The drastic decision to dissolve the Southern Transitional Council (STC) raised fears that Yemen would fall into a familiar cycle: defeat and marginalization of an important constituent of the political body, producing long-lasting, deeply held grievances.
One such cycle started immediately after Southern independence. The defeat and banishment of the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY) in 1967 continued to disrupt South Yemen’s stability and frustrate its development throughout the seventies. This culminated in the fateful civil war of January 13, 1986, which resulted in the defeat and marginalization of a political bloc dominated by the Abyan-Shabwa elites, who fled to North Yemen along with nearly one hundred thousand of their followers and were incorporated into the northern armed forces.
A mere three years later, elites from the Al-Dhalea-Lahj-Yafea Triangle, then in control of a much weakened southern state, received another major setback with the collapse of their Soviet backers. They acceded to a long-held ambition for the reunification of Yemen and agreed to merge into a single centralized state, heedless of the risk that the north might dominate the much smaller population of the south. On May 2, 1990, North Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of the unified state, and Ali Salem al-Beidh, the Secretary General of the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), which ruled South Yemen, became vice president.
But the bright prospects of unified Yemen were savagely dimmed by another cycle of conflict, defeat, and marginalization. The spring of 1991 saw a campaign of assassinations and terror against top YSP leaders of the Socialist Party, dealing a mortal blow to the project of unification. By 1994, the party had organized not just to defend itself, but also to renegotiate the terms of the merger. The stage was set for war.
The 1994 war was brief – two months and three days. At first, the southern army held the line. However, eyewitnesses and participants noted that many units lost the will to fight when Al-Beidh declared secession. Southern jet fighters dropped their ordnance in the mountains at a safe distance from the forces of the central government. The southern street was still pro-unity, and so were the armed forces.
The defeat of the southern army was not, in itself, catastrophic; the catastrophe was what followed. The losing faction of 1986, organized into part of the northern army named the “Unity Brigades“ and led by General Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, spearheaded the march on Aden and defeated its opponents from 1986. The looting, banishment, and marginalization that the losing side suffered left deep scars, and the cycle of grievance was repeated.
After a short while, cooler heads called for national reconciliation, and a national consensus formed around the need to reintegrate the losing side and address southern grievances, as far back as the peasant uprisings and broad nationalizations of the early seventies. However, Saleh had other plans. The war had been good for his regime. Before it began, Al-Beidh had been wildly popular in the north, much more so than in the south, as a leader withproven patriotism and integrity, having agreed to become a vice-president for the sake of unity. He was winning the popularity contest over Saleh. But the declaration of secession reversed that. Saleh emerged as the sole defender of unity and saw that “defending unity” could be used as a rhetorical weapon to silence the opposition and stay in power. So despite paying lip service to reconciliation, Saleh ensured that it would never happen. He chose General Hadi, the sworn enemy of the YSP, as his vice president and put him in charge of the integration of officers from the southern army. Hadi’s faction worked to become the sole representative of the south.
This monopoly of southern representation by one faction led to the founding of the Southern Hirak in the late 1990s, the peaceful protests that started in 2007, and the formation of the STC in 2017. The cycle closed with STC’s claim to be the sole representative of the south and its ill-conceived attempt to control the eastern governorates, followed by its dissolution in January 2026.
The ongoing restructuring of the leadership and the cabinet of the internationally recognized government will tell us whether another cycle of conflict will be triggered. Thankfully, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi’s recent appointments of former Defense Minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi to the PLC and Shaya al-Zindani as the new prime minister are promising signs that the lesson of history has been learned. Al-Subaihi is a suitable substitute for the ousted President of the STC, Aiderous al-Zubaidi. Hailing from Al-Sabbayha district of Lahj and enjoying broad popular respect as a war hero and a national leader, he is trusted by the southern and northern streets alike. Similarly, charging Al-Zindani to form the next cabinet was an astute choice. As the first-ever prime minister from Al-Dhalea, his appointment assures that the governorate will not be marginalized after Al-Zubaidi’s departure.
The breaking of this cycle of conflict and the integration of the losing faction are the best pieces of news I have heard in a long time. Such wisdom is needed for the country to exit the dark tunnel of war and division that has taxed the Yemeni people for over ten years.
This commentary is part of a series of publications produced by the Sana’a Center and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Reimagining Yemen’s Peace in the Regional Landscape program. The series seeks to bolster peacebuilding efforts in Yemen by strategically examining the country’s security and economic ties with the broader Gulf and Red Sea region.