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Political Developments in Hadramawt and Southern Yemen
Political tensions in Hadramawt intensified over the course of the fall, as the rivalry between the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the UAE, and the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA), led by Amr bin Habrish, escalated into crisis. At the end of November, public statements by STC figures framed the council as the only legitimate representative of southern political aspirations and rejected the authority of rival Hadrami political formations. STC rhetoric increasingly emphasized southern self-determination and portrayed other local autonomy initiatives, such as those led by Bin Habrish, as illegitimate. The governorate was already on edge. In late July, longstanding grievances over poor governance, including chronic power outages, culminated in the storming of a local authority building and the Munawwira electricity plant in Mukalla. Though neither the STC nor Bin Habrish appeared to be behind the protests, both camps tried to capitalize on the unrest. The HTA voiced support for the protests and criticized government corruption, while the STC blamed local and national authorities for deteriorating services.
Bin Habrish responded to the STC’s late November escalation by mobilizing tribal leaders, calling for unity among Hadrami constituencies and appealing to regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, to intervene. Bin Habrish was able to tap into long-standing grievances over governance, control of natural resources, and the delay in appointing a new governor for Hadramawt.
The dispute over the governorship became a focal point of political contention. Although the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) agreed in principle to appoint Deputy Prime Minister Salem al-Khanbashi to replace embattled governor Mabkhout bin Madi, regional disagreements—particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE—delayed confirmation. This paralysis reinforced perceptions of institutional weakness within the internationally recognized government and highlighted the degree to which external actors shape Yemeni political outcomes.
As the crisis unfolded, the STC portrayed its actions as part of a broader political project to consolidate its control of the south ahead of symbolic milestones, including the anniversary of Britain’s withdrawal from South Yemen on November 30, 1967.
The PLC struggled to assert its authority. Al-Alimi called for restraint, but this was widely seen as reactive and ineffective. The government’s inability to prevent unilateral action by one of its own members (STC chief and PLC member Aiderous al-Zubaidi) underscored deep fractures within the executive power-sharing arrangement established in Riyadh in April 2022.
In early December, STC forces advanced into the eastern governorates of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, triggering both a domestic political crisis and a regional confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE (see Military Section). Riyadh publicly reaffirmed its commitment to Yemeni unity and expressed concern that the STC’s unilateral actions undermined both the peace process and Saudi security interests. Abu Dhabi, while denying direct involvement, continued to back the STC’s southern project.
International actors, including the UN Security Council, the United States, European states, China, and regional powers such as Egypt and Turkey, repeatedly emphasized their support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty and a negotiated political solution. UN officials warned that unilateral moves risked derailing any prospects for peace and further weakening already fragile state institutions.
Within Yemen, the STC leveraged its momentum to strengthen its political position. Its leadership held executive meetings, courted ministers and governors, and advanced new institutional initiatives, including economic reforms and proposals for independent southern religious and administrative bodies. These steps, which occurred against the backdrop of pro-secession demonstrations in Aden, were widely interpreted as efforts to normalize de facto southern governance and marginalize the remaining state institutions.
Opposition forces, including the Islah party and advocates of Hadrami autonomy, viewed the developments as a significant threat. Although Bin Habrish briefly disappeared from the scene when STC forces overran the governorate, his calls for Hadrami self-rule and local control over resources continued to resonate.
By late December, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over Yemen had become overt, with Riyadh taking decisive military action against Emirati influence and reaffirming its red lines in Hadramawt and Al-Mahra. These moves, including backing the Nation’s Shield forces to retake Hadramawt and Al-Mahra and launching airstrikes against STC and UAE positions and equipment, marked a turning point in Gulf relations and reshaped the political landscape of southern Yemen.
On December 30, Bin Habrish reportedly met with PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi and newly-appointed Hadramawt Governor Al-Khanbashi in Riyadh, where the tribal leader was taking refuge following his forces’ temporary defeat. The visit was widely viewed as part of political efforts to rally Saudi-backed Hadrami figures and push back against the STC’s expanding influence in eastern Yemen.
The following day, in response to the Saudi airstrikes and Al-Alimi’s cancellation of a defense agreement with Abu Dhabi, the UAE began a formal withdrawal from Yemen, ending a decade-long military presence. Abu Dhabi had already reduced its footprint in 2019 following a strategic reassessment after the Stockholm Agreement, while maintaining limited involvement in southern governorates and on islands such as Socotra. Yemeni government officials stated that Emirati personnel were departing the country, marking a significant political shift in regional involvement in Yemen.
