis deal with the tribes. There have been other protests against the conduct of Houthi authorities this year, though none so large. In early February, the Al-Fadel family, who hail from central Yemen, called a similar tribal nakaf, giving the Houthis a week to release two prisoners who had been illegally detained for more than 12 years. The two men were subsequently released. In June, after the Houthis arrested Saif al-Shahari, his brother, Abdelhamid al-Shahari, appeared in a now-deleted Facebook post threatening tribal escalation and accusing the head of police intelligence, Ali Hussein al-Houthi, of thuggery. He subsequently announced his brother’s release and thanked the Houthi leadership for intervening. Abdelhamid recently appeared in Tehran, taking part in the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei’s condolence ceremonies as part of the Houthi delegation, in what appeared to be an effort to appease him and to avoid managing multiple ongoing disputes with the tribes.

The Houthis certainly see the Al-Rayyan gathering as a threat to their position in Marib and Al-Jawf, and have mobilized significant reinforcements to the area. The Houthis have also mobilized leaders from the Arhab tribe, to which they claim the woman belongs.

The Al-Rayyan gathering also manifested its own divisions, and as the weeks wore on, disagreements emerged among the organizers. Tensions rose after Bin Fadgham proposed establishing an alliance of Yemeni tribes that would collect donations through Al-Kuraimi Bank. Tribal leaders rejected the proposal on the grounds that the stated purpose of the nakaf was not to establish an alliance or collect donations. Al-Kuraimi Bank also reportedly rejected the proposal to use one of its accounts for this purpose, stating that a personal account could not be used to manage activities involving such large sums. The incident was used by opponents to discredit the nakaf and imply that Bin Fadgham aimed to profit from it. One of the principles governing a nakaf under tribal law is that participating tribes should provide for their members.

Matters became worse after a series of voice recordings attributed to Bin Fadgham spread through the camps, in which he allegedly called on tribesmen to mobilize toward Al-Yatama in Khabb wa ash-Sha’af district to confront Houthi forces. Bin Fadgham denied the recordings’ authenticity. On July 14, unidentified gunmen attempted to assassinate tribal sheikh Hussein al-Salahi al-Yafaei, a day after he delivered a speech at the camp in which he was reportedly highly critical of several parties.

It is unclear how long the gathering can continue, or what action the assembled tribes will take if their demand for the woman’s release is not met. There appears to be no clear plan, and Bin Fadgham has said any decision must await the completion of the tribes’ arrival and a decisive, final joint declaration. But the confluence of thousands of armed men, the Houthis’ reinforcement of nearby frontlines (see Military and Security), and regional escalation have all raised concerns about the future of the nakaf and the potential for violence.

Other Developments in Brief

Deadly Floods

Heavy rainfall that began in late March triggered deadly flooding across the country, with 24 people reportedly killed in Taiz. Estimates indicate that around 84,000 people have been affected, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs), in flood-prone areas. Flooding has also damaged agricultural land, crops, and livestock, while contaminating water sources due to runoff and compromised sanitation systems.

Houthis Continue Espionage Trials

On April 29, the Houthi-run Interior Ministry released new purported confessions from members of an alleged espionage network working on behalf of the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. According to the statement, the network was involved in gathering sensitive information and identifying the coordinates of key civilian, security, and military sites, which it claims enabled airstrikes that resulted in casualties. On May 17, a Houthi-controlled court in Sana’a sentenced 19 people to death and issued prison terms for nine others in a case involving 28 defendants accused of aiding the Saudi-led coalition and forming an armed group linked to Al-Qaeda. The defendants were accused of joining training camps in Al-Dhalea and Al-Makha between 2015 and 2023 and carrying out attacks against civilians and security forces. On June 28, the Specialized Criminal Court in Sana’a held hearings in two major espionage and security cases, involving death sentences against 52 defendants. One case involved alleged collaboration with British and Saudi intelligence, the other, assassinations and bombings in Dhamar.

Assassinations in Aden

Wissam Qaid, Acting Executive Director of the Social Fund for Development (SFD), was assassinated in Aden on May 3, in a shocking attack felt throughout the development and humanitarian community. Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani announced an investigation into the murder, and UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg said Qaid’s legacy would carry on while calling for accountability. Qaid was reportedly abducted near his home and then killed elsewhere. Qaid’s murder came on the heels of the assassination of Abdelrahman al-Shaer, Chairman of the Board of Al-Nawras Model Schools and an important figure in the Islah party. Al-Shaer was reportedly shot in his car in Aden while on his way to work.

New Political Initiatives in Hadramawt

On May 14, PLC member and Hadramawt Governor Salem al-Khanbashi attended a military parade in Seyoun set to coincide with a newly announced set of administrative and military measures that Al-Khanbashi said would “strengthen security and stability in the governorate.” Among the proposals was the creation of a joint command and political body, the Supreme Coordinating Council for Hadrami Forces and Constituents, intended to bring together local tribal, political, military, and social voices under a single Hadrami umbrella. Similar groups have been proposed by governors of other southern governorates, such as Abyan and Shabwa, as part of a broader Saudi-backed effort to weaken the STC’s power in the south. In recent years, Riyadh has repeatedly attempted, with limited success, to create alternative political blocs in Hadramawt, including the Hadramawt National Council, launched in 2023. On May 16, the head of the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), Amr bin Habrish, held a virtual meeting with commanders from the HTA’s military wing, the Hadramawt Protection forces. During the meeting, Bin Habrish declared that the governorate was entering a “new phase,” focused on security, stability, and efforts toward self-governance. Bin Habrish – once a radical proponent of self-rule in Hadramawt under his leadership – framed this new phase as a project to be coordinated with Saudi Arabia and led by Governor Al-Khanbashi. However, Bin Habrish is now in Saudi Arabia, and there have been conflicting reports over whether he is being prevented from leaving the Kingdom.

Former President Hadi Dead at 80

On May 28, former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi died in Riyadh. A longtime military officer who fled South Yemen after the 1986 Civil War, Hadi was appointed Vice President by President Ali Abdullah Saleh following the 1994 Civil War, in which Hadi had sided with pro-Saleh forces. He was elected interim president in an uncontested vote during Yemen’s political transition following the 2011 uprising, but was forced to flee the country after the Houthi takeover of Sana’a. Following the 2015 Saudi-led military intervention, Hadi remained president but spent most of his time in Saudi Arabia. He resigned and transferred his executive authority to the Presidential Leadership Council in 2022 following an inter-Yemeni dialogue in Riyadh. Dozens of Yemeni political figures and foreign leaders offered their condolences for his passing, and the government declared a period of national mourning. Hadi was buried in Riyadh.

Aden Hosts Decentralization Conference

Aden hosted the “Partnership and Integration Conference between the Government and Local Authorities,” which concluded its work on June 16. In his opening remarks, Prime Minister Shaya al-Zindani said that the conference aims to correct relationships and repair past imbalances between the central government and local authorities, in accordance with the constitution and the law. He added that resource management is the core issue, as some governorates have exceeded their financial and administrative authority and exploited the conditions the country is going through.