On January 2, Governor Al-Khanbashi announced the start of a formal handover of STC positions to the Saudi-backed Nation’s Shield forces, presenting the move as a restoration of state authority as they advanced and took control of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra. On the same day, at Al-Alimi’s request, Saudi Arabia announced it would host a comprehensive South-South Dialogue in Riyadh to address southern grievances and political aspirations. The initiative received broad regional and international support, including conditional approval from the STC. At the same time, Bin Habrish returned to Hadramawt and addressed his supporters, reaffirming his role in the governorate’s future alongside Saudi-backed structures.
On January 4, UAE-backed PLC members Abdelrahman al-Muharrami (Abu Zara’a) and Tareq Saleh traveled to Riyadh for meetings with Saudi officials, in response to a summons by the Kingdom, as it sought to cement control of the situation in southern Yemen. In contrast, the two other Emirati-backed members of the PLC, STC leader Al-Zubaidi and former Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani, declined the Saudi invitation, deepening political tensions.
Saudi Arabia claimed that Al-Zubaidi had aborted plans to travel to Riyadh and subsequently went into hiding, intensifying speculation about his political future. On January 7, the PLC formally expelled Al-Zubaidi from the council and charged him with high treason, accusing him of undermining the southern cause and state authority. Aden’s pro-STC Governor Ahmed Lamlas, who reportedly fled with Al-Zubaidi, was replaced by Saudi-aligned Abdelrahman Sheikh. On the same day, the STC announced the closure of its offices in Yemen and abroad.
The whirlwind changes that emerged from the STC’s failed takeover of Hadramawt and Al-Mahra have greatly bolstered Saudi Arabia’s position vis-à-vis the UAE in Yemen’s south. With the dissolution of the STC, the dominant force in southern politics and a staunch proponent of an independent southern state, the politics of southern governorates will likely align more closely with Saudi interests.
Houthis Escalate Pressure on UN and International Organizations
The Houthi group (Ansar Allah) continues to kidnap, detain, and issue death sentences for UN staff, aid workers, and members of civil society working in northern Yemen, bringing the total number of detainees to more than 70 since the crackdown began in June 2024. On October 7, UN officials announced that the Houthis had detained at least nine UN staffers, and on October 20, Houthi authorities confined 15 international and five Yemeni UN staff inside a UN compound in Sana’a following an incursion by Houthi security forces. Communication equipment, including computers, phones, and servers, was confiscated. Twelve staff members were released on October 22. The compound houses offices belonging to the WFP, UNICEF, and OCHA. Prior to the incident, Houthi leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi accused WFP and UNICEF staff of espionage in a public speech. The UN had already suspended aid operations in Sa’ada governorate, and UN Resident Coordinator Julien Harneis recently relocated his office from Sana’a to Aden after more than a year of failed outreach to Houthi authorities over the kidnappings and other abuses of humanitarian actors.
Houthi rhetoric toward the UN has intensified following Israeli strikes that killed senior Houthi officials, including Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi in August and military chief Mohammed Abdelkarim al-Ghamari, whose death was confirmed on October 16. Abdelmalek al-Houthi delivered a eulogy on October 21. Houthi media has increasingly accused UN and humanitarian staff of espionage, raising concerns about further action against international organizations.
Between October 25 and 27, Houthi forces raided several more UN offices in Sana’a, including those of the UN Special Envoy, FAO, UNOPS, and the UNHCR headquarters. Two female WFP employees were reportedly detained, equipment was seized, and additional staff were summoned for questioning.
Houthi authorities announced their decision to prosecute WFP employees on espionage charges, accusing them of involvement in the Israeli airstrike that killed Prime Minister Al-Rahawi and other cabinet members. Houthi officials claimed to have evidence and said the case would be referred to public prosecutors.
From early November, Houthi forces expanded their raids to other international organizations, including Doctors Without Borders (MSF), Islamic Relief, Action Against Hunger, Human Appeal, ACTED, Oxfam, the International Medical Corps (IMC), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Offices were searched, staff were detained or interrogated, and equipment and servers were confiscated. The Houthis also announced trials against alleged espionage cells, claiming links to US, Israeli, and Saudi intelligence agencies and accusing humanitarian organizations of serving as cover.
On November 5, the Houthi-affiliated Foreign Ministry called on the UN to pressure its agencies to hand over staff accused of involvement in Israeli strikes. On November 8 and 11, Houthi authorities announced arrests and publicized purported confessions from alleged spy networks.
On November 9, the Sana’a Specialized Criminal Court started trials against alleged espionage networks. Houthi officials described the proceedings as a warning to foreign intelligence cooperation. According to local media reports, one of the defendants in the case shouted during the trial, “We are not informants! Pay our salaries, thieves!” On November 22, the court sentenced 17 individuals to death on espionage charges, with additional prison sentences handed down to others. In early December, the court started a trial of 13 additional defendants accused of spying. The trials and verdicts drew condemnation from Yemeni government officials and Western governments, who described them as illegitimate and politically motivated.
Despite repeated condemnations from UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the detentions have continued as part of a broader campaign against UN staff, aid workers, and members of civil society. International concern continues to grow over the detentions and the escalation of espionage accusations and show trials.
Saudi Arabia Signals Interest in Reviving the Yemeni Roadmap and Direct Talks with the Houthis
In the months before the clashes in Hadramawt, Gulf officials indicated in private discussions that Saudi Arabia was interested in reviving the Yemeni political roadmap following a lull in the Gaza conflict after a Trump-brokered ceasefire. Saudi-Houthi talks in 2022 and 2023 were intended to normalize relations between Riyadh and the Houthis before transitioning to broader intra-Yemeni negotiations. A US diplomatic official said Washington was unaware of any concrete Saudi plans and described a return to talks as unlikely.
Houthi priorities in any renewed discussions include the reopening of airports and ports, a demand that has been closely linked to disputes over oil and gas exports from government-held areas.
In late October, well-informed sources privately confirmed that direct negotiations took place in Muscat between Saudi and Houthi representatives. Participants were said to include Yahya al-Razami on the Houthi side and Saudi general Mohammed al-Qahtani, who oversees Saudi-Yemeni affairs. Discussions focused on maintaining de-escalation, salary payments in Houthi-controlled areas, the reopening of ports and airports, and humanitarian issues, according to the sources.
UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg also met Houthi officials in Muscat on October 27 to discuss the roadmap and the status of detained UN staff. On October 29, chief Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdelsalam stated that talks had begun with Grundberg regarding the implementation of the Saudi-Houthi roadmap. Grundberg was accompanied by his former deputy, Muin Shreim, who was tasked with negotiating the release of detained UN employees.
On December 23, the UN announced a preliminary agreement between the Houthis and the government to exchange more than 2,900 abductees and prisoners. Houthi media reported that the deal stipulates that the Houthis release 1,200 detainees (including seven Saudi nationals and 23 Sudanese nationals) in exchange for 1,700 prisoners held by the government camp. The tentative agreement also includes the release of Islah-affiliated politician Mohammed Qahtan, whose case has been a key demand in previous rounds of negotiations. It is unclear whether Qahtan is still alive. The prisoner exchange announcement came just days after the Houthis detained an additional 10 UN staff members. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is tasked with implementing the prisoner swap.
Other Developments
October 7: The Indian Embassy began operations at its new office in Aden, offering visa services for Yemenis traveling to India, mainly for medical treatment. Then-Foreign Minister Shayea al-Zindani, who was appointed prime minister on January 15, welcomed the move, describing it as a sign of growing international confidence in Aden and a step toward the return of diplomatic missions.
October 7: Houthi forces raided the Sana’a residence of General People’s Congress (GPC) member and MP Ahmed Saghir al-Mazlam, expelling residents and looting the property. Local media later reported that several GPC leaders in Sana’a, including branch secretary-general Ghazi al-Ahwal, faced accusations of receiving foreign funding after their August detention.
October 22: Local media reported that Houthi forces, including the all-female Zainabiyyat unit, targeted the homes of Salafis in the Sa’wan neighborhood of Sana’a. Several of those detained were reportedly religious students.
October 25: Houthi authorities released Intisar al-Hammadi, a model and artist detained in early 2021 and sentenced to five years in prison on charges of “violating public morals.” Media outlets and rights groups reported extensively on the abuse she suffered during her detention.
November 18: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Washington for a state meeting with US President Donald Trump. During the visit, the US designated Saudi Arabia a “major non-NATO ally” and held discussions on defense cooperation, energy, and artificial intelligence. President Trump announced an agreement to sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. The visit concluded with an investment summit at which Riyadh pledged nearly US$1 trillion in US investments.
November 20: PLC chief Rashad al-Alimi received the credentials of Russia’s new ambassador to Yemen, Yevgeny Kudrov.
November 28: Bilqis TV, an Islah-affiliated channel broadcasting from Turkey and led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman, announced its closure. The channel cited “overwhelming external circumstances” without providing further details.
November 30: The Sana’a branch of the General People’s Congress appointed Yahya Ali al-Ra’i as acting secretary-general, as current secretary-general Ghazi al-Ahwal remains in Houthi detention following his August arrest. Al-Ra’i is deputy chairman of the party and speaker of the Houthi-controlled parliament. Houthi forces reportedly surrounded the GPC meeting as a show of force.
December 7: UNICEF announced that it had officially relocated its headquarters from Sana’a to Aden.
January 4: Senior Houthi officials Jalal al-Ruwaishan and Mohammed Nasser al-Atafi appeared publicly at a cabinet meeting in Sana’a, marking their first appearance since reports last year that they had been targeted by Israeli airstrikes.